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Citizens of Western and Northern Europe and some Commonwealth 
countries tend to take the idea of the welfare state for granted, as an 
essential part of a good society. In global politics, declarations and cam-
paigns of international organisations abound with terms like “social 
rights”, “inclusiveness”, and “universal social protection”, suggesting that 
the world is about to become a welfare state. However, the situation in 
the Global South and many other countries is very different, and it is an 
open question if substantial public welfare will ever become a principle of 
a global society.
The future of public welfare institutions in the world is likely to be 
shaped by non-Western countries. However, we do not know in what 
ways: will Western ideas and models spread or will indigenous concepts 
of the “social” create new institutional pathways? Will social issues be 
subordinated to other societal concerns and other ways of integrating 
societies, such as economic growth, nationalism, or religion? In short, we 
do not know to what degree and in what ways the “social question” will 
matter in the world to come. Social protection by itself is not a “sexy” 
subject, but a range of old and new global challenges—such as climate 
change, pandemics, migration, and precarious work—are demonstrating 
the need for livelihood protection all around the world. While we do not 
know the future, we can ascertain how the Global South has addressed 
social issues in the past. This is the subject of this volume, which derives 
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from the Research Group “Understanding Southern Welfare”, which I 
convened together with Ulrike Davy, a colleague from the law depart-
ment of my university, at the Center for Interdisciplinary Research (ZiF) 
at Bielefeld University, Northern Germany.
The volume starts with the assumption that Southern countries have 
their own social policy histories, external influences from foreign powers 
notwithstanding, and that these histories are under-researched. We need 
to know more about these histories—the agents, their ideas, interests, 
activities, and structural constraints—to “understand” Southern welfare. 
The volume delves into the national histories of social protections since 
their beginnings around 1920. When we applied for funding, we said 
that we would start in the 1940s, but during our research, we realised that 
we would need to go back to the 1920s.
To understand Southern welfare policies and avoid Eurocentrism, we 
give domestic actors a voice by analysing contemporary political docu-
ments. In theoretical terms, we have developed a new approach to analys-
ing social protection, which focuses not just on welfare programmes or 
outcomes, but on the fundamental ideas and concepts that underlie social 
protection policies, as articulated by Southern actors. We assume that 
welfare programmes are only the visible surface; they are underpinned, 
less visibly, by a range of ideas—values, beliefs, perceptions, and images 
relating to social problems, welfare institutions, statehood, and society. 
The Research Group, therefore, sought to investigate the ideational foun-
dations of Southern social protection. This kind of research has not been 
done before.
I owe the idea of an ideational approach to my teacher Franz-Xaver 
Kaufmann, the doyen of the German sociology of social policy, who, 
despite his age, attended a preparatory conference. Kaufmann is one of 
the few thinkers who has developed a genuinely sociological theory of the 
welfare state in the institutionalist Weberian tradition, which contrasts 
with the dominant political economy tradition rooted in Marxism. 
Kaufmann’s concept of the welfare state as a cultural phenomenon has 
inspired me. Focusing the Group’s analysis on ideas was a daring under-
taking, and I am happy that the members of the Research Group not only 
could relate to this approach but also took it up in their research. I was 
not sure if the approach would work out, especially since the volume is 
vii Preface and Acknowledgements 
not about the role of ideas in selected social reforms or selected periods of 
time (which would be interesting enough), but about ideas in the evolu-
tion of social protection over 100 years. I hope that the readers of this 
volume will see the yields of an ideational and pluralist approach to 
studying social protection.
When planning the Research Group, we decided not to choose area 
specialists from Western countries as group members (and contributors 
to this volume), but to recruit colleagues from the countries under inves-
tigation or scholars who have roots in them. This approach was demand-
ing—we experienced difficulties finding appropriate researchers from 
these countries.
One reason for the renewed interest in Southern welfare programmes 
is the rise, since the 2000s, of so-called social cash transfer programmes 
for the poor in most countries in the Global South. These programmes 
provide a modicum of social protection to large sections of Southern 
populations who had previously been excluded. In an earlier research 
project, FLOOR, I undertook a comprehensive study of social cash trans-
fers, including the construction of a dataset that covers all Southern 
countries (see www.floorcash.org). Ulrike Davy and Benjamin Davy (the 
latter from TU Dortmund University) had led the law group and the 
land policy group, respectively, in FLOOR. After FLOOR, we felt the 
need to investigate select countries in greater depth. This led us to the 
idea of case studies focused on middle-income countries since they might 
shape the global future of public welfare. The literature has analysed 
middle- income countries mostly in economic terms—as “emerging mar-
kets” or liable to a “middle-income trap”—or in political terms—as new 
democracies or authoritarian regimes—but much less in regard to public 
welfare policies. We chose Brazil, India, China, and South Africa because 
they represent different continents, political regimes, paths of economic 
growth, and cultures.
This volume is not the result of just one conference. Rather, the con-
tributors mostly worked together as members of the Research Group 
“Understanding Southern Welfare” over five years, beginning with prepa-
ratory conferences 2014–2016, continuing as fellows in residence at the 
ZiF (March to July 2018), and concluding with a final conference in 
2019. The ZiF provided both the venue and funds for our conferences 
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and the research in residence. Ulrike Davy and I had written the funding 
application together with Benjamin Davy. Unfortunately, Ben had to 
drop out in 2017 for reasons beyond his control.
The Research Group had two subgroups: the law group led by Ulrike 
Davy and the social science group led by me and from which this volume 
flows. The social science group included sociologists, political scientists, 
global and comparative historians, and a political economist. Originally, 
there was a third group, the land group, which we had to disband when 
Benjamin Davy left, but the issue of land kept cropping up in the research 
process. Gabriel Ondetti and Sony Pellissery switched from the land 
group to the social science group. Gabriel’s contribution to the volume 
focuses on land issues, and Sony has published separately on land issues 
(see footnote).
I am indebted to the fellows in the law group. We learnt a great deal 
from the legal approach to social policy, including the emphasis on con-
stitutions, courts, and human rights. The law fellows included Albert 
Chen Hun-yee (University of Hong Kong), Octavio Luiz Motta Ferraz 
(Kings College, London), Letlhokwa George Mpedi (University of 
Johannesburg), Sarbani Sen (O.P. Jindal Global University, New Delhi), 
and Ulrike Davy as convenor.
The ZiF is Germany’s first Institute for Advanced Study, founded in 
1968, and provides a wonderfully secluded space for scholarship (https://
www.uni-bielefeld.de/(en)/ZiF/index.html). The Institute is situated at 
the edge of a forest, in a purpose-built building with a modernist 1960s’ 
architecture, and includes apartments for the fellows and their families. 
The ZiF provides a broad range of services that make scholars’ stays as 
productive and pleasant as possible.
Research groups at the ZiF are interdisciplinary, and this Research 
Group was also very international. For me and the fellows, it was a most 
rewarding experience of scholarly exchange and learning—social science 
is truly global. I am grateful to the fellows—the contributors to this vol-
ume—for engaging in this common experience. The ties between the 
fellows are leading to further scholarly cooperation.
The Research Group was very active. During the residence period, we 
had a weekly Jour Fixe, which included discussions on pertinent publica-
tions, guest lectures, and presentations by the fellows. We also invited 
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external scholars from abroad to our preparatory conferences and work-
shops, as well as colleagues from other research centres at Bielefeld 
University, such as the Center for InterAmerican Studies and the Institute 
for World Society Studies. Fellows gave lectures at the University. The 
Research Group also made a trip to the Federal Social Court in Kassel, 
Germany. At the ZiF, we also had exchanges with another research group 
that investigated global labour markets.
The Research Group organised a series of conferences and workshops, 
which included invited external speakers, whom we thank for their con-
tributions, which supported the Group’s work: Workshop “Understanding 
Southern Welfare—the B(R)ICS Countries”, convened by Ulrike Davy, 
Lutz Leisering, and Benjamin Davy, 24–26 November 2014 (external 
speakers: Sandra Liebenberg, South Africa; Niraja Gopal Jayal, India; 
Marcus André Melo, Brazil; Yitu Yang, China; André van der Walt and 
Sue-Mari Viljoen, South Africa; Augusto Zimmermann, Brazil; and 
James Midgley, USA); Workshop “Social policies in Brazil, India, China, 
and South Africa: Towards a Deeper Understanding of Southern Welfare”, 
convened by Ulrike Davy, Lutz Leisering, and Benjamin Davy, 23–25 
November 2015 (external speakers: Marcus André Melo, Brazil; Shitong 
Qiao, Hong Kong; Andries du Toit, South Africa; and Vivek Nenmini 
Dileep, India); Workshop “Towards Understanding Southern Welfare: 
Preparatory Workshop for the ZiF Research Group”, convened by Ulrike 
Davy, Lutz Leisering, and Benjamin Davy, 5–7 December 2016 (external 
speaker: Prerna Singh, USA/India); Seminar (law group) “Social Policies 
in Brazil, India, China and South Africa, Past and Present—Perspectives 
from Law”, convened by Ulrike Davy, Albert Chen, Octavio Ferraz, 
Letlhokwa George Mpedi, and Sarbani Sen, 3–4 April 2018 (external 
speaker with a social science background: Frances Lund, South Africa); 
Workshop (social science group) “Hundred Years of Social Security in 
Brazil, India, China, and South Africa—the Rise of Social Ideas and 
Policies, 1920–2020”, convened by Lutz Leisering, 12–13 July 2018; 
Workshop (law group) “Social Rights and Values in Middle-Income 
Countries—Brazil, India, China, and South Africa in Comparison”, 
16–17 July 2018; Closing Conference of the Zif Research Group 
“Understanding Southern Welfare—Social Policies in Brazil, India, 
China, and South Africa”, convened by Ulrike Davy and Lutz Leisering, 
x Preface and Acknowledgements
11–12 July 2019 (external speakers: Kinglun Ngok, China; Ravi Ahuja, 
Germany; Leila Patel, South Africa; Sonia Fleury, Brazil; Sarah Cook, 
Australia; Eberhard Eichenhofer, Germany; and Göran Therborn, UK); 
Workshop (social science group) “Social Policy in Low and Middle- 
Income Countries: Perspectives of Comparative Research”, convened by 
Lutz Leisering, 13 July 2019. Maria Virginia Lorena Ossio Bustillos coor-
dinated all events.
The chapters in this volume are all original, except for the chapter on 
India (Chap. 5) by Ravi Ahuja, who joined the group at a late stage and 
contributed a revised and shortened version of an earlier article. In addi-
tion to this volume, the fellows of the social science subgroup of the 
Research Group have also produced a number of articles,1 and the law 
group is editing their own volume.
Large-scale research endeavours incur many debts. First of all, I thank 
the ZiF and its staff for enabling this Research Group and providing a 
tremendously supportive environment for the fellows. The staff was 
extremely committed to serving the needs of the fellows, and the Centre’s 
financial and non-financial support was generous and unbureaucratic. I 
particularly thank Nesrin Ak, Thomas Balls-Thies, Daniela Brinkmann, 
Hans-Jürgen Brinkmann, Andreas Hellwig-Sellin, Marina Hoffmann, 
Mary Kastner, Britta Padberg, Katharina Peters, Marc Schalenberg, 
Claudia Schumacher and her team, Claudia Schunck, Mo Tschache, 
Trixi Valentin, and others at the ZiF.
I am also deeply indebted to Maria Virginia Lorena Ossio Bustillos, 
who served as coordinator of the Research Group. Lorena contributed to 
the Group’s work both as a scholar, providing her legal expertise and 
Latin American experience to the Group, and as an impeccable Group 
1 Hu, Aiqun (2016) Social insurance ideas in the People’s Republic of China: a historical and trans-
national analysis. Transnational Social Review 6, 3: 297–312; Ondetti, Gabriel (2016) The social 
function of property, land rights, and social welfare in Brazil. Land Use Policy 50: 29–37; Shi, Shih- 
Jiunn (2017) Reviving the dragon: social ideas and social policy development in Modern China. 
Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs 53, 3: 1–25; 
Pellissery, Sony, Amrutha Jose Pampackal, and Partha Bopaiah (2015) Caste and distributive jus-
tice: can social policy address durable inequalities? Social Policy & Administration 49, 6: 785–800; 
Pellissery, Sony and Ivar Lødemel (2020) Property and social citizenship: social policy beyond the 
North. Social Policy and Society 19, 2: 275–292 (the lead article of a themed section on “Property 
and Social Citizenship” edited by the authors).
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organiser who was unceasing in her engagement. She also provided 
invaluable efforts furthering the social relationships within the Group 
and with the ZiF staff.
I also thank Benjamin Davy, who has been an inspiration due to his 
creative, non-mainstream thinking. He also forged links with colleagues 
from land-use studies and provided insight into land as a crucial dimen-
sion of social welfare that no longer figures in the collective memory of 
European social policy but plays a major role in Southern countries.
I also thank Prerna Singh, who attended a preparatory conference. 
Although she could not join the Research Group for personal reasons, 
her sharp insights were important to the Group’s work. I also thank 
Johannes Schmidt and André Kieserling from the Luhmann project at 
my university for tracing quotes by Niklas Luhmann in Luhmann’s vast 
writings.
I also thank Cansu Erdoğan and Timotheus Brunotte, who acted as 
efficient and committed editorial assistants. My former secretary Else 
Lück also supported the work, as did Tobias Böger and Kerem Öktem. I 
am also indebted to my wife Maria, who hopes that this is the last 
book I did.
I thank Aad Blok, Executive Editor of the International Review of 
Social History, for allowing me to use a revised and shortened version of 
an article by Ravi Ahuja for this volume.
I thank Jennifer Koester for her perceptive, sophisticated, and highly 
committed language editing of the non-native speakers’ contributions, 
and Wordvice for efficient organisation of the editing work. I also thank 
Flora Thomson-DeVeaux for translating Lena Lavinas’ contribution from 
the Portuguese. The ZiF funded both.
The publication of this volume in the book series of the Collaborative 
Research Centre (CRC) 1342 “Global Dynamics of Social Policy” of the 
German Research Council was enabled by Lorraine Frisina Doetter, 
Kerstin Martens, and Irina Wiegand from Bremen University. I am most 
grateful to them.
Last but not least, I was happy to have Sharla Plant and Poppy Hull as 
very supportive and patient partners at Palgrave Macmillan. SPi 
Technologies India provided high-quality copy-editing. Thanks also go to 
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the reviewers who provided extensive reviews on my book proposal. The 
reviews influenced and improved our work.
Open access of this publication was made possible through funding by 
the Collaborative Research Centre (CRC) 1342 “Global Dynamics of 
Social Policy”, Specialised Information Service Political Science—
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Social Protection in the Global South: 
An Ideational and Historical Approach
Lutz Leisering
 Towards a New Approach to Analysing Social 
Policy in the Global South1
The centres of gravity in the world are shifting. Some of the countries 
formerly referred to as developing or Third World countries are emerging 
as global players in terms of their share of the global economy, world 
population, and international political power. These shifts are changing 
the face of global society in many ways. As regards social welfare, we2 
cannot simply expect that the Northern concept of the “welfare state” 
will “travel” to the Global South. Gough and Therborn (2010: 711) posit 
1 I thank Sony Pellissery, Jeremy Seekings, Marianne Ulriksen, and Timotheus Brunotte for com-
ments on  an  earlier draft. I  am  also indebted to  Tobias Böger and  Shih-Jiunn Shi for  advice. 
Timotheus Brunotte helped to collect the data on the four countries.
2 “We” in the introduction refers to views discussed and shared by the contributors of the volume, 
whereas “I” refers to the author’s views and arguments.
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that the “developmental paths of European welfare states are not likely to 
be repeated” elsewhere. Some writers even question the possible spread of 
formal social protection programmes in the South on cultural grounds 
(Rieger and Leibfried 2004; Walker and Wong 1996). The global future 
of public welfare will be shaped by the Global South. At present, the 
majority of the population in the South lack formal social protection. 
What ideas and institutional models of public welfare are developing in 
the Global South?
“If we want to know where to go, we have to know where we came 
from” (Kaufmann 2012: 1). Accordingly, this volume investigates the 
evolution of social protection ideas and policies in four key middle- 
income countries—Brazil, China, India, and South Africa—from the 
1920s to the present day. We seek to trace the formative ideas and models 
that have inspired key actors in these four countries and defined institu-
tional paths in order to “understand” Southern welfare. We begin with 
the early twentieth century, because, as we argue, the history of social 
policy in the South had already started before World War II (Midgley 
1984: 1). In all four countries, intellectuals debated the use of social 
insurance as a “modern” kind of social welfare as early as the 1920s, and 
the first social legislation was passed.
The post-war welfare state in Europe was part of the rise of “demo-
cratic welfare capitalism”—the mixed or “hyphenated society” (Marshall 
1981a). Today, these countries spend 20–35 per cent of their gross 
domestic product (GDP) on monetary transfers and social services. In 
the Global South, other developments prevailed during those decades, 
such as struggles for political and/or economic independence, de- 
colonialisation, nation-building,  and “development”. State-provided 
social protection mostly took a back seat, and state social spending has 
continued to be low through the present day, making up regional aver-
ages of 5–13 per cent of GDP with outliers around 2 and 20 per cent. 
Only selected groups were covered. However, since the late 1990s, social 
protection policy has moved higher up on the agendas of many Southern 
governments and international development organisations. Social cash 
transfers to the poor mushroomed in the South in the 2000s and 2010s 
and provided a modicum of social protection to sections of the popula-
tion that had previously been excluded. Brazil, China, and South Africa 
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all pioneered social cash transfer programmes (Barrientos 2013; Leisering 
2019), and the Indian Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment 
Guarantee Act has also received much attention in the global develop-
ment community.
These recent developments have been much discussed in global politi-
cal and scholarly arenas, but the early history of social policy in the Global 
South is only beginning to be researched—unlike the evolution of the 
Northern welfare state, which scholars have comprehensively analysed 
both in empirical and theoretical terms (comparative studies include 
Rimlinger 1971; Flora and Heidenheimer 1981; Alber 1982; Lindert 
2004a, b). A whole continent of early social policy in the Global South 
awaits discovery.
This volume contributes to the filling of three research gaps by adopt-
ing a historical, ideational, and source-based approach.
First, although research on formal social protection programmes and 
policies in the South has cropped up since the mid-2000s, this literature 
has a presentist bias, focusing on changes since the 1990s and even more 
on changes since the 2000s, when “social protection”—a term which 
tends to supersede the older term “social security”—became a new para-
digm for development policy (Holzmann et al. 2003). The global social 
policy literature barely takes notice of the small but growing body of 
research on Southern social policy during colonial and early post-colonial 
times.3 Similarly, in the historical memory of Southern societies and gen-
eral historical studies of the South, social policy does not normally figure 
in a major way. To understand and explain Southern welfare policies, 
therefore, this volume pursues a historical approach that traces the devel-
opment of social protection ideas and policies in the four middle-income 
countries back to the 1920s.
The historical perspective implies attention to timing, critical junc-
tures, founding moments, and historical “paths” (Mahoney and Thelen 
2015). Lustick (1996) warns against a possible bias created when social 
3 However, see Midgley and Piachaud (2011), Seekings (2007a, b, 2011, 2013, 2016), Lewis and 
Lloyd-Sherlock (2009), Lindner (2014), Hu and Manning (2010), and Schmitt et al. (2015) (the 
latter two on the global history of social insurance), Schmitt (2015) on colonies, Collier and 
Messick (1975) on the historical sequences of social security adoption worldwide, Hort and Kuhnle 
(2000) on adoption sequences in Southeast Asia. See also the pioneering study by Midgley (1984).
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scientists draw selectively on extant historiographical studies. Social sci-
entists have to be careful, especially if there is a rich and long tradition of 
historiographical studies in the field under investigation rather than an 
undisputed “historical record” (Lustick 1996: 615). However, in the field 
of social protection, such tradition is absent, and the contributors to this 
volume themselves act as historians. In fact, two of the contributors are 
historians (Hu and Ahuja), and the author of two other chapters 
(Seekings) has a record of primary source-based historical studies.
Historical and comparative small n research (i.e. with few cases) has 
“played a central role in driving the agenda of research on welfare states” 
(Amenta and Hicks 2010: 118) and seems promising also for the South. 
Concentrating on a few cases enables in-depth primary research, and the 
comparative and historical perspectives may also contribute to theorising 
social policy by revealing the varieties of social policies. Even in research 
on the Global North, comparative qualitative historical studies are rare, 
especially comprehensive studies of welfare states rather than particular 
programmes (Rimlinger 1971, Pinker 1979, de Swaan 1988, Kaufmann 
2013a; partially quantitative: Flora and Alber 1981).
Second, in the Weberian tradition, this volume focuses on the ideas 
that underpin social policies. While most policy studies centre on the 
interests of and struggles between actors, such as political parties, busi-
ness, and workers, and analyse, for example, corporatism, cross-class alli-
ances, political settlements (for the Global South, see Lavers and Hickey 
2016), and political alignments (Haggard and Kaufman 2008), we exam-
ine the ideas that underlie social policies and, from a constructivist point 
of view, even co-define interests. By “ideas” we not only and not even 
primarily mean broad ideologies and values, such as liberalism, social 
democracy, or social justice, but complex, multi-layered configurations of 
ideas that encompass broad ideas as well as more specific normative and 
cognitive ideas: beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, theories, and images relat-
ing to welfare institutions, social problems, statehood, and visions of 
society. In the Introduction, I develop a multi-layered model of social 
ideas—the “onion skin model”—which has the social question as the 
pivot. Raising the “social question” means that a society recognises social 
issues in a generalised way as a key concern of society to be addressed by 
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the state, linked to a call for political remedies. The underlying assump-
tion is that the state is responsible for individual welfare.
By focusing on ideas, the volume also seeks to contribute to a theory of 
“social policy in development contexts” (UNRISD 2001; Gough et al. 
2004), which is a desideratum (for a call for theory, see, e.g. Surender 
2013: 29). Most studies on global social policy are reports by or for inter-
national organisations or case studies, and/or have a descriptive character 
and practical concerns or are interspersed with advocacy.
This introduction tackles the theorisation of Southern welfare in four 
steps (next four sections): (a) I start by sketching out a methodological 
framework, a constructivist sociology of knowledge approach, which 
brings in ideas in a constitutive way akin to constructivist and discursive 
institutionalism. The next three steps relate to substantive theorisation. 
(b) I discuss four basic strategies for theorising Southern welfare, and I 
opt for starting from Northern welfare state theories to be modified for a 
globally applicable theory. (c) I draw on the rich tradition of explanatory 
theories of Northern welfare state development and specify modifica-
tions. (d) Eventually, I develop a new, multi-layered model of social ideas, 
visualised as an onion with layers—therefore called the “onion skin 
model”. The model combines elements from the (small) tradition of ide-
ational welfare state theories.
Third, the volume goes back to historical sources, that is, to original 
documents like parliamentary records and manifestos that reflect the 
views of contemporary actors. The idea is to give a voice to domestic elites 
and social movements, rather than imposing preconceived concepts from 
Northern welfare state research on Southern societies. This volume’s 
authors come from the countries under investigation or have roots in 
them, which helps the authors to read and contextualise contemporary 
documents. Such contributions are significant because systematic recourse 
to documents is not widespread in the social policy literature.
We assume that over the last hundred years, social policy, by and large, 
has expanded in many Southern countries and, sometimes linked, gained 
prominence on the agendas of international organisations. We seek to 
trace and partially explain this process in our four countries. Our general 
research question is: What changes in ideas among elites and the citizenry 
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underpinned—or inhibited—the rise of social protection policies? When 
did basic “social” categories and terms like “social problems” and “social 
security” emerge? What contestations accompanied the evolution of 
social protection? More specifically we inquire:
• Was a “social question” raised, that is, did social issues become a key 
concern for state and society? How was the social question posed, that 
is, what was defined as the overarching problem that social policy 
should tackle?
• What other concerns, like independence, nation-building, or eco-
nomic development, competed with, eclipsed, or propelled the 
social question?
• What institutional models of social protection were advanced?
• What notions of the state prevailed in public discourses?
• Did external ideas—from other countries or international organisa-
tions—impact domestic policies?
The concluding chapter of the volume discusses the findings of the 
country-centric chapters in comparative and theoretical terms.
We chose Brazil, China, India, and South Africa because in all four 
countries public welfare programmes have expanded since the 1990s 
(Tillin and Duckett 2017; India the least), and they cover all non- 
European continents except Australia and the Pacific. The history of the 
four countries includes democratic, semi-democratic, and authoritarian 
regimes. Surprisingly, scholars have rarely analysed social policy in the 
four countries comparatively, and not with a focus on ideas or from a 
historical perspective. Tillin and Duckett (2017) focus on politics, 
OECD (2010), Rodgers (2013), and Fakier and Ehmke (2014) on 
employment-related issues, and practical concerns for “extending social 
security” drove the study by the International Social Security Association 
(ISSA 2013). This volume is closest to Midgley and Piachaud (2013) who 
focus on institutions (of social protection). Their volume provides valu-
able descriptions of the institutional arrangements for social protection 
in the four countries, including broad contexts and history. They do not 
take the spread of social protection for granted (Piachaud and Midgley 
2013: 276f.) and address the challenge of aligning welfare goals with 
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economic and other goals (Midgley 2013: 17–20). They also address 
ideas, via policy goals. While all this has an affinity to the approach taken 
in our volume, Midgley and Piachaud’s research is not conceived as a 
source- based and theory-driven study of ideas.
The volume by Breman et al. (2019a) addresses the social question in 
selected countries from all world regions, including our four countries, 
but is primarily concerned with objective socio-economic conditions 
rather than the ways that politics and society articulated these conditions 
as the social question. The focus is on labour issues and class actors. In 
this Marxist approach, ideas only figure in broad terms as class-related 
ideologies, especially neoliberalism and social democracy. Breman et al. 
(2019b: 245, 249) diagnose a recent global “return of the social question” 
which, however, as they argue, powerful global actors currently seek to 
limit and prevent.
Why social protection? In Global North countries, social protection is 
the key focus of the welfare state and accounts for the bulk of social 
spending: income maintenance and health are the biggest items. Almost 
everyone is covered, and social protection has increasingly shaped peo-
ple’s lives in these countries. But in many countries of the Global South, 
social protection is thin.
We chose the term “social protection” for the title of this volume 
because there is not one overarching term that was used throughout the 
last hundred years and in all countries, and, furthermore, “social protec-
tion” has come to complement or even replace the term social security in 
international debates since around the year 2000. “Social security” is the 
older term, but was not used throughout the world and past either. The 
International Labour Organization (ILO), the original champion of the 
concept of “social security”, switched to using “social protection” in the 
second edition of its “World Social Protection Report” (ILO 2017). Not 
using the term “social security” in our title also avoids references to US 
usage, which is largely restricted to old-age security.
The meaning of the term “social security” varies between authors, as 
does the meaning of "social protection". “Social protection” often covers 
(contributory) social insurance, non-contributory provisions and allow-
ances, social assistance, and labour rights, whereas authors tend to more 
narrowly define “social security” as mainly social insurance and social 
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assistance. “Social security” is a term with a considerable history, encap-
sulating much of the history of social policy (Petersen and Béland 2014: 
298). If and how the term “social security” emerged and how it was 
defined is part of the studies presented in this volume. In the concluding 
chapter of this volume, I will discuss the term and idea of social security 
in greater detail. The volume focuses on what nowadays is mostly viewed 
as “social security”; labour rights that relate to the workplace and to col-
lective action are mostly excluded. Health is included regarding entitle-
ments to medical services, through social insurance, but not regarding 
the provision of services.
The Introduction focuses on theorising, in four steps as explained 
above (next four sections). After the theoretical sections, there is a section 
that provides basic data on the history, the international context, and the 
socio-economic condition of the four countries. The Introduction con-
cludes with a section that summarises the volume’s chapters.
 Ideas: A Constructivist Sociology 
of Knowledge Approach
“Interests (material and ideal), not ideas, directly determine people’s 
actions. But: the ‘world views’ created by ‘ideas’ have, like a switchboard 
operator, often set the future course according to which the dynamics of 
interests have conditioned action” (Max Weber, translated by Ryan 
DeLaney; in Lepsius 2017: 23).4 In this famous quote, Max Weber iden-
tifies interests and ideas as the key forces of social action but places a 
special emphasis on ideas. Ideas provide legitimacy for interests and mobil-
ise people. Yet more fundamentally, ideas may even co-constitute—shape, 
define, and redefine—interests in the first place. In this sense, the contribu-
tions to this volume do not aim to provide histories of ideas as such. Rather, 
they are about ideas that matter in politics and how they matter.
4 German original: “Interessen (materielle und ideelle), nicht: Ideen, beherrschen unmittelbar das 
Handeln der Menschen. Aber: die ‚Weltbilder’, welche durch ‚Ideen’ geschaffen wurden, haben 
sehr oft als Weichensteller die Bahnen bestimmt, in denen die Dynamik der Interessen das Handeln 
fortbewegte” (Weber 1978: 252).
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To grasp the impact of ideas, an in-depth analysis of ideas is required. 
Lepsius (2017: 23–25, 33), a major Weber scholar, writes on Weber:
“His body of work is pervaded with the effort to analyze the intertwining 
of interests and ideas … ideas need to be unfolded in their cognitive struc-
ture in order to recognize the relevance for action contained within the 
ideas’ characteristics… . Only when this is done can their actual impor-
tance for the actions of individuals and collectives and for institutionaliza-
tion processes be identified. As long as ideas are described in general terms 
and their internal structure is not determined, their consequences for social 
action also cannot be exactly specified, and social behavior cannot be 
attributed to them… . this agenda does not imply an idealistic philosophy 
of history… . the focus here is on the empirically demonstrable attribution 
of social phenomena to cultural elements… . Interests and ideas … describe 
two analytical perspectives … [that] must be viewed in their 
complementarity.”
Accordingly, our theoretical aim is to model the cognitive structure of 
the ideas that constitute the field of social policy. To this end, I have 
developed a multi-layered ideational model, the “onion skin model”, 
which is reflected in the chapters of this volume.
References to ideas are common in the Northern welfare state literature, 
especially normative approaches that define social policy through values 
such as equality, solidarity, social justice, or security. Political economy 
approaches also take into account ideas by distinguishing class-based ide-
ologies—liberalism, conservatism, social democracy—that are viewed as 
characterising different welfare regimes with social democracy as the hall-
mark of fully fledged welfare statism (Esping-Andersen 1990). In com-
parative empirical research, these ideologies figure as the doctrines of the 
political parties in power. Values and ideologies obviously matter in social 
policy development, but it is more specific ideas that shape policies and 
the problems addressed by them. In the research on developed welfare 
states, the social construction of the problems addressed is mostly taken 
for granted and left unexplored like the definition of the social risks that 
social protection programmes address (explicitly so, e.g. by Baldwin 
1990: 12, FN 10). However, in a historical analysis of the rise of social 
policy, we need to trace when and how such categories were constructed 
in the first place.
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The ideational or discursive turn in policy analysis has also drawn atten-
tion to ideas5 but mostly refers to ideas in particular policy processes, like 
explaining the introduction of a certain welfare programme, rather than 
to the ideational foundations of social policy in the history of a country. 
However, we can use Hall’s (1993) concepts of “policy paradigms” and 
“paradigm shifts” to detect more far-reaching ideational changes in poli-
cies. Development economics is more interested in issues of finance and 
policy implementation than in ideas. When ideas are systematically 
addressed, this is done by way of normative theory, which discusses, for 
example, how poverty should be defined and social justice be conceived 
and what financial allocation is optimal (e.g. Barrientos 2013), rather 
than investigating the ideas held by actors. However, social policy is not 
only about financial flows, redistribution, and administration but also 
about ideas and social recognition (Kaufmann 2012: 251, 255–256; 
2015: 12–18).
Our analysis of ideas is based on five assumptions.
First, ideas matter for social policy. Ideas may imbue actors with a 
purpose beyond simple considerations of utility and material interests. 
“Whenever affective orientations can be collectively mobilised towards 
certain ideas, as recently happened with regard to peace and environmen-
tal concerns or female emancipation, there is a chance for new, powerful 
elements of normative culture” (Kaufmann 1991: 23; transl. L.L.).
Second, whereas recent ideational approaches in policy research mostly 
take ideas as a distinct factor besides other factors (Fischer 2003; over-
view von Gliszczynski 2015: ch. 1), exerting influence only under certain 
circumstances of, for example, instability and crisis (Blyth 2002; Béland 
2009; Campbell 2002), we adopt a constructivist sociology of knowledge 
approach based on the assumption that ideas and knowledge pervade 
politics and thereby co-constitute interests, institutions, and policies 
(Nullmeier 2003). The challenge, therefore, is to analyse how contempo-
rary actors constructed interests, institutions, and policies. The construc-
tivist perspective also helps us avoid Eurocentrism.
5 Ideational approaches to policy research emerged in the North in the 1990s. For a discussion, see 
von Gliszczynski (2015: 8–13), for proponents see V.A. Schmidt (2008, “discursive institutional-




Third, from the perspective of interpretive sociology, we emphasise 
that ideas are subject to interpretations by actors, with interpretations 
varying across time and space. In this way, we extend the constructivist 
approach to apply to ideas. For example, basic ideas like human rights, 
“development”, “inclusion”, and “poverty” can be interpreted in very dif-
ferent ways, leading to different policies.
Fourth, the focus on “ideas” is not only about the broad ideologies and 
values that are at the forefront of social policy debates but also about 
more specific normative and cognitive categories that constitute policy-
making and institution building. Substantial social policy is predicated 
on the emergence of specific “social” categories or “social knowledge” in 
politics and society (Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996). Pereira and 
Bertholini (2017), for example, find that the belief in “social inclusion” 
cuts across political ideologies in post-1988 Brazil. The historical rise of 
social protection relies on the formation of “social” concepts that relate to 
social problems, such as poverty or disability, to ideational models of 
welfare programmes like “social security” or “social insurance”, or to 
statehood. Epistemic communities, political parties, and social policy 
communities may entrench the emerging social categories in policymak-
ing. We can conceptualise the influx of “social” concepts and categories as 
a “socialisation” of politics (Leisering 2019: 325f.). Socialisation may 
include the rise of new ideas and actors as well as a social specification of 
older and more general ideas (like Christian thought or Confucianism) 
and actors.
Fifth, the ideas articulated early on in a country’s development may 
create a path for future development. This is why ideas matter beyond 
single policy acts and why a historical-ideational approach can help us to 
understand present-day social policy. Ideas—especially how the “social 
question” is articulated early on—shape institution building in the field 
of public welfare (Kaufmann 2013a: 32f.). For instance, defining the 
social question as the workers’ question is likely to lead to the introduc-
tion of employment-based contributory social insurance programmes as 
the mainstay of a country’s social protection arrangement as it did in 
nineteenth-century Germany under Bismarck. Through epistemic and 
policy communities that operate as the bearers of ideas, social ideas may 
acquire a degree of relative autonomy and independent dynamics. 
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Path- dependent development does not mean determination, but, instead, 
indicates the social costs of changing an institutional path. A path may be 
transformed, for example, by a new interpretation of the idea that defines 
the path, such as the idea of “social insurance”.
All in all, our approach incorporates elements from historical, discur-
sive, and constructivist institutionalism (Peters 2012; for historical insti-
tutionalism in social policy research see Rueschemeyer and Skocpol 1996).
There is a vast literature that focuses on causes and effects of welfare 
states, but only a few scholars have investigated the nature of the welfare 
state as an ideational and cultural project.6 The ideational and cultural 
strand of welfare state research is part of the pluralist Weberian- 
Durkheimian tradition, which conceives of social policy as a response to 
broad processes of modernisation rather than merely a response to capi-
talism, as assumed in the Marxist and political economy traditions (see 
the analysis of theoretical approaches by Alber 1982: 73–88 and Pinker 
1971: ch. 1). From a pluralist angle, a broad range of ideas beyond class- 
based ideologies come into view. The pluralist tradition represents an 
almost-forgotten, mostly sociological approach to the study of the welfare 
state and has been eclipsed by political economy approaches. The ide-
ational approach in this volume builds on the pluralist strand of research.
Assuming that the spread of public welfare is predicated on far- reaching 
changes in collective mindsets, the pluralist authors take a historical 
approach to welfare state analysis. Thomas Humphrey Marshall (1950) 
analyses the rise of the idea and institutions of equality in the wake of 
state-building, focusing on social rights and their societal requisites, 
which includes a “welfare consciousness” among citizens and elites 
(Marshall 1981b: 89) and the formation of social professions. Although 
Marshall is the most frequently quoted theorist of the welfare state, it is 
6 For the UK, see Marshall (1950, 1981a, b) and Pinker (1979); for the United States, see Janowitz 
(1976) and Heclo (1995); for the Netherlands, de Swaan (1988) and van Kersbergen (1995); for 
Germany, Kaufmann (1991, 1997, 2013a, 2012), Nullmeier (2000), Zacher (2013), and Achinger 
(1979, first published 1958); for India, see Singh (2015a, b); and for social anthropology and 
Southeast Asia, see von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann (1994). Lessenich (2003) and 
Béland and Petersen (2014) explore basic concepts of the welfare state and of social policy, respec-
tively. John W. Meyer’s (2009) neo-institutionalist theory of world society posits the existence of a 
“world culture” that took off in the 1940s and includes ideas of social progress, a growing awareness 
of social problems, and statehood.
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rarely acknowledged that his work follows a constructivist methodology, 
which differs from mainstream research (see the reconstruction in 
Leisering 2019: 51–56).
Abram de Swaan (1988) analyses the rise of a “social conscience” 
in  Western societies and related new configurations of knowledge 
among  citizens and elites, such as professionalisation and the “proto- 
professionalisation” of the citizens. Franz-Xaver Kaufmann (2015) con-
ceives of the welfare state as a demanding and historically unlikely “cultural 
idea”7 imbued with national “intellectual traditions”, even “autonomous 
cosmologies… It begins with the terms that are used and the associations 
they bear, carries over into different fundamental notions about the rela-
tionship between state and society, and culminates in different social policy 
ideals and the articulation of the problems these entail” (Kaufmann 
2013a: 33).
In this cultural sense, Kaufmann (2013c: 31) classifies the United 
States as “capitalism” rather than a “welfare state”. Robert Pinker (1979) 
argues that the notions of social obligations among citizens precede the 
notion of rights and do not necessarily support state-provided welfare. It 
is the “subtle interplay of loyalties which characterize people’s notions of 
welfare obligation and entitlement” (Pinker 1979: 10), and allegiance to 
the state is only one of several nested socio-spatial loyalties, which include 
family, local community, and international community.
 Strategies for Theorising Southern Welfare
Studies on formal social security in the South are relatively recent. Well 
into the 1990s, development scholars equated “social security” in the 
South with informal relationships between kin and within small com-
munities (e.g. Lachenmann 1997). The bulk of the research on state- led 
welfare was case studies, often of a descriptive nature (however, see 
Midgley 1984 and von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 
7 For cultural theories of social policy, see also Pfau-Effinger (2005, 2009), Ullrich (2003), and van 
Oorschot et al. (2008). For religious roots see van Kersbergen (1995), van Kersbergen and Manow 
(2009), and Rieger and Leibfried (2004) on Confucianism.
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1994). Other studies focused on subsistence production as a livelihood 
(Arbeitsgruppe Bielefelder Entwicklungssoziologen 1979) or interpreted 
work in the informal sector of the economy as a “quest for security” (Evers 
et  al. 1983). Anthropological studies of developing countries used to 
focus on informal relationships and livelihoods rather than new, formal 
welfare institutions.8 Macro theories relevant to the study of develop-
ment—post-colonial theories, cultural studies, theories of economic 
growth, and theories of global capitalism—help to contextualise social 
policy but arguably are too broad to explain specific policies and institu-
tion building.9 At the same time, research on Northern welfare states had 
almost completely neglected countries in the Global South until the 
2000s. Pioneering comparative studies include Gough et al. (2004) and 
Haggard and Kaufman (2008).
What theories, then, are appropriate for analysing “social policy in 
development contexts”? We can distinguish four strategies for theory build-
ing: drawing on “old” (extant) theories, designing new ones, adapting old 
theories to make them applicable to the Global South, and producing a 
generalised theory that applies to both North and South.
The first strategy would mean simply applying theories and conceptual 
instruments familiar from research on Northern welfare states to the 
South—“testing old theories in new surroundings” (Kangas 2012: 73). 
Generally, moving to a new field of investigation (here: the South) does 
not necessarily entail constructing new theories. The same factors could be 
relevant but the values could be different, such as minor industrialisation 
or a weak role for trade unions. By definition, developing a “theory” is 
ascertaining general patterns that shed light on diverse cases. Using 
Northern-based theories, however, might entail a Euro-centric bias that 
produces a negative perspective on Southern welfare, such as pointing out 
the “underdevelopment” of social welfare or the absence of ideas about the 
future among Southern citizens and, therefore, of the idea of social security 
(for a critique see von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda- Beckmann 1994).
8 However, see the legal anthropologists von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann (1994)’s 
early study questioning the distinction between formal and informal welfare.
9 Yet, see Lavinas (2017 and 2018) who relates the recent rise of social cash transfers to changes in 
global capitalism, especially the financialisation of social relationships.
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The second strategy argues for designing new concepts and theoretical 
tools from scratch, tailored to development contexts. Yet, it is not plau-
sible that the broad repertoire of concepts and theories on social policy 
that Northern welfare state research has produced since the 1970s should 
be entirely irrelevant to the study of formal welfare in the South, since 
basic institutions, like social insurance and social assistance, are similar, at 
least formally.
The third strategy occupies an intermediate position between applying 
old theories and inventing new ones. The idea is to start from “old” con-
cepts from Northern research and strip them of their Northern origins by 
adapting and re-specifying them in view of Southern conditions, as 
Gough (2008) explored and Böger and Leisering (2020) implemented in 
a case study.
The fourth strategy would also start from Northern concepts but, 
rather than adapting them to the South, would aim at creating a general 
theory of social policy that covers both North and South—a global the-
ory of social policy. This would mean not surrendering but qualifying the 
ingrained distinction between the North and South. In a broader sense, 
Midgley (2017: 201–204) calls for a “one world perspective”. A gener-
alised (global) approach would refer to general categories of social protec-
tion that we can expect to matter in most countries (see von 
Benda-Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 1994), such as “social” 
contingencies (like widowhood or ill-health), related regulations (embed-
ded in social relationships, like family life and community, or under spe-
cialised agencies, such as grain stores or hospitals), and collective agents 
(like family, kin, tribes, and states). Such a conceptual model does not 
presuppose the specific institutions, ideas, and societal contexts that have 
characterised the historical (Northern and Western) European experience 
of welfare statism.10 We can re-specify this kind of generalised model for 
either Southern or Northern conditions or, for that matter, to any  country 
under investigation, whether Northern or Southern. This volume pursues 
the fourth strategy, which I develop in the next sections.
10 For a discussion of the pioneers of a generalised North-South theory of social policy (Ian Gough, 
Jeremy Seekings, and Franz and Kebeet von Benda-Beckmann), see Leisering (2019: 28–32).
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 Explanatory Theories of Social Policy
The most common approach to analysing social policy in Northern wel-
fare state research is political economy, which Esping-Andersen (1990) 
exemplifies. Students of political economy centre their analysis on the 
capital and labour divide and conceive of social policy as a response to 
structural problems in formal labour markets under capitalism, politi-
cally driven by class-based actors and the grand, nineteenth-century 
European ideologies—liberalism, conservatism, and social democracy. 
The Power Resources Approach, in particular (re-stated by Korpi 2006), 
focuses on the struggles between employers and the labour movement 
and related political parties. These theorists define the purpose of social 
policy as “decommodification”, that is, relieving workers from the pres-
sure to sell their labour in the labour market (Esping-Andersen 1990). 
Social policy creates “forms of existence outside the labour market” (Offe 
1984: 94) by which workers can survive if they are unemployed, sick, or 
old, through unemployment benefit, sick pay, and old-age pensions. 
Some scholars have applied a political economy approach to the com-
parative study of Southern countries, for example, classifying Southern 
welfare regimes using Esping-Andersen’s typology of liberal, conservative, 
and social democratic welfare state regimes (e.g. Barrientos 2009).
Yet, key concepts of the classical political economy approach are of 
limited use in the South. Esping-Andersen’s concept of decommodifica-
tion presupposes wholesale commodification of labour, but labour in the 
South is predominantly informal, and the division between capital and 
labour is not as dominant as in the North. In many Southern countries, 
labour movements look different or play a lesser role than ethnic or reli-
gious movements (for India, see Singh 2015a, b). Moreover, the great 
ideologies of nineteenth-century Europe that define political party lines 
(liberalism, conservatism, and social democracy) are absent or take on 
different shapes in the South. The decommodification index (Esping- 
Andersen 1990) and the similar generosity index (Scruggs 2007), which 
measure the quality of entitlements to social security benefits, make little 
sense if Southern politics does not address some of the key risks that the 
indices cover, or if programmes that cover certain risks exclude the 
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majority of the population, especially the rural population, migrant 
workers, or persons in the informal urban labour sector. Moreover, clien-
telism and clan rule may eclipse formal political institutions and legal 
entitlements.
Tillin and Duckett (2017), in their theoretical framework for the study 
of social policy in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa, also qualify the 
power of explanatory factors common in political economy, such as polit-
ical parties and ideologies, organised labour, and economic globalisation. 
Instead they draw attention to domestic political factors like political 
leaders and policy entrepreneurs, ideas, federalism, courts, and the per-
ceived quality of government.
Nevertheless, political economy approaches in the broader sense, 
which emphasise the impact of economic structures on politics, have 
contributed to the study of Southern welfare, especially for middle- 
income countries (Haggard and Kaufman 2008; Huber and Stephens 
2012 for Latin America; Mares and Carnes 2009; Rudra 2007). Rudra 
(2007) analyses varieties of decommodification in the South, while Mares 
and Carnes (2009) examine the impact of authoritarian governments. 
Haggard and Kaufman (2008) highlight “production regimes”, “growth 
models”, and “critical realignments” that denote changes in the configu-
ration of power resources. Ulriksen (2012) draws attention to the role of 
taxation, and Lavinas (2017, 2018) emphasises the impact of the finan-
cialisation of global capitalism on domestic welfare politics. Gough’s 
global approach builds on Esping-Andersen’s concept of “welfare regime” 
but generalises the concept by stripping it of political economy features 
(Wood and Gough 2006; Abu Sharkh and Gough 2010).
Including, but going beyond political economy, Northern research has 
produced a comprehensive explanatory model of the emergence and 
expansion of the Northern welfare states—the orthodox model (Gough 
2008: 5; for early integrated models see Gough 1979, Flora and Alber 
1981, Alber 1982, Uusitalo 1984, and Huber et al. 1993). The orthodox 
model summarises and integrates the explanatory factors used in the lit-
erature, even though few authors make full use of all factors. According 
to the comprehensive model, three main groups of factors account for 
welfare state development:
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• Industrialisation, urbanisation, and other socio-economic changes (for 
short: Industrialisation), which create social problems but also supply 
the means to tackle them. The earliest studies focused on these factors, 
often referred to as the “logic of industrialisation” approach.
• The political mobilisation of interests (for short: Interests) like labour 
movements, conservative elites, and left-wing political parties, which 
determine if and how social problems actually elicit responses.
• The structure of political institutions (for short: Institutions), above all 
democracy, federalism, electoral systems, and the separation of powers, 
which channel the articulation of interests.
This is the “Three Is” model, which includes the components: 
Industrialisation, Interests, and Institutions.
In a seminal, but rarely exploited meta-theoretical article, Gough 
(2008) discusses the need for revising the orthodox explanatory model in 
view of developmental contexts in the Global South. For each of the 
three groups of factors—Industrialisation, Interests, and Institutions—
Gough discusses the potential differences between the North and South, 
and he adds two more groups of factors, namely Ideas and International 
Influences, which we can expect to particularly matter in the South. This 
results in a model with five groups of factors that Gough terms the “Five 
Is” (Fig. 1.1).
The Five-Is model illustrates the complex multi-causality of social pol-
icy (for an application of Gough’s model to social pensions see Böger and 
Leisering 2020). The breadth of the groups of factors and the factors 
within each group may seem unsatisfactory because the model does not 
offer a simple answer to the question of what drives welfare state develop-
ment. This is a key message of the Five-Is model: grand theories that 
centre on one key factor like global capitalism or post-colonialism—
“primacy theories” (Luhmann 1997: 571; transl. L.L.)—are of little avail 
when attempting to explain social policy (Alber 1982: 201). Instead, a 
“combination of structural factors, interest-based mobilisation, political 
institutions, and policy discourses has determined patterns of social pol-
icy development… Social policy… [is]… embedded in structural, politi-
cal, and institutional contexts” (Gough 2008: 63). The Five-Is model 
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implies that a range of demanding requisites must be met in order for a 
comprehensive social policy arrangement to emerge.
This volume focuses on the ideational requisites (Ideas), in interaction 
with the other four Is. I argue that ideas are no less relevant than socio- 
economic power relationships (Interests) and political regimes 
(Institutions) and that ideas co-constitute the other “Is”, following a con-
structivist methodology. A recent example of the way that ideas co- 
constitute interests is the emergence of new, individualised theories of 
economic development and the agency of the poor during the 1990s 
(von Gliszczynski 2015; von Gliszczynski and Leisering 2016). The new 
concepts make an economic case for social cash transfers to the poor by 
identifying the poor as agents of development and economic growth and 
conceiving of transfers to the poor as economic investment: “growth 
through redistribution” (von Gliszczynski 2015: 84–85). Previously, the 
poor had predominantly been seen as mere victims and as unable to use 
cash rationally.
The fifth “I”, “International Influences”, includes ideas. International 




























War, globalization, global civil society, policy transfer, global 
governance
Fig. 1.1 A simple model of social policymaking (the “Five Is”). (Source: Gough 
2008: 44)
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from the beginning in the late nineteenth century but are particularly 
important in the Global South. When Southern social policy began to 
emerge, Northern countries had already established welfare states that 
Southern countries could observe and use as models. As early as the 
1920s, some Chinese and Indian intellectuals identified the Northern 
model of social insurance as an instance of modernity that they could use 
to overcome the “backwardness” of their own countries, although others 
were critical of ILO models (Seekings 2008a). Southern policymakers 
considered diverse Northern programmes as models (for China see Hu 
2015, 2016; Leisering et al. 2017) in the light of their scarcity of domes-
tic legal and administrative expertise. Moreover, international organisa-
tions engage much more in domestic policies in Southern than Northern 
countries. In global discourses, social policy principles have been articu-
lated since the “welfare internationalism” of the 1940s (Kaufmann 2012: 
ch. 4). In particular, the UN has championed human rights, and, since 
the 1990s, international organisations have increasingly turned to social 
issues (see Deacon et al. 1997: 3) and influenced domestic social policies 
worldwide.
When analysing the historical rise of social security policies in Brazil, 
India, China, and South Africa since the 1920s, we need to treat the Five 
Is as evolving social forces. The research question then is: have “social” 
Interests, Institutions, Ideas, and International Influences evolved at all, 
and, if so, when, based on what ideas, and with what impact.
 Conceptualising Social Policy Ideas: 
A Multi-layered Model11
In order to follow Max Weber’s ideational methodology depicted above, 
we need to trace the cognitive structure of ideas that constitute social 
policies. The model of the ideational structure of social policy that I pres-
ent in this section differs from common conceptualisations in two 
respects. First, I use highly generalised concepts and categories that do not 
presuppose any specific social value or norm, in line with the fourth 
11 This section draws on Leisering (2019: 34–46).
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strategy for theorising social policy that I described above. Second, rather 
than naming single, broad ideas, like values or ideologies, I conceive of a 
complex multi-layered fabric of social ideas.12
I conceive of four layers, ranging from the concrete to the abstract: 
models of welfare institutions; policy paradigms, including social prob-
lem definitions; social questions; and collective social responsibility. 
Frames are a fifth, outer layer or a cross-cutting dimension. The model 
can be visualised as an onion with several layers (Fig. 1.2).13
The four dimensions highlight the challenges that any country faces 
when seeking to establish substantial social protection policies and insti-
tutions in a sustainable way: devising models for welfare institutions; 
12 For scattered multi-level ideational approaches to social policy, see Marshall (1981b: 96–98), 
Ullrich (2003), Pfau-Effinger (2005, 2009), Kaufmann (2015), Hall (1993), Nullmeier (2006: 
296f.); for development contexts (and more generally), see von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda- 
Beckmann (1994: 19–23) and Lavers and Hickey (2016); for global social policy, see von 
Gliszczynski (2015: 22f.).






Global frames Non-social frames Counter frames
Fig. 1.2 The ideational fabric of social policy—the onion skin model. (Source: 
The author)
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identifying, selecting, and constructing social conditions as “social prob-
lems”; raising a broad “social question” to direct public attention to social 
issues; and attributing to the state and other collectivities an explicit 
social responsibility for the well-being of all citizens. The task of empiri-
cal analysis is to ascertain if and how each layer is realised in a country. 
The model leaves open which social problems the state seeks to address 
and what broader “social question” it articulates, which welfare institu-
tions tackle particular social problems, and what kind of “social” respon-
sibility the state assumes. This allows for diversity between, but also 
within, the North and South.
The four layers signify four connected but relatively independent 
dimensions of variation between different countries. Few states establish 
all four layers completely—these states could be called “welfare states” in 
a cultural sense. From a comparative perspective, two countries may dif-
fer in some layers, while resembling each other in other layers. Moreover, 
Southern countries may be influenced by general Northern or global 
ideas (bottom layers), but may set up welfare institutions (top layer) of 
their own making or even do without institutionalisation (decoupling). 
This is also true in reverse: countries may receive models for welfare insti-
tutions from other countries or international organisations but may place 
them in a different normative context (social question, policy paradigm) 
particular to that country.
This multi-layer model is anchored in the tradition of the pluralist, 
Weberian sociology of the welfare state depicted above. In particular, we 
can identify all four layers in the work of Franz-Xaver Kaufmann, even if 
uncombined, and we can even reconstruct the four layers from Thomas 
Humphrey Marshall’s work.14 The layers also figure separately in the writ-
ings of some other authors. We can find the term “responsibility” in the 
social policy literature (e.g. in Gough et al. 2004: 30), but it is not nor-
mally developed as an analytic concept. Girvetz (1968) introduced col-
lective social responsibility as the most abstract layer of the social, which 
Kaufmann (1997) then took up and explored as the hallmark of the wel-
fare state. The concept of the social question is systematically addressed 
by Kaufmann (2013a: 32–33), Heclo (1995), Pankoke (1970), and 
14 See Leisering (2019: 37, FN 13) for Kaufmann, and Leisering (2019: 51–56) for Marshall.
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Castel (2003) from a historical perspective, and in global terms by Kreckel 
(2008), Faist (2009), Breman and van der Linden (2014), and Breman 
et  al. (2019a). The term “policy paradigm” stems from policy analysis 
(Hall 1993), and the social definition of social problems, which is a part 
of a policy paradigm, draws on social problems theory (Schetsche 1996). 
The concept of frames is common in policy analysis and social analysis 
more generally (van Hulst and Yanow 2016).
Each of the four layers of political commitments has its own political 
arena, political actors, and ideational logic. The most abstract layer, the 
assumption of collective social responsibility, in particular, refers to states, 
which continue to be decisive actors in global social policy. UN human 
rights declarations explicitly address states as the agents in charge of 
implementing human rights. The concept of the state’s collective social 
responsibility contrasts with clientelism and patrimonialism as modes of 
governance that do not reflect a universalistic and rights-based sense of 
welfare responsibility. A commitment to “the social” may be articulated 
in a country’s constitution through “social” clauses and by ratification of 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN 1948), the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR;  UN 
1966), and other human rights documents. Constitutional assemblies, 
courts, legal scholars, politicians, and (sometimes) the citizenry have a 
hand in these processes. The assumption of collective social responsibil-
ity, if it exists, is rooted in the (national) “societal community”, which 
Talcott Parsons (1969: 11–12, 253) sees as “the focus of solidarity or 
mutual loyalty”.
The social question, as I defined in the first section, is the pivot of the 
onion skin model. The social question relates to issues of social cohesion 
and the integration of society. It asks “how to hold society together amid 
vast destabilizing change” (Heclo 1995: 675). Similarly, Castel holds that 
“the ‘Social Question’ is a fundamental aporia, through which a society 
experiences the enigma of its own cohesion and tries to forestall the dan-
gers of its disintegration” (2003: xix f.). Social policy is not only about 
redistribution but also, at least as important but often neglected, about 
the social recognition of social groups and issues. In a sociological sense, 
the social question relates to both redistribution and recognition. By 
expressing social recognition, social policy addresses sociocultural aspects 
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of societal integration that redistributive policies do not address 
(Kaufmann 2012: 21–23). The concept of the social question emerged in 
the 1830s and 1840s in France and Germany (Castel 2003: xx; Kaufmann 
2013b: 32). “Poverty, inequality, and social injustice are ancient plagues 
of humankind. But they emerged as a ‘social question’ rather late, in a 
context of the Enlightenment and the Industrial Revolution—the former 
by putting inequality and human rights on the agenda…, and the latter 
by producing poverty and misery by wage labor” (Therborn 2019: ix).
The workers’ question in nineteenth-century Europe referred to labour 
rights—the labour question. Labour rights include individual rights, the 
right to collective action, and the right to monetary support in case of 
employment-related risks, but the latter moved to centre stage only after 
World War II, as “social security”, which extends beyond employment- 
related risks. In agrarian societies, the land question is likely to become a 
significant social question. The three social questions—land, labour, and 
social risks more generally—may interact or compete with each other. 
International organisations’ global definitions of a social question may 
also influence domestic social questions. For example, around 2000, pov-
erty became the number one social question in global social politics (Noël 
2006; Hulme 2015). A comparative analysis of nationally defined social 
questions can distinguish welfare states on sociocultural grounds, as an 
alternative to classifications based on a political economy point of view. 
For Europe, Kaufmann (2013a, c) distinguishes between the workers’ 
question, which has historically shaped the German welfare state, the 
poverty question (UK), the family question (France), and the inequality 
question (Sweden).
The social question may be eclipsed or even counteracted by other 
societal questions, especially the national question, a concern for eco-
nomic growth and development, or religion. However, other questions 
can also support and reinforce the social question, for example, when 
social protection is viewed as a productive force to promote economic 
growth or when social policies are designed to strengthen national unity, 
as under Bismarck in Imperial Germany, 1883–1889, in the wake of 
German unification in 1871 (for China see Shi 2017).
The other societal questions often act as frames of social protection. 
Social policy by itself mostly enjoys only a limited legitimacy and needs 
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more powerful normative underpinnings within larger constituencies. 
References to the collective—economic, political, and social—utility of 
social policy beyond individual welfare were major drivers of the rise of 
social policy in nineteenth- and twentieth-century Europe (Kaufmann 
2012: 278–283). Frames in this sense include references to “non-social” 
issues, especially economic and, more recently, ecological challenges, and 
transnational principles that international organisations have advanced, 
above all human rights (which are global frames). The recognition of 
international organisations and donors as knowledge actors rests on their 
claims to represent universal, world cultural values and ideas (Meyer 
2009: 186). We call frames that compete with or even counteract social 
policies “counter frames”.
 A First Glimpse of the Four Countries: Basic 
Social, Political, and Economic Data
Few studies compare Brazil, India, China, and South Africa in social and 
cultural (rather than economic) terms, but drawing on scattered litera-
ture, we can sketch a first comparative picture of the four countries.
In economic terms, all four countries have recently experienced massive 
growth. The “average annual increase in GDP in the BRICS countries 
(Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) exceeded 8 per cent in 
the 2000s, significantly higher than the average of 2.6 per cent in devel-
oped countries and the global average of 4.1 per cent over the same 
period” (ISSA 2013: 13).
While the economic rise of the four countries is widely known, it is less 
well known that the four countries, except for India, are currently among 
the leaders in social protection in the Global South (see Table 1.1, section 
“Social protection”). Going back in history, our four countries adopted 
social insurance programmes later than many Northern countries, but 
they were often earlier adopters (than Northern countries) if related to 
GDP or demographic ageing at the time of adoption (for the demo-
graphic ageing see Lindert 2004a: 218). However, as the country chap-
ters show, the early programmes only applied to small privileged groups 
and implementation was weak (Midgley 1984: 117). Collier and Messick 
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(1975) distinguish four global waves of first adoptions of social insurance 
up to 1960: 1883–1891, 1892–1901, 1908–1922, and 1923–1960 (no 
adoptions between 1901 and 1908). Roughly speaking, adoptions in 
Europe happened during the first, second, and third periods, making 
their way from Northern to Southern Europe; adoptions in Latin America 
and former British colonies occurred in the third (including Brazil and 
South Africa) and fourth periods; and adoptions in the Middle East and 
Asia occurred in the fourth period (including China, but excluding Japan, 
whose adoption took place in the third).
The picture of the overall welfare regime in the four countries (Table 1.1, 
section “Welfare regime”) is more variegated and less impressive than the 
data on social protection in the Table, which only refers to basic income 
protection and coverage and disregards benefit levels, welfare outcomes, 
and dimensions like morbidity and literacy. Gough et  al. (2004), Abu 
Sharkh and Gough (2010), and Wood and Gough (2006) generalise 
Esping-Andersen’s concept of “welfare regime” to simply “regime” and 
distinguish between three global types of regimes: “welfare state regimes” 
as Esping-Andersen originally conceived of Northern welfare states, 
“informal security regimes”, and “insecurity regimes”. The assumption is 
that security is a meaningful category not only for welfare states (“social 
security”) but also in development contexts (similarly von Benda- 
Beckmann and von Benda-Beckmann 1994), and that informal (non- 
state) agencies have a bigger share in generating security in developing 
countries. The studies by Gough, which include Eastern European coun-
tries, name around fifteen “proto-welfare state regimes”, including Brazil, 
that are countries bordering on becoming Northern welfare state-like 
regimes. From 1990 to 2010, the proto-welfare state regimes have been 
relatively stable (for 2010 see Karmann’s 2017 re-analysis and update of 
Abu Sharkh and Gough’s study).
Seekings (2008b, 2012, 2013) applies the nineteenth-century 
European distinction of policy for workers versus policy for the poor to 
the Global South, distinguishing between workerist welfare regimes (that 
rely on employment-based social insurance for formal workers) and pau-
perist welfare regimes (that rely on poor relief or, later on, on means- 
tested social assistance programmes, including social pensions) in the 
early and mid-twentieth century. In addition, Seekings describes 
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land- based agrarian regimes, and “minimalist” regimes that lack a clear 
orientation towards either workers or the poor and spend less than aver-
age on both. By the end of the twentieth century, Seekings posits a decline 
in agrarian regimes and a recasting and expansion of pauperist regimes as 
citizen-based social security regimes, founded on social cash transfers. 
According to Seekings, our four countries fall into distinct types (see 
Table 1.1, section “Welfare regime”, second line).
The political regimes (see Table 1.1, section “State”) differ between the 
four countries, and all four underwent marked changes during the twen-
tieth century. Regarding national independence, only China was formally 
never dependent, except limited territories.
The four countries differ considerably concerning their historical links 
to the world society (Table 1.1, section “Society”). India was a colony, 
while South Africa and Brazil were not simply colonised, but also settled, 
through waves of immigration by farmers, workers, and slaves. The four 
countries also represent distinct world religions, which give us a first clue 
to the country’s chances for public social welfare. Roman Catholicism has 
an affinity for state welfare (as has Islam; Lindert 2004a: 219), whereas 
Protestantism comes in pro- and anti-welfare state varieties (van 
Kersbergen and Manow 2009). Confucianism, a Weltanschauung rather 
than a religion, is seen by some as adverse to extended public welfare 
(Rieger and Leibfried 2004).
All four countries had weak formal links to global “social” norms 
(world society links) after World War II and forged them rather late 
(Table 1.1, section “World cultural links”).
All four countries experienced considerable economic growth over the 
last hundred years (Fig. 1.3), but India and China stagnated for a very 
long period of time, 1920 to c. 1980. South Africa was in the lead until 
1980, but was surpassed by Brazil thereafter. China skyrocketed in the 
2000s, while India like China started to grow in the 1980s, but at a much 
lower pace. All four countries experienced a massive upturn in the 1990s 
and 2000s, but growth rates abated in the 2010s.
Over the last three decades, social progress has been massive in all four 
countries (Table 1.2), but they started from exceedingly low levels regard-
ing life expectancy at birth, literacy, and poverty. India scores lowest, 
followed by South Africa. By and large, advancement has been 
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continuous, but the curve of life expectancy in South Africa reflects the 
HIV- created bulge in the 1990s and 2000s. China has caught up and 
nowadays surpasses the other three countries, while Brazil has fallen 
behind in relative terms. The figures only give a rough picture, since they 
were reported by the countries themselves.
Despite economic growth and social betterment, all four countries are 
riddled with excessive inequality of incomes, with South Africa as the 
most extreme case (Fig.  1.4). Inequality has increased massively since 
1980—the cost of economic growth. All four countries are “large uneven 
developers” (Frazier 2011: 90). Moreover, the social organisation of 
labour, especially the vast informal labour and the low participation of 
women in the labour force, above all in India (Table 1.3), differs sharply 
from most countries of the Global North. Inequality, informal labour, 
and the position of women are major challenges and limitations to social 
policy. The high share of rural workers also raises issues of social protec-
tion. Industrial employment has risen in India and China, but deindus-
trialisation and the rise of the service economy already show in the recent 
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Fig. 1.3 Real GDP per capita in 2011 USD in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. 




In response to the social problems arising from industrialisation, 
urbanisation, dislocation, and other social processes, all four countries 
took social policy measures. Social spending is a rough measure of social 
effort. Differences in social spending between the four countries (Fig. 1.5) 
roughly correspond to the differences in real per capita GDP between the 
countries (as shown in Fig. 1.3), with two exceptions. Brazil is a big social 
spender, much more ahead of South Africa than its real per capita GDP 
would suggest. This might be partially explained by the share of social 
insurance in Brazil. The second exception is China, which ranks relatively 
low in social spending as compared to its high ranking in real per capita 
GDP. Since China has considerably expanded the coverage of social 
Table 1.2 Basic social indicators for Brazil, India, China, and South Africa
Extreme poverty (1.90 USD a day, 2011 purchasing power parity; in percentage 
of population)
1993 1996 2005 2011 2014 2016
Brazil 19.9 14.2 8.6 4.7 2.7 3.9
India 45.9 – 38.2a 21.2 – –
China 56.6 41.7 18.5 7.9 1.4 0.5
South Africa 31.7 36.6 26.1 16.5b 18.9 –
Literacy (in per cent of people aged 15+)
1980 1990 2000 2006 2011 2018
Brazil 74.6 – 86.4 89.6 91.4 93.2
India 40.8c 48.2d 61.0e 62.8 69.3 74.4
China 65.5f 77.8 90.9 – 95.1g 96.8
South Africa 76.2 – – 88.7h 93.1 87.0i
Life expectancy at birth
1965 1975 1985 1995 2005 2017
Brazil 56.6 60.9 64.4 68.3 71.9 75.5
India 44.5 51.0 55.8 60.3 64.5 69.2
China 49.5 63.9 68.5 69.9 73.0 76.5
South Africa 50.3 55.4 60.9 61.6 53.4 63.5




























































































Brazil India China South Africa
Fig. 1.4 Gini index of income in Brazil, India, China, and South Africa. (Source: 
The author, data from Alvaredo et al. n.d., World Inequality Database)
Table 1.3 Basic labour indicators for Brazil, India, China, and South Africa
Employment in industry (in percentage of total employment)
1991 2000 2010 2019
Brazil 23.3 21.9 22.5 19.8
India 15.7 16.3 21.8 25.6
China 21.4 22.5 28.7 28.2
South Africa 28.7 27.3 24.4 22.9
Informal employment (in per cent of total non-agricultural employment)
2000 2009 2013 2018
Brazil – 42.0 37.0 –
India – 75.3a 74.8b 80.3
China – – – –
South Africa 53.8 33.4 32.4 35.2
Female labour force participation (in percentage of the female population 
aged 15–64)
1990 2000 2010 2019
Brazil 44.8 53.9 58.6 60.7
India 31.8 31.9 27.1 24.7
China 79.4 76.8 69.6 68.7
South Africa 45.4 52.4 48.3 53.5





protection during the 2000s and early 2010s, low spending might indi-
cate low benefit levels and patchy implementation. India ranks lowest, as 
on most other accounts. This suggests that there is little political effort to 
address the widespread poverty and destitution in the country. However, 
the overall trend in social spending is upwards in all four countries. In 
China, the increase is not linear, seemingly reflecting the swings in social 
protection policies analysed in Chap. 3 of this volume.
Social problems abounded in all four countries, and over the last hun-
dred years, the Brazilian and the South African economies increasingly 
provided resources to tackle them. In India and China, real economic 
growth started as late as the 1980s. Economic performance relates to the 
factor bundle “Industrialisation” in Gough’s explanatory model of welfare 
state development, the Five Is model, as outlined above. In 1920, all 
countries started from a roughly similar low economic level, except South 
Africa which had a per capita GDP that was double India’s and China’s 
per capita GDP (Fig. 1.3). The question is if, when, and how the coun-
tries addressed their social problems. Regarding politics and polity (factor 


















Brazil India China South Africa
Fig. 1.5 Public social protection expenditure (in % of GDP) in Brazil, India, China, 
and South Africa. (Source: The author, data from ILO 2017: 397–404, Table B.16; 
for definitions and data sources see ILO 2017: 199–209, Annex II)
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countries were to experience considerable upheaval, including war, civil 
war, foreign oppression, struggle for independence, revolution, and 
authoritarian rule, all of which may eclipse—or fuel—“social” concerns. 
The chapters in this volume bring in the factor bundle “Ideas” (and 
International Influences) from Gough’s Five Is model, conceptualised as 
a complex configuration, the onion skin model.
 The Chapters
The volume has two chapters on each country, except South Africa, for 
which there are three chapters.
China is the only socialist country among the four countries, at least 
since 1949. The two chapters on China by Hu Aiqun and Shi Shih-Jiunn 
(Chaps. 2 and 3) focus on the years 1912–1949 and 1978–2020, the 
People’s Republic of China’s reform era. Both chapters address the years 
1949–1978, but in less detail, because they have been much researched 
earlier.
Hu Aiqun argues that the thirty years before 1949 were formative years 
that provided the foundations for social legislation after 1949 when the 
People’s Republic of China was founded and the Nationalist government 
retreated to Taiwan. The decades before 1949 witnessed the public emer-
gence of “social” issues in intellectual debates, bills, acts, and public lan-
guage, including the concept of “social security”. The quest for stability 
by a society torn apart by economic backwardness, foreign oppression, 
and social divisions provided the context for the rise of the social ques-
tion. Chinese elites turned to a range of Western social ideas to “save the 
nation” in the face of imperialism. Some actors adopted communism, 
whereas reformist intellectuals espoused organic concepts of society that 
led to a concern for stability and harmony. In the 1930s, the Nationalist 
Party in government reinterpreted Confucianism as part of its state ideol-
ogy to answer the need for stability. During the Sino-Japanese war, 
Chinese elites were attracted to the contemporary global idea of universal 
social security, and this fuelled developments in social security. Although 




Shi Shih-Jiunn analyses the changing semantics of social policy in 
China as an indicator of changing policies. He argues that social policy in 
China was not just socialist in an egalitarian sense but has been subject to 
considerable swings regarding institutional design, concepts, terms, and 
frames, and that the swings ensued from the Communist Party’s legiti-
macy problems. These systemic concerns rather than those for individual 
rights shaped social policy. Accordingly, Shi reconstructs four recent 
phases of development in China: under socialism (1949–1978) the social 
question was seen to be resolved in the institutions of socialist produc-
tion, and social protection programmes centred on urban workers. The 
reform years after 1978 witnessed the advent of the social question, first 
through the “socialisation” of social welfare (transferring social responsi-
bility from the state to non-state agencies) and “GDPism” from 1978 to 
2000. From 2000 to 2012, the state massively expanded social protection 
under the flag of “social security”, “inclusive growth”, and “social man-
agement”. Since the authoritarian turn in 2012, social protection is 
understood as “social governance”, including using surveillance systems 
rather than supporting individual rights and civil society activity, in order 
to achieve national greatness (“Chinese Dream”).
The first chapter on India by Sony Pellissery (Chap. 4) takes a broad 
view, covering the last hundred years of social policies against the back-
ground of India’s history and culture. The second chapter on India by 
Ravi Ahuja (Chap. 5) focuses more specifically on issues of labour protec-
tions in late colonial India.
Sony Pellissery’s main argument is that in India the social question has 
been stifled until the present day. The idea of the state’s universalistic 
concern for the individual welfare of all members of society never mate-
rialised. Rather, narrow and particularistic versions of the social question 
prevailed, which related to scheduled castes and tribes, poverty, and hun-
ger. Caste-based social identity rather than citizenship informed calls for 
extending social protections. Pellissery names several reasons for this. 
After independence in 1947, other concerns, especially nation-building 
and economic development, crowded out the social question. Several 
visions of society competed with each other (those of Gandhi, Nehru, 
and Ambedkar), but only Ambedkar’s vision reflected a (weak) notion of 
the social question. The broader background includes traditional 
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Hinduism, which culturally denies equality and is tangible in the caste 
system. There has been a strong move towards political and legal equality, 
but this has been of little avail in the face of vast socio-economic inequal-
ity. From the late-twentieth century, social issues have become stronger 
but mostly in a particularistic and populist vein.
Ravi Ahuja aligns with Pellissery’s finding of a weak social question in 
India. Up to the present day, India has never come even near to institu-
tionalising social protection as a part of citizenship. Through an in-depth 
analysis of a limited time period, Ahuja draws a variegated picture of 
social ideas and legislation. Legislation was passed as early as the 1910s, 
passage continued during the interwar years, and reached a peak from 
1946 to 1952, with the Employees’ Social Insurance Act of 1948 as its 
core. The intimations of a social question were limited: it only concerned 
labour (the labour question) and only formal workers, resulting in 
“minoritarian labour welfare”. Social legislation was generally patchy, 
applied only to select industries and types of workers, and included many 
exceptions. Moreover, there was a massive decoupling between legislation 
and implementation. At the same time, Ahuja also demonstrates that 
there were repeated calls to extend the coverage of social rights and to 
turn social rights into a “birthright”. However, this “horizon of expecta-
tion” never materialised. External ideas from the ILO and the UK made 
themselves felt but mostly only influenced political language. Ahuja, a 
labour historian, also argues that the distinction between formal and 
informal labour was not a given economic distinction but was co-created 
by social law.
The chapters on South Africa and Brazil relate to settler societies. The 
three chapters on South Africa investigate pre-apartheid South Africa 
(1910–1948), apartheid South Africa (1948–1990), and the post-
apartheid years.
In the chapter on pre-apartheid South Africa (Chap. 6), Jeremy Seekings 
finds a remarkable expansion in the state’s social protection that started in 
the 1920s. By 1948, a “nascent welfare state” had emerged, a kind of 
liberal welfare regime. The contours of the social question became visible 
with the rise in the usage of comprehensive terms like “social policy” 
(1934) and “social security” (1942). The social question was racialised 
throughout this period: the “poor white problem” was the state’s key 
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concern. To secure the whites’ morals and behaviours, the social question 
included concern for deviant behaviours to be addressed through social 
work and institutional care. Moreover, there was a decoupling between 
legislation and implementation. Seekings argues that beyond the general 
racist fabric of South African politics, we need to trace specific ideas and 
cultural factors to explain the development of social protection policies. 
South African politics and society developed a range of ideas to justify 
their models of society and resultant social policies. These ideas were in 
flux, and pro as well as antisocial policy views were advanced. Afrikaner 
nationalists were ambivalent about social policy, whereas neo-Calvinists 
opposed state-provided social protections. Key ideas of the time included 
the whites’ superior “civilisation”, which gave rise to a racial hierarchy, 
and the “native question” that eclipsed (and shaped) the social question, 
Reformed Protestantism, especially neo-Calvinism, and the quest for 
modernising society.
Marianne Ulriksen’s chapter on apartheid South Africa (Chap. 7) shares 
Seekings’ assumption that ideas matter under a racist regime. The “poor 
white problem” of the pre-apartheid period became part of the wider 
“civilised workers’ question”, by which the government sought to secure 
racial purity, framed by the idea of “separate development” for different 
races. The civilised workers’ question reflected the uneasy intersection of 
race and class in South Africa that gave the labour question a unique 
nature. There was little change in the design of welfare programmes (old- 
age pensions) throughout this period. However, the conceptions of racial 
relationships and collective social responsibility changed. The state’s 
social responsibility was racially graded since the beginning, but in this 
era, the state further divided it through the creation of separate “home-
lands” for the non-white population, under the new frame “independent 
nations”. Only towards the end of the period did more universalistic 
notions of social responsibility emerge under pressure from anti-regime 
activists and global protests. Ulriksen draws on contemporary docu-
ments, as the other contributors do, but she also makes use of qualitative 
content analysis.
Jeremy Seekings’ second chapter, on post-apartheid South Africa (Chap. 
8), investigates the changes in the social question after 1994. He focuses 
on the key reformer of the 2000s, Zola Skweyiya, who was Minister of 
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Social Development from 1999 to 2009. Remarkably, the state did not 
extend social protections during the 1990s, the advent of democracy not-
withstanding. Yet, the 2000s witnessed a substantial expansion under 
Skweyiya. Seekings argues that the social question was significantly refor-
mulated as an issue of dignity. This reframing went beyond economic 
developmentalism and labourism, both of which narrowed the social 
question to the concerns of formal workers. Besides dignity, the social 
question was also phrased in terms of rights, with the courts assuming an 
important role in implementing and discussing the social question. 
Skweyiya embodied a paternalistic conservatism that linked developmen-
talism with broader social concerns for the poor and the dignity of all 
citizens. Still, the social question remained limited, providing only partial 
legitimisation for a welfare state. Although social protections were imag-
ined as universal, practically, they were mainly for formal workers, and 
social cash transfers were only for groups seen as deserving. Attitudes in 
South African politics about social issues remained ambivalent, especially 
those of the members of the ruling party, the African National Congress 
(ANC), which remained labourist. The ANC’s developmentalism also 
checked the extension of social protections. The social question was also 
eclipsed by a concern for political and civil rights rather than social rights. 
Seekings also demonstrates that social protection ideas and policies cut 
across the regime change of 1994. Yet, the legacy of apartheid also fuelled 
calls for dignity and universal rights that were conducive to expanding 
social protection.
Lena Lavinas’ chapter (Chap. 9) depicts Brazil’s rich history of ideas, 
political actions, legislation, and changes in political regime but also the 
structural limitations of social protections until the present day. 
Contributory social insurance began in the 1920s, laying the foundation 
for later expansion and shaping social protection since. Lavinas identifies 
five social questions over the past hundred years: people’s needs were at 
the origins of the first massive mobilisation at the turn of the twentieth 
century; the labour question was at the centre of political struggles from 
the 1920s, but the land question also lingered from the 1950s onward. 
The more general social question—social protection for all citizens 
including the poor—only became significant after 1988, under democ-
racy, when a comprehensive social security system was introduced, with 
contributory pensions, labour-related benefits, anti-poverty targeted 
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benefits, and universal health coverage. More recently, the social question 
has been reframed by claims of inclusiveness. The Citizen Constitution of 
1988 played a major role in advancing social legislation. However, the 
discrepancy between talk and action, legislation and implementation 
(decoupling), was massive. Brazil underwent several extreme political 
regime changes; yet social policies have increased under both democracy 
and dictatorship. Under the first period of dictatorship (Vargas, 
1930–1945), social policy was instrumentalised as a means of social con-
trol through state-organised labour relations while denying civil rights. 
During the second period of dictatorship (1964–1985), social protection 
was modernised. After 1988, social security remained largely underfi-
nanced. The overall arrangement of social protection remains fragmented 
and selective. The deep social and racial cleavages in Brazilian society 
remain a major challenge.
Gabriel Ondetti’s chapter (Chap. 10) on Brazil is the only chapter in 
the volume that focuses on the land question or, as it is mostly referred to 
in Brazil, the “agrarian question”. Brazil has one of the most unequal 
distributions of land in the world, which has been a major factor in poli-
tics and society. Ondetti shows that the three big social questions—in 
historical order: the land question, the labour or workers question, and 
the broader social question comprising social protection—may exist in 
parallel, may compete, or may relieve each other. For example, the intro-
duction of rural pensions in 1971 and conditional social cash transfers in 
the 2000s diverted attention from the land question. Ondetti depicts the 
broad range of ideas that shaped the social question including doctrines 
like reformism, communism, labourism, left Catholicism, legal doctrines, 
and, more recently, environmentalism. Economic interests and ideas 
could be pro or contra land reform. Legal ideas were the earliest: the law-
yer Duguit conceived of a “social function of property” in 1911, which 
was taken up in political debates later, as were Torres’ ideas of 1914 on 
land reforms. External ideas also mattered: Duguit was French; socially 
focused European constitutions influenced the constitutions of 1934 and 
1946; and the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965) shaped left 
Catholicism. Ondetti depicts the range of instruments used or designed 
for land policies and concludes that a far-reaching response to the land 
question—a thorough redistribution of land—never materialised, not 
even under recent leftist governments.
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The term “social security” first appeared in the 1935 US Social Security 
Act. International organisations officially used it in the early 1940s, and 
it gained wide usage after the Second World War. Social security, a major 
type of social policy—defined as state actions via legislation and admin-
istration to solve social problems—refers to a combination of social 
insurance and social assistance or any government programmes providing 
cash and in-kind benefits to those with inadequate income.
In China, “social security” as an imported term emerged in official 
documents in 1945. Throughout China’s long imperial history, Chinese 
people mainly relied on the family, clan and neighbourhood for their 
social security needs. China’s imperial state, however, provided tempo-
rary famine relief (huangzheng) after disasters and regular poor relief for 
individuals labelled as “widowers, widows, orphans, elderly without chil-
dren, and the infirm (guangua gudu fei)”1. In the 1900s (the last decade 
of the Qing rule), the Qing Dynasty set up vagrant workhouses as a new 
type of poor relief, which soon disintegrated after the fall of the Qing in 
1911. The succeeding Republic of China, in its first two chaotic decades 
under the Beijing government (1911–1927), was able to restore some of 
the poorhouses and workhouses, as well as issue factory and labour pro-
tection laws. In the two decades of GMD rule (1927–1949), the GMD 
government developed social security ideas and policies, including relief 
homes and labour insurance in the 1930s, as well as social relief and social 
insurance in the 1940s.
Historical studies on Republican China were conventionally very criti-
cal of the GMD government and attributed its defeat by the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) to corruption, incompetency, and factionalism 
(Eastman 1984). Recently, revisionist scholarship has treated the GMD 
government more favourably, concentrating not only on what it achieved 
in extremely tough circumstances but also on the significance of its 
achievements for the succeeding People’s Republic (Wakeman and 
Edmonds 2000). In terms of social welfare broadly defined, however, 
studies predominantly focus on relief for refugees, victims of famines, 
1 Elderly men without wives were widowers (guang), elderly women without husbands were widows 
(gua), elderly people without sons were du, children without fathers were orphans (gu), and dis-
abled persons were the infirm (fei).
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and the poor (MacKinnon 2008; Chen 2012), and they barely pay atten-
tion to social insurance and social security (except Hu 2015; Ma 2012, 
2014). Some scholars in social sciences have explored the ideational 
aspects of China’s social welfare but treat the ideas as an independent fac-
tor (Leung and Nann 1995). In other words, these studies tend to con-
ceive of ideational factors in social policymaking in terms of broad ideas 
(Hu 2012; Shi 2017; Breman et al. 2019) and neglect more specific ideas, 
like “social security” or “social questions”, and the interactive and forma-
tive role of ideas.
The present study attempts to fill this research gap by applying Lutz 
Leisering’s “onion skin model” of social policy ideas (Leisering 2019, 
chapter 2, 21–63, and chapter 9, 327–330; see also the introduction to 
this volume). Based on theories of the constructivist sociology of knowl-
edge, this model creatively treats ideas as a multi-layered system that not 
only interacts with but also co-defines other structural factors. According 
to this model, social policy ideas consist of four layers plus frames on top 
of the layers. From the most abstract to the most concrete, each of the 
four layers is collective social responsibility, social question, social prob-
lems, and welfare institutions, and on top of these four layers, there exist 
“frames” such as “discourses on nation building, development, economy, 
or world cultural principles, or any other frames” (ibid., 34–35).
According to Leisering, the collective social responsibility layer refers 
to the state’s recognition and assumption of its social responsibility, which 
is often written in a country’s constitution. The social question layer is a 
generalised recognition of social problems that require state policy rem-
edies. The social problems layer refers to the process of labelling, defining, 
and theorising social problems and seeking policy remedies. The welfare 
institutions layer refers to the state’s adoption of certain welfare institu-
tions, such as social assistance and social insurance as a response to per-
ceived social problems. Policy frames are broader ideas that can legitimise 
or negate the adoption of certain social policies (ibid., 327–330).
As an empirical study applying Leisering’s ideational model, this chap-
ter reveals that China saw an early rise in social security ideas and institu-
tions in the first half of the twentieth century, which include certain 
continuities across the 1949 divide between the nationalist and commu-
nist regimes. Western imperialism, along with domestic developments, 
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led to unprecedented social upheavals in China, which provoked Chinese 
intellectuals and officials alike to constantly seek a way out to “save the 
nation” (Zanasi 2006; Fung 2010). These Chinese elites turned to 
Western social ideas, especially sociological knowledge, to identify social 
problems and seek relevant social policies to tackle these social problems 
in the early decades of the twentieth century, especially in the interwar 
era of the 1920s and 1930s. With the breakout of the Second Sino- 
Japanese War in 1937, the above-mentioned trends were strengthened 
during the war. In the early 1940s, Chinese elites were attracted to the 
emerging global idea of universal social security, which led to a significant 
and intensified period of social policy development in China. This had 
policy significance for post-war social security programmes, mainly in 
Taiwan, but also in China in the 1950s.
Although Western social ideas played an important role, this study 
argues that Republican China, especially the GMD state, emphasised 
collectivistic rather than individualist notions of social problems and 
social policy that fit the perceived special Chinese situation, which was 
viewed as a mixture of such factors as an agrarian society, backward pro-
duction, an unorganised society that could not prevent foreign oppres-
sion, and a deep-rooted tradition of Confucianism as well as Western 
imperialism. Overall, this study contends that in the entire Republican 
era, especially under the GMD regime, the social question remained 
strong, but social policy to respond to the social question was treated as a 
crucial part of state building based on a combination of reinterpreted 
Confucianism and Western social ideas. Thus, social policy emphasised 
not only productivism but also social order and harmony, with the ulti-
mate purpose of advancing China’s national interests and achieving 
wealth, power, and glory for China.
It is helpful to trace the evolution of the official terms used to discuss 
social security in Republican China, as this ideational study is related to 
the literature on the conceptual history of social policy (Rodgers 1998; 
Kettunen and Petersen 2011; Kaufmann 2013; Béland and Petersen 
2014). In the last decade of the Qing dynasty, the government main-
tained the imperial poorhouses or yangji yuan (nurture-relief homes) for 
“those unable to work”. The government also established xiyisuo (work-
houses) for vagrants and petty criminals, and a new type of poorhouse, 
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jiaoyang yuan (teaching-nurture homes), for “unruly people”. These 
workhouses and poorhouses continued to exist under the Beijing govern-
ment (1911–1927) but in a disintegrated state (Chen 2012). In 
Republican China in the 1920s, the Beijing government called for “social 
insurance” in response to the International Labour Organization’s (ILO) 
request, while the CCP-led labour movement demanded for “social 
insurance” (Hu 2015).
In the first decade of the GMD’s rule (1927–1937), a single “relief 
home” (jiuji yuan) incorporated the functions of all sorts of previous 
poorhouses and workhouses, while “labour insurance” appeared in the 
1931 Constitution. In addition, the term “social relief ” referred to a 
broad range of poor relief, labour insurance, and other types of social 
welfare in the 1930s, while “social insurance” appeared in scholarly dis-
cussions in the 1920s and 1930s. In the 1940s, the GMD state used such 
terms as “social welfare” and “social insurance”, while “social security” 
began to emerge in official usage in 1945. Furthermore, the content of 
the term “social relief ” in the 1940s shrank to refer to social assistance 
only as “social insurance” became officially recognised. The CCP also 
used similar terms, such as social relief, labour insurance, social insur-
ance, and labour protection laws in its documents for areas under its 
control.
This chapter is divided into five parts. Part one introduces pre- 
Republican China’s state relief with a focus on the ideational transition 
from Confucian benevolence to Western disciplined labour as the base-
line for ensuing discussions. Part two analyses the rise of social problems 
in China and the accompanying Chinese Marxist and non-Marxist con-
cepts, explaining these social problems, mainly in the 1920s. Part three 
discusses the GMD state’s social policy in its first decade (1927–1937), 
especially poor relief and labour insurance, and argues that the GMD 
state’s social policy, as part of its state-building efforts, emphasised pro-
ductivist and collectivistic notions of social problems and social policy. 
Part four focuses on the GMD state’s wartime social policy (1937–1945). 
It argues that the Allied forces’ emerging concept of universal social secu-
rity had a profound impact on the GMD state’s social security, but 
Chinese elites emphasised China’s special situation when designing 
China’s social security (both social relief and social insurance) policies. 
2 The Early Rise of Social Security in China: Ideas and Reforms… 
60
Part five concerns itself with the institutionalisation of social security in 
the post-war era and explores the implications of the GMD state’s social 
security on that of the People’s Republic. Meanwhile, parts three to five 
consider the years under GMD rule, including discussions of social secu-
rity in the CCP-controlled areas. Finally, the conclusion highlights the 
major findings.
 Social Security in Imperial China: 
From Benevolence to Disciplined Labour
Imperial China, largely a unitary state system for over 2000 years, began 
to provide emergency famine relief during the Han Dynasty (206 
BCE—220 CE) and regular poor relief during the Tang Dynasty 
(618–907 CE), with the majority of people dependent on their families, 
kin groups, and neighbourhoods for social security. Some scholars even 
argued for an earlier origin of state famine relief, for example, one scholar 
contends that the Zhou rulers (1046–256 BCE) established well- managed 
granaries for famine relief, and granaries existed even in the Xia Dynasty 
of the sixteenth century BCE (Wang 2002: 153–154). The reason for the 
early recognition of state responsibility for providing social relief is closely 
related to China’s long-lasting and deeply rooted Confucianism. 
Confucianism, together with Daoism and Legalism, took shape during 
the three centuries proceeding the Qin state’s unification of China in 221 
BCE. These early intellectual schools focused on restoring the social and 
political order, as centuries of warfare had caused great suffering, chaos 
and confusion, following the disintegration of the Western Zhou 
(1045–771 BCE).
Confucianism, however, was established as the state ideology during 
the Han Dynasty in 136 BCE and was restored during the Song Dynasty 
(960–1279 CE) as neo-Confucianism, which incorporated many philo-
sophical ideas from Buddhism in the twelfth century. Confucianism thus 
remained as the state ideology for the rest of Chinese imperial rule and 
emphasised the value of benevolence (ren), benevolent government (ren-
zheng), familism, and harmony. In terms of familism, the family was 
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regarded as a prototype of the state: the family was a mini-state, and the 
state was an enlarged family. The emperor as the son of heaven was the 
father of his subjects; thus, the emperor should take care of the well-being 
of his sons or his subjects (Leung and Nann 1995). Therefore, state relief 
was regarded as necessary emperor and state benevolence.
In any case, the Han Dynasty established ever-normal granaries (chang- 
ping cang). These granaries not only aimed to stabilise market grain prices 
at a “normal” level, which led to the term “ever-normal” but also distrib-
uted grains to famine victims in times of disaster. By the Sui and Tang 
Dynasties (581–907 CE), the state not only inherited the ever-normal 
granaries but also set up charity granaries (yi cang) and community gra-
naries (she cang). The government organised charity granaries and col-
lected taxes or donations of grain to redistribute to the poor in times of 
famine and other disasters, while villages organised and managed com-
munity granaries, which collected and distributed grains to the poor for 
relief purposes. This granary system remained the main state measure for 
famine and disaster relief throughout imperial history (Will and 
Wong 1991).
Furthermore, the Chinese imperial state began to provide medical and 
material relief to the poor during the Tang Dynasty. India-originated 
Buddhism became so influential that the Tang Dynasty launched a sup-
pression of it in 845 CE and took over the Buddhist medical relief insti-
tutions (Cai 2003: 37). These medical relief institutions survived into the 
succeeding Song Dynasty, which also opened up other types of relief 
institutions to provide material support to the poor (Wang 2007: 234). 
The Song poor relief, according to recent scholarship, represented the 
highest level of development of social policy in Chinese imperial history, 
surpassing the levels of the succeeding Ming and Qing Dynasties (Sun 
and Bi 2018; Zhang 2017).
Nonetheless, the succeeding imperial dynasties inherited the poor-
houses, which were grouped into four types by the mid-nineteenth cen-
tury: nurture-relief homes (yang-ji yuan), universal-relief halls (pu-ji 
tang), soup kitchens (zhou chang), and vagrants’ shelters (qi-liu suo). The 
emperors decreed these poorhouses, which local governments then man-
aged. Local revenue financed the nurture-relief homes and admitted 
those within the local administration’s jurisdiction. They provided food, 
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winter clothes and money to the inmates. Unlike the nurture-relief 
homes, the universal-relief halls did not have stable financial sources 
because they relied on government subsidies and private donations and 
investment. As shown by the name, these halls did not have local resi-
dency requirements; they not only provided food, winter clothes, and 
money but also included soup kitchens and other facilities to provide 
cold water in the summer and warm ginger soup in the winter 
(Zhang 2012).
After the mid-nineteenth century, however, the Qing government’s 
famine and poor relief declined, as the Qing dynasty’s central financial 
situation rapidly deteriorated due to both internal crisis and Western 
imperialism. This situation not only provided an opportunity for non- 
governmental and non-family-based charities operated by local gentries 
to play an increasingly important role in social relief in this period (Liang 
1997) but also inspired Chinese elites to reform the existing poorhouses 
based on the “positive” methods used by Western missionaries to manage 
their charities in China.
In the latter half of the nineteenth century, Western missionaries oper-
ated schools and charities to facilitate their missionary activities in China. 
The Chinese elites viewed the Westerners’ methods for running their 
charities as “positive” because these charities not only provided material 
support but also taught children how to read and write and the skills they 
needed for future employment. The elites thus began to introduce these 
positive methods to reform the declining poorhouses. For instance, the 
vagrants’ shelters, which originally only provided food, clothing, and 
medicine, began to provide job training to the inmates. The Shanghai 
vagrants’ shelter was one of the first to do so in 1879. The Tianjin guan-
grentang (a comprehensive charitable institution), which was established 
in 1878 and followed the model of missionary hospitals, included work-
shops that required homeless inmates to work (Huang 2011; Wang 2008).
In the 1900s, the above-mentioned trends continued as the Qing gov-
ernment launched new policies, a set of comprehensive political and eco-
nomic reform measures. Among these reforms was the establishment of 
handicraft and industrial training centres (gong-yi ju) as part of the policy 
to develop industry, which coincided with Qing Dynasty’s penal system 
reforms, which established workhouses (xi-yi suo) based on Japanese 
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models. While the training centres gradually declined due to lack of 
funding, workhouses were widely set up for both criminals and vagrants. 
The first workhouses included the 1904 Tianjian Criminal Workhouse, 
the 1905 Tianjin Vagrant Workhouse, and the 1906 Beijing Capital 
Workhouse for both criminals and non-criminals. Meanwhile, new types 
of poorhouses (jiaoyang yuan) were established as reformatories for con-
victs, and the centuries-old poorhouses, such as universal-relief halls (pu- 
ji tang), were converted into “indoor institutions that required labour in 
exchange for relief ” (Chen 2012: 31).
This shift from the centuries-old state relief system based on Confucian 
benevolence and Buddhist kindness to Western-style workhouses and 
poorhouses based on “compulsory labour in exchange for relief ” demon-
strates the influence of Western social ideas and institutions on China’s 
social relief ideas and institutions.
 The Rise of the Social Question: Non-Marxist 
Versus Marxist Concepts, 1900–1920s
In the early twentieth century, the terms “social problems” and “social 
policy” emerged in China shortly after the introduction of Western soci-
ology into China, along with socialism and, later, Marxism. By the 1920s, 
Chinese mainstream intellectuals mainly consisted of returned students, 
first from Japan, then from Europe, and the USA. Among them were 
China’s early sociologists, who were trained in the classical sociological 
tradition for which Auguste Comte (1798–1857), Herbert Spencer 
(1820–1903), and Emily Durkheim (1858–1917) advocated. Meanwhile, 
Marxism became very influential following the 1917 Russian Revolution, 
the 1919 May Fourth movement and the establishment of the CCP in 
1921. Thus, the 1920s saw the emergence of both non-Marxist and 
Marxist concepts of social problems and social questions.
Sociology was first introduced into China in 1895 when Yan Fu 
described Spencer’s sociological studies together with Darwin’s theory of 
evolution in his article On the Origin of Strength (yuan qiang). In this 
article, Yan Fu describes how Spencer established sociology as a science of 
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society, his basic sociological principles, subject-matter, and research 
methods (Ding 1988: 86–87). In 1903, Yan Fu translated Spencer’s most 
influential book The Study of Sociology (1874), the first book with “sociol-
ogy” in its title. Spencer was the single most influential sociologist in the 
late nineteenth century; he inherited the conceptions of society and soci-
ology from Comte while adding his evolutionary framework to the new 
discipline. For Spencer, society was an organic whole, and sociology was 
“a holistic, naturalistic, and evolutionary science of society” (Breslau 
2007: 40). Spencer’s evolutionary sociological ideas had a profound 
impact on Chinese intellectuals and sociologists in the early twentieth 
century.
Marxism came to China at the turn of the twentieth century, however, 
in the name of socialism. In the beginning, socialism was often refuted as 
radical, inhuman, and unsuitable for China and, thus, had little influence 
in intellectual circles. It was not until after the 1919 May Fourth 
Movement, and even after the establishment of the CCP in 1921, that 
Marxism began to become increasingly influential, as a small group of 
Communist theorists disseminated Marxism, especially Leninism. These 
early Marxists, like Qu Qiubai and Shi Fuliang, taught at Shanghai 
University (1923–1927), the only higher institution that taught such 
courses because it was controlled by the nascent Communists. When 
teaching, they adopted Marxist books as their major textbooks, such as 
Bukharin’s Historical Materialism (1921) and Lenin’s Imperialism (1917) 
(Chiang 2001).
In the 1920s, China’s mainstream intellectuals, some of whom became 
GMD party members, and Marxists began to debate China’s “social 
problems”. These contemporary writings included the term “social prob-
lems” in their titles, and not only discussed “social problems” in general 
but also analysed specific social problems regarding family, women, 
vagrancy, poverty, and labour. The debates focused on: what is society? 
What are social problems? What is or are China’s most important social 
problem or problems? What are the causes of China’s social problems? 
And what are solutions to China’s social problems?
Almost all Republican non-Marxist intellectuals accepted the classical 
sociological idea of “society as a social organism” (Tsin 1997, 1999; Culp 
2017). They also viewed “social problems” as a social disease threatening 
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social order. But Republican intellectuals disagreed on the most impor-
tant social problems in China and their solutions. That is, in the 1920s, 
sociologists and many other intellectuals agreed that poverty was the 
most pressing issue, while Marxists argued that the labour question was 
the most important, and Nationalist leader Sun Yat-sen focused on the 
land question as the most fundamental. Mainstream intellectuals, includ-
ing Nationalist leaders, advocated for social policy while refuting social 
revolution and class struggle, for which only Marxists advocated.
One of the earliest scholarly books on social problems was written by 
Tao Menghe, a representative of China’s early sociologists, professor, and 
chair of the Sociology Department of Beijing University in the 1920s. 
Tao published his 1924 book titled Social Problems (shehui wenti) as a 
textbook for senior high school students. Tao defined a “society” as “an 
organic collection of individuals” and “social problems” as “the diseases of 
a society” that hindered humans’ collective lives (Tao 1924: 15). Tao crit-
icised Marxist explanations for social problems as relying on a single fac-
tor (the economy) and discussed the natural, biological, demographic, 
psychological, economic and historical factors that cause “social prob-
lems”. Tao then identified “poverty” as the fundamental and central social 
problem in China (ibid., 174–175). Tao applied his multi-factor explana-
tion to rank the importance of these factors for contributing to poverty, 
natural and political were the most important, familial factors were very 
influential, and only after those factors were under control could eco-
nomic and labour conditions be addressed, and they were not the only 
ones. As Tao put it, “if people had the ability to control nature, if political 
integrity could be achieved, and if new economic organisations could be 
developed, then economic and labour conditions might be the most 
important causes of poverty”, he continued, “we should not think that 
they are the only causes  for poverty” (ibid., 165). Tao discussed poor 
relief as temporary solutions and social reforms as fundamental solutions 
to poverty.
On the other hand, China’s early socialists and communists, such as Li 
Dazhao, Chen Duxiu, Qu Qiubai, and Shi Fuliang argued for Marxist 
explanations of social problems, which Tao criticised. Shi Fuliang taught 
a course on Social Problems at Shanghai University. Based on his trans-
lated book Outlines of Social Problems (1929), we can discern the content 
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of his course. As he made it clear, his book was a translation of the work 
of Japanese socialist intellectual Hitoshi Yamakawa (1880–1958), a leader 
in establishing the Japanese Communist Party in 1922. The book gives a 
Marxist analysis of the social question, which he regarded as the labour 
question, a product of capitalism. In the preface, Shi put it directly, “The 
labour question, which is at the centre of all social problems, is the prod-
uct of capitalist contradictions. The solution to capitalist contradictions 
is socialism” (Shi 1929: 2). In this book and his 1930 book on social 
problems, however, Shi did not particularly discuss China’s social prob-
lems (Shi 1930).
However, GMD labour leaders and sociologists discussed China’s 
labour question using non-Marxist concepts. Ma Chaojun (1885–1977), 
who studied political economy at Meiji University in Japan and served as 
the head of the Labour Bureau of the Nationalist state in 1927, pointed 
out in his 1926 book China’s Labour Question that the labour question 
was the most important social question in the world, but it was not the 
time for Chinese labourers to fight capitalists yet, as there were not any 
capitalists in China due to China’s inadequate production. Ma criticised 
those calling for “labourers to rise up to fight capitalists” as being “igno-
rant of the time and circumstance” (1926: 3). His solution to China’s 
labour question was to provide labour protection measures rather than 
class struggles as promoted by the communists.
Chen Da, a most accomplished sociologist on China’s labour question, 
expressed similar views in his 1929 China’s Labour Question; as he put it, 
“in our country, this (labour) question is simpler than that of the West, 
but it will become more complicated with the development of China’s 
industry. So it is necessary to study China’s labour question without any 
delay” (Chen 1929: 2). Chen also proposed that developing welfare insti-
tutions, such as compulsory insurance, was the fundamental solution to 
the labour question.
Most of the sociologists and early Marxists, who were still at the stage 
of absorbing Western ideas, which were industry and urban oriented, did 
not pay enough attention to the land question as well as related peasant 
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problems until the 1930s.2 However, Sun Yat-sen, the founding father of 
the GMD and the Republic of China, insisted that the land question 
should be China’s biggest social question as demonstrated in his lectures 
on people’s livelihood in 1924. In these lectures, Sun refuted Marxism 
and criticised Marxist class struggle as “inverting causes and effects” and 
argued that China’s social question should be solved by “equalising land 
rights” and “regulating capital”, which meant preventing large landlords 
from controlling key industries. Sun continued to argue that, because of 
China’s poverty and insufficient industrial production, China should 
develop its national capital and revive industrial production (Sun 1924, 
Lectures I and II).
The ruling Beijing government, although unstable and short lived, did 
respond to these social problems. In 1915, it inherited and continued its 
support for the Qing Dynasty’s workhouses by issuing Regulations on 
Vagrant Workhouses (youmin xiyisuo) “to nurture young homeless people 
and reform juvenile delinquents (aged 8–16 years) so that they have the 
general knowledge and basic skills to make a living” (Yue 2006: 227–228). 
For the labour question, the Beijing government, under the pressures of 
the CCP-led labour movement, the GMD’s Southern Regime, and the 
ILO, issued its Provisional Factory Regulations in 1923 (revised in 1927) 
and the Factory Inspections Regulations in 1927. The two factory regula-
tions and the factory inspections regulations, however, were not imple-
mented because the GMD government soon replaced the Beijing 
government (Hu 2015).
 The GMD State’s Social Policy: State-building, 
Productivism, and Collectivism, 1927–1937
Upon ascending to power, the GMD state started its state-building pro-
cess, which claimed to follow Sun Yat-sen’s legacy, notably his three peo-
ples’ principles and his three-stage process of revolution (from military 
rule through political tutelage to constitutional government). In 1929, 
2 However, Mao Zedong, the would-be founder of the People’s Republic, was a notable exception 
and carried out several surveys on peasant issues in the 1920s.
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the GMD state claimed to enter the political tutelage stage, in which the 
GMD had the highest power in the political system and would guide 
state affairs. By the early 1930s, a five-sector government, or a five-yuan 
system, was established, following the American model (Myers 2000; 
Strauss 2000). By 1935, Jiang Jieshi (known in Western countries as 
Chiang Kai-shek) became the indisputable leader after winning over local 
warlords, driving the CCP out of its Jiangxi base and defeating his politi-
cal competitors.
Under the GMD’s one-party rule, the dynamic and tolerant political 
environment of the 1910s and 1920s changed dramatically. The GMD 
state was explicitly against Marxist class struggle as well as the individual-
ism of capitalist society. It promoted an “inclusivist and co-optive strat-
egy” to incorporate all those who could be co-opted because of the 
GMD’s belief in “the organic unity of the Chinese people” and its fear of 
open division (Strauss 2000: 90). This strategy was the result of incorpo-
rating Confucianism into the party-state’s ideology and learning from the 
West, including fascism. Fascism was only viewed as a way of restoring 
China: the GMD state was not fascist in nature but an authoritarian and 
military dictatorship (Wakeman 2000; Clinton 2017; Tsui 2019).
In the field of social policy, the GMD state immediately responded to 
the social problems widely discussed in the 1920s. To solve the poverty 
problem, it issued a series of regulations affecting poor relief organisa-
tions and private charities, with the dual purposes of providing welfare 
and social control. By 1935, these regulations consolidated existing poor-
houses and workhouses within an administrative jurisdiction into a single 
relief home and brought private charities under the state’s control (Cai 
2003: 254–261). In response to the labour question, the GMD state 
drafted the famous Labour Code Draft in 1929, which did not become 
law but served as the model for a series of labour protection laws issued 
in the early 1930s and a labour insurance bill that was not issued because 
of the breakout of the Second Sino-Japanese war. The GMD state’s social 
policy was outlined in its 1931 Provisional Constitution in chapter four, 
which covered the “national livelihood” (guomin shengji). While the relief 
homes functioned to some degree—although not always fulfilling their 
stated purposes—the labour laws basically were never put into practice. 
This was mainly due to the fact that these laws copied the contents of 
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Western laws, which surpassed the financial and administrative abilities 
of the Chinese state. Rhetorically, Sun Yat-sen’s three peoples’ principles, 
especially people’s livelihood, guided the GMD state’s policy for poor 
relief and labour protection. In reality, the immediate purpose of these 
policies was to root out communist influence (Ma 1927).
Productivist approaches adopted in 1927 greatly influenced the GMD 
state’s social policy, which had its roots in Sun Yat-sen’s people’s liveli-
hood principle. In 1924, Sun Yat-sen ultimately “identified an increase in 
national production as the central solution to the social problem” (Zanasi 
2006: 70). The GMD state pursued Sun’s productivism to guarantee 
people’s livelihood, which, in turn, reinforced the state’s belief in “com-
pulsory labour in exchange for relief ”. Due to the GMD state’s produc-
tivism, officials and sociologists alike frequently criticised China’s 
traditional poor relief as passive and as producing paupers. In his 1935 
book on China’s poverty, Ke Xiangfeng identified that the result of 
China’s traditional relief policy was “a society full of beggars, even profes-
sional beggars, and dependent poor” (Ke 1935: 325–326). As a correc-
tion to China’s traditional relief policy, the GMD state claimed that its 
poor relief provided active relief through compulsory labour to help 
recipients become independent and turn them from consumers into 
producers.
Collectivist notions of society and social problems also influenced the 
GMD state’s social policy. Following the introduction of Spencer’s works, 
Durkheim’s The Rules of Sociological Method (1895) was translated into 
Chinese in 1924 and methodologically defined sociology as an indepen-
dent and positivist social science. In 1935, in the midst of the GMD 
state’s revitalisation of Confucianism, Durkheim’s The Division of Labour 
in Society (1893) was translated into Chinese. This book presented 
Durkheim’s main concern for how to maintain social order through 
“mechanical solidarity” in “primitive societies” and through “organic soli-
darity” in advanced industrial societies, as well as his concern for the 
transition from primitive to industrial societies, which, he argued, might 
lead to major crises and anomie that was pathological to modern society.
Durkheim’s two books were well received. According to Sun Benwen, 
arguably the most important official sociologist in the Republican era, 
Durkheim’s two books were the most important sources of China’s 
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“synthesis school” of sociology, which was very influential in this time 
period (Sun 1948 [2011]: 270). Sun identified himself with this school 
in 1948, whereas before he had been well known for his emphasis on 
cultural factors (ibid., 276–279). It is not difficult to understand why 
China’s official sociologists received Durkheim’s works so well. Durkheim’s 
concerns with the transition from a traditional to a modern society agreed 
with China’s situation, as the GMD state engaged in modernising China. 
In addition, Durkheim’s notion of “society as a social organism”, which 
emphasised that society had a common purpose that transcended those 
of individuals, and it would impose that common purpose on its indi-
vidual members, fit in squarely with China’s Confucianism, which was 
being revived under GMD rule. Thus, the GMD state could take advan-
tage of this notion to justify the party’s authoritative rule over society.
Sociologist Zhu Yisong, one of the leading scholars of the synthesis 
school, wrote about introductory sociology as well as social problems and 
social policy. His 1933 Social Policy was one of a very few books that dis-
cussed China’s social policy in the 1930s; although there were several 
books published with the term “social policy” in their titles, they were 
either Chinese translations of foreign works or merely introductions of 
foreign social policies. The notion of a social organism inspired Zhu’s 
book, and he argued that the purpose of social policy was to increase 
order, peace, and harmony. Zhu’s arguments were in agreement with the 
GMD state’s official ideology.
In Social Policy, Zhu treated society as a system which had both har-
monising and conflicting interests and defined social problems as “prob-
lems that have threatened the order, peace, and happiness of society” 
(1933: 4). He argued for adopting a social policy that could increase the 
interests of a society or state (labelled as harmonising interests) and 
decrease the interests of groups or individuals (labelled as conflicting 
interests). As Zhu put it, social policy’s purpose is “to coordinate all sorts 
of interests so that groups and individuals can realise their interests under 
a single social system” (ibid., 6). He continued that, “a society thus 
achieved is a democratic society”, and “such a society will be full of hap-
piness, people will be friendly with one another, and such a society will 
become a closely connected organism, in which there will be no room for 
a philosophy of hatred” (ibid.). Finally, Zhu argued that in such a society 
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Marxism would naturally lose its attraction for workers, peasants and 
young people: as he put it, “when the soil becomes unsuitable, Marxists 
will not harvest anything even if they disseminate the seeds” (ibid.).
While the GMD determined to uproot the CCP’s influence, the CCP 
survived in rural areas. However, the communist-controlled Shanghai 
University closed in 1927, Qu Qiubai, a CCP leader, was executed, and 
Shi Fuliang was expelled and his translations of Marxism were banned. 
Nonetheless, the CCP established 15 bases in rural areas from 1928 to 
1934. The Soviet Union strongly influenced the policies of the CCP’s 
Central Committee by appointing its leaders. In February 1930, the Far 
Eastern Bureau of the Comintern helped the CCP Central Committee 
draft five laws on land, labour, economic policy, the red army, and organ-
isation of the Soviets, respectively, which were the basis for the Outline of 
the Constitution, Land Law, Labour Code, and Resolution on Economic 
Policies all issued in 1931. These laws attempted to establish a political 
regime modelled on the Soviet socialist system (Yu 1995: 45–46).
The Labour Code was applied to all workers in all sorts of enterprises, 
imitating the Soviet Labour Code of the 1920s in all aspects. It stipulated 
an eight-hour workday, a series of paid public holidays that totalled 175 
days per year, a high level of wages and welfare, and a set of comprehen-
sive social insurance benefits (ibid., 90–99). However, implementation of 
the Labour Code was a failure. By spring 1933, the Labour Code caused 
the shutdown of many small enterprises and, thus, unemployment of 
workers, due to the unrealistic benefits mentioned earlier (Zhang and 
Sun 2011). As a result, half a year later, the CCP issued a revised Labour 
Code on 15 October 1933, which made it more flexible in terms of work-
ing hours and other labour conditions to suit local situations (Yu 1995: 
338–356). However, the new Labour Code could not be fully applied 
because the CCP was driven out of its bases and began the Long March 
to Northwest China on 16 October 1934.
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 Wartime Social Policy: Universal Social Security 
and China’s “Special Situation” (1937–1945)
The outbreak of war with Japan did not change the features of the GMD 
state’s social policy, which continued to be part of the nation-building 
process, embodied collectivist notions of social problems and attempted 
to promote production. On the other hand, however, the Atlantic powers 
introduced the idea of universal social security, which greatly attracted 
Chinese elites in social policymaking, although they continued to empha-
sise China’s special situation.
The war made the refugee issue an unprecedented national crisis, 
which led to the establishment of the National Relief Commission (NRC) 
in 1938, an emergency organisation to deal with the refugee crisis. 
Meanwhile, the war provoked the GMD state to tighten its monitoring 
of mass mobilisation, and the GMD party consequently established the 
Ministry of Social Affairs in 1939.
However, in 1940, with the war at a stalemate, the Social Affairs 
Ministry was transferred to the Executive Yuan, which served as the state 
council and thus the highest administrative agency. The ministry not 
only retained its former responsibilities but also took over other social 
duties from the Interior Ministry, the Industries Ministry, the Economic 
Ministry, and the NRC. Accordingly, the ministry was made up of three 
subordinate departments for social welfare, social movements, and coop-
erative affairs, respectively. The social welfare department included six 
divisions and one bureau, each of which was, respectively, in charge of 
social insurance, labour welfare, social services, job centres, social relief, 
children’s welfare, and factory inspections (Qin 1983b, vol. 97: 14–28).
The 1940s were a decade of “welfare internationalism” (Kaufmann 
2012, chapter 4, 94–130). The term “social security” began to appear in 
international documents in the early 1940s. In August 1941, the Atlantic 
Charter referred to “the fullest collaboration between all nations in the 
economic field with the object of securing for all improved labour stan-
dards, economic advancement and social security”. In 1942, the ILO, at 
its Montreal office, published Approaches to Social Security: An International 
Survey, which promoted the idea of coordinating and integrating existing 
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social insurance and means-tested social assistance programmes into a 
single national scheme, as exemplified by the New Zealand system (ILO 
1942). In November 1942, Britain published the Beveridge Report, titled 
Social Insurance and Allied Services, which embodied similar ideas as those 
of the ILO 1942 Survey. The Beveridge Report proposed a thorough plan 
for the government to address the five giants identified by the report: 
want, disease, idleness, ignorance and squalor. What the report proposed 
was a single national flat-rate social insurance system, which was univer-
sal in its population coverage and comprehensive in its covered social 
risks in order to provide a national minimum safety net via flat-rate ben-
efits and contributions. More importantly, the Beveridge Report com-
mitted to three larger objectives, which were full employment, family 
allowances, and a general revenue-financed National Health Service sys-
tem free for the entire population.
If the ILO’s 1942 survey did not draw immediate attention, the 
Beveridge Report had an immediate impact on circulating the idea of a 
universal social security scheme and the post-war ideals advocated for in 
both the ILO survey and the Beveridge Report. The Beveridge Report 
became a milestone in the history of the development of the post-war 
welfare state. As Rodgers commented, “of all the welfare state programs 
and platforms that were to follow, none was to match its influence or the 
electricity of its reception” (1998: 489). As a result, the USA passed the 
Wagner-Murray-Dingell Bill in 1943 and Canada published its Marsh 
Plan in 1943. In 1944, India, supported by two ILO experts, considered 
issuing an Indian Beveridge Plan based on the Adarkar draft of a health 
insurance programme (Kumar 2003). The ILO further reinforced the 
ideas embodied in its 1942 survey and the 1942 Beveridge Report at its 
1944 Philadelphia Conference, which recognised the ILO’s obligation to 
advance global programmes that would achieve full employment, a basic 
income, and comprehensive medical care. In terms of social security, the 
Conference Declaration called for extending social security measures to 
provide not only a basic income but also a comprehensive medical care to 
all who were in need (Johnston 1970). China was not exempt from this 
global trend of emerging universal social security policies, especially 
under the leadership of the newly consolidated Ministry of Social Affairs 
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staffed with Euro-American-trained sociologists and other social scien-
tists (Hu and Manning 2010; Hu 2015; Ma 2012, 2014).
The Ministry of Social Affairs began to extensively recruit China’s soci-
ologists. Gu Zhenggang, the Social Affairs Minister during the ministry’s 
existence (1939–1949),3 studied at Berlin University from 1922 to 1925 
and returned to China in 1926 as a GMD party member. In 1931, Gu 
became a Deputy Minister for the Interior Ministry, then the Social 
Affairs Minister in 1939. Under his leadership, the Social Affairs Ministry 
appointed sociologists Xie Zhengfu and Zhang Hongjun as the head of 
the Social Welfare Department from 1942 to 1944 and from 1944 to 
1949, respectively.
Furthermore, the ministry invited Chinese sociologists to participate 
in every step of the ministry’s work on social policy formation from the 
initial policy design through drafting legislation to assessing policy imple-
mentation. For instance, many sociologists attended a series of important 
conferences the ministry held from January 1941 to the end of 1942 
(Qin 1983b, vol. 97). In 1942, based on the ministry’s suggestions, soci-
ologists from universities in the Chengdu region established a research 
committee on social relief, and the ministry’s Research Office began to 
edit a book series on social administration written by Chinese sociologists 
(Ke 1943: 1). By 1944, universities began to add sociology departments 
and opened courses on social administration and social affairs (Yan 2010: 
261–262). The ministry also recruited university graduates and dis-
patched outstanding ones to study social policy in the USA and Europe.
As a result of the ministry’s intensive efforts, the Social Relief Law was 
promulgated in 1943. Compared with its forerunner—the 1928 
Regulations on Local Relief Homes—this law significantly enlarged its 
target groups and improved the benefit levels, a result of learning from 
worldwide trends. As the ministry put it in its explanation of the social 
welfare bill, “according to the implications of the Grand Unity (Da Tong) 
in the Books of Rites on relief principles and in reference to various coun-
tries’ relief administration trends, we have drafted this social relief bill” 
3 In 1949, the Social Affairs Ministry was abolished and its major responsibilities were incorporated 
into the Interior Ministry under its Social Affairs Department, and Gu Zhenggang became the 
Minister of the Interior Ministry in 1950.
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(Yue 2006: 236). According to the ministry, the bill adopted four major 
ideas embodied in worldwide trends. First, it assumed the idea of state 
responsibility and abandoned former ideas of benevolence and kindness 
in providing social relief. This means that it is the state’s responsibility 
rather than the state’s mercy and grace to provide social relief. Second, 
accordingly, relief methods should transition from passive, post-event 
material assistance only to preventive and positive relief to help people 
become independent, useful instead of useless, and producers instead of 
consumers. Third, coverage should be extended from “the poor, old and 
weak, and disabled and sick” (pinqiong laoruo canji) to the entire popula-
tion, including pregnant women, children, the physically disabled, and 
labourers, as well as citizens in such situations as renting a home, contrib-
uting to economic cooperatives, and providing for family consumption. 
Benefits should cover all types of contingencies. As the ministry put it, 
“all countries around the world have provided their peoples with all sorts 
of benefits from birth to death”. Fourth, with the expansion of coverage 
and circumstances, the state should take responsibility and also greatly 
encourage people and organisations to operate private relief organisations 
(ibid., 236–238).
The passage of this social relief law also reflected changes in attitudes 
towards poverty. As early as the turn of the century, eradicating poverty 
was linked to China’s national survival. By the 1920s, Chinese elites 
largely emphasised the personal flaws of the poor and blamed them for 
their poverty, and criminalised vagrants and other poor. In the 1930s, 
sociologists, like Ke Xiangfeng, differentiated “pauperism” from “pov-
erty”: pauperism was defined as “dependency on others who were not 
naturally or legally responsible” for them (1935: 10). This implies that 
poverty rather than pauperism should be socially supported. It was in the 
1940s during the war that intellectuals began to emphasise that “poverty 
is not a crime”, and laziness was not the source of poverty but, instead, 
social factors, such as the war, caused many diligent and frugal people to 
experience poverty (Zhou 1944).
From its inception, the ministry recognised the novelty and impor-
tance of social insurance in solving social problems that industrialisation 
created and maintaining social order. It planned to set up a Social 
Insurance Bureau in the near future. It viewed drafting social insurance 
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bills as one of its major tasks: for that purpose, it collected and translated 
a series of social insurance laws from Euro-American countries and the 
Soviet Union. By 1943, the ministry had already drafted a series of social 
insurance bills, and a Chinese translation of the Beveridge Report reached 
the Ministry in 1943, leading to wide-ranging discussions of its major 
ideas by the ministry’s experts and the desire to draft China’s own 
Beveridge plan in 1944 (Ma 2012: 337–344). Although no social insur-
ance laws were enacted during the war, the ministry chose the district of 
Ziliujin in Northern Sichuan to experiment with social insurance funds 
for salt miners. In 1943, it had established about ten insurance societies 
in ten counties, covering around 50,000 workers altogether.
Overall, although “world trends” played an important role in the 
GMD state’s wartime social policy formation, Chinese intellectuals and 
officials emphasised China’s inherent social ideas and China’s own situa-
tion, as demonstrated by a 1943 GMD Propaganda Department docu-
ment on wartime social administration. This document first stated that 
China’s inherent ideal society was harmonised, and then it discussed 
major features of China’s social administration as compared to those of 
Euro-American countries. This shows the GMD state’s continued rheto-
ric reliance on Confucianism while learning from the West.
According to this document, we can summarise the major features of 
China’s social administration as follows. First of all, as the purpose of 
China’s state-building was to realise the three peoples’ principles, the 
party-state needed to train the masses to achieve national independence. 
Second, while Western countries were industrialised and their living stan-
dards were relatively high, China was still primarily agricultural and all 
socio-economic levels of society suffered from low living standards, espe-
cially when China was at war. Therefore, although Western countries’ 
social administration programmes focused on redistribution, China’s 
social administration should aim to improve industrial production. 
Third, while Western countries had class conflict caused by capital, China 
had no classes at all. As a result, while Western countries’ social policies 
targeted workers to reduce class conflict, China’s social policies needed to 
target the entire population to prevent the emergence of classes (Qin 
1983a, vol. 96: 15–49).
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In 1944, in his article “Several Principles of Social Administration 
from the Last Three Years”, the Social Affairs Minister Gu Zhenggang 
analysed the issue of what kind of social policies China should adopt. In 
this article, Gu mentioned that China’s social administration’s biggest 
task was to solve China’s social problems and complete its social recon-
struction. Whereas there were three kinds of global social policies—capi-
talist, socialist, and fascist—he recommended that China should adopt 
the three peoples’ social policy because of China’s state ideology, social 
needs, and social problems. As Gu put it, “we should know that state 
ideology and social needs are the two conditions that determine the types 
of social policies of any country. The three peoples’ principles are our 
country’s supreme ideology and principles, and our country’s social prob-
lems have their own nature. Therefore, our social policy must be based on 
the three peoples’ principles” (Qin 1983c, vol. 99: 1–3).
Upon the outbreak of the war, the GMD and CCP formed a second 
united front, and the CCP abandoned “its policies of armed revolt, sovi-
etisation, and forcible confiscation of landlords’ land” (Van Slyke 1967: 
92–93). With the war’s stalemate in late 1939 and 1940, the united front 
became fragile due to both military and ideological conflicts. In response, 
in January 1940, Mao Zedong published his essay “On New Democracy”, 
arguing for the establishment of a new democratic republic that would be 
a proletarian-led, multi-class coalition regime in transition to a socialist 
regime (Mao 1940). In other words, the essay emphasised class coordina-
tion between national capitalists and the working class as well as a transi-
tion to a socialist regime in the future.
Accordingly, in late 1940 and 1941, the CCP promoted a wartime 
labour policy that abandoned its previous radical labour policy (Central 
Committee 1985, vol. 3: 42). The Labour Policy Outline provided con-
crete measures for major aspects of labour policy. The Labour Policy 
Outline pointed out that “social insurance should be set up as contingen-
cies for sickness and death”; however, “if there are difficulties in setting up 
social insurance, regulations on benefits for workers’ injuries, accidents, 
and deaths should be provided” (ibid., 52–54).
During the rectification campaign of 1942 and 1943, the CCP further 
criticised the radical labour movement as subjective, which “blindly 
applied the set of measures suitable in industrial urban areas to the 
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wartime base areas”, and was described as “rural, economically backward, 
repeatedly attacked by enemies, and characteristic of the new democratic 
economy and politics” (Tang et al. 2002: 537–539). Thus, production, 
rather than improving workers’ livelihoods, was stressed, especially after 
Mao’s 1943 call “to organise up”, which led to another round of large- 
scale production campaigns (Mao 1991: 933).
As a result of implementing the wartime labour policy that emphasised 
class coordination and increased production, social insurance disappeared 
in all labour protections and collective contract regulations issued by 
administrators in major bases from 1941 to 1944 (ibid., 75–119). In 
contrast, we recall that social insurance was part of the 1930s Labour 
Code, and, as late as 1940, public enterprises in a major base area offered 
labour insurance funds to provide benefits to workers’ families in the 
event of sickness, death, or injury (Xinhua Daily, 1 May 1941, in ibid., 
149). Yet, wartime regulations provided labour compensation rather than 
social insurance benefits.
 Post-war Development: Establishing Social 
Security Institutions, 1945–1978
In May 1945, at its Sixth National Congress, the GMD adopted its 
famous four principal social policies, including the National Health 
Programme, Labour Programme, Agrarian Programme and Preliminary 
Facilities for a Post-war Social Security Programme (Chinese Ministry of 
Information 1947). The post-war social security programme was brand 
new, and the 1942 British Beveridge Report and the ILO’s post-war recon-
struction plan greatly influenced it. It used the term “social security” in 
its title and pointed out that, “the main tasks of a postwar social security 
programme shall be vocational guidance, social insurance, and social 
relief ”; and “social insurance” referred to a comprehensive social insur-
ance programme, its financial sources, and principles for determining 
benefits (ibid., 52). In 1946, the GMD state approved “Implementing 
Measures to Establish Preliminary Facilities for a Postwar Social Security 
Programme”, which provided a strategy and specific agenda for setting up 
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social insurance programmes (Chen 1984: 368). Meanwhile, the 1947 
Constitution provided “social security”.
In 1946, the GMD government was able to set up a Preparation 
Department to establish the Central Social Insurance Bureau under the 
Ministry of Social Affairs. This Preparation Department drafted Principles 
for Social Insurance Laws (shehui baoxianfa yuanze), which was passed by 
the National government’s state conference in 1947 and became the first 
social insurance law in modern China. The explanation of the 1947 
Principles made clear reference to the British National Insurance Act of 
1946, and the ILO’s publications, such as the ILO’s 1942 Approaches to 
Social Security, and many other contemporaneous foreign laws and mate-
rials (Nanjing Archives 1947). In 1948, China not only participated in 
the drafting of the United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights but also ratified the declaration, which included social security as 
a major human right. The GMD took over the workhouses and poor-
houses in areas Japan previously occupied. With hyperinflation, the col-
lapse of the economy, and the deterioration of the refugee situation, 
poverty-related problems became even more challenging, although the 
GMD state continued to stress positive relief and labour productivity.
On the eve of victory in the Second Sino-Japanese War, the CCP 
claimed to continue its wartime new democratic labour policy and called 
for a social insurance programme. As Mao Zedong contended in his 
1945 report “On Coalition Government”, the government would adopt 
social insurance, eight- to ten-hour workdays and unemployment relief 
to protect workers’ interests (Mao 1945). As a result, from 1945 to 1948, 
various bases adopted labour protection regulations that included a sec-
tion on “labour insurance” or “social insurance” (Zhou et  al. 2002: 
326–347). As the CCP took over more and more cities from the GMD, 
they called for a meeting of trade unions from all liberalised areas in 
1948, which turned into the Sixth National Labour Conference. Labour 
insurance for public enterprises became a major issue at the conference 
because the number of state enterprises had increased. Thus, the 
Resolution of the Conference states that “places with large concentrations 
of industrial workers can initiate labour insurance programmes” (All- 
China Trade Union 1957: 373). Shortly after the Sixth Labour Conference 
concluded, in December 1948, the Northeast Region adopted a labour 
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insurance programme, which was based on the Soviet model of social 
insurance.
In 1949, the People’s Republic was officially established in October, 
and, upon its defeat, the GMD central government retreated to Taiwan 
in December. Shortly thereafter, in 1950, Taiwan adopted a labour insur-
ance programme at the provincial level, while China adopted its labour 
insurance model at the national level in 1951. Both labour insurance 
systems were continuations of the GMD and CCP’s pre-1949 efforts to 
provide social insurance (Hu 2015, 2016). The fate of each system, how-
ever, contrasted greatly in the following decades, until the early 1980s 
when China entered a new era. By 1952, Taiwan’s labour insurance pro-
gramme had rapidly extended to all enterprises with more than ten work-
ers, while in the 1950s separate labour insurance schemes were established 
for the self-employed, fishermen, and sugar employees. In 1958, all these 
existing systems were incorporated into a single labour insurance system 
(Hu 2015). In contrast, China’s labour insurance scheme only applied to 
enterprises with 100 workers or more, and the system’s operation deterio-
rated during the Great Leap (1958–1960) and broke down completely 
during the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976).
In both China and Taiwan, government employees and military ser-
vicemen received privileged social benefits either in the form of social 
insurance as in Taiwan or from the state’s budget as in China. By the 
1980s, only farmers, housewives, and other unemployed populations 
were excluded from the existing social insurance system in Taiwan, but in 
China, a much larger population remained without coverage as “state 
paternalism” was “practiced on the principle of exclusivity” (Lee 2019: 
59). In Taiwan, the 1943 social relief law was in effect until 1980, and, in 
China, the government provided both emergency and social relief to 
urban residents.
Furthermore, China implemented a separate social security system for 
peasants due to the urban-rural divide. This divide materialised as a result 
of the household registration system that the government developed in 
the 1950s, which classified the population into rural and urban residents 
and made it extremely hard for rural residents (peasants) to become urban 
residents. In the countryside, the state inherited the emergency relief sys-
tem and set up a system for the wubaohu (households similar to the 
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historical guangua gudu fei) in which local rural collectives rather than the 
government provided them with the basics like food, clothing, and hous-
ing. The state provided free public education and organised rural health 
cooperatives for all rural residents through the local People’s Communes 
(for China’s Commune welfare programme, see Dillon 2015). Both sys-
tems were globally recognised and highly praised. This rural system has 
undergone great changes since 1978, when China officially entered the 
reform and opening-era (Shi, Chap. 3 of this book).
 Conclusion: Ideas and Reforms
This chapter analysed the rise of social security ideas and policies in China 
in the first half of the twentieth century using Leisering’s “onion skin 
model” of social policy ideas (see the summary in Table 2.1). It first dis-
cussed China’s imperial state relief policies and demonstrated the influ-
ence of Western missionaries and Western poor relief on China’s relief 
system from the late nineteenth century to the first decade of the twenti-
eth century. It then analysed the rise of social problems and the social 
question in China in the 1920s, and the accompanying debates between 
China’s mainstream non-Marxist intellectuals and early Marxists at a 
time when the political environment remained tolerant before the GMD 
came to power and suppressed Marxism and liberalism. Parts three to five 
examined the GMD state’s social security policies during its reign from 
1928 to 1949 and argued that its social policy was regarded as part of its 
state-building processes and it adopted collectivistic notions of social 
problems and social policy that emphasised production rather than redis-
tribution and individual rights. In particular, part four explored the war-
time social policy, including the impact of universal social security ideas 
on the GMD state’s social policy. Parts three to five also introduced the 
CCP’s social security policies in the areas that it controlled.
Several ideational points are worth highlighting. First, this chapter 
revealed that there was an early rise in social security ideas and institu-
tions in China in the first decades of the twentieth century, although 
these ideas often did not become bills, bills often did not become legisla-
tion, and related laws were often not implemented due to China’s weak 
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central state during this turbulent time. The early 1940s, however, began 
to see intensified social policy development in China, partially due to the 
great impact of the Allied powers’ universal social security ideas on China. 
The result was the issuance of a series of social security laws and decrees, 
including the Social Relief Law in 1943, the Employee’s Welfare Law in 
1943, and the Principles of Social Insurance Laws in 1947. In addition, 
the GMD party issued the Four Principal Social Policies in 1945, which 
included the first policy with the term “social security” in its title. This, in 
turn, paved the way for “social security” to be written into the 1947 
Constitution. Unlike most of the laws in previous decades, the two laws 
on social relief and employees’ welfare were not only implemented but 
also had a significant impact (together with the 1947 Principles) on 
Taiwan’s social security throughout the post-war era.
Second, the above-mentioned two laws from 1943 also had an impact 
on Communist China’s social security policies in the sense that China 
carried on the enduring tradition of state emergency relief and continued 
some social relief and employee’s welfare practices in the 1950s. It thus 
partially agreed with the recent literature, arguing there were ideological 
and practice continuities across the 1949 divide between the GMD and 
CCP regimes. However, this chapter insisted that the GMD state’s social 
security policy was the direct source of Taiwan’s social security programme 
in the post-war era, whereas Communist China’s social security model 
originated in the areas it controlled before 1949 and emulated the Soviet 
models as shown by pertinent discussions throughout this chapter.
Third, in Republican China, almost all non-Marxists, who remained 
the mainstream intellectuals, accepted the organic concept of society pro-
mulgated in the classic sociological tradition of Comte, Spencer and 
Durkheim, which viewed “social problems” as social diseases that threaten 
the social order. The organic concepts of society led to a concern for sta-
bility and harmony in society, and this concern was reinforced under the 
GMD rule in the 1930s when Confucianism was incorporated into the 
party-state’s ideology. By abandoning Marxist notions of class struggle 
and radical revolution, as well as suppressing liberal notions of individual 
rights, the GMD state adopted collectivist notions of social policy, which 
emphasised economic growth and increasing production.
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Fourth, although external ideas played an important role in China’s 
social security policy as discussed earlier, Chinese elites emphasised 
China’s special situation when debating and designing China’s social pol-
icy. The GMD state recruited many Western-trained sociologists to its 
social administration as advisors and officials, especially after the Ministry 
of Social Affairs was established in the 1940s. While these intellectuals 
and officials paid close attention to global trends, they consistently argued 
that China’s social problems had their own causes and forms, which were 
different from those of the West, and China had its own state ideology, 
which was different from foreign ones. Thus, they continued, China 
should not adopt any existing foreign social policies (neither Soviet, capi-
talist, nor fascist), but its own social policy based on China’s special situ-
ation, which was officially labelled as the three peoples’ social policy.
References
All-China Trade Union (eds.) (1957) Selected materials from all conferences of the 
All-China Trade Union. Beijing: Workers’ Publisher.
Béland, Daniel, and Klaus Petersen (eds.) (2014) Analysing social policy concepts 
and language: Comparative and transnational perspectives. Bristol, UK: Bristol 
University Press and Policy Press.
Breman, Jan, Kevan Harris, Ching Kwan Lee, and Marcel van der Linden (eds.) 
(2019) The social question in the twenty-first century: A global view. Oakland, 
California: University of California Press.
Breslau, Daniel (2007) The American Spencerians: Theorizing a new science. In 
Sociology in America: A history, ed. Craig Calhoun, Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 39–62.
Cai, Qinyu (2003) State, society, and the vulnerable: Social relief in the Republic of 
China, 1927–1949. Tianjin: Tianjin People’s Publisher.
Central Committee of the CCP (eds.) (1985) Selected documents on the Labour 
Movement, vol. 3. Beijing: Central Committee of the CCP.
Chen, Da (1929) China’s Labour Question. Shanghai: Commercial Press.
Chen, Guojun (1984) Social policy and social legislation. Taibei: Three 
Peoples’ Press.
Chen, Janet (2012) Guilty of indigence: The urban poor in China, 1900–1953. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
2 The Early Rise of Social Security in China: Ideas and Reforms… 
86
Chiang, Yung-chen (2001) Social engineering and the social sciences in China, 
1919–1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Chinese Ministry of Information (eds.) (1947) China handbook, 1937–1945: A 
comprehensive survey of major developments in China in eight years of war. 
Revised and enlarged edition. New York: Macmillan.
Clinton, Maggie (2017) Revolutionary nativism: Fascism and culture in China, 
1925–1937. Durham: Duke University Press.
Culp, Robert (2017) Articulating citizenship: Civic education and student politics 
in Southeastern China, 1912–1940. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Dillon, Nara (2015) Radical inequalities. Chinas revolutionary welfare state in 
comparative Perspective. Cambridge, MA and London: Harvard 
University Press.
Ding, Yi (1988) On the original introduction of Western sociology into China. 
Sociological Studies 6: 86–87.
Eastman, Lloyd E. (1984) Seeds of destruction: Nationalist China in war and revo-
lution, 1937–1949. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Fung, Edmund S. K. (2010) The intellectual foundations of Chinese modernity: 
Cultural and political thought in the Republican era. Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press.
Hu, Aiqun (2012) The global spread of neoliberalism and China’s pension 
reform since 1978. Journal of World History 23,3: 609–638.
Hu, Aiqun (2015) China’s social insurance in the twentieth century: A global his-
torical perspective. Leiden: The Brill Academic Publisher.
Hu, Aiqun (2016) Social insurance ideas in the People’s Republic of China: A 
transnational and historical analysis. Transnational Social Review 6,3: 297–312.
Hu, Aiqun and Patrick Manning (2010) The global social insurance movement 
since the 1880s. Journal of Global History 5,1: 125–148.
Huang, Hongshan (2011) Research on charity in Modern China: Centred on 
Jiangnan in the Late Qing Dynasty. Tianjin: Tianjin Guoji Chubanshe.
International Labour Organization (1942) Approaches to social security: An inter-
national survey. Montreal: International Labour Office.
Johnston, G. A. (1970) The International Labour Organization: Its work for social 
and economic progress. London: Europa.
Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver (2012) European foundations of the welfare state. Trans. 
John Veit-Wilson. New York: Berghahn Books.
Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver (2013) Thinking about social policy: The German tradi-
tion. Trans. Thomas Dunlap. Berlin, Germany: Springer.
Ke, Xiangfeng (1935) China’s poverty issue. Shanghai: Zhongzheng Shuju.
 A. Hu
87
Ke, Xiangfeng (1943) Social relief. Shanghai: Zhongzheng Shuju.
Kettunen, Pauli and Klaus Petersen (eds.) (2011) Beyond welfare state models: 
Transnational historical perspectives on social policy. Cheltenham, UK: 
Edward Elgar.
Kumar, S. Vijaya (2003) Economic security for the elderly in India: An over-
view. Journal of Aging & Social Policy 15: 45–65.
Lee, Ching Kwan (2019) The social question as the struggle over precarity: The 
case of China. In The social question in the twenty-first century: A global view, 
ed. Jan Breman, Kevan Harris, Ching Kwan Lee, and Marcel van der Linden, 
Oakland, California: University of California Press, 58–76.
Leisering, Lutz (2019) The global rise of social cash transfers: How states and inter-
national organizations constructed a new instrument for combating poverty. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Leung, Joe C. B. and Richard C. Nann (1995) Authority and benevolence: Social 
welfare in China. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press.
Liang, Qizi (1997) Shishan yu jiaohua: Ming-qing de cishan zuzhi (Charity and 
moral indoctrination: Philanthropic organisations of the Ming and Qing 
Dynasties). Taibei, Taiwan: Lian Jing Publisher.
Ma, Chaojun (1926) China’s Labour Question. Shanghai: People’s Intelligence 
Publisher.
Ma, Chaojun (1927) Introduction. Labour Monthly 1.
Ma, Tehyun (2012) A Chinese Beveridge plan: The discourse on social security 
and the post-war construction of China. European Journal of East Asian 
Studies 11,2: 329–349.
Ma, Tehyun (2014) “The common aim of the Allied Powers”: Social policy and 
international legitimacy in wartime China, 1940–47. Journal of Global 
History 9,2: 254–275.
MacKinnon, Stephen (2008) Wuhan, 1939: War, refugees, and the making of 
modern China. Berkeley: University of California Press.
Mao, Zedong (1940) On New Democracy. https://www.marxists.org/chinese/
maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-194001.htm (retrieved 08 May 2020).
Mao, Zedong (1945) On Coalition Government. https://www.marxists.org/
chinese/maozedong/marxist.org-chinese-mao-19450424.htm (retrieved 08 
May 2020).
Mao, Zedong (1991) Organise up. In Selected works of Mao Zedong, vol. 3, ed. 
Mao Zedong, Beijing: People’s Publisher, 933.
2 The Early Rise of Social Security in China: Ideas and Reforms… 
88
Myers, Ramon H. (2000) The Chinese state during the Republican Era. In The 
modern Chinese state, ed. David Shamaugh, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 42–72.
Nanjing Archives (1947) 11-6504: Preparation Department for the Central 
Social Insurance Bureau of the Ministry of Social Affairs: Drafting social 
insurance principles.
Qin, Xiaoyi (ed.) (1983a) Revolutionary documents, vol. 96: Historical documents 
of the Resistance War against Japan and reconstruction—Social Reconstruction 
I. Taibei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe.
Qin, Xiaoyi (ed.) (1983b) Revolutionary documents, vol. 97: Historical documents 
of the Resistance War against Japan and reconstruction—Social Reconstruction 
II. Taibei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyingshe.
Qin, Xiaoyi (ed.) (1983c) Revolutionary documents, vol. 99: Historical documents 
of the Resistance War against Japan and reconstruction—Social Reconstruction 
IV. Taibei: Zhongyang wenwu gongyinghshe.
Rodgers, Daniel (1998) Atlantic crossings: Social politics in a progressive age. 
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Shi, Fuliang (1929) Outlines of social problems. Shanghai: Shanghai Nanqiang 
Publisher.
Shi, Fuliang (1930) The basics of social problems. Shanghai: New Life Publisher.
Shi, Shih-Jiunn (2017) Reviving the dragon: Social ideas and social policy devel-
opment in Modern China. Issues & Studies 53,3: 1–25.
Strauss, Julia C. (2000) The evolution of republican government. In Reappraising 
Republican China, ed. Frederic Wakeman, Jr and Richard L.  Edmonds, 
New York: Oxford University Press, 75–97.
Sun, Benwen (2011) Sociology in contemporary China. Shanghai: Commercial 
Press. First published in 1948.
Sun, Hong and Deguang Bi (2018) Research on the social relief system of the 
Song Dynasty. Journal of Jingdezhen University 33,1: 64–68.
Sun, Yat-sen (1924) People’s livelihood: Lectures I and II. In Lectures on three 
peoples’ principles, see https://zh.wikisource.org/zh-hans/三民主义 (retrieved 
08 May 2020).
Tang, Yuliang, Jilan Zhang, Yanping Cao, and Mingkui Liu (eds.) (2002) The 
working class and workers’ movements in the anti-Japanese, democratic bases in 
the era of the resistance war against Japan, vol. 11 of The working class and 
workers’ movements in Modern China, ed. Yuliang Tang and Mingkui Liu. 
Beijing: The CCP’s Central Party School Publisher.
Tao, Menghe (1924) Social problems. Shanghai: Commercial Press.
 A. Hu
89
Tsin, Machael (1997) Imagining “society” in early twentieth-century China. In 
Imagining the people: Chinese intellectuals and the concept of citizenship, 
1890–1920, ed. Joshua Fogel and Peter Zarrow. Armonk: 
M. E. Sharpe, 212–231.
Tsin, Machael (1999) Nation, governance, and modernity in China: Canton, 
1900–1927. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Tsui, Brian (2019) China’s conservative revolution: The quest for a new order, 
1927–1949. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Van Slyke, Lyman P. (1967) Enemies and friends: The united front in Chinese com-
munist history. Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Wakeman Jr., Frederic (2000) A revisionist view of the Nanjing Decade: 
Confucian fascism. In Reappraising Republican China, ed. Frederic Wakeman, 
Jr. and Richard L. Edmonds, New York: Oxford University Press, 141–178.
Wang, Junqiu (2008) Charity and relief in China. Beijing: Chinese Social 
Sciences Publisher.
Wang, Weiping (2002) On the primitive formation of Ancient China’s social 
security system. Jianghai Academic Journal 5: 153–154.
Wang, Weiping (2007) On China’s traditional social security affairs in ancient 
times. Study and Exploration serial no. 168: 232–236.
Will, Pierre-Etienne and R. Bin Wong (1991) Nourish the people: The state civil-
ian granary system in China, 1650–1850. Ann Arbor: The University 
of Michigan.
Yan, Ming (2010) A history of China’s sociology: A discipline and an era. Beijing: 
Qinghua University Press.
Yu, Boliu (1995) Zhongyong Suqu Jinji Shi. Nanchang: Jiangxi People’s Publisher.
Yue, Zongfu (2006) Social security legislation in Modern China, 1912–1949. 
Jinan: Qilu Book Publisher.
Zanasi, Margherita (2006) Saving the nation: Economic modernity in Republican 
China. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Zhang, Wen (2017) Inside and outside the system: The double-track system of 
social security in the Song Dynasty and its historical limitations. Chinese 
Social Security Review 1,4: 116–126.
Zhang, Younan and Wei Sun (2011) Research on the issue of labour laws in the 
Central Soviet Era. Jiangxi Social Sciences 3: 132–137.
Zhang, Zuping (2012) Research on the social security systems of the Ming-Qing era. 
Beijing: Beijing University Press.
Zhou, Xianwen (1944) Shou pin (Speaking of poverty). Dongfang Zazhi 
40,12: 23–26.
2 The Early Rise of Social Security in China: Ideas and Reforms… 
90
Zhou, Zhengben, Zhu Zhu, Shi Hua, Mingkui Liu, and Yuliang Tang (eds.) 
(2002) The working class and workers’ movements in liberated areas during the 
Liberalisation War, vol. 14 of The working class and workers’ movements in 
Modern China, ed. Yuliang Tang and Mingkui Liu. Beijing: The CCP’s 
Central Party School Publisher.
Zhu, Yisong (1933) Social policy. Shanghai: Commercial Publisher.
Open Access  This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative Commons 
Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/
by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and reproduction 
in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to the original 
author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons licence and 
indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
 A. Hu
91© The Author(s) 2021
L. Leisering (ed.), One Hundred Years of Social Protection, Global Dynamics of Social 
Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54959-6_3
3
Social Security: The Career 
of a Contested Social Idea in China 
During the Reform Era, 1978–2020
Shih-Jiunn Shi
 Introduction: The Rise of the Idea of “Social 
Security” in China
In the history of the People’s Republic of China, social welfare is a domain 
that has witnessed dramatic institutional changes. In various phases of 
economic development, the state established or restructured social secu-
rity systems in a rather radical way: from the overwhelming state pre-
dominance in the socialist period (1949–1978), to the retreat of public 
responsibility at the beginning of the reform era (1978–2000), and, 
finally, to the recent return of the state that seems to be successively 
reclaiming its authority over other societal sectors and organisations. The 
inconsistency of welfare reform logic from period to period compelled 
the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to craft delicate ideas to justify 
each policy change. One prime example is the notion of “social security”, 
S.-J. Shi (*) 




which did not exist in socialist China until years after the CCP launched 
its “reform and openness” (gaige kaifang) policy in 1978. Initially bor-
rowed from the policy materials of international organisations, “social 
security” has been gaining recognition in both official documents and 
domestic academic articles as the way to characterise the state’s collective 
commitment to individual well-being and the corresponding institu-
tional arrangements the state has made to honour this pledge.
The rise of the idea of “social security” in Chinese social policy has 
received scant scholarly attention. Indeed, most of the studies on this 
topic take this idea for granted without exploring its conspicuous emer-
gence in the reform era. Even those accounts that reference Chinese cul-
ture generally suggest the impact of traditional familialism or community 
relief on the minimal role of the state but leave the question of why, and 
in what ways, new social policy ideas sprout unanswered (e.g. Chen 1996; 
Wong 1998; Twohey 1999). This is surprising given that the instrumen-
tal role semantics (or to use a more pejorative term, propaganda) has 
played in the CCP’s rule. Since its foundation in 1921, the party has 
mastered the discursive skills necessary to frame political and social situ-
ations in specific ways, as well as to enable mass mobilisation in its favour. 
Unveiling particular semantic contexts is the key to grasping the develop-
ment of various policy fields, such as social welfare. The present study 
seeks to fill this gap by tracing ideational developments in these related 
fields. I argue that the career of the term “social security” and its variants 
neatly reflects the zeitgeist of social policy of the reform era, especially 
with respect to the relations of the state to other societal sectors (markets, 
social organisations, and others). The latter aspect is crucial but also 
problematic, given the monopolistic nature of CCP’s authoritarian rule. 
The consequence is a trajectory of somewhat elusive, if not contradictory, 
understandings of “social security” in the reform era.
It is important to note that the chronological sequence of various ideas 
analysed below by no means presumes a linear evolution or ideational 
continuity of the “social security” concept, rather the aim is to outline 
how, and in what ways, pertinent social welfare ideas arise and undergo 
semantic changes—at times intersecting with or even at odds with one 
another—in the Chinese context. To some extent, the coexistence of 
occasionally inconsistent ideas helps mitigate the potential 
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contradictions that would otherwise undermine the legitimacy of the 
government’s reform efforts. The first section offers a historical back-
ground of socialist welfare ideas from 1949 to 1978. The following sec-
tions then outline the early idea of welfare “socialisation”, the subsequent 
début of the concept of “social security”, and its recent reinterpretation as 
“social governance”. The final section summarises the chapter’s findings 
and reflects on their implications for social policy in contemporary China.
 Socialist Welfare Ideas, 1949–1978: Urban 
Labour Insurance Versus Rural 
Residual Welfare
When founding the People’s Republic in 1949 after the civil war, the 
CCP laid out a blueprint to build a socialist system that would uphold its 
ideological supremacy vis-à-vis capitalism. In the Cold War era, the Soviet 
model of urban development with a focus on heavy industry set the prec-
edent for the new Chinese nation to follow and emulate, leading to what 
Selden (1988: 11) termed “mobilisational collectivism” both in urban 
and rural regions and, ultimately, class struggle, mass mobilisation, col-
lectivisation of the economy, elimination of market mechanisms, and 
equal distribution. The state-owned enterprises (SOE) in conjunction 
with the danwei (work unit) system and the people’s communes became 
two distinctive pillars of the Chinese socialist model.
 Urban Welfare
Urban welfare rested on SOE welfare programmes. Workers’ benefits, 
including comprehensive, non-contributory, and fully fledged welfare 
benefits, stemmed entirely from the work units to which workers 
belonged. Given the vanguard role of workers in socialist ideology, the 
government established a full employment system (the iron rice bowl),1 
coupled with a comprehensive system of labour-related social benefits 
1 A Chinese term denoting secure livelihood.
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and guaranteed low-price food supply (Dixon 1981; Leung and Nann 
1995; Lü and Perry 1997). Urban welfare featured high employment, 
generous benefits, and low nominal wages. Underpinning the urban sys-
tem was labour insurance that covered such risks as old age, sickness, 
work injury, and maternity (in addition to unemployment since 1986). 
Each SOE was responsible for the financial expense of the insurance pro-
grammes for its employees: 3 per cent of total enterprise wages flowed 
into a collective fund for labour insurance. The trade union in each enter-
prise organised contribution collection under the umbrella of the All- 
China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), which represented 
party-affiliated worker organisations. In the case of specific SOEs’ finan-
cial difficulties, the state claimed final responsibility for the SOEs’ contri-
bution liabilities using tax revenue. Since all SOEs belonged to the state, 
management bore little concern for the operation’s profits or losses, nor 
did the enterprise’s performance have any impact on employees’ welfare 
benefits.
A central element of urban social policy was labour insurance (laodong 
baoxian): an urban-centred and labour-first idea. The year 1952 saw the 
promulgation of Labour Insurance Regulation of the People’s Republic of 
China, which laid the foundation of the urban welfare programmes. 
While the term “labour” revealed the employment basis of social welfare 
programmes and urban workers’ privileged access to public benefits vis-
à- vis other social classes (e.g. rural peasants), “insurance” defined the 
state’s commitment to preventing social risks for this specific group 
(Dillon 2015). To achieve the goal of industrialising with a focus on 
heavy industry, the state’s monopoly over crop prices in the pricing and 
marketing of agricultural products transferred rural economic resources 
to the urban sector.2 In a time when China remained an underdeveloped 
economy and peasants made up the majority (80 per cent) of the popula-
tion, the establishment of labour insurance appeared premature but 
revealed the CCP’s ardent zeal for industrialisation.
One characteristic defining the labour insurance programme in the 
socialist era was the absence of unemployment insurance because jobless-
ness was considered a pathology of the capitalist economy that would 
2 Total resources directed in this way is estimated at over 600 billion yuan (Lin et al. 2000: 149).
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(and should) not exist in socialism. Indeed, the architecture of the labour 
insurance programme strengthened the image of the state caring for citi-
zens from the cradle to the grave. The underlying social contract between 
the state and urban workers assured the former’s responsibility for 
employment security in exchange for the latter’s lifelong devotion. The 
danwei became the organisational interface between the state and urban 
workers, undertaking care-taking responsibilities for their employees. For 
urban workers, affiliation to the danwei entailed economic resources in 
exchange for labour, political power through rankings in the organisation 
hierarchy, and symbolic esteem socially (Cheng and Selden 1997; Lü and 
Perry 1997). By the same token, urban social assistance programmes have 
remained largely rudimentary because poverty was an unusual incident 
that only occurred in the case of physical and mental disabilities or loss of 
family support. Aside from these two rare misfortunes, the labour insur-
ance programme virtually covered all workplace risks and secured the 
urban livelihood.
 Rural Welfare
The socialist institutional framework of resource allocation in favour of 
urban workers operated at an enormous price, largely paid by the major-
ity of the rural population. Owing to the rigid system of household reg-
istration (hukou) that prohibited peasants from freely moving around and 
choosing their residence, peasants often stayed trapped in the People’s 
Communes, which granted meagre public benefits, and the land and 
families were the mainstays of social provision.3 In this respect, the tacit 
understanding between the state and peasants brought the principle of 
self-reliance to the fore. Unlike the situations covered by urban labour 
insurance, this pronounced residualism left little room for any active state 
involvement in rural social protection programmes. Within the People’s 
Communes, the main programme, “five-guarantees” (wubao), provided 
care for people in need, particularly frail elderly people, persons with 
3 The residualist ideology underpinning the relationship between the state and peasants also reflects 
a moral economy, albeit a much more limited one compared to its urban counterpart.
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disabilities, and young orphans who could expect no support from other 
sources. Originally consisting of food, fuel, clothing, education, and 
burial, the wubao programme was decentralised. The number of benefits 
and the eligibility criteria depended on local financial resources, leading 
to a considerable variation among the communes.
The cooperative health system (nongcun hezuo yiliao) established in the 
1950s constituted the second pillar of rural welfare. Originating from the 
voluntary self-aid medical care system in some regions, this programme 
saw nationwide implementation during the 1960s (Bloom and Fang 
2003; Liu 2004). It provided affordable, basic medical care for rural resi-
dents, promoted primary medical knowledge, and took sanitary measures 
such as vaccination. This health programme operated on the premiums 
collected from the communes’ collective welfare funds. Together with 
wubao, rural welfare in the socialist era featured a strong decentralised 
structure in terms of finance and administration. Each locality was 
responsible for its own social provisions.
With the introduction of the hukou system, Chinese society was de 
facto divided into two separate worlds of social citizenship, that is, an 
employment-based, comprehensive social insurance system for urban 
residents and a community-based, residual social assistance system for 
rural inhabitants. This dualisation highlighted the stratification of social 
benefits based on the hukou status difference (urban vs. rural) and pro-
nounced administrative decentralisation. Even during the turbulent 
period of the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), when political tumult 
paralysed the central government, local implementation of the urban and 
rural welfare systems remained partially intact. The institutional legacy of 
the Maoist era has lingered for a long time even after economic 
reforms began.
 The Ideational Turn in the Course of Economic 
Reforms, 1978–2000: “Socialisation” of Welfare
Starting from our national circumstances, socialisation of social welfare 
adopts the multi-channel forms of state, collective, and individual provi-
sion to forge ahead with the joint development of multiple-ownership of 
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the welfare institutions. (“Opinions on accelerating the socialisation of 
social welfare” issued by the State Council, no. 19, February 2000)
The Third Plenary Session of the Eleventh Central Committee of the 
CCP in December 1978 marked the start of the reform process. Unique 
for this event was the official revision of the collectivist approaches of the 
Maoist era, with the conclusion that the introduction of market mecha-
nisms along with a reduction of state intervention in economic spheres 
should be the key to reviving the moribund socialist economy. In 1979, 
the second session of the Fifth National People’s Congress ratified the 
party-state’s resolutions, with the overall goal of realising four modernisa-
tions in industry, agriculture, science and technology, and national 
defence. The bold moves under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping ushered 
in the “reform and openness” era that tremendously increased the national 
wealth in the following decades.
 SOE Reform and Its Effects
These ambitious plans could not succeed without overhauling the con-
ventional, socialist welfare edifice. Urban SOEs first won discretion to 
retain a certain percentage of their profits for investment, welfare provi-
sions, and bonuses. The SOEs’ autonomy gained further authorisation in 
1984 when the government launched various management responsibility 
system experiments to allow room for independent decision-making of 
enterprises. These efforts led to a concrete policy in 1988 when the 
National People’s Congress passed the “Law of state-owned industrial 
enterprises of the PRC” to allow SOEs to operate at the managers’ own 
discretion. However, the efforts to separate SOEs from the trammel of 
the planned economy inevitably triggered a massive dismissal of their 
redundant labour force. In tandem with the loss of jobs was the erosion 
of generous welfare benefits meant to unchain SOEs from the severe bur-
den of welfare liabilities for employees. The consequence was large-scale 
job loss and a suspension of pension payments to retirees.
The dismissal of the redundant labour force created a new impover-
ished group whose needs posed a huge challenge for the existing social 
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security system (Chan 1998; Smyth 1998, 1999; Whyte 1999). What 
characterised the unemployment protection of the post-socialist transi-
tion was the unique xiagang system—literally off-the-post—which pre-
scribed SOEs to pay those laid-off a certain amount of monthly allowance 
despite their status as inactive. Due to the lack of a real unemployment 
benefits system, as is the case in a capitalist society, xiagang created a 
peculiar relationship between the laid-off workers and their enterprises in 
which the former temporarily left their positions but remained “employed” 
by the SOEs. This semantic invention allowed room for the CCP to 
avoid confronting the awkward question of why a socialist economy, in 
which unemployment should not exist at all, now witnessed a surge of 
laid-off workers.
However, the transitional xiagang arrangement hardly appeased the 
laid-off workers because many SOEs failed to honour their financial obli-
gations. Payment deferral or even default resulted in hardship for the 
people concerned. Worries about the waning of the danwei system went 
hand-in-hand with scepticism over the sustainability of the withering 
socialist welfare system (Chan and Chow 1992; Leung and Nann 1995; 
Wong and Macpherson 1995; Wong 1998; Lee 2000). Uneven welfare 
retrenchment in the work units also produced an age-based hierarchy: 
while older cohorts generally benefited greatly from the occupational 
welfare system, younger cohorts who joined the work units later were 
most susceptible to the cutbacks in welfare provisions. Conceivably, the 
SOE reforms made a painful process palpable to the urban workers 
involved, especially the late 1990s saw the peak of SOE mass dismissals, 
which numbered in the millions.
The restructuring of the SOEs and the heavy toll incurred could not 
proceed smoothly without the refurbishment of ideas. This particularly 
applied to the case of urban workers who used to stand for the supremacy 
of the socialist ideal vis-à-vis Western capitalism. The Chinese socialist 
economy rested on the tacit premise that the government would provide 
for workers’ well-being in exchange for their lifelong devotion to the 
socialist fatherland. Now, the normative foundation of this moral econ-
omy crumbled with the retrenchment of urban welfare programmes—a 
moral crisis the CCP had to avert with an alternative justification for this 
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situation. Against this background, the conventional socialist ideas 
required novel elements to accommodate the new circumstances.
The reinvention of terms culminated in the “Opinions on accelerating 
the socialisation of social welfare” issued by the State Council (No. 19) in 
2000, in which the central government explicitly addressed its goal to 
invite the joint participation of various societal sectors in welfare produc-
tion. Noteworthy is the specific understanding of the term “socialisation” 
(shehuihua) and its Chinese characteristics during the reform era. Whilst 
Western readers may wonder if this notion signals a more public recogni-
tion of the state’s responsibility to provide social necessities, its content 
points in the opposite direction both in rhetoric and reality. The “sociali-
sation of social welfare” stands in sharp contrast to the conventional 
socialist mode of work unit provisioning (danweihua), in which the SOEs 
bore the majority of the burden of providing welfare services, and refers 
to the transfer of financial responsibilities to non-state agencies (here the 
enterprises and employees themselves) (Wong 1995). “Socialisation” in 
this regard entails a clear territorial distinction between the state and soci-
ety, with the latter encompassing all those sectors outside of the state 
hierarchy. In a similar vein, “socialisation” touches upon service provi-
sion. Already in the mid-1980s, the Ministry of Civil Affairs adopted the 
slogan “Social welfare provided by society” (shehui fuli shehui ban)—in 
view of contracting fiscal capacity—to probe the possibility of community- 
level service arrangements. Echoing the term “socialisation”, the idea 
behind the policy change suggested the state’s attempt to delegate its 
omnipresent responsibilities.
 Policy Reforms: Pensions and Healthcare
Nonetheless, behind the official euphoria for welfare pluralism (fuli 
duoyuan zhuyi) lay the reality of the state’s outright retreat from all major 
welfare responsibilities for urban workers. In various policy domains, 
“socialisation” has come close to effectively meaning marketisation and 
privatisation. Pensions are one prime example: during the 1990s, reform 
efforts of this policy area centred on the introduction of a multi-pillar 
pension system. Inspired by advice from the World Bank (1994), the 
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State Council issued an announcement (guanyu shenhua qiye zhigong yan-
glao baoxian zhidu gaige de tongzhi) stipulating that the programme would 
consist of a combination of basic social pension insurance, topped up by 
a personal account for individual workers (so-called shehui tongchou yu 
geren zhanghu). The establishment of individual accounts aimed to 
expand the funding base and reduce employers’ contributions as well as 
provide incentives for employees to also contribute. All workers owned a 
personal fund account that was portable throughout their job career. The 
individual contribution rate was set at no more than three per cent of the 
individual’s average wages for the previous year, which would then rise by 
1 per cent every two years.
In many aspects, the reality of pension “socialisation” during that 
period was far from rosy. For one, many localities with SOEs in funda-
mental financial difficulties had to bear enormous pension liabilities in 
addition to the monthly allowances provided to spare workers who had 
been laid-off. Deferred payments or even defaults due to enterprise bank-
ruptcy had become so widespread that they plagued the old-age security 
of many pensioners. The late 1990s witnessed the disgruntled urban pen-
sioners’ large-scale protests, which placed huge pressure on local govern-
ments who had to answer to these protesters’ demands without 
jeopardising social stability. Moreover, the mixture of social pooling and 
individual accounts failed to fulfil its acclaimed promise to provide multi- 
pillar support for old-age security. Quite the contrary: due to the decen-
tralised political structures and the lack of legal frameworks during the 
reform period, the central government had little leeway to enforce penal-
ties for local non-compliance (Béland and Yu 2004; Frazier 2010; Shi 
2011). The individual accounts were often empty because most of the 
contributions paid into them were unlawfully diverted to settling more 
urgent pension liabilities for current pensioners—instead of accumulat-
ing in the prescribed funds. Especially in places that traditionally had 
many SOEs, not least the Liaoning province, local labour departments 
(the main bodies of implementation) often found it difficult to coerce 
enterprises to make contributions, particularly those already struggling to 
survive.
To tackle these urgent issues, the central government implemented 
local-level experiments in 2000—starting with Liaoning—and subsided 
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the provincial governments in their efforts to liquidate the empty indi-
vidual accounts. Financial challenges posed by the above period of pen-
sion “socialisation” did not recede until a decade later when the booming 
Chinese economy replenished the public purse with abundant tax reve-
nue. Local governments won more fiscal leverage to resume payments to 
pensioners and xiagang workers. But even so, the problem of empty indi-
vidual accounts still haunts the urban pension insurance programme up 
to today, mainly due to the increasing pace of population ageing that 
largely countervailed the dividends from strong public fiscal growth. The 
latest “China pension actuarial report 2019–2050” that the Chinese 
Academy of Social Sciences (CASS 2019) compiled estimated that, unless 
either institutional reforms took place in due course or enormous public 
subsidies chipped in, China’s pension insurance programmes would 
begin to run deficits in 2035. In short, policy efforts to “socialise” pen-
sions achieved the goal of limiting the state’s responsibility at the expense 
of enterprises and individual workers.
In healthcare and education policies, the “socialisation” of welfare went 
even further. The programmatic reform of the urban healthcare system 
(alongside pension reform) began in the 1990s. The retreat of the state 
proceeded with a rise in private providers in the urban stationary health 
sector (marketisation). As public subsidies to hospitals declined, they 
could not help but turn to issuing more drug prescriptions for profit. The 
situation in rural areas also changed for the worse because the existing 
Rural Cooperative Healthcare programme broke down following the col-
lapse of the People’s Communes (Duckett 2011; Unger 2002). 
Marketisation has led to the exacerbation of social inequality by increas-
ing the risk of poverty in case of illness. The “socialisation” of welfare also 
entailed uneven territorial politics: the central government imposed mer-
itocratic mandates on local cadres, which prioritised performance evalu-
ations based on economic growth over social redistribution in their 
jurisdictions. The lopsided emphasis on local economic growth (GDPism) 
led to low social expenditures and unequal welfare rights throughout the 
1980s and 1990s, especially in fields that had large, local financial respon-
sibilities (such as education and healthcare) (Shi 2012b; Béland et  al. 
2018). All of these problems put enormous pressure on the party-state, as 
illustrated by the new phrase “three big mountains” (sanzuo dashan) that 
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referred to the new social risks associated with healthcare, education, and 
housing. This term mirrored the extremely negative public perception of 
the economic reforms’ marketisation consequences.4
 The Emergence of the Idea of “Social Security” 
in the New Millennium: From GDPism 
to Inclusive Growth
Social security is a human right and is defined as the set of policies and 
programmes designed to reduce and prevent poverty and vulnerability 
throughout the life cycle. (International Labour Organisation 2017: 1)
The state’s attempts to “socialise” their welfare responsibilities led to 
public discontent and social unrest. Against this background, a semantic 
turn began to take place in the late 1990s: the state largely shifted away 
from their initial touting of public-private welfare partnerships to a re- 
emphasis on the comprehensive public responsibility for social provision-
ing. Official documents boasted the ideas of “take humanity as basis” 
(yiren weiben) or “inclusive growth” (baorongxing zengzhang), which 
demonstrated the party-state’s growing awareness that social policy was 
an essential tool for redressing the dire consequences of the economic 
reforms (Gong and Su 2010). A cognitive shift took place in tandem with 
this discursive change: while economic growth remained crucial, its sus-
tainability would require social protections that would address the social 
misfortunes resulting from the ongoing market reforms. The idea of 
social security thus entailed the imperative to redress the results of the 
uneven stress on economic development by focusing on income redistri-
bution and human well-being.
The reframing of overall social problems contributed to the “return” of 
the state’s role in social provision. Alarmed by the widespread perception 
of social injustice resulting from the economic reforms, central govern-
ment initiatives since 2000 have introduced new social policies covering 
4 The slogan “Three big mountains” first appeared in Mao Zedong’s revolutionary call to overturn 
China’s three major obstacles: imperialism, feudalism, and bureaucratic capitalism.
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almost all segments of the population while simultaneously granting spe-
cial payment transfers to laggard inland regions in support of their social 
programmes. Further reform efforts have promoted the institutional 
integration of existing social insurance programmes (CDRF 2012; Shi 
2012a). For example, in 2003, the central government played a direct 
role in the introduction of the New Rural Cooperative Medical System 
and, in 2007, the abolition of school fees and the introduction of univer-
sal health insurance coverage. In addition, in 2012, the government con-
tributed to the instalment of the new social insurance programme for 
serious illnesses (Brown et al. 2009). In 2016, some local governments 
also launched their pilot, long-term care policy programmes.
It is interesting to note that the term “social security” (shehui baozhang) 
did not appear in mainland Chinese until the late 1980s when academics 
and welfare practitioners realised that the dire social consequences of the 
economic reforms would not be resolved unless the state initiated com-
prehensive social policy reforms. In addition, the term shehui baozhang 
denoted the collective responsibility of the state for providing a basic 
safety net  for the people—in stark contrast to the notion of welfare 
socialisation that was dominant in the welfare reforms of the preceding 
period. This new idea referred to both the normative reframing of the 
state-market-society nexus (in which the state should resume its leader-
ship role) and the institutional restructuring of the welfare system (which 
should include public social insurance, social assistance, and social service 
programmes to secure citizens’ well-being).
Furthermore, international organisations’ knowledge diffusion played 
a role. The ideational void left over by the Cultural Revolution prompted 
Chinese elites to search for new ideational elements appropriate for the 
new epoch. They found inspiration in the documents of renowned inter-
national organisations, such as the International Labour Organization 
(ILO) and the International Social Security Association (see Hu 2015; 
Liu and Leisering 2017). Whilst no evidence could specify the original 
authorship of the Chinese term shehui baozhang, its debut in 1986 in the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan signalled official recognition of the need to address 
social policy issues directly. This juncture witnessed the introduction of 
the first People’s Republic unemployment insurance programme, an 
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unprecedented step in tackling the rising xiagang problem.5 Later social 
insurance reforms also witnessed the involvement of international 
organisations.
To be sure, the early appearance of a new idea such as social security is 
certainly not equivalent to its immediate public popularity. The state’s 
primary role in social policy expansion did not take shape until much 
later (the new millennium), owing to the even more acute challenges that 
arose out of the SOE reforms in the 1990s. In other words, the emer-
gence of the concept of social security merely sowed a seed in intellectual 
(and official) minds but remained far from formal institutionalisation in 
public policy domains. For the mid-1980s to the late 1990s, the state’s 
attempts to “socialise” social welfare prevailed, leaving little space for the 
realisation of the social security model. It was not until the late 1990s 
that one can observe the growing significance of the social security idea 
in Chinese social policy, both ideationally and institutionally. In aca-
demic literature and official discourses alike, the use of the term shehui 
baozhang mushroomed with a clear reference to the state’s responsibility 
to establish a basic social safety net for the people. Characteristic of this 
understanding is the official interpretation as follows:
Social security (shehui baozhang) is the cornerstone of the people’s well- 
being. It is a vital socio-economic institution, including primarily social 
insurance, social assistance, social welfare, and charity activities… The 
Chinese government highly appreciates the construction of a social secu-
rity system, in accommodation with the economic development level.
(Chinese government’s website at http://big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/
www.gov.cn/test/2012-04/20/content_2118401.htm, accessed 29 
March 2020.)
The advent of the Hu-Wen era (2002–2012) introduced real, substan-
tial change in terms of the state’s reversal regarding “welfare socialisation” 
(see Howell and Duckett 2019). Under the rubrics of “take humanity as 
basis” and the “harmonious society” (hexie shehui), the Hu-Wen 
5 The insurance programme had the title “job-seeking insurance” (daiye baoxian) rather than 
“unemployment insurance” (shiye baoxian), which indicates the state’s awkward handling of this 
social problem in a self-proclaimed socialist economy.
 S.-J. Shi
105
leadership sent an unequivocal message of the state’s return to the social 
domain. Since 1998, there has been a quantum leap in social policy 
expansion in both urban and rural areas. Social policy expansion in terms 
of a fully fledged, basic layer of social security protections for all, espe-
cially for vulnerable population groups, such as farmers, migrant work-
ers, unemployed workers, and the urban poor. One of the most essential 
efforts was the urban-rural harmonisation programme, which established 
new basic social pension and health insurance programmes to cover both 
urban and rural residents (Shi 2012a). At the same time, policies address-
ing the woes of transient populations also took shape: many localities 
granted migrant workers access to the urban worker social insurance pro-
gramme, although many migrants remained reluctant to take advantage 
of this offer. The diverse designs of the disparate insurance programmes 
in the various regions often deterred insured migrants from transferring 
their entitlements when they moved. Meanwhile, the government 
achieved significant progress in improving rural livelihoods, notably with 
the introduction of the New Rural Cooperative Medical System in 2003, 
the abolishment of agricultural taxes in 2006, and the guarantee of nine 
years of free education for children the following year. Even in the resid-
ual social assistance environment, a modern programme “Minimum 
living- standard guarantee” (zuidi shenghuo baozhang, dibao) replaced the 
traditional wubao to become the major pillar of poor relief for urban (in 
1999) and rural (in 2006) households in need (Leung and Xiao 2015; 
Gao 2017).
The term “social security” thus took a crucial turn both in rhetoric and 
in substance—away from the state’s retreat in the “socialisation” sense to 
the acknowledgement of the state’s comprehensive public responsibility 
for all citizens. Thanks to the solid state treasury funded in times of rapid 
economic growth, the Hu-Wen leadership trod an alternative path to 
social policy expansion. The CCP’s Seventeenth National Congress’s 
2007 report expounded on the necessary components of social security:
Social security is the cornerstone of social stability (shehui wending). It 
should be based on social insurance (shehui baoxian), social assistance (she-
hui jiuzhu), and social welfare (shehui fuli) with an emphasis on basic old- 
age security, basic healthcare, and a minimum livelihood guarantee 
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supplemented by charity activities and commercial insurance. We should 
accelerate our pace for establishing a unified social security service system.
(The People Net; http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/6429195.html; 
accessed 12 August 2019)
However, it would be misleading to conceive of the recent policy 
advancements as constituting a generous social security system for all. 
What emerged from the renewed state endeavour was a welfare edifice 
with basic protections for all and ample room for stratified benefit levels 
to accommodate different occupational groups and regional diversity 
(Shi 2012b; Béland et al. 2018). The state explicitly envisioned that the 
new social security system would entail a basic pillar of social security 
with universal coverage and need-based entitlements (guangfugai, dishuip-
ing) to which supplementary schemes could be established according to 
local circumstances (duocengci), while also securing the long-term finan-
cial sustainability of social security (kechixu). Given China’s vast size and 
enormous regional diversity, social security as a leitmotif needed to ensure 
some leeway for decentralised governance, namely flexibility in institu-
tional design and policy implementation. Understanding this feature is 
crucial to grasping the specifically Chinese version of social security, 
which implied that the state’s responsibility was to provide basic security 
to all citizens but left room for the stratification of social benefits among 
different population groups and across the regions.
Moreover, the accentuation of social security for all should by no 
means disguise the state’s intent to police the lives of its citizens. From the 
very beginning, the state conceived of social security as a useful tool for 
maintaining social stability (weiwun). While this type of social control is 
not foreign to social policies elsewhere, the official semantic context of 
the concept of “social security” reveals certain Chinese characteristics. 
Already in the Hu-Wen era, the concept of “social management” (shehui 
guanli) had burgeoned to underline the importance of administering 
society as an object. This idea originated in 1998 from a central govern-
ment proposal to recognise social management as a central administrative 
function. Subsequently, in 2004, “innovating social management” 
(chuangxin shehui guanli) became a core concept for the fourth plenary 
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session of the Sixteenth CCP Congress. The session also coined the phrase 
“party leadership, government responsibility, societal cooperation, public 
participation” to describe key policy principles.6 The term “social man-
agement” gained recognition in the Eleventh and the Twelfth Five-Year 
plans: one chapter specified it as a key government target (Pieke 2012). 
Subordinating social security to the state’s overall governance goal of 
maintaining social stability has since taken root.
 Social Security as “Social Governance”, 2012–
Present: From Regulatory Managerialism 
to Statist Control
The construction of a comprehensive social safety net in the new millen-
nium takes on an ambivalent feature: on the one hand, it embodies the 
governmental response to various population groups’ demands for more 
public, social provisions. On the other hand, underneath the pronounced 
expansion of social security lies the firm grip of the state over civil society. 
What is noteworthy about the idea of “social management” is its essence 
of regulatory managerialism that advances a new understanding of the 
mixed public-private welfare economy, somewhat akin to the Western 
notion of the “regulatory welfare state” (Shi 2017a; see Leisering 2011). 
This concept explicitly encourages the participation of non-state organ-
isations (NGOs) in providing welfare support under the supervision of 
the CCP: the party-state establishes a regulatory framework that deploys 
non-state actors in provisioning social services. Inviting these social 
organisations into the service domains that the state conventionally dom-
inated resulted from necessity because the state could no longer meet the 
growing public demand for social services. This situation is reminiscent 
of the “socialisation” idea delineated before and, yet, the state’s “social 
management” appears even more ambitious in its attempt to ensure the 
incorporation of non-state organisations into the state’s overall develop-
ment vision. The Hu-Wen era witnessed a widening spectrum of civic 
6 A shift towards social governance in China. East Asia forum, 9 September 2011, accessed on 15 
January 2019 at http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2011/09/09/a-shift-toward-social-governance- 
in-china/.
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participation under this doctrine (Spires 2011; Teets 2013). Even NGOs 
found their niche in various parts of Chinese society.
However, hope for a nascent civil society soon vanished after the 
advent of the fifth-generation Xi-Li leadership. With the slogan “Chinese 
Dream”, Xi Jinping advocated for the grandiose resurgence of the Chinese 
nation under the CCP’s command (Economy 2014; Shi 2017b). 
Underneath this overarching, strategic goal lay his endeavour to empower 
a new state that would assume a pre-emptive role in orchestrating all 
societal sectors’ contributions to the Dream. A significant semantic shift 
took place from “social management” to “social governance” (shehui 
zhili). Though seemingly equivalent terms, the nuance between “social 
management” and “social governance” lies in the latter’s broader goal: for 
the state to steer (even monitor) society from all sides. Hailed as the 
“Fifth modernisation” at the Third Plenum of the Eighteenth CCP 
Central Committee in 2013, the aim was to upgrade (modernise) the 
state’s capacity for governing the nation.7 In essence, “social governance” 
unravelled an explicit, technocratic vision of the party-state’s engineering 
of society via rule by law (not rule of law!) under changing economic and 
social circumstances (Li 2018). “Social governance” had nothing to do 
with supporting the flourishing of civil society, as “social management” 
might still entail. Quite the contrary: it implied the circumscription of 
the state’s range of civic participation and only by the monopolistic CCP 
rule. To fulfil this statist project, Xi adopted a much more draconian 
approach towards social organisations than his predecessors: lawyers 
engaging in human rights activism were arrested in a nationwide crack-
down in 2015—all remain in jail today—followed by strict police regula-
tion of foreign NGOs in 2017. Even businesses faced new limits after the 
government announced an ordinance requesting the insertion of CCP 
personnel into corporate management (dangjian), foreign companies 
included.
In social policy, Xi-Li leadership largely followed the expansionary 
direction of the Hu-Wen era, albeit in an instrumental fashion. In order 
7 The term “Fifth modernisation” echoes the slogan “Four modernisations” (sige xiandaihua; refers 
to modernising industry, agriculture, national defence, and science) the then premier Zhou Enlai 
promulgated in the 1960s and the second-generation leader Deng Xiaoping re-emphasised in the 
late 1970s (see the above analysis on the “socialisation” of welfare).
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to accelerate the pace of interregional development, “urbanisation” 
(chengzhenhua) took the lead as the guiding principle for social cohesion. 
In 2014, the hukou system experienced a fundamental overhaul that 
eliminated the urban-rural household registration barrier by granting 
peasants urban resident status should they work and live in middle- and 
small-sized cities for a certain period of time.8 In addition, the central 
government requested that local cadres implement all necessary measures 
in a bid to eradicate (rather than alleviate) poverty by 2020—a temporal 
horizon the party-state outlined to make China a well-off, middle-range 
society (xiaokang shehui).
Consequently, the notion of social security experienced a fundamental 
shift during the Xi-Li era. It denoted a contributory means to building an 
auspicious society under the proclaimed socialist banner rather than an 
end to achieving social rights for the people per se. Since social security 
implementation falls within a range of administrative jurisdictions, citi-
zens’ access to social benefits is in danger of falling victim to arbitrary 
bureaucratic discretion. In other words, social governance is coercive in 
nature because it grants or withholds social rights based on the conduct 
of ordinary people, gauged by the official yardstick of “good citizenry”. 
Indicative of this substantive change to the idea of social security was the 
introduction of the “social credit system” (shehui xinyong tixi) in 2015, 
which grades each citizen according to his/her conduct in daily life.9 The 
omnipresence of surveillance, closed-circuit televisions (CCTVs) enables 
the government to track the behaviour of every person. The government 
limits or even denies those with low “citizen scores” access to common 
activities, such as purchasing train tickets or opening bank accounts. 
Some localities have gone even further and barred the children of those 
families who failed the credit test from attending local schools.10 Above 
8 Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Central Committee’s “Opinions regarding the further deepen-
ing of hukou-reform” (Renmin Ribao, 1 July 2014). Local governments followed this directive by 
passing relevant reform measures in the following years. However, metropolises, such as Beijing, 
Shanghai, Shenzhen, and Guangzhou, kept in place strict barriers to resident status for newcomers.
9 China “social credit”: Beijing sets up huge system. BBC News, 26 October 2015. Accessed on 10 
November 2019 at https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-china-34592186
10 A recent report by the agency of the “social credit system”, the National Public Credit Information 
Centre, states that, in 2018 alone, the court declared around 12.8 million Chinese citizens “credit- 
less”. Information collected on 13 December 2019 from the central government website: http://
big5.www.gov.cn/gate/big5/www.gov.cn/fuwu/2019-02/19/content_5366674.htm
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all, migrant workers, who already suffer inferior social rights due to their 
secondary hukou status, have become an easy target of the new control 
measures. The Beijing government’s use of the pejorative term “low-end 
population” (diduan renkou) in its expulsion of migrant workers from the 
suburban Daxing District in the winter of 2017 is a recent expression of 
explicit, official discrimination. The recent news release of the govern-
ment’s new plan to extend the application of the “social credit system” to 
foreign companies has aroused much anxiety amongst Western corpora-
tions who fear political censorship.
The recent initiation of the “social credit system” lays bare the fact that, 
although “social security” as an idea is taking shape in the reform era, the 
scope and extent of its social rights protection remain vulnerable to 
bureaucratic infringement. Whilst modern Western welfare states may 
also restrict or even withhold welfare rights, they mostly do so to immi-
grants with a more limited legal status (e.g. denizen, non-citizen, or asy-
lum seeker) than citizens. This differentiation of citizenship in terms of 
status and rights entitlement corresponds to Lockwood (1996)’s descrip-
tion of “civic stratification”, suggesting that access to, and the capacity to 
demand, citizenship rights critically depends on the possession of moral 
or material resources. In this vein, the Chinese case exemplifies the 
unequal nature of the “social credit system” in which the state bureau-
cracy wields considerable power in allocating limited resources based on 
an individual’s merit or demerit de jure. The absence of any check on the 
bureaucracy’s power (such as a free press or independent jurisprudence), 
to keep possible administrative abuse at bay, further erodes the statutory 
(and substantive) foundation of social citizenship rights.
 Conclusion: Social Security in the Shadow 
of Hierarchy
The emergence of the concept of “social security” and its changing inter-
pretations in the reform era testifies to the shifting contexts of collective 
perception of social questions and to changing state-society relations as a 
result of social policy reforms (for a summary see Table 3.1). In various 























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































elaborate rhetorical devices to frame the contexts in which public respon-
sibility for social provisioning experienced constant redefinition. Whilst 
an overall trend of social policy expansion has dominated since the new 
millennium—set in motion by the Hu-Wen leadership—the accentua-
tion of the “social security” concept in the current Xi-Li era has under-
gone some nuanced but substantial changes. One crucial distinction lies 
in the role of social policy. Unlike his predecessors in the Hu-Wen era 
who associated “social security” with humanity-based social harmony, the 
current leader Xi Jinping seems resolute to place “social security” under 
the direction of a strong state (Shi 2017b). The changing interpretation 
of “social security” has led to different social policy models that at times 
swing between extremes: whilst the Soviet model dominated the socialist 
period, the “reform and openness” era witnessed aspirations to follow the 
examples of other countries, such as Chile’s pension privatisation when 
Chinese welfare reforms focused on the “socialisation of welfare” or the 
ILO notion of social security for all when the states resumed responsibil-
ity for welfare (Hu, in this volume).
“Social security” is undergoing yet another significant change in con-
tent under the current leadership. In the name of the party-state’s 
“Chinese Dream”, “social security” must conform and subordinate itself, 
if necessary, to the national goal of China’s rise on the global stage. Instead 
of serving as an end in itself, namely to protect the social rights of each 
citizen, “social security” is now part of the social governance framework 
that empowers the party-state’s rule over society and individuals. The 
immediate consequence of this interpretation of “social security” is that it 
is vulnerable to bureaucratic infringement and thus is fragile. In addition 
to the alleged public responsibility for the people’s well-being, “social 
security” is now charged with subduing civil society and individuals per 
the code of conduct that the state bureaucracy unilaterally defines.
To be sure, the social control innate to social policy is neither unique 
nor confined to China. The collective utilisation of social policy has been 
crucial for the historical rise of nation-building in the West. However, 
there welfare states have generated synergies between the individual and 
collective benefits (Kaufmann 2012: chapter 8), whilst in China, the col-
lective interests of nationhood and social stability have often overridden 
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concerns for individual welfare  rights. Moreover, bureaucratic control 
over citizens’ behaviour in Western welfare states has proceeded within 
the rule of law, democracy, and a free civil society, a circumstance largely 
unknown in contemporary China. The authoritarian regime’s unchecked 
grip has infringed on civil society and individuals on an unprecedented 
scale, leaving very little statutory space for any civic engagement and citi-
zenship rights protection. Although the quantitative growth in social 
policies may point to the emergence of a Chinese welfare state, one must 
not overlook the background of an assertive Leviathan with an ever- 
expanding range of statecraft that encroaches on the core substance of the 
“social” ideas inherent in “social security”, namely the individualist 
understandings of social protections and rights, beginning when the term 
first appeared in official semantics. The erosion of this normative founda-
tion, which is present in the reform era of the 2000s, may well fore-
shadow the end of this progressive reform journey.
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Social Policy in India: One Hundred 
Years of the (Stifled) Social Question
Sony Pellissery
 Introduction
What social policy is possible in a context in which the culture denies 
equality between citizens but at the same time the constitution guaran-
tees it? To answer this central question, I describe the way the “stifling” 
mechanism acts on the idea of the “social” from the point of view of 
interests, institutions, and international influences. I use “stifling” to 
indicate “non-recognition”, an idea Hegel originally developed 
S. Pellissery (*) 
Institute of Public Policy, National Law School of India University,  
Bengaluru, India
e-mail: sony.pellissery@stx.oxon.org
This chapter is the result of a long engagement with the Centre for Interdisciplinary Research 
(ZiF), University of Bielefeld, Germany, since 2011. I would like to express my gratitude to Lutz 
Leisering, Ulrike Davy, and Benjamin Davy for the opportunity to engage with two subgroups of 
the ZiF research group from which this volume flows. Ideas presented in this chapter were mainly 
developed in consultation with different scholars in residence at ZiF. I would also like to thank 
colleagues at the Institute of Public Policy, Bangalore, for inputs on the draft paper. Some of the 
articles in which these ideas were earlier published include Davy and Pellissery (2013), Pellissery 
et al. (2015), Pellissery (2016, 2017), and Pellissery and Anand (2017).
122
(1807/1966) in his classic The Phenomenology of the Spirit1 to show how 
unequal relations develop. Usage of this framework is in tandem with the 
idea that “the core of citizenship is about recognition, not about material 
levelling” (Davy et al. 2013: 6).
“Social” in Indian languages refers to “belonging to a community”.2 
This is very close to the early meaning of “social” in Greek and Roman 
traditions, in which we find human cohabitation described as the 
Aristotelian zoon politicon and in Latin as animal sociale (see contestations 
of this translation in Arendt 1958 and Kaufmann 2013). However, the 
“community” of reference in Indian languages is not a “public” from 
which we could derive a Marshallian “universal citizenship” (also see 
Tönnies 1887/2001; Arendt 1958). Rather, citizens derive their identity 
through their community affiliations—religious, regional, and caste—
which thus produces differentiated citizenship (Young 2000). That is why 
Jayal (2011) contends that citizenship in the Indian context is delinked 
from welfare. However, the English-language usage of “social policy”, 
“social welfare”, “social issues”, or “social service” in political discourses, 
academic contexts, budgets, and administrative settings gets close to the 
ideas of anti-poverty policies and, thus, the idea of the “social” (“social 
question with distributive aims”) as Heclo (1995) or Kaufmann (2012, 
2013) elucidates. The problematique of this chapter is how the “social 
question” in this context has only feebly addressed “social inequality”, 
which is the key causative factor requiring social policy intervention.
1 Hegel refers to one individual’s realisation of conscious existence and the impossibility of the 
counterpart’s self-consciousness. This imbalance is created through the former fulfilling a “desire for 
recognition” and the negation of the same by the latter. Hegel wrote about this process in a highly 
condensed fashion (229–240). However, subsequent scholars (Fanon 1967; Mannoni 1962; Kojève 
1969; Gadamer 1976; and Honneth 2014) have interpreted and elaborated on this rich text. See a 
good summary of these interpretations in Bulhan (1985) and Fraser and Honneth (2003). 
Communication forms the crux of the defining relationship between two human beings. It is 
exactly because of this that “intersubjective recognition constitutes a necessary prerequisite for 
attaining self-consciousness” (Honneth 2014: 4). This is a radical departure from Kant, who argued 
that self-consciousness is the Self observing its own consciousness. Several scholars today have 
applied the idea of recognition in social policy contexts. Charles Taylor (1992) argued that the poli-
tics of recognition is at the heart of justice.
2 The expressions in Sanskrit-root languages (for instance, the Hindi language uses samajik) and 
Dravidian-root languages (for instance, the Tamil language uses samuha) refer to “community”.
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This chapter is arranged in eight parts. Broadly, I aim to divide Indian 
history into different periods in which qualitative changes to the social 
question took place. In each of the historical settings, “stifling” of the 
social question took place in unique ways. In the first stage, the religious 
reforms addressed the social question in the context of culturally rooted 
inequality. In the second stage, the labour question in the context of the 
production process—particularly the Asiatic mode of production—is 
taken up. The third stage is the prioritising of political freedom over the 
“social question” in the context of anti-colonial movements. In the fourth 
period, the battle of ideas (on the social problem) between three promi-
nent public intellectuals during the foundation of the republic is dis-
cussed. While these three public intellectuals had clear ideas on 
redistribution policies, their ideas on the identity question also shaped 
the valuation of social policies. The fifth and sixth periods referred to in 
the chapter analyse how two main identity categories in India (caste and 
religion) shaped the social question. The seventh part of the chapter dis-
cusses how prioritising economic development over the “social question” 
neglected addressing inequality. In the final section, I discuss how intel-
lectual colonialism thrust the last nail in the coffin of the social question 
in India. This chapter demonstrates the ways in which the dominant 
social idea in each stage prevented the recognition of social inequality. 
These historical periods stifling the “social question” are inconsistent with 
the modernity that the nation-state wants to achieve and the functional 
aspirations of a heterogeneous population.
 Religious Reforms as Social Reforms
To investigate the societal and cultural dimensions of the origins of the 
“social question” in India, one has to revisit the period 2000 years ago, 
because the rationalist challenge to authority systems (in this case reli-
gious systems) (comparable to the Enlightenment in Europe) began when 
the Buddha rejected God as well as the Hindu social order. Without a 
brief examination of this legacy, documenting the evolution of the “social 
question” in India would be incomplete.
4 Social Policy in India: One Hundred Years of the (Stifled)… 
124
Hindu social order and ancient Indian jurisprudence3 symbiotically 
evolved together. The caste system’s organisation of society formed the 
primary pillar of India’s political economy:4 “India has a unique social 
division: the (endogamous) caste system. Caste is class at a primitive level 
of production, a religious method of forming social consciousness in such a 
manner that the primary producer is deprived of his surplus with the mini-
mum of coercion” (Kosambi 1954: 14; italics in original). Until 800 BCE, 
caste was not viewed as an institution of discrimination (or a “social 
problem” in the sense we understand today) since inter-dining and inter- 
marriage was possible. During the late Bronze Age and early Iron Age, 
pastoral-nomadic communities developed into four castes. Kosambi 
(1955: 42) explains this development as follows:
The reason for caste stratification is the new productive basis, which had 
led to relations of production between groups, higher than in the tribal 
stage but with still primitive tools. Thus, we have a tenant of Brahminism 
for state policy that each caste and subcaste (jati), tribal district, guild, and 
even large family group had to be judged by its own particular laws, obvi-
ously because it was then a unit of production. Therefore, the state could 
not uniformise the juridical structure within groups, but only regulate 
transactions between groups.5
Religion was used to valorise some functions and devalue others. In 
other words, the actions of the highest caste (Brahmins), such as offering 
sacrifices, were most noble compared to the activities of the labouring 
caste (Shudras): “Brahminism had constructed the acts of tilling the land, 
3 “India” as a nation-state is a recent construction as a result of colonisation and integration of 
several kingdoms. Prior to that, the expression used was “Hindustan”, referring to the region near 
the Indus River. This had a geographic stretch roughly similar to that of South Asia today.
4 Prominent academic works on caste have not taken the political economy approach seriously. The 
works of Max Weber and Louis Dumont (1966) emphasised the cultural dimensions of caste. In 
recent times, there is a renewed interest in examining the caste issue from this missing angle. Singh 
(2014) argues that underlying the issue of caste relations is property and land rights.
5 Note that Kosambi uses the term “caste-class”. B.  R. Ambedkar and subsequent writers, for 
instance, Omvedt (2007), have emphasised that the caste system’s origin is not “functional differ-
entiation” as happened in the capitalist stage of European development. The caste system origi-
nated in the pre-capitalist mode of the production period. Ambedkar repeatedly maintained that 
caste is not “division of labour, but division of labourers”.
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removing a carcass from the village, skinning a carcass, and transforming 
hide into leather as filthy. In other words, the whole process of human 
intercourse with nature, land, plants, and animals in productive and cre-
ative modes was constructed as unclean” (Iliah 2007: 303). The untouch-
ables or dalits, who did menial jobs, were kept outside of formal Hindu 
society.6 This rigid caste structure, which prevented mobility, warranted a 
revolution.
Buddhism was that revolution in Aryan society circa 400  BCE.  It 
began as a religious revolution and evolved into a social and political 
revolution (Ambedkar 1956/1987). It challenged the caste system, 
accepted members from the lower castes as priests (a role reserved for 
Brahmins, the highest caste, in Hinduism), and gave equal status to 
women. These were explicit challenges to the societal power structure. At 
the core of the Buddhist revolution was the principle of social equality. 
This was possible because of the reasoned rejection of God. King Ashoka 
(304–234 BCE) accepted these Buddhist ideas and put them into prac-
tice. As a result, the religious revolution became a social revolution and 
received the patronage of the state.
In response, Brahmanical forces solidified the caste system through 
much stricter laws that Manusmriti developed (Ambedkar 1956/1987), 
and the regime that succeeded King Ashoka persecuted Buddhists using 
the Manusmriti code of law (compiled between 200 BCE and 200 CE). 
The dharmic system codified during this period emphasised individuals’ 
duties rather than rights, and it was considered the duty of every indi-
vidual to work for the well-being of society (Sharma 1984).7
6 Several scholars (for instance, Galanter 1984) have documented how discrimination was institu-
tionalised through the legal system, which I need not repeat here.
7 Various Hindu scriptures even defined not only individuals’ duties but also their mutual relations; 
for example, “Stri dharma paddhati” defines married women’s duties and “Rajadharma” defines a 
king’s duties. Similarly, the “Ashram-dharma” prescribes an individual’s duties during various life 
stages, and, according to this, it is an individual’s duty to look after one’s family, which includes the 
elders, ancestors, progeny, and other members of the family who need protection (Kane 1941). The 
joint-family system that emerged out of this idea has always provided a sense of protection and 
security for the elderly and disabled.
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The biggest assault on rationality is rejecting reason in favour of reli-
gious precepts:8 “Hindus observed untouchability and caste not because 
they were inhuman or wrong-headed. They observed caste because they 
were deeply religious” (Ambedkar 1936: 68). Thus, the very social phi-
losophy of Hinduism focuses neither on the individual nor on society, 
but on “Brahminic supermen” (Haragopal and Sukumar 2007).
There have been similar challenges to the Hindu social order from time 
to time, such as the development of Jainism (500  BCE) or Sikhism 
(1500 CE), which were revolutionary religions and offered a dignified life 
outside of the Hindu caste system. During the medieval period, Bhakti 
saints (such as Kabir and Nanak) preached social equality and casteless-
ness. In the nineteenth century, there was an intellectual renaissance dur-
ing which many reformers (some influenced by Western thoughts) 
advocated for liberation and the abandonment of class and caste distinc-
tions (see Thapar 1966). Ambedkar and millions of dalits converted to 
Buddhism in 1956. In a nutshell, what appears to be religious reform or 
conversion is a response to the systemic inability to raise the “social ques-
tion” of inequality. In a later part of the chapter, we examine how social 
policies have responded to inequality, particularly that arising from caste 
discrimination. However, before that, we need to examine other institu-
tional frames that contributed to the ideational architecture of social 
policies.
 “Asiatic” Stifling
Marx first raised the question of why the history of the East was the his-
tory of religion. He did not discover the characteristics of feudalism in his 
analysis of India and China. In what he called the Asiatic mode of pro-
duction (AMP), he identified two central reasons for this: “The stationary 
nature of this part of Asia, despite all the aimless activity on the political 
surface, can be completely explained by two mutually supporting cir-
cumstances: 1. The public works system of the central government and, 2. 
8 Ambedkar argues that the reason for the disappearance of Buddhism from India is Brahmanical 
persecution rather than Islamic invasion.
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Alongside this, the entire Empire which, apart from a few large cities, is 
an agglomeration of villages, each with its own distinct organisation and 
each forming its own small world” (Marx 1853).9
Some scholars have challenged this self-sufficiency theory of village life 
(Srinivas and Shah 1960). However, there is a consensus that the village 
was the centre of the agrarian production system, and private property 
ownership was absent before the advent of the British empire. In 
Grundrisse, Marx (1858) further expanded on this idea: “a part of their 
surplus labour belongs to the higher community”. This would tremen-
dously change during British rule:
The inordinate and unscrupulous greed of the East India Company caused 
gradual disintegration of these gram panchayats. The deliberate introduc-
tion of the Ryotwari system as against the village tenure system dealt a 
deathblow to the corporate life of the village republics. The centralisation 
of all executive and judicial powers in the hands of the British bureaucrats 
also deprived the village functionaries of their age-long powers and influ-
ence. (Agarwal 1946: 52)
This analysis has two implications for the term “social”. First, as long 
as a surplus of labour served the British administration, the workers’ 
question would remain dormant. Breman (1996) traces how the exploi-
tation of dalit (outcast) labourers—the cultural conditions of whom I 
described in the previous section—intensified during British colonial 
rule. Marx (1853) himself commented that the Asiatic system created an 
unresisting human who was limited to a vegetative state; it “restrained the 
human mind within the smallest possible compass”.
Second, the breaking of the common property system meant that 
many citizens did not own property and, thus, penury was rampant 
(Pellissery and Biswas 2012). The origins of this deprivation go back to 
9 Marx formed these views based on the works of François Bernier (1934) and documents from the 
British Empire. It is worth quoting one of the accounts of a governor of the Raj: “The village com-
munities are little republics, having nearly everything they want within themselves, and almost 
independent of any foreign relations. They seem to last where nothing else lasts. Dynasty after 
dynasty tumbles down; revolution succeeds to revolution; Hindu, Pathan, Mughal, Maratha, Sikh, 
English, are masters in turn but the village communities remain the same” (Lord Metcalfe 
1833: 470).
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the historical circumstances described in this section. At the same time, it 
is important to distinguish between the notion of “feudalism” as under-
stood in Europe and India when the emergence of the social is discussed 
in these different contexts. In the Indian context, caste as an institution 
prevented functional differentiation (the defining feature of modernity in 
Europe), and labour was never valued. Labouring was the duty of the 
lower strata in the societal hierarchy to those who occupied higher posi-
tions. The imagined organic unity of the society without functional dif-
ferentiation stifled the emergence of the idea of the social.
However, colonial rule had the potential to change this. In several 
countries, colonial rule provided a historical break from the past and a 
move from a traditional society to a modern society. But, what happened 
in India?
 Political Freedom over Social Justice
One of the foundational experiences of the Indian population coming 
together as a nation-state is their struggle for freedom, which lasted for 
about a century (1857–1947).10 Did this struggle facilitate the rise of the 
“social question” so that all sections of society could come together against 
the colonial power? A section within the Congress party, which spear-
headed the freedom struggle, argued that social reform (in a limited 
sense) must precede political reform. However, those who held the view 
that political reform and independence from the British was more impor-
tant silenced the Social Reform Party. Ambedkar (1936: 28) analysed the 
reasons for this. He pointed out that the Social Reform Party was con-
cerned with reforming the Hindu family and not wider concerns for the 
reorganisation of Hindu society:
The Social Conference was a body which mainly concerned itself with the 
reform of the high caste Hindu family. It consisted mostly of enlightened 
high-caste Hindus who did not feel the necessity for agitating for the 
10 The first organised revolt against the East India Company took place in 1857, after which the 
British crown directly took over the rule of India.
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 abolition of caste or had not the courage to agitate for it. They felt quite 
naturally a great urge to remove such evils as enforced widowhood, child 
marriages, etc., evils which prevailed among them and which were person-
ally felt by them. They did not stand up for the reform of the Hindu soci-
ety. The battle that was fought centred round the question of the reform of 
the family. It did not relate to the social reform in the sense of the break-up 
of the caste system. It was never put in issue by the reformers. That is the 
reason why the Social Reform party lost.
Thus, the elitist nature of the freedom struggle and the fact that the 
writers of the constitution were English-speaking, Western-educated 
Indians were precedents to the suppression of important social questions.
The Drafting Committee Chairman of the Constituent Assembly, 
Ambedkar (1948) (who was from a low caste), strongly made this argu-
ment: “Democracy in India is only a top dressing, on an Indian soil, 
which is essentially undemocratic”. He further cautioned that if inequal-
ity was not reduced, the poorest sections of Indian society would undo 
the constitution and democracy itself. The Constitution of 1950 specifi-
cally recognised two social groups as hugely disadvantaged. These groups 
were: Scheduled (listed in the constitution) Castes or dalits (literally 
meaning “broken” people: outcasts from the Hindu caste system and, 
therefore, untouchables. Note that the Constitution of India does not 
abolish the caste system but abolishes discrimination based on caste, 
creed, and language) and Scheduled Tribes or adivasis (people who lived 
in the forests or indigenous people). Presently, dalits constitute 16.6 per 
cent of the Indian population and adivasis constitute 8.5 per cent.11
These groups remained loyal supporters of the Congress party until the 
1970s when they realised that remaining within the Congress party sys-
tem would not help them raise the question of inequality. Since the early 
1980s, the Congress party system has withered, and the Bharatiya Janata 
Party (BJP) and regional parties have reaped the advantages of this. 
However, the leaders of the Congress party were not unanimous in their 
11 Various reports and studies (both by government agencies and civil society organisations) provide 
evidence of the discrimination against lower castes and adivasis in education, health, and access to 
public services, and an over-representation of these groups below the poverty line (for a synthesis 
of these reports, refer to World Bank 2011, which need not be repeated here).
4 Social Policy in India: One Hundred Years of the (Stifled)… 
130
“ideas” of the social and the policy recourse they should take. In the next 
section, we will discuss these tensions.
 Three Ideas of the “Social” at the Founding 
Moment of India
Three distinct development models and interventions existed in early 
independent India. We can trace their origins to the ideological leanings 
of three social reformers and policymakers of the nascent nation in the 
late 1940s. First, Mahatma Gandhi, icon of the Indian independence 
struggle, emphasised the disorder of the markets and, therefore, the need 
to pursue development based on local resources. His concept of swaraj 
(which literally means “self-rule”) was an ideal combination of political 
and economic freedom by giving political power to the people and pro-
viding for individual emancipation, particularly for the poorest of the 
poor. Second, Jawaharlal Nehru, the first prime minister of the country, 
drew significant inspiration from Soviet planning models as well as capi-
talist advancements in Western Europe. He called for a development 
model that could combine both these approaches. His advocation for 
national development through public-sector industrialisation came in 
direct conflict with Gandhi’s development model based on local resources. 
B. R. Ambedkar propounded a third development model: a social justice 
model for development. Coming from a historically excluded, lower- 
caste community, he emphasised “annihilation of the caste” for the suc-
cess of social democracy.
All three of these influential leaders agreed on the urgency of the “social 
question”. However, they differed significantly in their understanding of 
the “social” as well as the proper course of action that the state should 
take. Despite this, they agreed to put their differences aside (to build the 
nation-state), and all agreed to advance the “social”. Chatterjee (2004: 
36) captures this as the “antinomy between the homogenous national 
and the heterogeneous social”. Let us look at the subtle differences 
between these three views, which is useful for understanding the underly-
ing tension that required the stifling of the “social”.
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Ambedkar’s ideas focused primarily on the question of representation. 
He disagreed with Gandhi that development should be centred around 
the village (Ambedkar felt that the “village was a den of ignorance and 
exploitation” from which dalits should escape).12 In this dispute, he found 
an ally in Nehru who wanted to support industrialisation and urban 
progress. Fabian socialism13 deeply influenced Nehru. This led him to 
create several state-owned, state-operated, and state-controlled means of 
production. Some of these sectors included steel, transportation, tele-
communications, mining, and electricity generation. The government 
used permits, high tax rates, and rationing to regulate private activity, 
property rights, and entrepreneurship. To a great extent, the pre-1980s’ 
Indian developmental model was the Fabian Society version of socialism. 
Ambedkar was decidedly supportive of urbanisation and industrialisation 
because they would increase mobility for dalits (as an economist, he 
believed that industrialisation was the only economic alternative to low- 
productivity agriculture). However, unlike Nehru, he stressed training 
and the reservation system (discussed in the next section in detail) for 
dalits to help them access new opportunities both in the workplace and 
in politics. He was against the Leftist strategy of striking. Compared to 
him, Nehru facilitated trade unions, on the one hand, and made truces 
with trade union leaders in order to avoid strikes, on the other.14
Gandhi, who explicitly withdrew from positions of power after inde-
pendence, took strong exception to the Nehruvian industrialisation 
strategy,15 as well as the strategy of state control. According to Gandhi, 
the state machinery would work against the emancipation and full reali-
sation of the individual.
Gandhian economic philosophy was strongly rooted in “trusteeship” 
because John Ruskin’s book Unto This Last had inspired him during his 
12 Ambedkar’s disagreement with Gandhi on the question of the political representation of margin-
alised classes also has important significance for this chapter. We will discuss this in the next section 
when we explore the effectiveness of the quota-based welfare system.
13 The Fabian Society of Britain aimed to create a democratic socialism grounded on the principle 
of reforming the capitalism, rather than overthrowing the capitalism.
14 I am grateful to Professor Babu Mathew for introducing this insight into Nehruvian strategy.
15 Sanyal (2007: 155) compares the Gandhi-Nehru debate on industrialisation to that of the debate 
between Lenin and Narodniks in Russia and discusses the paradox of the initial victory of Nehru 
and Narodniks and contemporary disenchantment with such capital-intensive models.
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studies in England. The idea of trusteeship also had origins in Indian 
scriptures and the belief that possessions are immoral and sinful.16 Thus, 
Gandhi believed that only moral conduct could lead one to the truth, 
and he contended that morality could not be translated using the lan-
guage of rights and obligations. It is this conception of a duty-bound 
individual that informs Gandhi’s views on human rights. On two occa-
sions (first to H. G. Wells in 1940 and later to Dr Julian Huxley, Director- 
General of UNESCO, in 1947), Gandhi emphasised that the discourse 
on human rights is erroneous, and instead, duties should be emphasised 
and the rights would follow.
In his aspiration to give autonomy to each individual, he advocated for 
decentralised governance structures and self-rule. Such a decentralised 
governance structure would coordinate different autonomous village 
units. Ambedkar disagreed with this proposal and, instead, wanted a 
strong state that would contain the social forces that perpetuated cas-
teism. It is also important to remember that Ambedkar, who once created 
the Labour Party (and who also went on to become a labour minister), 
was responsible for introducing several classical measures of labour pro-
tection, such as “minimum wage” (enacted in 1948), maternity benefits, 
and limited working hours, to India. The most significant of Ambedkar’s 
contributions was the emancipation of oppressed castes through the res-
ervation system.
 Did the Reservation System Achieve Its Goal?
One of the key commitments of the Constitution of India was to improve 
the welfare of marginalised groups—women, children, and oppressed 
castes. This commitment defined the social justice goals of the Constitution 
16 The monist philosophies of ancient Indian religions had several written texts (the Upanishads) 
during 700–100 BCE that articulated this. Most popular among them is Om. “That (Brahman) is 
infinite, and this (universe) is infinite. The infinite proceeds from the infinite. (Then) taking the 
infinitude of the infinite (universe), it remains as the infinite (Brahman) alone” (Brahadaranyaka 
Upanishad 5.1.1). This classical text on monism was composed in 700 BCE. A later text (written 
in 100 BCE) describes moral principles more directly: “Whatever there is change in this ephemeral 
world, all that must be enveloped by the Lord. By this renunciation, support yourself. Do not covet 
the wealth of anyone” (Verse 1 from the Isha Upanishad).
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of India and was operationalised through quota-based reservation poli-
cies. Over the years, this affirmative action strategy has defined the law of 
the land as well as shaped the political discussions on equality and social 
justice. However, what has been achieved?
The challenges to affirmative action in India were based on the criteria 
for inclusion in the reservation system. One argument was that economic 
criteria should be the only criteria for inclusion, and, therefore, only 
“backward groups” should receive the benefits of affirmative action. This 
position maintained that if any other criteria are used, the principle of 
“merit” would be sacrificed. However, others contested this view because 
caste-based discrimination is not merely economic. For example, despite 
being economically well off, one could experience social discrimination 
and, thus, barriers to both social and economic mobility. Ambedkar 
(1920) articulated this when he compared India to “a tower which had 
several storeys without a ladder or an entrance. One was to die in the 
storey in which one was born”. Ambedkar argued that political represen-
tation with separate electorates was the ideal solution to this problem, 
but Gandhi opposed this. Gandhi argued that although he was from an 
upper caste, he could represent untouchables. They resolved this conflict 
through negotiations in the 1930s (known as the Poona Pact) and agreed 
to reserve seats for untouchables within the Hindu electorate. This model 
of representation has persisted till date.
Similar debates took place on the topic of untouchables’ economic 
welfare. Nehru gave in to Ambedkar’s arguments in practice but not in 
principle:
frankly…I would like to put an end to such reservations as still remain. But 
again, speaking frankly, I realise that in the present state of affairs in India 
that would be not a desirable thing to do, that is to say, in regard to the 
Scheduled Castes. I try not to look at it from the religious minority, but 
rather in the sense of helping backward groups in the country.17 
He based his position on his conviction that caste was a division of labour 
(Ambedkar’s argument that caste was a division of labourers). On this, 
17 Speech in the Constituent Assembly, 26 May 1949. Constituent Assembly on India Debates, Vol. 
VIII: 331.
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Nehru agreed with Gandhi, and, finally, the Constitution of India did 
not abolish the caste system, only caste-based untouchability.
Eventually, the argument for affirmative action based only on eco-
nomic measures was rejected, and 15 per cent jobs, educational opportu-
nities, and political positions were reserved for scheduled castes and 7.5 
per cent for adivasis. This was in proportion to the population break 
down of these groups. The creation of a “schedule” and listing communi-
ties who were eligible to benefit from these quotas has been controversial. 
More and more groups wanted inclusion in these lists. From time to 
time, this schedule has been revised, primarily as a function of electoral 
politics. However, the argument for affirmative action based on economic 
criteria has persisted, and a commission was appointed in 1979 to iden-
tify “socially or educationally backward classes”. This commission pre-
pared a list of communities who fit the new economic and social criteria. 
This new list consisted of 52 per cent of India’s population. After intense 
political opposition from upper castes, the government reserved 27 per 
cent of the novel reservations for the newly identified “Other Backward 
Classes”. Eventually, the Supreme Court decreed that reserved positions 
cannot exceed 50 per cent (Indra Sawhney and others v. Union of India 
and others, 1992).
Originally, when the constitution was written, the authors planned for 
reservations for oppressed castes to last only 50 years. However, the deep- 
rooted caste political system (mobilisation of castes on political lines to 
win elections) has made it nearly impossible to end any part of the affir-
mative action programme. Different types of groups’ demands for reser-
vations are increasing. In some states in India, quotas in particular 
employment categories have reached 75 per cent. Nationally, in 2019, an 
additional quota of 10 per cent was extended to economically weaker 
sections of the country in addition to the existing quotas outlined in the 
124th Constitutional Amendment.
It is worth reflecting on how affirmative action has shaped ideas of the 
“social”. There is no doubt that the material welfare of a large number of 
members of groups who benefit from affirmative action has increased. 
However, this has created a “creamy layer” within these oppressed groups 
and, eventually, divided members of these groups. This is clear based on 
the demand for sub-quotas” since some subgroups within these categories 
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have never benefited from affirmative action, even while other subgroups 
have repeatedly benefited (Ramavat 2018). Critics of reservation have 
also pointed out its inability to address the intersectionality of disadvan-
tage (e.g., women from marginalised groups). Furthermore, job opportu-
nities in the public sector have declined in the wake of liberalisation 
because several governmental industries were outsourced to the private 
sector.18
Even more interesting is the question of indigenous communities, 
which were recognised as “Scheduled Tribes”. Internationally, India 
refused to recognise that India has an “indigenous” population since all 
Indians are historically from India (unlike in Canada, the USA, and 
Australia, where outsiders conquered and dispossessed local indigenous 
populations).19 Although the government domestically recognised the 
presence of indigenous people by listing them in the schedule, it had 
limited impact on the ground in terms of this group’s quality of life. 
Thus, the Dhebar Commission was appointed in 1960 to address this 
challenge. This commission recommended that the schedule list 52 com-
munities as “Particularly Vulnerable Tribal Groups” who require particu-
lar types and numbers of welfare interventions.20 The quota approach has 
been less successful, since larger market interventions deprive people of 
livelihoods, compared to the state welfare system. For instance, Das and 
Padel (2010) demonstrated how the nexus between the state and mining 
companies displaced indigenous communities from traditional land, 
where the indigenous communities had control over and access to natural 
resources. Furthermore, providing welfare does not make up for their loss 
18 In some sectors, there is a demand for quotas for private-sector jobs.
19 India has refused to ratify the International Labour Organization (ILO) Convention No. 169 
concerning indigenous and tribal peoples in independent countries, because the concept of “indig-
enous peoples” is not relevant to India and there is no need for external cooperation or evaluation, 
including from the United Nations (UN), for tribal development programmes in India (full report 
on this is available in the report of the Joint Stakeholders submission on the situation of the rights 
of indigenous people in India for the third cycle of the Universal Period Review [UPR] of India, 
27th Session of the Human Rights Council [Apr–May 2017]. The report is accessible here: https://
www.upr-info.org/sites/default/files/document/india/session_27_-_may_2017/js46_upr27_
ind_e_main.pdf ). It is also interesting to note that India has supported the United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP), 2007, which is a non-binding 
agreement.
20 As of 2020, this number has increased to 75.
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of land and resources, nor does it substantially improve their quality 
of life.
Most of the regional states in India and the union government have 
“social welfare departments” or “social justice departments”. These 
departments have limited functions available to enforce the schemes 
designed for the two most disadvantaged communities—scheduled castes 
(dalits) and scheduled tribes (adivasis). This is indicative of the disconnect 
between the social and labour questions.
However, on a positive note, the reservation system recognised that the 
dominant communities had perpetuated historical injustices against 
these groups, which has tremendously energised localities where these 
scheduled groups were able to use legal recourse to end systems of injus-
tice. This includes resisting violence, claiming rights to land, and demand-
ing a proportionate share in welfare funds, cooperatives for economic 
enterprises, and other resources. These demands indicate these groups’ 
increased representation in the polity. The effectiveness of political repre-
sentation (compared to economic compensation through the quota sys-
tem) is an indication that the “social question” is primarily political when 
it comes to questions of caste.
 Democracy’s Coexistence with Religion
As I explained in the first section of this chapter, the “social” was closely 
associated with the idea of community (including religion) in India. 
Thus, when the Republic of India adopted its modern constitution in 
1950—although there were differences of opinion about the nature of 
the “social” (as explained in the preceding section)—there was wide 
agreement that social justice was a key principle of the Indian constitu-
tion. However, it was only in 1972 (through the 42nd Amendment to 
the Constitution of India)21 that two key terms (socialist and secular) 
were added to the original terms: “sovereign”, “democratic”, and 
21 The 42nd Amendment to the Constitution was passed during a turbulent time in India’s democ-
racy, namely during the Congress government and the then prime minister Indira Gandhi’s state of 
Emergency (25 June 1975–21 March 1977). One of the amendment’s key aims was to make par-
liamentary powers dominant over those of the Supreme Court (Austin 1999).
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“republic” in the preamble22 to the Indian constitution. How the single 
amendment added both “socialist” and “secular” shows the two terms’ 
indivisible relationship in the Indian context.23 Therefore, both the delay 
in introducing these two ideas and their implications when added deserve 
our attention.
Secularism as a concept is important for understanding the rule of law 
in India: all citizens irrespective of their religious faith are treated equally. 
This idea developed during the struggle for independence, when Pakistan 
became a Muslim state and India positioned itself as a secular state. 
However, the contradictions of this position were clear. Leaders of the 
independence struggle, such as Bal Gangadhar Tilak and Gandhi, used 
Hindu texts and symbols to organise and bring people together against 
the British colonial rulers. Thus, the idea of secularism addresses the tense 
relationship between members of the majority religion (Hindus consti-
tuted about 85 per cent of the population) and members of minority 
religions. The Indian state does not have an official religion. Unlike the 
idea of secularism in Western constitutions (in which the separation of 
church and state is key), Indian secularism professes “pluralism” or the 
responsibility of the state to protect all religions and religious groups.
This advocacy of secularism has limited the social rights of citizens on 
matters of inheritance, maintenance, marriage, and divorce. Since the 
personal laws that govern individual conduct in these domains derive 
primarily from religious conventions and rules, very often there is a con-
tradiction between state and personal laws. The contestation point of 
recent secular policies is whether to adopt a uniform civil code (spurning 
all personal religious-based laws) or not. This question primarily touches 
on gender (and family law) and, thus, has significance for social policy.
The Indian Constituent Assembly debated this question while framing 
the constitution and made uniform civil code an ideal to achieve in the 
22 Although courts decide certain matters, the preamble of the constitution has a radiating effect on 
their interpretations of certain topics (Mathew et al. 2020).
23 The Congress government was overthrown via a democratic process after the Emergency. 
Although the subsequent government (the Janata Party) proposed two amendments (the 43rd and 
44th) to restore the constitution, they did not completely succeed. At the same time, the Congress 
Party in opposition underwent an internal reassessment at this point in time. Some leaders within 
the Congress Party fought for the modernisation, socialisation, and democratisation of the party 
(Johari 1973).
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future. However, the question again publicly arose when a Muslim 
woman approached the court to grant her income maintenance from her 
husband, who had divorced her (after 43 years of married life and five 
children) per Muslim personal law.24 The woman pleaded her case under 
the Code of Criminal Procedure, which applied to all Indians. In 1985, 
the Supreme Court of India upheld the decisions of a lower court and 
maintained that, irrespective of the personal laws, the husband is obliged 
to provide income maintenance under the Code of Criminal Procedure. 
This judgement caused an uproar. While human rights groups celebrated 
the judgement as a victory for the protection of women, Muslim com-
munities saw it as a state attack on their identity and rights.
Along similar lines, questions related to the inheritance of property 
arose in 1986 among Christians. Among Kerala Christians, the personal 
law provided a woman with only one-fourth of share in her father’s prop-
erty, whereas the son got the majority share. The Supreme Court of India 
decided that the Indian Succession Act provided for equal shares for both 
son and daughter.25 In another development in 2014, the Supreme Court 
decided that even though Muslim personal law prohibited the adoption 
of children, an Indian Muslim could legally adopt children. These cases 
have kept the discourse on whether to implement a uniform civil code 
alive. Paradoxically, in 2019, the Indian parliament dominated by the 
Hindu majoritarian party (Bharatiya Janata Party) made talaq (Islamic 
divorce) illegal, which progressive Muslim women had long demanded. 
While this move is viewed as a step towards a uniform civil code, it is also 
seen as an example of the majoritarian religion forcing its personal laws 
on minority religions. Several feminist groups have decried this as hypoc-
risy since the human rights of Hindu widows have not been addressed at 
all. In other words, the common denominator for a uniform civil code (if 
agreed to as a principle in a pluralist polity) should be women’s welfare, 
not the standards of a majoritarian religion. Majoritarian standards (as in 
the case of a state religion) could be civil, but could also easily erode 
social rights.
24 Mohd. Ahmed Khan v. Shah Bano Begum (1985 SCALE 767 = 1985 SCR 844 = 1985 SCC 
556 = AIR 1985 SC 945).




 Economic Development over 
the Social Question
Independent India’s development plans were not meant to reduce inequal-
ity. Poverty alleviation was only added in the fifth development plan (the 
late 1970s). The history of two concrete poverty interventions (that of 
land redistribution and industrialisation policy) will prove this point. 
First is the question of land reform. As I show in section “Religious 
Reforms as Social Reforms” of this chapter, colonial rule created property 
inequality. For a nation that is committed to the constitutional principle 
of equality, the redistribution of assets is an important step. Several assess-
ments on land reforms (Appu 1996; Jeyaranjan et  al. 2010; Pellissery 
et al. 2017) show some land transfer from a small section of upper-caste 
landlords to the middle and lower castes but not to the outcasts (dalits). 
The idea of land reform primarily came from the Communist Party, and 
communist ideology emphasises the class rather than the caste question. 
This explains why land reform strategy was the least effective when it 
came to the redistribution of land to dalits.
Second, industrialisation as a strategy involved state protections for 
capitalists, unlike in Europe, where capitalists emerged as entrepreneurs 
through industrial investment. A handful of industrialists in Bombay 
prepared the “Bombay Plan”, which would become the blueprint for 
national development over the next few decades under Nehru (Chibber 
2003). Although the Bombay Plan was not socialist (Pellissery et  al. 
2020), Nehru believed that industrialisation was possible without the 
suffering that Europe experienced, in contrast to Gandhi, who believed 
that industrialisation was inherently a problem.
After the initial balancing of investment in small-scale and large-scale 
industries, the Indian planning process hugely favoured capital-intensive 
large industries. The strategy was to extract surplus from agriculture to 
support the development of industry. As Chakraborty (1987: 21) states, 
“it was necessary for agriculture to contribute to the building up of a 
modern industrial sector by providing cheap labour and also cheap food”. 
Thus, the capital-good hypothesis (the state should invest in the creation 
of tangible property such as machine tools) and the wage-good 
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hypothesis (the state should invest in sectors where labour-intensive pro-
duction will happen) simultaneously worked in India. Sanyal (2007: 
167) argues that, although there was no surplus extraction, the very pro-
cess of separating the means of labour from labour itself was sufficient to 
establish the process of primitive accumulation in early independent India.
India’s development programmes were primarily “Five-Year Plans”, 
inspired by the erstwhile socialist planning model of the Soviet Union. 
Sen (2017) considers the First Five-Year Plan (1951–56) not as a develop-
ment plan but as a reconstruction of the economy that was completely 
damaged due to centuries of exploitation under British rule. The Second 
Plan (1956–61) began with an obligation to “increase the growth rate of 
the gross domestic product” by establishing publicly supported heavy 
industries. The emphasis of this plan was on rapid industrialisation and 
increasing the economy’s savings rate. The Third and Fourth Plans were 
also designed to broadly focus on continuing the agenda set by the sec-
ond plan.
Despite these different approaches, poverty still haunted the nation. 
Therefore, by the 1970s, the basic needs and poverty reduction approaches 
took centre stage. The Fifth Plan (1974–79) is considered an important 
milestone in the development trajectory of India because it is when the 
ideas of poverty alleviation entered the agenda of the planning process 
with the then prime minister Indira Gandhi coining the term “Garibi 
hatao” (eradicate poverty). Since then, all plans have attempted to balance 
economic development and welfare programmes. Later, the focus of 
development programmes shifted to industrial growth and boosting the 
national income.
To evaluate these development programmes from the “social ques-
tion”, we need to ask whether these plans recognised and addressed social 
inequality. At the outset, we can say that the reservation strategy addressed 
only “social inequality” since the constitution provided positive discrimi-
nation for “scheduled” populations (dalits and adivasis). However, this 
strategy actually created two classes of services in public institutions. 
Discrimination continued to prevail against socially ostracised groups. 
Two important arenas for social policy intervention—education and 
health care—have demonstrated the reality of the syndrome “services for 
the poor are poor services”. Poor-quality services (for instance, teacher 
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and doctor absenteeism from schools and hospitals) have alienated peo-
ple from accessing these services.
The third intervention most aptly demonstrates how economic devel-
opment has stifled the social question. The key concern for the sovereign 
state of India after independence was how to feed its citizens and build a 
hunger-free nation. In other words, the material dimension of the social 
question was recognised as early as the 1940s. Food importation policies 
of the 1950s gave way to what is known as the Green Revolution in the 
1960s, which was based on biotechnological inventions. Three inter-
linked policies were introduced in the mid-1960s consisting of (1) 
output- price policies including minimum support prices for farmers 
when grains are procured, (2) input-price subsidies, and (3) a public dis-
tribution system (PDS) to provide relatively low-cost food grains without 
harming the interests of the producers. This new agricultural strategy was 
largely successful in increasing production, which more than doubled, 
from 63 million tons in 1965 to 154 million tons in 1991, and drastically 
reduced the need for food grain imports (Suryanarayana 1995). These 
asset-focused policies were completely blind to the question of rural 
labour, which the dalit communities primarily provided (Siegel 2018). In 
other words, despite achieving food sufficiency, the outcome was depriva-
tion amidst plenty.
The arguments developed hitherto in this section should not be con-
strued as ignorance of the artificial distinction between the “social and 
economic” (Mkandawire 2001; Midgley and Tang 2001). Development 
interventions have ingeniously brought these two together. However, 
whether developmental interventions have addressed social inequality 
directly is an open question. In the Indian context, the empirical exami-
nation of expenditure data shows how infrastructural projects gained 
more attention than social inequality.
We can observe two broad types of spending in the public finance 
accounts relevant to social policy. First is development expenditure, 
which includes spending on agriculture and allied activities, rural devel-
opment, special area programmes, irrigation and flood control, energy, 
industry and minerals, transport and communications, science and tech-
nology, and environment. Second is money spent on social services, 
which includes expenditures on education, sports, art and culture, 
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medical and public health, family welfare, water supply and sanitation, 
housing, welfare of historically deprived communities, labour and labour 
welfare, social security, nutrition, relief on account of natural calamities, 
and urban development.
As per the mandate of the Constitution of India, the majority of the 
social sectors fall under the domain of state governments, hence spending 
on their part is higher compared to the central government. Kaur et al. 
(2014) analysed the data available and concluded that state governments 
alone incur 80 per cent of government (both centre and state) expendi-
tures on social services. The education and health services combined 
account for 60 per cent of the total social expenditures of state govern-
ments. Between 1990–91 and 2013–14, per capita social-sector spending 
recorded a threefold increase, of which education-sector spending 
increased by 2.7 and health-sector spending increased by 2.3 times. The 
majority of the increase in social-sector spending occurred after 2000. 
However, despite this increase, India still remains below the international 
standard of expenditure in the social sector.
Apart from social expenditure data, the confirmation of our argument 
of the ineffectiveness of developmental expenditures to address social 
inequality is the demand for community-specific funds. General expen-
ditures on both development and social welfare neglected the most disad-
vantaged sections of society—dalits and adivasis. This led to the demand 
for special component plans. These plans argued that state government 
budgets should allocate spending in proportion to the population for the 
welfare of these populations. For instance, 15 per cent of the union bud-
get should be earmarked for dalits since 15 per cent of the population 
are dalits.
This is an example of how the “social question” may be populistically 
responded to within the aggregate democratic framework (Young 2000). 
Solidarity ideals of the “social” are dismissed in favour of appeasing frag-
mented vote banks. The “social” is no longer a tool to increase and 
encourage dialogue with other communities and to gain “recognition”. 




 Authoritarian Democracy Stifles 
the “Social” Question
The Hegelian tension of the citizen’s two roles in the public sphere26 is 
absent in Indian discourses due to the post-colonial process of nation- 
state creation that several South Asian countries witnessed. Thus, the 
“social question” was transplanted to consolidate the legitimacy of the 
rulers of the post-colonial states, rather than challenge them (as hap-
pened in post-revolutionary France and, generally, in Europe by raising 
the social question). This approach demobilised the possibility of raising 
the social question. The demobilisation of the power of the people coex-
isted with an authoritarian democracy that could and did stifle the 
“social” question.
An important aspect of South Asian and, specifically, Indian democ-
racy is the authoritarian nature of the democratic leaders (Baxter 1985; 
Jalal 1995), especially the leaders of political parties (and thus national 
leaders). These parties appoint leaders based on their ascriptive identities, 
such as family lineage, membership in the aristocracy, or even descent 
from erstwhile feudal rulers (or provincial kings). The patronage these 
leaders provide to the local population enables them to win elections 
through the democratic process and to retain their positions of power.
This authoritarian democracy has had a crucial impact on the limits 
and opportunities for raising the social question within the polity, three 
aspects of which deserve specific attention within this chapter. The first 
implication of authoritarian democracy is the lack of responsiveness to 
the welfare question. Since elections are won on different criteria (e.g., 
patronage or religious identity), the indirect accountability model27 
26 The two roles of a citizen are “as a citizen (citoyen) of the state and as a member (bourgeois) of civil 
society” (Kaufmann 2012: 63). Partha Chatterjee (2004: 38) dismisses the role of the citoyen—in 
which a citizen has rights. He does so because only a small elite who have access to the state appa-
ratus could enforce these rights. The majority of citizens have to resort to politics to enforce their 
rights. Therefore, he proposes the concept of “political society” in a subaltern context.
27 The indirect accountability model describes the ability of service recipients to demand services 
directly from service providers. Compared to this, the direct accountability model outlines the 
power of electors to hold the elected responsible through their ability to vote them out of power if 
they do not deliver services. Elected representatives indirectly influence bureaucrats to improve 
their services (World Bank 2004).
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(World Bank 2004) fails. A political model that fails to generate a social 
question produces a large vacuum in society. Vibrant civil society voices 
in the form of non-governmental organisations (NGO) and media 
sources then fill this vacuum. In the late 1960s, there was a surge of these 
organisations, because political non-responsiveness to the poverty ques-
tion was evident throughout the Congress Party’s uninterrupted rule of 
over 20 years (Chandhoke 1995). The term NGO became identified with 
development agencies. Most NGOs operated as an extended arm of the 
government in remote areas of the country where bureaucracy had lim-
ited reach.28 Their grassroots-level contacts made them more effective 
agencies for raising the social question in a contextualised manner.
A report in 2015 stated that India had 3.2 million registered NGOs: 
“Indians have more per capita NGOs than hospital beds” (Down to 
Earth 2005). The Central Statistical Organisation of India noted the exis-
tence of “four NGOs for every 1,000 people in urban areas and 2.3 
NGOs for every 1,000 people in rural areas”. This spectacular growth was 
largely due to funding from foreign countries, particularly from the 
Global North. Funding agencies found that the government was an inef-
ficient agent of development and social service delivery, so they began to 
route resources directly through NGOs. However, the question that is 
relevant for this chapter is whether NGOs can raise the social question. 
An answer to that question becomes clear as we examine the second 
implication of authoritarian regimes for the social question in South Asia.
The second implication of authoritarian democracy is the capture of 
bureaucracy.29 The bureaucracy (including the judiciary) fails to perform 
its role as a countervailing force to the legislative branch. The subordi-
nated bureaucracy must serve the objectives of the elected politicians 
rather than the people. Thus, the direct model of accountability also fails. 
Elected politicians primarily control the bureaucracy through 
28 As I mentioned earlier in this chapter, each village acted as an autonomous republic, treating 
those outside the moral community of the village as aliens (on the moral community of the village, 
please refer to Platteau [1990] for the debate on the distinction between the rational and moral 
peasant with reference to the implications for social security).
29 The current Indian Administrative Service (IAS) is patterned after the former Indian Civil Service 
of British India (or ICSI). Apart from central government–appointed civil servants, who may serve 
in any part of the country, the regional state governments also appoint civil servants, who may serve 
in any part of the state.
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appointments and transfers (Wade 1985). Furthermore, bureaucrats 
operate in constituencies, where politicians are elected on patronage 
grounds and require middlemen to fulfil their promises (Reddy and 
Haragopal 1985; Pellissery 2006). In other words, governance is, in fact, 
collusion between the politician and the bureaucrat. The key breeding 
ground for corruption is this collusion, which requires detailed elabora-
tion later in this section. The second generation of NGOs resisted this 
arrangement. Especially after a brief spell of Emergency rule in the coun-
try (June 1975 to January 1977), several bureaucrats, disillusioned by the 
politicians, resigned and decided to work in the civil society space. The 
NGOs they worked for were not merely an extended arm of the govern-
ment; instead, they encouraged citizens to challenge what the elected 
government was doing.
The third implication of authoritarian democracy for the social ques-
tion is the paradoxical operation of “trust”. Rothstein (2005) successfully 
demonstrates that trust is the cement of institutions to deal with the 
“social” problem. Authoritarian regimes roll out welfare programmes to 
perpetuate their patronage relationship with the electorate.30 Thus, the 
patronage modality in the context of social cleavage destroys “system 
trust”. Citizens trust individual politicians but not the political system. 
This paradoxical trust breeds corruption. The bribe that a citizen pays to 
a politician is viewed as a “gift” for the politician or bureaucrat’s extra 
efforts (Pellissery and Bopaiah 2020). This is the fertile ground for the 
capture of the modern institutions by the traditional power sources.
All the three illnesses emanating from authoritarian democracy point 
out that, unless nurtured and adapted to the cultural settings, even the 
institution of democracy could be counter- productive to the “social”.
30 As shown by Keefer and Khemani (2005) in the context of information asymmetry in developing 
countries, the public choice approach is optimal because it provides welfare only to the targeted 
population rather than to everyone. This could translate as politicians reaching out to their own 
voter blocs often organised as religious or social groups.
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 Ideational Stifling from International Regimes
Various scholars (including the author of this chapter), and prominently 
Ambedkar, have shown that the “social question” is not indigenous to 
Indian philosophy and religion. However, has borrowing ideas from else-
where facilitated the raising of the social question in a meaningful man-
ner in India? The most telling aspect of this question is the political 
responses to the question of inequality. India has witnessed the political 
mobilisation of both left-wing and right-wing ideologies. Both these 
political ideologies succumbed to Western notions of class, while the 
question of inequality is not addressed. The Indian variant of class-caste 
interplay (Pellissery et al. 2015) was neglected. Leftist political parties,31 
which rose to power in some of the states through the democratic process 
(including Kerala, West Bengal, and Tripura) by championing the causes 
of the working class and poor, also completely ignored how caste creates 
inequality (Rajan 2003).32 This disappointment with left-wing politics is 
why identity-based political parties emerged in the late 1970s. They were 
generally known as “samaj” (community or caste) or political parties that 
made the social question their core.
Failure to raise the contextualised social question is attributable to 
intellectual colonialism that persisted through the funded projects, evalu-
ation schemes, and policy advocacies of international organisations, such 
as the World Bank, the WTO, and UNICEF. In the rest of this section, I 
examine, in detail, a case study33 of the ways in which ILO operations in 
India distorted one of the social questions.
India, as a colony of Britain, was a founding member of the ILO. Yet, 
ILO conventions had very little impact on raising the “social question” 
and increasing labour welfare for Indian workers until independence. 
Tensions between the ILO and India became apparent on ratification of 
some conventions after independence. What requires our attention is the 
31 It is also interesting to note that by the mid-1970s, leftist political parties were vertically split 
between “Communist Party Marxists” and “Communist Party of India”, primarily on the degree to 
which they were dogmatic.
32 Globally, this is similar to how leftist political groups have ignored the feminist question.
33 The case study is primarily informed by the research work at Centre for Labour Studies at the 
Institute of Public Policy, Bangalore.
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International Conventions on Forced Labour (C029 of 1930) and the 
Abolition of Forced Labour (C105 of 1957), among other international 
human rights instruments. India has ratified these conventions. However, 
in the 1940s, the Indian Constituent Assembly’s discussion on forced 
labour was without any reference to the ILO convention of 1930.
The caste-based system of forced labour was endemic to Indian society 
and did not require debt as a form of coercion for its perpetuation. There 
was widespread recognition of this coercive system at the beginning of 
the process of consulting on and drafting the Indian constitution. The 
Constituent Assembly extensively discussed “begar”, a then-prevalent 
form of forced labour, and, as a result, drafted and passed Article 23 of 
the 1950 Constitution of India, granting people a fundamental right not 
to be exploited through traffic in human beings, begar, and other forms 
of forced labour (with the exception of state-enforced public service, as 
long as it was imposed in a uniform, non-discriminatory manner).
After 25 years, through another unique law—the 1976 Bonded Labour 
System (Abolition) Act—India prohibited a wide gamut of bonded 
labour practices. The bonded labour system was primarily based on the 
caste-based exploitation of lower scheduled castes and tribes by the upper 
castes.34 Other legislative measures like the 1989 Scheduled Castes and 
Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act provided a broad framework of leg-
islative measures to challenge caste oppression.35 These were in conjunc-
tion with measures for positive discrimination programmes (discussed 
extensively in an earlier section) in education and employment to address 
the systematic caste oppression in India.
There was a marked difference between the ILO’s conceptualisation of 
“forced labour” and India’s conceptualisation. Combined with their 
stance on slavery (including modern slavery), the ILO’s definition imag-
ined employers’ (including the state as an employer) exploitation of 
34 Evenforty-three years after the enactment of the Bonded Labour System (Abolition) Act, forced 
and bonded labour continue to be prevalent in India. As of 2018, the Ministry of Labour reported 
having earmarked money for the rehabilitation of 289,222 workers rescued from bonded labour. In 
the absence of disaggregated government statistics on bonded labour, this remains the most reliable 
authoritative figure.
35 In the year 2013 alone, all over India, 39,327 crimes committed against dalits were reported. Out 
of these, 13,975 cases were registered under this law.
4 Social Policy in India: One Hundred Years of the (Stifled)… 
148
employees using “force”. The Indian definition used the term “bonded 
labour system” to indicate that force emerged from the caste system rather 
than a transaction between two individuals.
These differing conceptualisations also gave rise to divergent strategies. 
The ILO emphasised the identification and rescue of individuals trapped 
in forced labour arrangements. In contrast, India emphasised the trans-
formation of the polity by ending the bonded labour system. India also 
emphasised the rehabilitation of former bonded labourers by providing 
alternative livelihoods directly.
Furthermore, the ILO emphasised criminalising the use of forced 
labour. Criminalisation as a strategy to achieve social aims is antagonistic 
to the ideal of solidarity. This is specifically true when the perpetrators of 
forced labour, as they are in this context, are farmers on whom a labourer 
depends for a job in their community. Criminalisation creates a rupture 
in a community, affecting the possibility of employment for labourers. 
However, criminalisation is a continuation of the individualisation of 
social rights since 1993 and in tandem with the state’s neoliberal strategy 
of retreating from positive action36 (Davy 2013). This is the beginning of 
the era of providing for “social rights” in the form of material well-being 
while underplaying the need to uphold citizens’ civil and political rights.
 Conclusion
The central question this chapter aimed to address is the potential and 
possibility of social policy in contexts in which equality among citizens is 
culturally denied but at the same time constitutionally guaranteed. 
Unlike Breman et al. (2019), this chapter argued for the need to broaden 
the scope of analysis beyond Marxist class analysis when we considered 
the social question. This chapter demonstrated how effected reforms and 
changes—religious, social, economic, developmental, and political (see 
Table  4.1 for a summary)—were denied the full recognition of the 
36 See Nussbaum’s (2003) articulation of the difference between positive liberty in the Indian con-














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































problem of inequality. In other words, the Indian polity has sidestepped 
the “social question” of group inequality during different historical phases.
This chapter has shown that prior to the formation of the modern 
Indian state, several attempts to raise the social question were thwarted as 
a result of a strong, socially held, religious philosophy and feudal control 
over the peasantry. The possibility of raising the social question was lost 
during the independence struggle since political priorities dominated. 
Similarly, after independence was won, against the background of nation- 
state construction, unity among the various leaders forced them to set 
aside their differences on “social” problems. By the time “social” issues 
were formally recognised as a state objective in the mid-1970s, the coun-
try had a divisive political scene. The middle class was solidifying, and the 
social question was beginning to be perceived as partisan. These series of 
historical efforts to stifle the “social question” are inconsistent with the 
modernity that the nation-state wants to achieve and the functional aspi-
rations of a heterogeneous population.
If the “social” question in independent India had to be appropriately 
framed within a modernist frame, it should have been within a Hindu 
reformation frame, that is, a challenge to the internal contradictions of 
Hindu social philosophy in the light of the modernist values of the mid- 
twentieth century. Policies focusing on redistribution and representation 
have fallen short. A rediscovery of public sphere, where recognition is the 
core of moral economy, is essential to achieve this ideal (Table 4.1).
References
Agarwal, Shriman Narayan (1946) Gandhian Constitution for free India. 
Retrieved from: cadindia.clpr.org.in (accessed on 01/01/2020).
Ambedkar, Bimrao Ramji (1920) Editorial. Mooknayak (newspaper) first issue.
Ambedkar, Bimrao Ramji (1936) Annihilation of caste. Ambedkar Institute of 
Social and Economic Change, Mumbai.
Ambedkar, Bimrao Ramji (1948) ‘Draft constitution’ a speech delivered in the 
Constitutional Assembly. The Constitution and the Constituent Assembly 
Debates, Lok Sabha Secretariat, Delhi, 1990, 107–13; 1171–183.
4 Social Policy in India: One Hundred Years of the (Stifled)… 
152
Ambedkar, Bimrao Ramji (1956/1987) Cultural revolution and counter revolu-
tion. In Writings and Speeches, Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar, Government of 
Maharashtra, Mumbai.
Appu, P. S. (1996) Land reforms in India. New Delhi: Vikas Publishers.
Austin, Granville (1999) Working a democratic constitution – the Indian experi-
ence. Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Arendt, Hannah (1958) Human condition. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Baxter, Craig (1985) Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia. Journal of 
International Affairs 38,2: 307–319.
Bernier, Francois (1934) Travels in the Mogul Empire: 1656–1668. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press.
Breman, Jan (1996) Footloose labour. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Breman, Jan, Kevan, Harris, Ching Kwan Lee, and Marcel van der Linden 
(2019) The social question in the 21st century. California: University of 
California Press.
Bulhan, Hussein Abdilahi (1985) Frantz Fanon and the psychology of oppression. 
New York: Springer Science.
Chandhoke, Neera (1995) State and civil society: explorations in political theory. 
Delhi: Sage Publications.
Chakraborty, Sukhamoy (1987) Development planning: the Indian experience. 
Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Chatterjee, Partha (2004) The politics of the governed. Columbia: Columbia 
University Press.
Chibber, Vivek (2003) Locked in place: state-building and late industrialization in 
India. Princeton: Princeton UP.
Das, Samarendra and Felix Padel (2010) Out of this earth. Delhi: Orient 
Blackswan.
Davy, Ulrike (2013) Social citizenship going international: changes in the read-
ing of UN-sponsored economic and social rights. International Journal of 
Social Welfare 22, S15–S31.
Davy, Benjamin, Ulrike Davy, and Lutz Leisering (2013) The global, the social 
and rights: new perspectives on social citizenship. International Journal of 
Social Welfare 22: S1–S14.
Davy, Benjamin and Sony Pellissery (2013) The citizenship promise (un) ful-
filled: the right to housing in informal settings. International Journal of Social 
Welfare 22,1: S68–S84.
Down to Earth (2005) Rise of third sector. https://www.downtoearth.org.in/cov-
erage/rise-of-third-sector-33712 (accessed on 20/04/2020).
 S. Pellissery
153
Dumont, Louis (1966) Homo hierarchicus: the caste system and its implications. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Fanon, Frantz (1967) Black skin, white masks. New York: Grove Press.
Fraser, Nancy and Axel Honneth (2003) Redistribution or recognition? 
London: Verso.
Gadamer, Hans (1976) Hegel’s dialectic of self-consciousness. In: Hegel’s dialec-
tic: Five hermeneutical studies, P. Christopher Smith (trans.), New Haven: Yale 
University Press, 54–74.
Galanter, Marc (1984) Competing equalities: law and the backward classes in 
India. New Delhi: Oxford University Press.
Haragopal, Gudavarthy and Sukumar (2007) Cultural roots of undemocratic 
order. In Ambedkar in retrospect, eds. Sukhadeo Thorat and Aryama, Rawat 
Publications, Jaipur, 292–300.
Heclo, Hugh (1995) Social Question In) Poverty, inequality and the future of 
social policy, eds. Katherine McFate, Roger Lawson, and William Julius 
Wilson, London: Russel Sage Publications, 665–691.
Hegel, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich (1807/1966) The phenomenology of mind. 
London: Allen and Unwin.
Honneth, Axel (2014) The I in we: studies in the theory of recognition. 
Cambridge: Polity.
Iliah, Kancha. (2007) Indian counter culture. In Ambedkar in retrospect, eds. 
Sukhadeo Thorat and Aryama, Jaipur: Rawat Publications, 301–314.
Jalal, Ayesha (1995) Democracy and authoritarianism in South Asia. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Jayal, Niraja Gopal (2011) A false dichotomy? The unresolved tension between 
universal and differentiated citizenship in India. Oxford Development Studies, 
39,2:185–204.
Jeyaranjan, J., John Harriss, and K Nagaraj (2010) Land, labour and caste poli-
tics in rural Tamil Nadu in the 20th century: Iruvelpattu (1916–2008). 
Economic and Political Weekly 45,31: 47–61.
Johari, J. C. (1973) Young Turks and the radicalisation of the Congress leader-
ship. The Indian Journal of Political Science 34,2:173–198.
Kane, Pandurang Vaman (1941) History of Dharmasastras: part I. Poona: 
Bhandarkar Oriental Research Institute
Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver (2012) European foundations of the welfare state. 
New York: Berghahn Books.
Kaufmann, Franz-Xaver (2013) Thinking about social policy. The German 
Tradition. German Social Policy 1, ed. Lutz Leisering. Berlin et al.: Springer.
4 Social Policy in India: One Hundred Years of the (Stifled)… 
154
Kaur, Balbir, Atri Mukherjee, Neeraj Kumar and Anand Prakash Ekka (2014) 
Debt sustainability at state level in India, RBI Working Paper Series WPS 
(DEPR): 07/2014.
Keefer, Philip and Stuti Khemani, (2005) Democracy, public expenditure and 
the poor. The World Bank Research Observer 20,1: 1–27.
Kojève, Alexandre (1969) Introduction to the reading of Hegel. New  York: 
Basic Books.
Kosambi, Damodar Dharmananda (1954) Stages of Indian history. Journal of 
the Indo-Soviet Cultural Society 1,1:11–19.
Kosambi, Damodar Dharmananda (1955) The basis of ancient Indian history. 
Journal of the American Oriental Society 75:35–45.
Marx, Karl (1853) Marx to Engels, 14 June 1853. https://marxists.architexturez.
net/archive/marx/works/1853/letters/53_06_14.htm (accessed on 
30/09/2019).
Marx, Karl (1858) Grundrisse. marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1857/grun-
drisse/ch09.htm#p471 (accessed on 30.09/2019).
Mannoni, Octave. (1962) Prospero and Caliban: The psychology of colonization. 
New York: Praeger.
Mathew, Babu, Sony, Pellissery, and Arvind, Narrain (2020) Why is law central 
to policy process in Global South? In Transformative law and public policy, 
eds. Sony, Pellissery, Babu Mathew, Avinash Govindjee, and Arvind Narrain,, 
New Delhi: Routledge, 1–25.
Metcalfe, Charles (1833) Appendix to the Report from the Select Committee of the 
House of Commons on the Affairs of the East-India Company, III-Revenue 
(London House of Parliament Archives).
Mkandawire, Thandika (2001) Social policy in a development context. UNRISD 
Working Papers PP-SPD-7.
Midgley, James. and Kwong-leung Tang (2001) Social policy, economic growth 
and developmental welfare. International Journal of Social Welfare 10: 244–252.
Nussbaum, Martha (2003) Capabilities as fundamental entitlements: Sen and 
social justice. Feminist Economics 9 (2–3): 33–59.
Omvedt, Gail (2007) Towards a theory of caste and class. in Ambedkar in retro-
spect, eds. Sukhadeo Thorat and Aryama, Rawat Publications, Jaipur, 246–260.
Pellissery, Sony (2006) The politics of social protection in rural India. Doctoral 
Dissertation Submitted to University of Oxford.
Pellissery, Sony and Sattwick Dey Biswas (2012) Emerging property regimes in 
India: what it holds for the future of socio-economic rights? IRMA Working Paper.
 S. Pellissery
155
Pellissery, Sony, Amrutha Jose Pampackal, and, Partha Bopaiah (2015) Caste 
and distributive justice: can social policy address durable inequalities?. Social 
Policy & Administration 49, 6: 785–800.
Pellissery, Sony (2016) Land alienation infused poverty in India. In Poverty and 
inequality in middle-income countries, eds. Einaar Braathen, Julian May, and 
Gemma Wright, London: Zed: 130–56.
Pellissery, Sony (2017) Social investments and poor families in India. In Social 
investment and social welfare, eds. James Midgley, Espen Dahl, and Amy 
Conley Wright, Cheltenham: Edward and Elgar, 70–86.
Pellissery, Sony, Ben Davy and Harvey Jacobs (2017) Land Policies in India, 
Singapore: Springer.
Pellissery, Sony and Vivek Anand (2017) Social investment regimes in India. 
Conference paper presented at Sciences Po, Paris during 9–12 March 2017.
Pellissery, Sony, Sharada Srinivasan, and Anusha Chaitanya (2020) Politics of 
making and unmaking of the Indian Planning Commission. In Transformative 
law and public policy, eds. Sony Pellissery, Babu Mathew, Avinash Govindjee, 
and Arvind Narrain, New Delhi: Routledge, 111–127.
Pellissery, Sony and Partha Bopaiah (2020) Corruption and social policy. In 
Oxford Handbook of Public Administration for Social Policy, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press: (forthcoming).
Platteau, Jean-Philippe (1990) Traditional systems of social security and hunger 
insurance. In Social security in developing countries, eds. Ehtisham Ahmad, 
Jean Dreze, John Hills, and Amartya Sen, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 112–170.
Rajan, Nalini (2003) Left liberalism and caste politics. Economic and Political 
Weekly 38,24:2346–49.
Ramavat, Pradeep (2018) From millions to fractions: re-examining pragmatism in 
the context of internal reservation. Occasional paper series 04/2018 of the 
Institute of Public Policy, Bangalore.
Reddy, G. Ram and Gudavarthy Haragopal (1985) The Pyraveekar: “the fixer” 
in rural India. Asian Survey 25,11: 1148–1162.
Rothstein, Bo (2005) Social traps and the problem of trust. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Sharma, R. S. (1984) How feudal was Indian feudalism?. The Journal of Peasant 
Studies 12,2: 19–43.
Sanyal, Kalyan (2007) Rethinking capitalist development. Routledge, London.
Sen, Pronab (2017) Plan, but do not over-plan: Lessons for NITI Aayog. 
Economic and Political Weekly 52,18: 41–48.
4 Social Policy in India: One Hundred Years of the (Stifled)… 
156
Siegel, Benjamin Robert (2018) Hungry nation. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press.
Singh, Hira (2014) Recasting caste- from the sacred to the profane. Sage Publications, 
New Delhi.
Srinivas, Mysore Narasimhachar and Arvind M. Shah (1960) The myth of self- 
sufficiency of Indian village. The Economic Weekly (Sept 10).
Suryanarayana, M. (1995) PDS: Beyond implicit subsidy and urban bias- the 
Indian experience. Food Policy 20,4: 259–278.
Taylor, Charles (1992) Multiculturalism and the politics of recognition. In 
Multiculturalism, ed. Amy Gutmann, Princeton: Princeton University 
Press: 25–73.
Thapar, Romila (1966) History of India. Penguin Books, New Delhi.
Tönnies, Ferdinand (1887/2001) Community and civil society. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.
Young, Iris Marion (2000) Inclusion and democracy. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.
Wade, Robert (1985) The market for public office: why the Indian state is not 
better at development. World Development 13,4: 467–497.
World Bank (2004) Making the services work for the poor people. Washington: 
World Bank.
World Bank (2011) Poverty and social exclusion. World Bank, New Delhi.
Open Access   This chapter is licensed under the terms of the Creative 
Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/
licenses/by/4.0/), which permits use, sharing, adaptation, distribution and 
reproduction in any medium or format, as long as you give appropriate credit to 
the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons 
licence and indicate if changes were made.
The images or other third party material in this chapter are included in the 
chapter’s Creative Commons licence, unless indicated otherwise in a credit line 
to the material. If material is not included in the chapter’s Creative Commons 
licence and your intended use is not permitted by statutory regulation or exceeds 
the permitted use, you will need to obtain permission directly from the copy-
right holder.
 S. Pellissery
157© The Author(s) 2021
L. Leisering (ed.), One Hundred Years of Social Protection, Global Dynamics of Social 
Policy, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-54959-6_5
5
Minoritarian Labour Welfare in India: 
The Case of the Employees’ State 
Insurance Act of 1948
Ravi Ahuja
 Welfare in India: Institutional Pillars 
and Social Contexts
Welfarism in postcolonial India, in its policies and institutional forms, 
has not been based on the universal human right to social security that 
was proclaimed in the centres of metropolitan capitalism in the period 
following World War II (Nullmeier and Kaufmann 2010; Pierson and 
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blatant historical fact has facilitated the almost complete exclusion of 
India from the existing scholarship on global welfarism, which, until 
recently, has been largely confined to the North Atlantic rim.1 This exclu-
sion has appeared to be justified even to scholars of South Asian societies 
who often believe that international policy debates on welfare had largely 
bypassed India before the end of colonial rule and whose analyses of 
Indian social policy tend to begin with India’s political independence in 
1947 (Goyal 2013). However, key characteristics and global connections 
of India’s postcolonial social policy become perceivable only if we turn to 
their—generally miserable—origins in the colonial period, under politi-
cal conditions of a barely veiled despotism where the State was less 
exposed to democratic pressures and in less immediate need of legitimiz-
ing authority than most European polities.
The colonial Government of India survived, after all, with limited 
political damage, a chain of famines of genocidal proportions that 
stretched over the last three decades of the nineteenth century2—the very 
decades when foundations for the European “welfare state” were laid in 
response to growing labour movements (Kuhnle and Sander 2010). As 
late as in 1943, the lack of formal entitlements, or citizen rights, to social 
protection let the political cost appear bearable to the British authorities 
of millions of starvation deaths in Eastern India3—at a time when the 
introduction of a system of universal social protection seemed unavoid-
able on the British Isles even to conservatives. Nevertheless, the last seven 
decades of colonial rule, beginning with the Famine Codes of the 1880s, 
were arguably also the period when the foundations were laid for the pil-
lars of Indian social policy as we know it, even though the edifice was 
fully erected and distinguishable in its present-day form only after the 
attainment of political independence in 1947. Three such pillars of social 
policy are distinguishable, which have borne the weight of 
1 This is exemplified by paradigmatic studies such as Esping-Andersen (1990). The more recent 
Oxford Handbook of the Welfare State (Castles et al. 2010) does present a section on “Emerging 
Welfare States” that contains chapters on Latin America, East Asia, Eastern Europe and Russia, but 
still not on South Asia.
2 There is now a rich historiography of famines in India that includes the important monographs by 
Bhatia (1991, 3rd ed) and Davis (2001).
3 This has not been lost on either contemporaries or later scholars. See, for example, Nehru (1989: 
496) (1st ed. 1946) and Sen (1981).
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the—altogether limited—Indian welfarism unevenly, the proportions 
shifting over time.
The first of these pillars originated from older conceptions of poor 
relief. After the famine crises of the last third of the nineteenth century, 
these forms of social policy took the shape of targeted “workfare” pro-
grammes and, if politically unavoidable, of price controls on essential 
goods or of provisioning schemes (Brennan 1984). India’s postcolonial 
and perpetually contentious food rationing systems, the more recent (if 
now increasingly hollowed out) “National Rural Employment Guarantee” 
or the “Midday Meal Schemes” for school children are important 
instances for this policy lineage (Mooji 1998; Amrith 2008; Siegel 2018). 
A second pillar consists in the establishment of quotas regulating the 
access of specific social groups to public employment and public goods 
(crucially, education). This pillar, too, originated in the colonial period 
but assumed growing importance after the end of British rule and par-
ticularly when movements of Dalit and “other backward” castes became 
more assertive in the 1980s (Assayag 2012: 451–455; Jaffrelot 2012: 
470–476; Srivastava 2018).4 This chapter is solely concerned with the 
third pillar, which made social welfare benefits conditional on specific 
forms of employment. Such policies followed the welfare logic established 
by the Bismarckian social insurance reforms of the 1880s in that they 
conceived of welfare entitlements not as a universal right inherent in citi-
zen status, but as derived from legally defined types of employment status 
and thus as a special right (or, legal privilege) conferred on certain catego-
ries of employees.
If the historiography of Indian social policy is meagre in general, it is 
almost non-existent in regard to employment-based welfare schemes.5 To 
many they would appear, in any case, as being of little consequence to the 
vast majority of India’s wage-earning population. For 93 per cent of the 
Indian workforce are conventionally (and somewhat simplistically) 
4 See also Chap. 4, in this book.
5 Even the historian of Indian labour perhaps most sensitive to issues of social security assumed that 
state-born welfare schemes were largely irrelevant in colonial India, Das Gupta (1994: 612–620).
The only colonial welfare laws that have attracted more serious historical analysis so far are the 
provincial Maternity Benefit Acts and, more particularly, that of Bombay (cf. Chhachi 1998; 
Srivastava 2018).
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reckoned to be employed in the so-called informal sector and thus largely 
exempted from the ambit of labour law and employment-based wel-
farism. Even of the remaining 7 per cent about half are reported to be 
employed “informally” within the “formal sector” (Sanyal and Bhattacharyya 
2009: 39). They are, in other words, employed by contractors or in other 
ways that permit to pay much lower wages, evade labour law and with-
hold employment benefits. Many critical scholars agree with apologists of 
neoliberalism that India’s labour laws—including employment-based 
social security schemes—have been relevant only to a small proportion of 
the country’s workforce and have hermetically sealed off a privileged 
labour aristocracy of formally employed workers from the vast informal 
labour economy.6
This seemingly uncontroversial line of argument needs to be interro-
gated, however. At issue is not whether massive social differences exist 
among India’s workforce: the shrinking proportion of effectively tenured 
workers in public sector enterprises has undoubtedly very little in com-
mon, for instance, with the day labourers constituting the majority of 
India’s enormous construction labour force. Rather the question is how 
to conceptualize this wide scope for differentiation among India’s wage- 
earning people in terms of income, employment conditions, social status 
and economic security. Like Jan Breman (2013), I would plead for a 
dynamic, non-dualistic understanding of the phenomenon.7 For harsh 
exclusionary practices and merciless competition between segments of 
the workforce operate within a structure of graded informality: rather 
than assuming a stationary dichotomy between formal and informal 
labour status, I propose to examine formalization and informalization as 
processes that are contingent, continuous and contentious. Boundaries 
and passages between the various segments of the workforce are, in other 
words, multiple and shifting; they are produced and reproduced through 
social conflicts and coalitions; and they possess relative stability only.
6 See, for example, Parry (2013: 45), where formal sector workers are characterized as a “compla-
cently cocooned enclave of labour inhabiting a ‘citadel’ of state-sponsored privilege, progressively 
protected against incursions by workers from outside”.
7 Breman (2013; see esp. Chap. 1) has summed up and updated his argument, first presented in 
1976 in a series of articles.
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For labour and employment-based social security laws have played a 
major role not only in the definition of boundaries but also of passages 
between sharply differentiated segments of the workforce. This is not to 
play down the potency of structural boundaries, which has been reflected 
in all-too-real difficulties faced by trade unions in developing workable 
strategies encompassing all sections of the working classes based on a 
commonality of interest. But taking account also of the passages permits 
to perceive counter-tendencies, potentials for cross-sectional alliances 
and to make sense of the persistent demands of informally employed 
workers to be included in schemes like the Employees’ State Insurance or 
the Provident Fund. If employment-based social security programmes 
thus have mattered not only to the fraction of the working classes covered 
by them explicitly but to wider sections of India’s workforce, it is because 
they span, together with other labour laws, a horizon of expectation, 
define possibilities and help to formulate demands.
If we thus assume “(in)formalization” to be a dynamic, bidirectional, 
even reversible process, and that “formality” and “informality” are, accord-
ingly, not to be understood as stable attributes of static and hermetically 
sealed “sectors” of the labour market, we need to reconstruct this process 
historically. We need to trace, in other words, the historical evolution of 
those patterns of segmentation within the workforce that came to be 
described from the 1970s onwards in many parts of the world with the 
adjectives “formal” and “informal”. Law has served, as Prabhu Mohapatra’s 
studies show, as a crucial regulatory technology for the separation of “for-
mal” from “informal” modes of employment (Mohapatra 2005, 2012). A 
historical—as against a merely logical—reconstruction of this process of 
separation, a chronology of the intertwined processes of formalization 
and informalization is still lacking, however. As we begin to retrace this 
chronology, the middle of the twentieth century emerges as a key moment 
of these processes: almost all major pieces of legislation that have marked 
out the parameters of India’s postcolonial regime of labour regulation up 
to the present day were passed during the six years from 1946 to 1952. 
These acts have regulated labour relations, industrial disputes procedures, 
trade union rights and also employment-based social benefits, including 
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the Employees’ State Insurance and Provident Fund schemes mentioned 
already.8
Largely ignored by historians, this spate of legislation was, in the 
immediate political context of the post-war situation, a response of the 
outgoing colonial administration and their nationalist successors to the 
extreme political volatility encompassing India in general and to alarm-
ing levels of working-class unrest in particular (see Ahuja 2019b). But 
these changes also had a longer history, dating back to World War I at 
least, and were conditioned by larger and deeper international as well as 
India-level contexts: these are discussed more fully in the long version of 
this essay9 and can here only be briefly alluded to. International debates 
on labour welfare did by no means bypass late colonial India: they pro-
vided the “language of welfare” that was used in political controversy and 
policymaking. Welfarist arguments were taken up both from the debates 
around the International Labour Organization (ILO) of which India was 
a founding member and from social policy developments in post–World 
War I Britain and other Euro-American nation states. Established for-
mats of welfare legislation such as maternity benefit, workmen’s compen-
sation, sickness or old-age insurance were freely borrowed from these 
international contexts and from the memoranda of ILO councillors. In 
the same vein, British social policy experts such as John Henry Whitley 
or William Beveridge came to be involved in legislative processes in India.
While the discursive and regulatory forms of early welfarism in India 
were thus strongly shaped by these international contexts, the specific 
regulatory content (and particularly the strong exclusionary, minoritarian 
focus) of the emergent regime of labour welfarism was largely determined 
by India-level contestations between (a) the late colonial and, subse-
quently, the early postcolonial State, (b) British expatriate as well as 
Indian big business and (c) an expanding and politically plural labour 
movement. To cut a long story short, the State became increasingly 
involved in issues of “labour efficiency” and, therefore, of the social repro-
duction of the workforce during the World Wars both as a growing 
8 For an overview, see International Labour Organization—ILO (1957).
9 For a detailed discussion, see Ahuja (2019a), especially sections “The Employees’ State Insurance 




industrial employer and as a consumer of strategic commodities; Indian 
industrialists, on their part, faced increasing international competition 
and temporary labour market bottlenecks, expanded into more capital- 
intensive sectors, all of which implied that influential sections of big busi-
ness came to promote the “rationalization” of industrial labour processes 
and to acknowledge the importance of raising the living standards of at 
least sections of the workforce to reduce labour turnover and “absentee-
ism”; Indian labour movements not only proliferated massively since 
World War I and came to involve, especially since the 1940s, sections of 
the workforce even beyond large-scale industry, but they were also a field 
of contestation between various political forces with a marked presence of 
militant communist and socialist tendencies.
The historians’ lack of interest in the origins of employment-based 
social security legislation thus points us towards a wider gap in the histo-
riography of contemporary South Asian societies. The present essay 
approaches this gap from a specific and limited angle: it traces the prehis-
tory and the making of one major piece of protective labour legislation, 
the Employees’ State Insurance Act of 1948. This was a compulsory 
insurance scheme financed by contributions from employers, employees 
and the state, which was to provide workers employed in “permanent 
factories” with monetary benefits as well as medical services to protect 
them from the risks of sickness, childbirth and employment injury while 
regulating sickness leave also. In this essay, I confine myself to discussing 
the political and legislative process from which this piece of labour legis-
lation emerged and how it both gave legal expression and contributed to 
an increasing differentiation among the industrial workforce along the 
lines that would later be described in terms of a “formal”-“informal” divide.
The chapter is organized as follows. The section “Early Industrial 
Welfare and the Debate on Welfare Legislation in Interwar India” traces 
early industrial welfare schemes at the company level and discusses why 
the reproduction of the industrial workforce emerged as a political issue 
at the all-India level during the interwar period. The following section 
“The Employees’ State Insurance Act: The Making of a Law” traces the 
making of the Employees’ State Insurance Act in the political field of 
forces of the transitional 1940s. The concluding section “Repercussions: 
Graded Informality, a ‘Birthright’ Lost and a Horizon of Expectation” 
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argues that the results of this process were contradictory: while the spe-
cific form of Indian health insurance contributed to a harsh segmentation 
of the working classes, and while the promise of welfare as a citizen’s right 
remained unfulfilled, horizons of expectation were spanned simultane-
ously that continue to inform struggles for social equality.
 Early Industrial Welfare and the Debate 
on Welfare Legislation in Interwar India
Before World War I, employers both British and Indian, colonial officials 
and large sections of the press agreed that India did not require protective 
labour legislation or a welfarism focused on industrial labour. Two lines 
of argument stood out, the first asserting that India’s young industry 
could not afford expensive welfare measures if it was to compete interna-
tionally. A leading nationalist newspaper, Amrita Bazar Patrika, formu-
lated this position with admirable clarity in 1875: “A larger death rate 
amongst our operatives is far more preferable to the collapse of this rising 
industry. […] We can, after the manufactures are fully established, seek 
to protect the operatives”.10 The second line of argument insisted that 
labour welfare was largely irrelevant to India since the country had “as yet 
practically no factory population, such as exists in European countries” 
(Indian Factory Labour Commission 1908: 18). Factory work, the adher-
ents of this latter view reasoned, was no more than a temporary occupa-
tion of and a supplementary source of income for a migratory workforce. 
The mill worker, it was held, was “essentially an agriculturalist”: “His 
heart is in the country and not in his work” (Burnett-Hurst 1925: 60). 
Moreover, the workers’ health was provided for by their rural families and 
other “traditional” village-based forms of mutual aid: “in most cases” the 
Indian Factory Labour Commission asserted in 1908, “he is secured 
against want by the joint family system” (p. 19) and an official report on 
the industrial city of Bombay concurred in 1923 that periodical visits to 
the home village had “a beneficial effect upon their health as reflected by 
10 Amrita Bazar Patrika, 2 September 1875, quoted in Chandra (1966: 336).
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weight and counteracts to a very large extent the effects of working and 
living conditions”.11
Such opinions continued to be pronounced well into the postcolonial 
period, and cracks appeared, at first, in this hegemonic construct only in 
certain industrial sectors and for limited periods. Exceptions were capital- 
intensive industrial enterprises such as the Tata steel works, founded in 
1907 and operational by 1912, where profits depended on the stable 
employment of a skilled workforce and where—as in the case of the rail-
ways and their extensive engineering workshops—strategic needs of the 
empire were at stake. Here welfare schemes, including housing and health 
services, were created even before World War I and expanded in the 
course of the 1920s (Lala 2006: 284; RCLI 1931a: 53–69 and passim). 
Other exceptions were observable even in India’s more typical labour- 
intensive industries when severe bottlenecks of labour supply threatened 
to stifle industrial production for periods sufficiently long to affect capital 
returns. Bombay’s cotton textile industry experienced such a bottleneck 
during the plague crisis of the late 1890s. This induced industrialists to 
look for devices restricting the mobility of the workforce—devices that 
included company-level welfare measures and, more particularly, housing 
programmes (cf. Sarkar 2018: 202–211). When the exigencies of the 
“Great War” dictated a greater British reliance on India’s labour markets 
and industries, the cracks widened and the “welfare” of industrial labour 
emerged, for the first time, as a political issue at the all-India level. The 
Indian Industrial Commission (1916–1918) was appointed by the 
Government of India with no labour representative, while half of its 
members were Indian or British businessmen. Interestingly, the 
Commission moved cautiously away from the earlier consensus in its 
report: the lack of welfare facilities that addressed dismal health condi-
tions among the industrial workforce was now identified as a competitive 
handicap since even the cheap wages of Indian workers could not make 
up, the Commission believed, for their alleged low “efficiency”:
11 T. Maloney, Report on Humidification in Indian Cotton Mills, Delhi: Government of India Press, 
1923, quoted in Burnett-Hurst (1925: 60, fn. 1).
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The conditions under which industrial operatives live and work in this 
country ought, if efficiency be aimed at, to approximate, as nearly as cir-
cumstances permit, to those of temperate climates. […] The problem, not 
only on moral grounds, but also for economic reasons, must be solved with 
the least avoidable delay, if the existing and future industries of India are to 
hold their own against the ever-growing competition, which will be still 
fiercer after the war. No industrial edifice can be permanent, which is built 
on such unsound foundations as those afforded by Indian labour under its 
present conditions. (Indian Industrial Commission 1918: 179f )
The recommendation of measures implying legal obligations on the part 
of employers was, however, carefully avoided. Even so, the argument of 
welfare as a precondition for “efficiency” stuck and was taken up time and 
again in the following years. Accordingly, in April 1922, a report pub-
lished in The Servant of India, mouthpiece of an influential social reform 
society, summed up the rationale of India’s first “Industrial Welfare 
Conference” as follows:
Welfare work wherever conducted on right lines has been found to be a 
veritable boon to the worker and a sound business proposition to the 
employer. India cannot hope to compete successfully with other countries 
unless the present low level of efficiency of the Indian labour is consider-
ably raised. (Kanekar 1922: 136)
Unprecedented levels of labour unrest and the emergence of numerous 
trade unions after the “Great War” added the desideratum of “social har-
mony” to that of “efficiency”. This induced Gandhi, for instance, to offer 
a nativist justification for welfarism by developing during these years the 
idea of a paternalist “trusteeship” that employers were morally obliged to 
take upon themselves for the benefit of their employees (Chandavarkar 
1998). During the interwar years, a growing minority of industrial 
employers came up with voluntary factory-level welfare schemes that 
addressed issues of social reproduction by providing for housing, crèches, 
educational facilities, subsidized grain shops, credit or dispensaries. These 
generally modest schemes often had a sharp disciplinary edge, as they 
sought to suppress the militancy and to reduce the horizontal mobility of 
core segments of the factory workforce. They were particularly prevalent 
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in areas with large concentrations of industrial employment such as the 
cotton textile metropolises of Bombay and Ahmedabad, where strikes 
and unionization were on the rise and where sizeable local labour markets 
enabled workers, at least in boom years, to shift to employers who offered 
better conditions (RCLI 1931b: 260f ).12
A “social policy” in the sense of a legal regulation of the workforce’s 
social reproduction based, in part, on statutory contributions by employ-
ers was resisted, however, on the whole successfully throughout the inter-
war period. As in other countries (Kuhnle and Sander 2010: 71–74) a 
“Workmen’s Compensation Act” was the first piece of labour welfare leg-
islation in colonial India. It was enacted in 1923 and put into force a year 
later. The divergence between European and Indian legislation was 
already perceivable, however, as the scope of workmen’s compensation 
was defined much more narrowly than, for instance, in Britain. Small- 
scale industries and agriculture (including the sizeable quasi-industrial 
plantation complex) were expressly exempted from the law (Punekar 
1950: 55). Numerous loopholes were created even with regard to labour 
market segments covered by it, which included initially not more than 
four million workers (ILO 1957: 95). Moreover, the implementation was 
left to district magistrates in general; even 20 years later, a special com-
missioner to adjudicate workmen’s compensation cases had been 
appointed solely in Bombay, while in Bihar, Bengal and Madras, Labour 
Commissioners were charged with workmen’s compensation as an addi-
tional duty (Punekar 1950: 73). As a result, the “Compensation Courts” 
appear to have sat in some of India’s vast Provinces only twice a year 
(Health Survey and Development Committee 1946: 77). Even more 
importantly, adjudication could only begin after private negotiations 
between the injured worker and the employer had failed, which made it 
almost impossible for uncounselled workers to stake their compensation 
claims. The injured worker, it was observed, ran “the risk of losing his job 
on top of losing a limb, if he decides to fight a case” (Adarkar 1947: 14). 
Even when adjudication took place, after all, the actual payment of the 
12 See also: Bulletins of Indian Industries and Labour 63: “Sickness Insurance”, Government of India: 
New Delhi, 1937, p. 82 and Srivastava (2018).
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awarded compensation was often not enforced (Lokanathan 1929: 107; 
Punekar 1950: 74).
When the economics professor and government councillor B.P. Adarkar 
submitted his “Report on Health Insurance for Industrial Workers” to 
the outgoing colonial dispensation in 1945, he recommended to scrap 
the Workmen’s Compensation Act altogether. It was to be replaced by an 
integrated healthcare scheme, as the working of the former had been “far 
from satisfactory”. He had very similar remarks for the other major item 
of interwar labour welfare legislation, that is, the Maternity Benefit Acts 
that had been passed in the majority of provinces after Bombay made a 
start in 1929 (Adarkar 1945: 10; s.a.: ILO 1957: 100f ). The Report of 
the (Rege) Labour Investigation Committee similarly observed in 1946 
that the
main defects of maternity benefits legislation are that it is neither uniform 
nor universal, that there is no provision for free medical aid before, during 
or after confinement except in a few provinces […], and that there is no 
provision for preventing an employer from dismissing a woman worker on 
the first sign of pregnancy except in a few provinces.
The Report also stated that women workers had often been dismissed 
when the Acts were put in force and that employers continued to “show 
a preference for the employment of unmarried girls, widows and women 
past child-bearing age” (Labour Investigation Committee 1946: 57). In a 
circular letter to the provincial governments in May 1945, H.C. Prior, 
Secretary to the Government of India, concurred that the Workmen’s 
Compensation and the Maternity Benefit Acts had “serious defects […] 
which cannot be removed except by means of an integral scheme of 
insurance”.13
Even though employers resisted any legal obligation to pay for welfare 
measures as an interference with the freedom of labour contract, the 
demand for social security legislation became if anything more insistent 
from the late 1920s onwards. The report of the Royal Commission on 
13 H.C. Prior, Secretary to the Government of India, to all Provincial Governments, 4 May 1945 
(“Subject: Health Insurance Scheme”), BL: IOR/L/E/8/4948 (“Health Insurance for Industrial 
Workers, incl. Sickness Statistics”).
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Labour in India (RCLI), presented to the British Parliament in 1931, 
accepted the view that continuing circulatory migration between city and 
countryside distinguished Indian factory workers from their European 
counterparts, but refuted the conventional notion that the former were 
“essentially” peasants (RCLI 1931b: 11–13). They conceded that the “vil-
lages have hitherto provided a measure of insurance against the effects of 
the various changes which may reduce, interrupt or destroy the earning 
capacity of the worker” (p. 19). Yet, they added, this “measure of insur-
ance” did not prevent workers even after short periods of illness from 
falling into debt and from finding themselves “destitute of resources, 
unable to take proper measures to restore [their] health and in difficulties 
regarding even the means of subsistence” (p. 265). The RCLI thus recom-
mended the development, in due course, of a system of sickness insur-
ance for industrial workers, funded by contributions from employers as 
well as employees (pp.  265–269). However, one of its members, 
N.M. Joshi, a prominent social reformer, legislator and trade union leader 
with close links to the ILO in Geneva, went beyond this Bismarck-style 
employment-based conception of social security: in February 1932, the 
consultative Committee of the Round Table Conference discussed (and 
promptly turned down with reference to “the peculiar conditions of 
India”) his suggestion
that the chapter on Fundamental Rights in the new Reformed Constitution 
for India should include a clause entitling every citizen to support from 
public funds, if no work could be found for him and to the provision, 
through a system of State insurance or otherwise, for maintenance during 
sickness, infirmity or old age and in the case of women for a reasonable 
period before and after confinement.14
The oppositional Indian National Congress, too, endorsed demands for 
social welfare: during the campaign for the provincial elections in 
1936–1937, its manifesto promised “protection against the economic 
14 ILOrep 3/1932, p. 65 (citing The Hindu, 1 March 1932). The Roundtable Conferences prepared 
the Government of India Act of 1935, which was the last quasi-constitutional legal framework of 
colonial rule before independence.
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consequence of old-age, sickness and unemployment”.15 A National 
Planning Committee (NPC), instituted by the National Congress in the 
late 1930s, was chaired by the moderate socialist Jawaharlal Nehru, but it 
also included a strong posse of Indian businessmen. In 1940, the NPC 
resolved that “social security should be assured to all classes of workers” 
(National Planning Committee 1940: 60). More specifically, the NPC 
announced that “[a] system of compulsory and contributory social insur-
ance for industrial workers should be established directly under the con-
trol of the State, to cover the risks of sickness and invalidity”. This as well 
as other schemes were envisaged for independent India and to “be 
extended by stages, priority being given to particular classes of workers, 
with due regard to the relative urgency of their needs, facility of applica-
tion, and to the ability of the community to provide for them” (p. 55). 
The NPC thus applied the globally circulating term “social security” to 
the Indian context as early as in 194016 but limited it, in the main, to 
labour welfare: it made entitlements to social benefits conditional, at least 
initially, on industrial employment and did not seek to establish them as 
a constitutional citizen’s right. It thus chose to follow the RCLI’s more 
restricted Bismarck-style approach rather than N.M.  Joshi’s 
universalism.
With the Indian National Congress assuming in 1937 the government 
of the majority of provinces, including Bombay with its sizeable indus-
trial centres, the latter emerged as the main hub for the development of a 
nationalist labour policy. In their “Labour Programme” of August 1937, 
the Bombay government already dampened the expectations raised dur-
ing the election campaign17 and had their Labour Commissioner declare 
a few months later that “conditions do not at present exist in the 
Presidency for the successful operation of a scheme of sickness insurance 
as it is understood and worked in the United Kingdom or other foreign 
15 “Industrial Reform in Presidency”, ToI, 18 August 1937, p. 6.
16 During the interwar period, the phrase “social security” had circulated in the Indian press with 
increasing frequency, especially after the US “Social Security Act” of 1935, but mainly with refer-
ence to international developments. From the beginning of the 1940s onwards, the term was 
applied to Indian contexts more regularly. For evidence, see, for instance, the digital archive of the 
Times of India. The quoted instance from the resolutions of the National Planning Committee in 
1940 might be significant in this respect.
17 “Industrial Reform in Presidency”, ToI, 18 August 1937, p. 6.
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countries”. As preliminary, cautious steps, the government proposed to 
first generate the required statistics, to legally sanction three to four weeks 
of paid sick leave for industrial workers and to deduct part of the wages 
for this leave period in order to create a State-administered provident 
fund. These were seen as first steps towards a social insurance scheme that 
was to be restricted to industrial workers.18
 The Employees’ State Insurance Act: 
The Making of a Law
When the colonial government declared India’s war entry in September 
1939 without consulting the nationalist opposition, the provincial gov-
ernments led by the Indian National Congress stepped down. In 1942, 
Nehru and other nationalist leaders were arrested, and the National 
Planning Committee ceased to function. The Congress’ temporary exclu-
sion from policy-making circles did not, however, cut short the debate on 
social insurance for industrial workers. Discussions between employers’ 
spokesmen, trade unions and representatives of the Government of India 
on a compulsory sickness insurance continued during the early years of 
the war, and if they remained fruitless, this was justified now more often 
by a lack of funds rather than by asserting the undesirability or the irrel-
evance to India of such a scheme.19
This political impasse ended only in the latter half of 1942, when the 
colonial suppression of the nationalist Quit India Movement was in full 
swing and when the British War Cabinet discussed the expediency, under 
these circumstances, of a “more progressive social and industrial policy” 
in India.20 The Government of India’s new Labour Member 
B.R. Ambedkar, a towering leader of India’s “untouchables”, used this 
situation to suddenly announce a social insurance bill that would be 
18 Bombay Chronicle, 15 November 1937, p. 8 (“Sickness Leave with Pay for Industrial Labour”) 
and p. 6 (“An Essential Reform”); see also ILOrep 11/1937, pp. 18f.
19 See, for example, ILOrep 1/1942, pp. 4–6 (special reports produced on the basis of participants’ 
minutes and papers distributed at the 3rd Labour Ministers’ Conference).
20 BL: IOR/L/E/8/2527 Social Reform in India, 1942–1944. See also above.
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introduced in the Legislative Assembly by spring 1943.21 B.P. Adarkar 
was appointed by the Labour Ministry to develop a “Report on Health 
Insurance for Industrial Workers”, which was submitted in the fall of 
1944.22 The Report drew upon various tentative schemes developed in 
the preceding years (Adarkar 1945: 14–16) but developed a concrete 
financial and administrative structure for the first time. It was vetted sub-
sequently by ILO experts at the request of the Government of India and 
revised by Adarkar by July 1945.23 The Workmen’s State Insurance Bill 
was introduced in the Central Legislative Assembly towards the end of 
the following year and eventually passed as the Employees’ State Insurance 
Act (ESI Act) in March 1948. It was to provide workers in perennial 
factories with more than ten employees with eight weeks of paid sick 
leave, monetary benefits in case of maternity, accident and invalidity, as 
well as medical benefits to be offered by special medical services that were 
to be created for the purpose.24
The law remained a dead letter for several years, however. The Times of 
India observed a year after the passing of the Act that while the ESI 
depended on the close cooperation of the Central Government, the 
Provincial Governments and of employers, “[a]ll the three are too preoc-
cupied with their own problems to attend to the teething troubles of a 
child whom none consider as their own”.25 In 1951, the All-India 
Organisation of Industrial Employers, a body representing Indian big 
business, demanded a further postponement of its implementation and 
particularly of any raising of contributions from the employers since they 
considered the scheme “socially unjust” and even “disastrous” in its eco-
nomic consequences, as it imposed “on industry a burden which it can-
not bear”.26 Influential forces within the ruling Indian National Congress 
supported this stance: the government of the populous northern province 
21 ILOrep 10/1942, p. 5 (cites The Statesman, 14 October 1942).
22 ILOrep 10/1944, pp. 24f (cites “Unofficial Note issued by the Bureau of Public Information, 
Government of India”, n.d.).
23 ILOrep 7/1945, p. 18 (referring to Indian Labour Gazette [hereafter: ILG] 6/1945).
24 ILG V/10 (April 1948), pp. 698–701; ILOrep 4/1948, pp. 90–93 (cites The Statesman, 2 and 3 
April 1948).
25 “Employees’ State Insurance Corporation”, ToI, 30 August 1949, p. 11.
26 ILOrep 5/1951, pp. 16–18 (cites Hindustan Times, 17 May 1951).
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of Uttar Pradesh had previously “signified their opposition to the scheme 
following a representation made to the Centre Government by certain 
employers at Kanpur”—the Times of India’s commentator even feared 
that the project was about to be abandoned.27 In 1952, Jawaharlal Nehru 
finally inaugurated a pilot scheme that was confined, however, to Delhi 
and the industrial city of Kanpur.28 It was only in the course of the late 
1950s that ESI coverage was rolled out more widely though considerable 
parts of the country still remained outside the remit of the Act. A full 
decade after the ESI Act had been passed by the Parliament of indepen-
dent India, a “Study Group on Social Security” set up by the Ministry of 
Labour believed that of 2.2  million factory workers to which the law 
extended, a mere 1.3 million were actually covered by the mechanisms of 
implementation established by then (Study Group on Social Security 
1958: 25).
The passing of the law had clearly not put a stop to the struggle over 
health insurance for workers—trench warfare over legislation now merely 
turned into an unending battle of attrition over its implementation. 
While these struggles over implementation require further research, we 
can here only discuss schematically four major lines of contestation that 
emerged already in the process of legislation in negotiations between 
business representatives, trade unionists and state officials. These were (a) 
the compulsory nature of the scheme, (b) its contributory character and 
the connected issue of financial liability, (c) its administrative structure as 
a state insurance and (d) the vexed question of scope.
Backed up by the 1944 Recommendation of the ILO, government 
officials and experts as well as trade union spokesmen agreed that sickness 
insurance for industrial workers had to be compulsory if it was to have any 
impact (Punekar 1950: 3,9; Adarkar 1945: 24).29 This caused some dis-
comfort in business circles and even among industrialists who admitted a 
certain need for an improvement of health services for industrial workers. 
At issue was not only that compulsory participation in a health insurance 
27 “State Insurance Scheme. Employers’ Opposition”, ToI, 18 August 1950, p. 5; “A Sorry State”, 
ToI, 20 September 1950, p. 6. See also: Albuquerque (1958: 108f ).
28 ILOrep 2/1952, pp. 94f (cites The Statesman and National Herald, 25 February 1952).
29 See also Trade Union Record, IV/5–6 (1–2/1945: 38f ).
5 Minoritarian Labour Welfare in India: The Case… 
174
scheme implied an obligation to contribute to it financially—an aspect 
we shall discuss instantly. Employers were also concerned that a compul-
sory scheme regulating, among other things, the employees’ right to paid 
sickness leave brought the conditions of work or the modalities of the 
performance of the labour contract under the scrutiny of state officials. 
Employer spokesmen thus pointed out repeatedly that the issue of health 
insurance was directly connected to that of holidays with pay30—the 
scheme was thus not external to the labour relationship, but a mechanism 
that restricted the “freedom” of employers to fashion labour contracts as 
they pleased. In 1935, the Bengal Chamber of Commerce had flatly 
opposed any social insurance scheme based on compulsion, had sug-
gested voluntary schemes at the company level according to a “model 
scheme” to be drawn up by government and had demanded that existing 
“adequate” arrangements should not be interfered with.31 By 1943, when 
many employers recognized that a compulsory sickness insurance scheme 
could be forestalled for some time but not avoided altogether, the Bombay 
Chamber of Commerce still demanded that existing voluntary employer 
schemes should be allowed to continue, thus opening a route towards the 
exemption from legal obligation.32 Trade unionists insisted, on their part, 
that “[e]xceptions in favour of any private factories will lead to unfair 
practices”.33 Adarkar, while recommending strictly regulated exceptions 
wherever employers had created satisfactory insurance schemes for their 
workforces, emphasized that such schemes were extremely rare: “The 
existing medical facilities in most places are no doubt extremely inade-
quate; even some of the so-called health insurance schemes are a mere 
parody of what they should be” (Adarkar 1945: 186). At the end of the 
day, employers could not prevent that the ESI Act defined health insur-
ance as a compulsory scheme. The interdependence between 
30 ILOrep 8/1940, pp.  35f (cites Circular no. 146, dated 8 August 1940, of the Employers’ 
Association of Northern India in Kanpur); ILOrep 6/1943, p. 12 (citing Proceedings of Bombay 
Chamber of Commerce for May 1943).
31 ILOrep 11/1935, p. 12 (“Abstract of Proceedings of the Committee of the Bengal Chamber of 
Commerce for Sept. 1935”).
32 ILOrep 6/1943, p.  12 (excerpted from Proceedings of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, 
May 1943).
33 “Memorandum submitted by the All-India Trade Union Congress…”, Trade Union Record, 
IV/5–6 (January–February 1945), p. 39.
 R. Ahuja
175
employment- based health insurance and the conditions of the perfor-
mance of the labour contract was even brought forward openly by 
B.R. Ambedkar as an argument for the urgency of regulating employ-
ment conditions through the Standing Orders Act that was passed by the 
Central Legislative Assembly in 1946.34
The second line of contestation emerged over the contributory character 
of the ESI scheme and the connected issue of financial liability. From the 
early war years onwards, state officials and trade union representatives 
had agreed that the envisaged social insurance scheme needed to be based 
on contributions by employers and employees. Business spokesmen and 
trade unionists had, at the same time, concurred in the opinion that a 
financial contribution by the State was required.35 Raising the threshold 
for the passing of an unwelcome law without having to contradict gov-
ernment openly was surely one of the tactical considerations that 
prompted employers to pursue this line. The War Government at the 
central level responded by taking the comfortable stand that if state sub-
sidies were required, they would have to come from the provinces—pre-
dictably, the latter ruled this out altogether (Adarkar 1945: 164).36 The 
Adarkar Report, in 1945, argued strongly for a financial contribution by 
the State, but it outlined two alternative models of funding, only one of 
which involved state subsidies (Adarkar 1945: 38–45, 105–109). The 
Report also advocated a state guarantee for the solvency of the social 
insurance scheme (Adarkar 1945: 63f )—a demand taken up by the 
Bombay Millowners’ Association when the Bill was eventually under dis-
cussion in the Constituent Assembly, in order to protect the employers 
from financial liabilities.37 As per the Act finally passed a year later, the 
Government of India undertook to cover two-thirds of the administra-
tion costs for the first five years, while the provinces were asked to finance 
one-third of the costs of the medical facilities that were to be established 
34 “Fixing of Labour Conditions by Employers”, ToI, 13 April 1946, p. 8.
35 ILOrep 1/1942, pp. 4–6 (special reports on the 3rd Labour Ministers’ Conference and the pre-
ceding meeting of the Labour Ministers with employer and worker representatives in January 1942).
36 See also: “Health Insurance Plan for Workers. Provincial Govt.’s Attitude”, ToI, 31 October 
1944, p. 4.
37 ILOrep 7/1947, pp.  28f (cites proceedings of the Committee of the Bombay Millowners’ 
Association for January to March 1947).
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for the provision of the medical benefits. An estimate calculated that, on 
this basis, employers were to contribute 60 per cent of the total ESI bud-
get, while employees and the State were answerable for 20 per cent each 
(Punekar 1950: 194f ). Again, the actual implementation of the Act cre-
ated a rather different scenario: business advocates achieved a temporary 
exemption of companies from the payment of “maximum contributions”,38 
and by the end of the 1950s, trade unions calculated that employees had, 
in fact, contributed significantly more to ESI funds than employers.39 
The state governments, on their part, renegotiated their share of expenses 
for the ESI scheme’s medical services and succeeded in reducing it from 
one-third to one-quarter (Albuquerque 1958: 108f ).
Since state contributions remained narrowly circumscribed, the opera-
tional costs of the ESI scheme were mainly borne by bipartite contribu-
tions from employers and employees. The administrative structure—the 
third line of contestation we need to take account of—assumed a strongly 
tripartite form, however, and came to be dominated by state officials: 
while employers’ associations and trade unions were entitled to appoint 
their representatives, the administrative bodies in control of the ESI 
funds were controlled by government servants as were the special arbitra-
tion structures for ESI disputes (Albuquerque 1958: 108; Punekar 1950: 
148–150, 158f ). This was a major departure from the implementation 
structure of the Workmen’s Compensation Act where the respective 
employer was in charge of payments to beneficiaries and where hurdles 
had been created intentionally, as we have seen earlier, to render recourse 
of claimants to legal adjudication more difficult. The state-centred admin-
istrative structure of the ESI was created with the explicit aim of prevent-
ing the malfunctions of the earlier Acts that were believed to be rooted in 
the principle of “employer liability”: “for if the employer is saddled with 
the responsibility of compensation, he is bound to find ways of avoiding 
it” Adarkar 1947: 14, see also 11–17, 23, 1945: 12).
The fourth and even more defining line of contestation arose in regard 
to the issue of scope. When the debate grew more intensive in 1940, an 
38 “Health Insurance Scheme. Central Act Likely to be Amended”, Bombay Chronicle, 5 December 
1950, p. 1; Report of the Study Group on Social Security, pp. 24f.
39 A Question to Trade Unions: On ESI, PF and Pension Schemes, p. 107.
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alliance of British and Indian industrialists demanded that a compulsory 
social insurance scheme, if it had to be created at all, was to have an 
extensive reach from the start. They insisted to include the Princely 
States—comprising almost one third of the subcontinent—to avoid 
unfair competitive advantages for industrialists operating from these ter-
ritories.40 For the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, this was an issue suf-
ficiently important to justify the “postponement of the scheme for several 
years”.41 Sir Vithal Chandavarkar, spokesman of the Employers’ 
Federation of India, even combined his appeal to the new government of 
independent India not to “scare away private enterprise” with the demand 
that the undue focus of labour legislation on industrial workers should be 
overcome and that its scope needed to be extended to agricultural work-
ers. Ostensibly in the best interest of the working classes, such proposals 
seemed to have the main objective of derailing the project by raising the 
hurdles.42 Adarkar envisaged a universal scheme in the long run, but rec-
ommended for the initial period a narrow focus on workers in perennial 
(i.e. non-seasonal) factories in three industrial sectors that had employed 
about 1.3 million workers in 1942: textiles, engineering, “minerals and 
metal” (i.e. the metallurgical and oil industries) (Adarkar 1945: 29, 159). 
This would have covered about 60 per cent of the factory workforce.43 
The All-India Trade Union Congress (AITUC) demanded a wider scope 
to include all employees of “organized industries”, irrespective of occupa-
tion, whether working in factories or not, and including employees of 
seasonal factories (e.g. those processing agricultural produce like sugar) as 
40 Adarkar quoted a resolution to this effect of a Joint Conference of the (expatriate British) 
Employers’ Federation of India and the All-India Organisation of Industrial Employers (controlled 
by Indian big business interests) in September 1940 (Adarkar 1945: 164). See also: ILOrep 8/1940, 
p. 37 (summarizing a “Letter to the Superintendent of Industries, Delhi, sent by the Secretary, All- 
India Organisation of Industrial Employers, on 15-8-1940, copy of which was forwarded to this 
Office”). This line of reasoning was endorsed by the Bombay Millowners’ Association and the 
Calcutta Chamber of Commerce. Cf. ILOrep 9/1940, p. 26 and ibid., 10/1940, p. 15.
41 “Scheme for Sickness Insurance. ‘Should be on All-India Basis’”, ToI, 30 June 1943, p. 6. See also: 
ILOrep 6/1943, p.  12 (excerpted from Proceedings of the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, 
May 1943).
42 “Employers’ Federation Pledge Support to Government”, Bombay Chronicle, 20 December 1947, 
p. 3. See also ILOrep 7/1943, p. 12 (cites Journal of the Indian Merchants’ Chamber, July 1943).
43 ILOrep 10/1944, pp. 24f (cites “Unofficial Note issued by the Bureau of Public Information, 
Government of India”, n.d.).
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well as “[s]ome of the dependents”.44 Two ILO experts, Raghunath Rao 
and Maurice Stack, were assigned the task to revise the scheme and rec-
ommended to extend it to all factory workers in perennial factories.45 
This recommendation was incorporated into Adarkar’s final report and 
subsequently in the Employees’ State Insurance Act of 1948.46
Consequently, smaller manufacturing units, agricultural labour, 
including the workforce of India’s sizeable quasi-industrial plantation 
economies, the enormous construction sector as well as miners and trans-
port workers remained outside the remit of the ESI Act, though it allowed 
provincial governments to expand its scope. Nor were the workers’ fami-
lies initially covered by the health insurance. Furthermore, provincial 
governments were empowered to grant exemptions from the law to 
industries considered to be unable to contribute to the scheme. The pro-
visions for the Act’s implementation allowed for further exceptions even 
within the industries explicitly covered by the Act. Crucially, “the condi-
tions of qualifying period for cash benefit exclude[d] casual workers”, 
while unpaid apprentices were not granted protection because the Act 
applied to remunerated labour only (Punekar 1950: 84).
 Repercussions: Graded Informality, 
a “Birthright” Lost and a Horizon 
of Expectation
While the ESI Act thus permitted a differentiation of employment condi-
tions even on the same shop floor, it also contributed to a process of dif-
ferential formalization that generated a pattern of graded entitlements in 
44 “Memorandum submitted by the All-India Trade Union Congress …”, Trade Union Record, 
IV/5–6 (January–February 1945), pp. 38, 40; see also: ILOrep 3/1945, pp. 24f.
45 “Note on the Report prepared by Professor B.P. Adarkar on a Scheme of Health Insurance for 
Industrial Workers, by Mr. M. Stack and Mr. R. Rao of the International Labour Office”, p. 3, BL: 
IOR/L/E/8/4948 (“Health Insurance for Industrial Workers, including Sickness Statistics”).
46 ILG V/10 (April 1948), pp. 698–701; ILOrep 4/1948, pp. 90–93 (referring to The Statesman, 2 
and 3 April 1948). For a contemporary analysis of the Act in its final form, see confidential report 
by K.D. Jones, Labour Adviser to the High Commissioner for the UK in New Delhi, to Secretary, 




the labour market and multiple rifts among the working classes as a 
whole. Certain sections of the workforce had, for instance, access to 
health facilities that were and would remain far superior to the ones pro-
vided by the ESI scheme—this was the case with the nationalised rail-
ways, which had generated their own medical services in the course of the 
1920s, and it would hold true for new public sector enterprises of 
Nehruvian India.47 Other and much larger sections of the industrial 
workforce were, at the same time, legally entitled only to a level of sick-
ness and invalidity protection much inferior to that offered by the 
ESI. This becomes evident if we return to the Workmen’s Compensation 
Act of 1923, which the ESI Act was to replace. In fact, it did so only for 
about a third of the six million workers that were entitled to workmen’s 
compensation by the early 1950s. The incongruent remits of the two laws 
thus implied that the industrial workforce of postcolonial India was fur-
ther divided into a minority segment entitled (by the ESI Act) to pensions 
in the event of work accidents and another segment, twice as large, enti-
tled (by the Workmen’s Compensation Act) to lump sum payments, which 
provided not only less security but were also more difficult to claim (ILO 
1957: 95, 104; see also Punekar 1950: 54–57, 154–158).
This is only one of many similar instances, one element of a much 
larger phenomenon: multiple and overlapping central and provincial 
labour laws have defined the “workman”, the “worker” or the “employee” 
and, accordingly, their remit in sharply diverging ways, while labour tri-
bunals and courts of justice have added to the complexity of these defini-
tions by way of conflicting interpretations (Karuna 2019).48 The 
Employees’ Provident Fund Act of 1952 applied, on its part, only to 
about half of the factory workers covered by the ESI Act of 1948 
(Narasimhan 1953: 49). The incongruence of labour- and employment- 
based welfare laws in terms of scope thus generated a complex site of 
conflict that was to engage employers, trade unions, judges, government 
47 RCLI, Evidence, Vol. VII, part 1: Railways, London: H.M.’s Stationary Office, 1931, pp. 53–69; 
Dilip Subramaniam, “‘No Room for Class Struggle in These National Undertakings’: Providing 
Social Welfare for Indian State Sector Industrial Workers (circa 1950–2000),” MAS 49 (2015), 
pp. 1526–1579.
48 This issue will be examined more systematically elsewhere. For a perceptive exploration of con-
flicts over the legal status of “worker” and “employee” in South India see: Karuna (2019).
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officials and various other social actors for the decades to come: legisla-
tion did not result in a formal/informal bifurcation of the workforce into 
two “sectors”, but in an unstable, contested and to some extent malleable 
structure of graded (in)formality.
Despite its narrowly confined remit, postcolonial India’s first Labour 
Minister, Jagjivan Ram, celebrated the ESI Act, when it was passed, as a 
breakthrough: “the tiny and tender sapling” would “in its own time, grow 
into a gigantic tree” and the scope of the scheme would be “extended 
gradually and steadily so that ultimately it becomes all-comprehensive”.49 
Health Minister Rajkumari Amrit Kaur confirmed that the scheme was 
to be extended, in due course, to about 85 per cent of the population.50 
A propaganda film, released by the Government’s Films Division in 1952, 
pronounced that the ESI scheme would be extended “until its benefits are 
available in every industrial section of our country, until not only our 
2.5 million workers, but all employees, including our agriculturists, enjoy 
this, their birthright”.51 The choice of these words, read out in the King’s 
English as the footage shifted from machine operators to ploughing farm-
ers, was significant: “swaraj [self-governance] is my birthright” had been 
a rousing slogan in the independence struggle, associated with the mili-
tant nationalist Bal Gangadhar Tilak. Quoting this phrase elevated secu-
rity from illness to the status of a fundamental right intrinsic to citizenship 
of independent India. The universalization of health insurance from an 
employment-based privilege to a citizen right was thus announced and 
explicitly married to the nation-building project. This official promise 
survived the bleak facts of implementation for quite some time. In 1965, 
when V.V.  Giri’s influential Labour Problems in Indian Industry was 
reprinted once again, the former Labour Minister and future President of 
India still characterized ESI as “a nucleus of a general social insurance 
scheme” (Giri 1965[1959]: 267; see also Albuquerque 1958: 108).
However, the universalization of health insurance turned out to be, as 
we know today, one of the unfulfilled promises of postcolonial 
49 “Speech by the Minister of Labour, Jagjivan Ram, at the inaugural ceremony of the Employees’ 
State Insurance Corporation”, 6 October 1948, BL: IOR/L/E/8/6222 “The Employees’ State 
Insurance Act 1948”. See also: “‘India Has Turned the Corner Now’”, ToI, 7 October 1948, p. 3.
50 ILOrep 4/1949, pp. 71f (citing Hindustan Times, 22 April 1949).
51 Government of India, Films Division, “Dawn of Social Security” (1952).
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citizenship and was postponed ad infinitum. As late as in 2013, a mere 3 
per cent of India’s almost half billion–strong workforce or less than half 
of the “organized sector” workers were entitled to often unsatisfactory 
ESI benefits (Duggal 2015: 19). Instead, the Employees’ State Insurance 
Act came to be one of the key mechanisms for the separation of India’s 
formal and informal labour economies into an embattled, segmented 
structure of graded entitlements. Despite the many references to Beveridge 
and Geneva, the guarantee of a national minimum standard did not dif-
fuse to India in subsequent decades as the basis of a universalist welfare 
policy. Employment-based Indian welfarism remained robustly minori-
tarian, confined to a very small and mostly male section of those who 
built postcolonial India for wages. When consulted on the ESI scheme by 
the outgoing colonial government in 1945, William Beveridge had stated 
that “freedom from want [was] probably to be sought for the greater part 
of the Indian population” in a “different direction”. This not only was 
prescient but also indicates that even liberal British reformers did not rule 
out, at the time, the possibility in India of social policies more far-reaching 
and comprehensive than those the postcolonial dispensation chose to 
accept as inheritance from their colonial and deeply conservative 
predecessors.52
Yet the lines, drawn by labour welfare laws of the 1940s and 1950s, 
should not be understood solely as borders breaking the workforce into a 
multiplicity of fragments but also as a horizon of expectation—a horizon 
that would remain out of reach for most workers but has been well in 
sight: it has created a language for the formulation of standards of “decent 
work” that are transgressively utopian as well as eminently carnal in their 
concreteness. They have thus endowed labour struggles with a moral edge 
and could even serve as blueprints for legislative initiatives for the protec-
tion of informally employed workers. A particularly striking case in point 
is the Dock Workers Act of 1948, which served as a template for mobili-
zations among the enormous and almost completely “informal” 
 construction workforce for the establishment of welfare boards and for 
52 W. Beveridge to D. Monteath, India Office, draft letter, 21 September 1945, BL: IOR/L/E/8/2903 
“Social Security in India. Proposed Visit by Sir W. Beveridge”.
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the (no doubt severely diluted) Unorganized Workers’ Social Security Act 
of 2008 (Dietrich 1992: 1970–1972; Agarwala 2013: 4, 47–49). 
Similarly, contract workers and employees of predominantly “informal 
sector” industries have for many years raised the demand for inclusion in 
“ESI”53—a demand that has signified not only the desire for protection 
against the existential risks and economic perils of sickness. For entering 
the remit of one of India’s employment-based welfare laws—such as the 
ESI or the Provident Fund—also implied a formal acknowledgement of 
their employment status. This was no negligible achievement since certi-
fied employment status could serve as a legal basis for claiming further 
entitlements. Table 5.1. summarizes the analysis.
Employment-based social security schemes thus have mattered not 
only to the minority of the Indian workforce covered by them explicitly 
but to wider sections of the working classes, as they have defined possi-
bilities, together with other labour laws, and have helped to formulate 
demands. While undeniably dividing wage earners according to graded 
entitlements, these schemes have simultaneously established a form for 
collective claims of workers against employers and a sense that the State 
bears an—if often shirked—duty to guarantee such claims. This sense of 
entitlement has made it difficult to do away altogether with the Employees’ 
State Insurance and other labour welfare schemes despite three decades of 
largely unmitigated neoliberal policies in India. However, in a significant 
new development, the second Modi government introduced to the Indian 
parliament in late 2019 a “Social Security Code”, which aims at “amal-
gamating” and “corporatizing” eight existing labour welfare schemes, 
including ESI, while simultaneously reducing compulsory contributions. 
It remains to be seen whether this new law will, in fact, do more than 
undermine the existing, doubtlessly minoritarian welfare schemes 
(mainly, as some trade union argue, by transforming legal entitlements 
53 For a case concerning construction workers see “Road roko: police remove construction work-
ers”, The Hindu, 10 February 2011. For a case concerning powerloom workers see “Over 5,000 
powerlooms fall silent in Chennimalai”, The Hindu, 28 October 2007. For recent cases of contract 
workers demanding inclusion in the ESI, see, for example, “Workers rampage at DLF site, seek 
better work conditions”, The Hindu, 22 July 2017; “Contract power staff on strike to seek service 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































into benefits to be doled out by the executive at their discretion) and 
achieve the proclaimed goal of expanding health services to larger parts of 
the workforce.54
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6
The Social Question in Pre-apartheid 




In South Africa, as across much of the world, the period between the 
1910s and 1940s was one of extraordinary intellectual as well as social 
and political turmoil. Not only were societies being rapidly transformed 
through migration, urbanisation and industrialisation, but there were 
competing and conflicting visions of “modernity”. Intellectuals, elites 
and ordinary people alike grappled with the shifting relationships between 
state and society, as states were “modernised”, old social institutions 
(including churches) lost some of their authority and new social institu-
tions (including trade unions) emerged. Social relations—of gender, class 
and race—were contested and reimagined.
In contrast to the democracies of Northwest Europe, however, contes-
tation over the social question in South Africa did not entail simply 
struggles over the form of social citizenship, as the state assumed an 
expanded role in the social and economic inclusion of citizens. In 
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Northwest Europe, social democracy emerged as a powerful ideology to 
address the social question, and existing conservative and liberal ideolo-
gies were reinvented. The working classes and the poor enjoyed consider-
able political power through the ballot box, strikes and the threat of direct 
action. Welfare states expanded, providing a considerable measure of 
social citizenship for all. This picture was reflected in South Africa with 
regard to one part of its population. But the majority of South Africa’s 
population was excluded from social citizenship. The social question 
entailed exclusion as well as inclusion, with protracted debates and strug-
gles over the boundaries of social citizenship—i.e. who is a social citi-
zen—as well as the content and mechanisms of achieving it.
In some respects, South Africa was not unlike other parts of the world. 
In Latin America, most clearly, immigration, industrialisation and urban-
isation defined the social question in terms of the inclusion of politically 
powerful groups—including the small, organised working class—while 
excluding the larger population of urban and rural poor. The dominant 
corporatist ideology framed this combination of inclusion and exclusion 
(see especially Malloy 1979; Huber and Stephens 2012). Social citizen-
ship across much of Latin America—as in the southern states of the 
USA—was racialised. South Africa was distinctive, however, in the extent 
to which social citizenship was fundamentally rooted in the country’s 
racial politics.
The Union of South Africa was established in 1910 as the outcome of 
protracted negotiations following the British defeat of independent Boer 
republics in the South African War (see glossary at the end of the chapter 
for an explanation of South African terms including “Boer” and 
“coloured”). The new Union comprised the two former British colonies 
(the Cape and Natal) together with the two former Boer republics (of the 
Orange Free State and Transvaal). The political settlement provided for a 
substantially independent white-supremacist state, notionally under 
British control, with limited rights for the “coloured” population, very 
limited rights for the “native” African majority and almost no rights at all 
for the small immigrant Indian population. (White) Afrikaners com-
prised a majority of the electorate, with the result that the Union had 
three former Boer generals as prime minister for its first thirty-eight years 
(Louis Botha, 1910–1919; Jan Smuts, 1919–1924 and 1939–1948; 
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J.B.M. [Barry] Hertzog, 1924–1939). The Union had a parliamentary 
system, with a prime minister accountable to a bicameral legislature. 
From 1910 to 1924, the government was run by the South African Party. 
The 1924 elections resulted in a “Pact Government” comprising the 
National (i.e. Afrikaner nationalist) Party and small Labour Party (linked 
to Labour Parties in Britain and Australia). The Pact Government disin-
tegrated in 1933–1934, with most of the National Party joining the 
South African Party in a “Fusion Government”, and then combining as 
the United Party. A minority of the National Party led by D.F. Malan 
remained independent, as the Gesuiwerde (“Purified”) National Party. In 
1939, many of the former National Party Members of Parliament (MPs) 
left the United Party over the issue of the Union’s participation in the 
Second World War, joining with the Gesuiwerde National Party in a 
Herenigde (Reunited) National Party. In 1948, the National Party 
returned to government, with Malan as prime minister, and began to 
implement apartheid (see chapter by Ulriksen in this volume).
South African politics and society were defined primarily by white 
privilege. The white minority comprised approximately one-fifth of the 
population, including both farmers who had settled on the land and 
urban workers drawn to South Africa by the extraordinary industrialisa-
tion that followed the discovery of diamonds in the 1860s and gold in the 
1880s. The African population was largely rural, divided between white- 
owned farms and the “reserves” set aside for “natives”. Many African men 
worked at some point of their lives as migrant workers on the mines. 
Legislation restricted what work African people could do, where they 
lived and (above all) their political rights. Almost all white South Africans 
concurred that their hold on power should be preserved, but there was 
some disagreement over the flexibility of the boundaries of political (and, 
as we shall see, social) citizenship. There were also deep divisions among 
white South Africans over the division of power among them. An obvi-
ous cleavage divided Afrikaner nationalists from English-speaking South 
Africans as well as those Afrikaners who were reconciled with their loose 
incorporation into the British Empire. Class also divided the white popu-
lation: Both English- and Afrikaans-speaking workers resented the 
extraordinarily wealthy mine owners (and their influence over the state). 
The commercialisation of agriculture also generated new class divisions: 
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Many Afrikaans-speaking farmers lived on the edge of poverty; many of 
these “poor whites” migrated to towns. Without skills, they were unable 
to compete with either skilled white workers or unskilled African work-
ers. The Labour Party, Afrikaner nationalist parties, communists, syndi-
calists and anarchists competed for the support of white workers. In 
1922, white mineworkers on the Witwatersrand rose in violent rebellion 
(the Rand Revolt) before being suppressed brutally by the army and air 
force (Krikler 2005; Simons and Simons 1969; Greenberg 1980; O’Meara 
1983; van der Walt 2011).
In this context, demands for policy reforms were understood in very 
diverse ways. There was little or no discussion of the “social question” per 
se, nor any consensus—even within white politics—over which of several 
other, interrelated “questions” was most pressing. The “native question” 
was clearly of great importance: Should African people, or some African 
people, be included in any way in a common society? If not, how should 
they be excluded? But there were other pressing “questions” also. The 
“poor white question” attracted considerable attention, not least because 
poverty among white people undermined the racial hierarchy and white 
solidarity. There was also a “labour” or “worker question” in that many 
(white) workers asserted their “rights” in relation to their (white) employ-
ers and some contemplated alternatives to capitalism. There was also the 
question of women’s rights, not only to the vote but also to control over 
many other aspects of their lives.
For many (but certainly not all) white South Africans, the state was an 
attractive vehicle for tackling these questions in self-consciously modern-
ist ways. The post-1910 South African state accumulated considerable 
infrastructural power: In the collection and use of statistics, fiscal capacity 
(including especially income taxes), strategic interventions in infrastruc-
tural and industrial development, the regulation of wages and employ-
ment, and with respect to the regulation of the family and the amelioration 
of poverty, all administered through a professionalised bureaucracy 
(Seekings 2016; Freund 2019). The South African state contrasted 
sharply with the “paper leviathans” of Latin America (Centeno and 
Ferraro 2013). Some white South Africans had grave reservations about 
this modern state. Some liberals welcomed many aspects of state support 
for business but were wary of what they saw as overreach. Neither 
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anarchism nor syndicalism enjoyed as much support in South Africa as in 
some Latin American cities in the early twentieth century, but South 
African socialists and communists also had mixed feelings about a mod-
ern state that seemed to be closely tied to capitalist elites. More impor-
tantly, the powerful “Reformed” Protestant churches (including the 
largest, the Dutch Reformed Church, known by its Afrikaans initials as 
the NGK) included a variety of conservatives anxious to retain important 
roles for the churches. Whilst the NGK had long embraced a missionary 
role that encouraged charity, it also saw itself as a volkskerk (people’s 
church), referring to the Afrikaner volk. In the late 1930s the NGK 
became more ambivalent about the state, in part through the spreading 
influence of the neo-Calvinist ideology associated with the Dutch theo-
logian (and politician) Abraham Kuyper. Kuyper’s theology revolved 
around the idea that different spheres of life (including the family) were 
all divinely sovereign, providing a new and powerful justification for 
restricting the scope of the state. The African population was unsurpris-
ingly even more ambivalent about the role of the state, which they expe-
rienced as more repressive than progressive.
The result between the 1920s and 1940s was a gradual deployment of 
state power to address the “native”, “poor white”, labour and other (social) 
“questions”, but the expansion of the state was shaped by the ambivalence 
and opposition of important sections of the white population. The battle 
lines in these contested reforms were often surprising, not least because 
Afrikaner nationalism was torn between modernisers who sought to use 
the state (including Hendrik Verwoerd, who was later to become the key 
architect of apartheid in the 1950s and 1960s) and NGK-linked oppo-
nents of state power. This shifting division within Afrikaner nationalism 
was to be especially important for social welfare policy. The result, by 
1948 (when the National Party, by then committed to the apartheid proj-
ect, was elected back into office), was a welfare state that had significant 
reach in terms of social assistance programmes and the regulation of the 
family (and delinquency) but not with respect to social insurance.
This chapter charts policy reforms and identifies the underlying under-
standings and motivations of key reformers (and their opponents) in 
three broad periods: The period of the Pact Governments from 1924 to 
1933; the period of the Fusion or United Party governments from 
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1933/34 until the outbreak of war in 1939; and the period during and 
immediately after the war, also under United Party governments but with 
growing opposition from an opposition National Party radicalised in part 
by new religious beliefs.
Whilst the conditions framing debates in South Africa might have 
been unique, the South African participants in these debates were 
immersed in global networks of ideas. At every point, South African 
debates were informed by ideas and models from elsewhere. The South 
African state followed the British lead in using commissions of inquiry to 
investigate possible policy reforms. These commissions typically collated 
a mass of information on policies elsewhere in the world (and generally 
summarised these in their reports). When, in the late 1920s, the Pienaar 
Commission investigated welfare policy reforms, it drew heavily on infor-
mation provided by the International Labour Organization (ILO), as 
well as information from Britain and elsewhere. Several members of the 
commission visited the ILO in Geneva, attended one of the ILO’s annual 
International Labour Conferences and visited various European capitals 
in order to collect additional information. In addition, many prominent 
South Africans studied abroad. Prime Ministers Smuts and Hertzog stud-
ied in Cambridge (1892–1894) and Amsterdam (1888–1892), respec-
tively. Others who played important roles in policy debates included Jan 
Hofmeyr (Oxford, 1913–1916), E.G.  Malherbe (New York, the early 
1920s) and Hendrik Verwoerd (mostly in Germany, 1926–1928). 
Individual Members of Parliament (MPs), trade unionists and academics 
travelled and had contacts elsewhere in the world, especially in Australia 
and New Zealand. For all these reasons, innovative foreign reforms and 
proposals had immediate and wide impact within South Africa. In the 
early 1940s, as we shall see, reforms in New Zealand and the proposals set 
out in the Beveridge Report in Britain framed South African debates. 
American ideas about social casework also had a strong influence. Not all 
foreign ideas strengthened reforms, however. Many Afrikaner nationalist 




 Securing the Racial Hierarchy, 1924–1933: 
State, Church and the “Poor White Problem”
Prior to 1924 the state’s involvement in social regulation and provision 
expanded slowly but remained very limited. The South African Party gov-
ernments in office from 1910 to 1924 were broadly pro-business. The 
state provided modest poor relief, almost entirely for “poor whites”, sup-
plementing the charitable work of churches (Bottomley 1990; Butler 
2017). Compensation was introduced for the (white) victims of indus-
trial accidents. The 1913 Children’s Protection Act—based on British 
legislation from 1908—provided for the state to place (white) children in 
need of care in institutions and for state subsidies to both these residen-
tial institutions and churches or other child welfare societies that oversaw 
other children in need of care. In 1921, pensions were provided to (mostly 
white) mothers (as well as stepmothers and grandmothers) who had been 
widowed or abandoned by their husbands, to reduce the need to place 
destitute children in residential institutions (Du Toit 2018; Chanock 
2001). Reformatories and industrial schools were also established for 
(mostly white) boys and girls (Chisholm 1990).
These reforms were racialised in intent. White families organised 
around Christian marriage were seen as a bulwark against the degenera-
tion of the white population. It was when white men disregarded their 
obligations to their wives and children that children were neglected, 
dropped out of school and thus rendered unfit to compete for jobs against 
coloured or African people. Flawed families meant that girls risked slid-
ing into prostitution, and poor white men and women risked sinking 
into “a demoralising and corrupt intercourse with non-Europeans”, as a 
parliamentary committee put it. The 1913 Children’s Protection Act thus 
sought to maintain the “boundaries of whiteness” (Chanock 2001: 
205–209). Under the 1913 and 1921 Acts, it was hard for coloured chil-
dren or their mothers to access benefits and almost impossible for African 
children or their mothers to do so. Sexual “impropriety”—typically across 
racial lines—was the main reason for white girls being placed in institu-
tions (Chisholm 1990). The protection of the white family—and hence 
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white supremacy—required intensified segregation to limit mixing 
between white and non-white children.
Reforms accelerated under the Pact Government elected in 1924. The 
Pact Government comprised the National Party, based in poor rural 
areas, and the ostensibly socialist Labour Party, whose core support was 
among skilled urban workers. These parties had broadly antagonistic rela-
tionships with the mining companies and other large businesses. The 
National and Labour Parties had campaigned on platforms for tackling 
both the “poor white problem” and the excessive profits of mining capi-
talists. Solving the poor white problem meant protecting unskilled white 
workers (and their dependents, in both rural and urban areas) who lacked 
the skills required for skilled employment and were unable to compete 
for unskilled work with cheaper African labour. The National and Labour 
parties had accused the then governing South African Party of jeopardis-
ing the future of white South Africans “as a civilised people” and pander-
ing to “big financial” interests. The National Party was unashamedly 
racist. The Labour Party comprised both unabashed racists and socialists 
who felt uncomfortable with explicit racial discrimination but were 
opposed to the exploitation of “cheap labour”.
In office, the Pact Government sought to deepen racial segregation, 
not only keeping white and African people apart but also protecting poor 
white people from competition from African people. The colour bar in 
employment was strengthened, and parastatals (especially the railways) 
were instructed to employ unskilled white workers. Subsidies were 
extended for white farmers, especially on smaller or family farms. The 
Labour Party secured regulatory institutions that protected workers’ 
wages (along the lines of policies in Australia). In 1926, the Pact 
Government appointed the Pienaar Commission (chaired by a senior 
National Party MP, P.J. Pienaar) to examine a comprehensive system of 
social insurance and assistance. In its first Report, in 1927, the commis-
sion recommended the introduction of means-tested old-age and invalid-
ity pensions. But African men and women were excluded, and coloured 
pensioners were to receive lower benefits than white pensioners. 




The most important factor behind the expansion of public provision 
and care was the imperative—for the National Party—of protecting its 
“poor white” supporters against gelykstelling (social levelling) and the risk 
of becoming subordinate to or intermingling with African people. Old- 
age pensions constituted one cornerstone of the segregationist policies 
through which the Pact Government sought to raise all-white people to 
“civilised” standards of living, above, rather than below or alongside, the 
“native” (African) population. The racial hierarchy had to be maintained. 
As one National Party Member of Parliament (MP) put it, the “poor 
white” problem
is a question which not only concerns the poor; it affects the whole white 
civilisation of this country. It confronts us with the question whether we, 
the descendants of the staunch old pioneers, will maintain their civilisation 
and hand it over to our children. … It may be asked whether there is pov-
erty only in South Africa and whether other countries do not suffer from 
the same thing. There are poor people everywhere, but the circumstances 
in South Africa are unique. In Europe poverty has proved a great breeding 
place for Socialism and Bolshevism. If grievances arise there it is simply an 
economic matter. In this country, however, there is a small number of 
whites against the natives, a few civilised people against uncivilised hordes, 
and for that reason it is so important that not a single white person should 
be allowed to go under.1
These beliefs were not confined to the National Party. In 1933, the first 
woman elected to Parliament, Leila Reitz, was a member of the South 
African Party. Reitz, who was active in the emerging field of social work, 
emphasised in her maiden parliamentary speech that poor (white) fami-
lies “constitute a danger to the moral life of this country, a danger to 
themselves, a danger to our social order, our national character, and, in 
the end, a danger to our white civilization itself ”. Poor (white) people 
must be “lifted” up to save “our white civilization”.2 For most MPs, in 
most if not all parties, white people were the guardians and agents of 
modernity in the face of the threats posed by the African majority.
1 Hansard, House of Assembly, 12 August 1924, col. 429–32 (Stals).
2 Hansard, House of Assembly, 5 June 1933, col. 294–5 (Reitz).
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The NGK played a central role in the Afrikaner nationalist movement 
and National Party in particular. D.F. Malan was a dominee (priest) in 
the NGK prior to becoming editor of the influential newspaper Die 
Burger, provincial leader of the National Party, minister in the Pact 
Government and then national leader in 1934. Malan himself came out 
of the missionary tradition within the NGK that sought to recruit African 
people (into racially segregated branches of the NGK) and was even sup-
portive of charity towards the African population as well as white popula-
tion. In the 1920s and 1930s, Malan—and the NGK, more broadly—came 
to perceive African people as more of a threat to poor whites, warranting 
more systematic exclusion and discrimination (Elphick 2012; 
Koorts 2014).
Whilst the NGK and National Party became increasingly resolute over 
the exclusion of African people, they also worried about the transfer of 
responsibilities from church to state. Sections of the NGK and National 
Party pushed for amendments to the Old Age Pensions Act. The Carnegie 
Commission into the “poor white problem”, established by the NGK not 
the state, called in its 1932 report for social welfare functions to be shifted 
back to churches and families. Financial support to the poor should be 
reduced because it encouraged “dependency”. Interventions should 
address instead the “weak traits” of the poor, including improvidence, 
thriftlessness, dishonesty and indolence. The NGK succeeded in partially 
rolling back the old-age pension in the early 1930s by giving officials 
much more discretion in taking into account the capacity of kin. But 
modernisers in the National Party (led by Verwoerd) and state fought 
back. MPs from various parties demanded the expansion of the pension 
programme, citing cases of deserving constituents who had been denied 
pensions despite the lack of familial support. “I very much favour the 
principle that children should provide for their parents”, one MP declared, 
“but … we can go too far in that direction”.3 Public provision continued 
to expand (see Seekings 2008).
3 Hansard, House of Assembly, 8 June 1933, col. 543–4.
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 The Institutionalisation of “Social Policy” 
Under the Fusion Governments, 1933–1939
In 1933–1934, economic crisis precipitated the collapse of the Pact 
Government. A new coalition, comprising most of the National Party 
together with the South African Party, formed the Fusion Government, 
and the parties proceeded to merge as the United Party. The basis of the 
Fusion Government—and United Party—was the concession by Smuts’s 
South African Party to Hertzog’s National Party to deepen racial segrega-
tion. The Fusion Government was, politically, a very illiberal administra-
tion, although it included prominent liberals in some positions (including, 
especially, Jan Hofmeyr as minister with responsibility for education, 
public health [until 1936] and social welfare [from 1936]). In the face of 
economic crisis and fuelled by improved public revenues (swelled through 
taxes on the gold mines), ministers expanded existing programmes, 
including public works programmes, for unemployed white men, subsi-
dies for white farmers (devastated by drought) and poor relief for other 
poor whites—and then moved towards more innovative government 
interventions.
In 1934 MPs began for the first time to refer to “social policy” to 
describe favourably policies to address poverty. A newly elected South 
African Party MP proposed a motion calling for a “broad social policy” to 
address the inequities and hardships associated with unemployment. 
Hofmeyr referred to “the social policy of the Government”. Another 
minister described the introduction of a limited contributory unemploy-
ment insurance programme as a component of South Africa’s developing 
“social legislation”.4
MPs from different parties insisted on the need to relax constraints on 
the award of old-age pensions to elderly white men and women. “The 
older people who are not assisted by their children must be the definite 
care of the Government”, asserted one MP.5 A senior MP in the National 
Party—now in opposition—demanded “security” for the poor man and 
4 Hansard, House of Assembly, 27 February 1934, col. 826–57 (Wadley); 17 April 1934, col. 2299 
(Hofmeyr); 17 April 1935, col. 5191–2 (Fourie).
5 Hansard, House of Assembly, 27 February 1934, col. 851–3.
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worker: “To-day we have the position that, in order to get an old age pen-
sion, a poor man has to prove that he has no children from whom he can 
get anything, and who earn sufficient. That is a wrong and humiliating 
position”.6 In 1937 the government relaxed some of its restrictions on 
old-age pensions and lowered the age of eligibility for women from 65 to 
60. Between November 1936 and November 1939, the number of white 
old-age pensioners rose by 55 percent and total expenditure on old-age 
pensions almost doubled. A series of committees recommended reforms 
to policies on blind people, children, health insurance and poor relief.
The new “social policies” were institutionalised within a dedicated 
office for Social Welfare, initially part of the former Department of 
Labour (renamed the Department of Labour and Social Welfare) then in 
a new, stand-alone Department of Social Welfare. The new department’s 
approach was, in its understanding of poverty, conservative. In his first 
report, the new secretary for Social Welfare explained that his department 
focused on “cultural” aspects of the “rehabilitation” of “socially malad-
justed” (white) people. Even if poor white men found employment, they 
remained in need of the state’s help in reforming “their habits, attitudes 
and interests” (South Africa 1940). The newly appointed (British) 
Professor of Sociology at the University of the Witwatersrand, John Gray, 
was struck by what he saw as the resilience of a Calvinist tradition and the 
perpetuation of a Poor Law tradition (Gray 1937: 278–80). At the same 
time, the new department saw this cultural poverty as the responsibility 
of the state, not of the churches. The secretary of Social Welfare himself 
noted that government policy was now based on “a new conception of 
duty to the poor arising from the slowly dawning realisation that the poor 
need not be a liability but that they are a potential asset” (South Africa, 
1940: 4). Moreover, science itself could be harnessed to the tasks of reha-
bilitation, as some of the members of the Carnegie Commission had rec-
ognised. The department championed social work rooted in casework 
and backed up by research. A detailed study of Poverty and Dependency in 
Cape Town—supervised by (then-Professor) Verwoerd—examined how 
the “dependent” destitute might be “rehabilitated” (Wagner 1936). The 
department also oversaw the expansion of social assistance for the blind 
6 Hansard, House of Assembly, 1935, col. 417 (Bremer).
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and invalids. “It is generally accepted that it is the duty of the State to see 
that its citizens have the opportunity of making a living”, explained one 
MP, adding that “it is doubly the duty of the Government to see that 
unfit persons shall be given means of existence. It is shameful that people 
have to beg on the streets”.7 The new invalidity pensions were—like the 
old-age pensions—means-tested, taking into account the income of co- 
resident unmarried children (and, in exceptional cases, of children who 
resided elsewhere also).
Provision for children was also expanded. Pressure from women’s, child 
welfare and liberal organisations (Du Toit 2018) as well as from the hand-
ful of (white) women newly elected to Parliament resulted in the appoint-
ment of an inter-departmental committee on “Destitute, Neglected, 
Maladjusted and Delinquent Children” and then, in 1937, a new 
Children’s Act. The new Act provided for care in two main respects, both 
intended to prevent (white) children becoming “socially maladjusted” or 
delinquent as a result of growing up in bad conditions at home. First, a 
battery of measures provided for the state to intervene where children 
were being neglected and to “rehabilitate” those who were already delin-
quent. Local officials were empowered to place in a foster home or insti-
tution any children who were identified as being “in need of care”, 
including (inter alia) children with absent or delinquent parents, children 
who were themselves delinquent and—in an acknowledgment of the 
anxieties of the time—any child that “frequents the company of any 
immoral … person, or is otherwise living in circumstances calculated to 
cause or conduce to its corruption, seduction or prostitution”.8 The 
objective, as the Department of Social Welfare explained, was “to con-
serve for the nation the socially desirable qualities of those persons whose 
normal development is in danger of being retarded or frustrated through 
physical or mental defects, social maladjustments or unwholesome envi-
ronmental stimuli”. In implementing these provisions, the department 
embraced casework and “scientific social analysis” (South Africa 1940: 
53), reflecting the new enthusiasm for scientific “poverty knowledge” 
(Davie 2015). Secondly, the 1937 Act provided for the expanded 
7 S.P. Le Roux (Oudtshoorn), Hansard, House of Assembly, 26 March 1936, col. 2056.
8 Act 31 of 1937, para 1.
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payment of cash grants-in-aid to poor people caring for children, and to 
institutions or associations caring for children.
By the late 1930s, South Africa had an extensive system of social assis-
tance providing for sections of the white population, including the 
elderly, blind and disabled, children and single mothers. Gray, in his 
inaugural lecture in 1937, assessed that “Today the provision for [the] 
European population … is scarcely less complete than that of Great 
Britain” (Gray 1937: 270). Gray’s endorsement overlooked the limited 
extent of social insurance. The only contributory pension schemes were 
company- or sector-based, with few members. Unemployment insurance 
was finally introduced in 1937, but only in selected sectors (Meth and 
Piper 1984). Poverty among white working-age adults continued to be 
addressed primarily through public works and farm-support programmes. 
But the most important difference between South Africa and Great 
Britain was that the South African welfare state excluded almost entirely 
the African majority of the population.
The more liberal ministers, MPs and state officials had begun to pro-
mote a more inclusive approach. From 1936, pensions were paid to blind 
African as well as blind white and coloured people. Growing anxiety 
about juvenile delinquency among African adolescents in town prompted 
the approval of grants to a slow trickle of African mothers and children 
(Du Toit 2018: 11–13). The 1937 Committee that drafted the Children’s 
Protection Bill made no distinction on racial grounds, arguing that “the 
principles underlying the treatment of children “in need of care” or of 
delinquents are of equal validity whether the children to whom they 
apply are of one race or another”. Whilst there were “special social cir-
cumstances which affect the application of these provisions in the case of 
non-Europeans”, it would be a mistake to adopt different standards for 
the welfare of non-European children. The Committee explicitly recom-
mended the expansion of public provision of institutional care for black 
children (South Africa 1937: 52–3). When it came to implementation, 
however, African children continued to be excluded from public pro-
grammes (Du Toit 2018).
The exclusion of (or discrimination against) African people was justi-
fied using a variety of arguments. The general exclusion of the African 
majority was based on the perception, among almost all white 
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policymakers, that African people were different and inferior, in part 
because they were seen to be incompletely Christian (practising polyga-
mous marriage and witchcraft) (Chanock 2001). The African population 
was also viewed increasingly as a threat to the “poor white” population 
and hence “white civilisation”. The more charitable, missionary tradition 
within the NGK weakened during the 1920s and 1930s (Elphick 2012). 
With respect to social welfare programmes specifically, the extension of 
public provision to the African population was widely assessed as imprac-
tical and unaffordable (Du Toit 2018). It was also asserted that African 
people did not need public assistance, either because they had lower 
needs or because they could be supported by extended kin. The Native 
Economic Commission found in 1932 that:
The poverty of individuals which occurs among Europeans is not common 
among Natives. Their communal system cares for all its people. Broadly 
speaking there is no starvation because each man will share his food with 
others. … Such poverty as exists, therefore, applies to the whole of the 
community among which it occurs, but urban conditions are beginning to 
break down the communal traditions, and instances were quoted to us of 
Natives who found it necessary to hide what food they have, because shar-
ing would tend to leave them without the necessaries for their own subsis-
tence. (South Africa 1932: para 998–9)
This argument became a pillar of the ideology of apartheid after 1948: 
The African population had its own traditions and practices. The 
Department of Social Welfare denied maintenance grants and “mother’s 
pensions” to African people on the grounds that “under Native law it is 
the natural duty of the head of the kraal or guardian-at-law to support 
any minor belonging to his kraal or under his care”. Moreover, “the grant-
ing of maintenance by the State will probably lead to an evasion of the 
responsibility resting upon the Natives under their own customs” (quoted 
in South Africa 1940: 64; see also Du Toit 2018). There was, of course, 
little evidence for this argument: Poverty was very widespread among 
African people, and (as in the white population) kin were often either 
unable or unwilling to assist. This denial of reality was the privilege of the 
powerful.
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 The Experience of War, 1939–1945: External 
Influences, Local Conditions 
and “Social Security”
The Second World War had a major effect in South Africa, as elsewhere 
across the British Empire and beyond. It precipitated a change of govern-
ment and political realignment. It forged a political environment in 
which the government was unusually open to reform. And it introduced 
new proposals for reform, primarily through the diffusion of new ideas 
from abroad. The war thus changed the agenda for and the political pos-
sibility of reform. At the same time, opposition to public provision 
strengthened within the opposition National Party, in part through the 
influence of neo-Calvinist theology from abroad.
The outbreak of war led to the collapse of the Fusion Government and 
a split in the United Party. Prime Minister Hertzog advocated neutrality 
but lost a parliamentary vote. Hertzog resigned, the Anglophile Smuts 
was appointed as Prime Minister, and Hertzog led some (but not all) of 
his former National Party MPs to reunite with Malan’s faction of the 
former National Party already in opposition. The exit of Hertzog and his 
supporters allowed the United Party, under Smuts, to tilt in a slightly 
more liberal direction. Its weak “liberal” wing was led by Hofmeyr, who 
served as Minister of Finance and intermittently as acting prime minister. 
Reform was also supported by the rump of the Labour Party. Whilst 
Hofmeyr was undoubtedly liberal, Smuts himself was more complex. 
During the war, Smuts made encouraging public speeches about the need 
to build a better society, including “a better life for all sections of the 
population”, including (explicitly) the “native population”.9 At the same 
time he expressed concerns in his private correspondence: “I don’t like all 
this preoccupation with the post-war paradise on earth which makes us 
all concentrate less on the war and more on schemes which confuse and 
divide us”, he wrote to a close friend in London in early 1943; “it is here 
[in South Africa] very much as with you [in Britain], where people talk 
9 Hansard, House of Assembly, 12 January 1942, col. 5–6 (Smuts).
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Beveridge instead of war and Hitler”.10 Nonetheless, Smuts allowed 
Hofmeyr the space to proceed with modest reforms, perhaps hoping to 
defuse the militancy shown by industrial workers—including white, 
coloured and African workers (Alexander 2000).
The first set of ideas to invigorate debate in South Africa during the 
war were independent of the war itself. In 1938, New Zealand’s Labour 
Party government enacted universal old-age pensions and other benefits 
(McClure 1998). The New Zealand “model” was cited frequently in 
South Africa in 1941–1942 (see Miles-Cadman 1941; Burrows et  al. 
1942; Batson 1943). Several MPs visited New Zealand and referred to it 
in parliamentary debates. Introducing a debate on social welfare reforms 
in January 1942, a Labour Party MP asked explicitly “Can our govern-
ment do what New Zealand has done?”11
Most reformers did not seek simply to replicate the New Zealand 
reforms, however. One of the United Party’s more liberal MPs, Leslie 
Blackwell, had been born in Australia, before his family migrated to 
South Africa when he was ten years old. In the late 1930s he was fasci-
nated with the New Zealand Labour Party’s “full-blooded policy of 
‘Socialism in our time’” (Blackwell 1938). In 1941, Smuts sent him to 
Australia and New Zealand, charging him (inter alia) with investigating 
their social security systems. Blackwell returned to South Africa with res-
ervations about the replicability of the New Zealand model:
New Zealand is known throughout the Empire and beyond as the home of 
social security. It was here that the first full-blooded social security charter 
was put into operation, and it is here that it is being tested out most thor-
oughly today, but when I returned to South Africa I told my colleagues that 
they must be careful not to take it for granted that results arrived at in New 
Zealand could necessarily be predicted for the Union. New Zealand is a 
rich pastoral country with a homogeneous population and a high standard 
of living, without the extremes of wealth which are still to be found in 
South Africa. It has almost no problem of native or coloured people, and, 
most important of all, it has operated its social security experiment in times 
10 Letter, Smuts to Leo Amery, 21 February 1943, reproduced in J. van der Poel (ed.), Selections from 
the Smuts Papers, Vol. 6 (Cambridge, 1973), 414.
11 Hansard, House of Assembly, 6 Jan 1942, col. 3304 (Van der Berg).
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of great agricultural prosperity and commercial expansion. (Blackwell 
1946: 125)
In the parliamentary debate on social welfare in January 1942, 
Blackwell (1946: 156–8) argued that comprehensive reforms were not 
feasible until African people in South Africa earned more.
In the meantime, pressure was building outside of Parliament, through 
what became known as the “social security movement”. In September 
1942, an economist and Vice Principal of the Durban Technical College, 
Joseph Sullivan, organised a Social Security Congress in Durban. Sullivan 
himself had been born in New Zealand. A team of economists from the 
University of Natal, led by Professor H.R. Burrows, published a detailed 
set of proposals (Burrows et al. 1942). Under pressure, Smuts established 
a Social and Economic Planning Committee to examine economic and 
social reforms, as well as a Commission of Inquiry into a National 
Health System.
The publication of the Beveridge Report in Britain in December 1942 
further invigorated debate in South Africa. Beveridge was discussed in 
popular pamphlets (e.g. Sullivan 1942; Batson 1943) and in parliamen-
tary debates (by MPs from diverse parties). In January 1943, Smuts 
appointed a Social Security Committee, including Burrows, to examine 
and cost options. Parliament dedicated considerable time to debating 
social security. In the June 1943 parliamentary election, Smuts and the 
United Party campaigned around the slogan “A better life for all”, hold-
ing out a vision of a society in which “there will be no forgotten men” and 
the spectres of “want, poverty, and unemployment” would be “combated 
to the best of our ability”. With the apparent blessing of the United Party, 
Sullivan stood successfully for election as an independent MP.  In 
September 1943, the Social Security Committee recommended massive 
public expenditure on welfare (together with Keynesian macroeconomic 
policies). The Committee’s report used Beveridge’s terminology and 
referred to the new international approach to social security which had 
the “ultimate aim” of “a comprehensive, unified and socially-adequate 
security plan under the auspices of the State” (South Africa 1943: 11). 
Crucially, this would provide for at least some African people. The 1943 
report acknowledged that “overcrowding of the Reserves, primitive 
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farming methods and low unskilled wages” made it “increasingly diffi-
cult” for African people to support their kin. African men and women 
might not need the “elaborate cash benefits indispensable for a civilised 
community”, but “nominal payments” in cash or kind were now “essen-
tial” for the elderly and disabled. The Committee therefore recommended 
that old-age pensions be extended to the African population.
Support for the extension of old-age pensions was not limited to lib-
eral reformers. The extent of poverty in rural areas—and the failure of 
migrant workers in towns to provide and care for all of their rural depen-
dents—was of growing concern to the magistrates responsible for rural 
administration and the employers who sought to recruit labour in rural 
areas. In addition, policies of “influx control” could not prevent the 
growth of the urban African population, including women and children. 
This fuelled anxiety about the decline of marriage and the rise of juvenile 
delinquency within the African population. African political leaders—
through both the elected but conservative councils in some rural areas 
and the (at the time) slightly less conservative African National 
Congress—demanded social citizenship, although they were generally 
distracted by the more important issue of political citizenship (Sagner 
2000; Seekings 2000, 2005; Posel 2005).
Reformers made faltering steps towards extending some social pro-
grammes. In 1940, the new Acting Prime Minister Jan Hofmeyr 
instructed that all applications for grants under the Children’s Act, 
regardless of race, should be assessed on merit. In practice, only applica-
tions for urban African children were entertained, and benefits were paid 
at a much lower level than for white children, probably because of the 
cost implications (Du Toit 2018). Old-age pensions were introduced for 
African men and women in both rural and urban areas in 1944, albeit 
with much lower benefits than for white pensioners. By 1946, there were 
almost twice as many African pensioners as white pensioners, although 
total expenditure on white pensioners was higher (Jones 1948: 42). 
Residential institutions were also established for a very small number of 
“non-European” men and women. In 1946, the state subsidised nineteen 
old-age homes for a total of 753 elderly white men and women, but only 
two homes for 217 “non-European” men and women (Jones 1948: 425).
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In these debates on programmatic reform—in public and in 
Parliament—three positions predominated. First, there was the pro- 
reformist position, articulated outside of Parliament by the various 
strands of the informal “social security movement” and inside Parliament 
by the more progressive members of the United Party. Reform here 
entailed partial deracialisation and expansion of existing programmes. 
This position was informed by “New Liberal” thought: The laissez-faire, 
small-government approach of the classic liberals had given way to an 
appreciation of the need for the government to assume responsibility for 
tackling various problems that affected society as a whole, including pov-
erty among the elderly and children. The war legitimated these argu-
ments in favour of a more active government. Army service may have 
radicalised some South Africans (Roos 2003), as it did in New Zealand 
(Fennell 2017). Classic liberal sceptics tended to keep quiet. A second, 
also pro-reform position was a more social democratic one, articulated by 
the very small rump of Labour Party MPs (including van der Berg and 
Miles-Cadman). The third position—the National Party’s—was in flux, 
as we shall see next. These positions certainly did not exhaust the full 
range of views within Parliament (or white South African society), but 
they were the positions articulated publicly. People with other views 
tended to keep quiet.
The main public opposition to programmatic reforms came from the 
National Party. The National Party had wavered in its support for an 
expanding state, especially in the early 1930s, but the modernisers (led by 
Verwoerd) had prevailed, ensuring that programmes were introduced 
(and expanded) for white people. The party never accepted, however, that 
pensions and other programmes should be introduced for African people. 
Moreover, shifts in the character of Afrikaner nationalism and especially 
the rise of neo-Calvinist theology within the NGK pushed the National 
Party to reconsider its support for expanding the welfare state. Until the 
1920s, Stellenbosch was the unchallenged base of Dutch Reformed the-
ology, with a strong emphasis on its evangelical mission. Paternalistic 
charity was integral to this. Whilst the NGK sought to retain a leading 
role, the National Party itself had embraced an expanded role for the state 
in tackling the “poor white” question. In the 1930s, however, the hitherto 
marginal strand of neo-Calvinist theology, based in the small Gereformeerde 
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Dutch Church and its associated university (formerly seminary) in 
Potchefstroom, gained increasing influence—at the same time as the 
Transvaal National Party grew in importance relative to the Cape National 
Party within the (federal) National Party.
The neo-Calvinists were inspired by the thought of the Dutch theolo-
gian and politician Abraham Kuyper. Many South African theology stu-
dents studied at Amsterdam’s Free University, founded by Kuyper (with 
the “Free” meaning free from state control). For Kuyperians, “the funda-
mental error of European history was a consistent erosion, since the 
French Revolution, of the sovereignty of God in favour of the autonomy 
of the individual” (Kinghorn 1997: 143). Kuyper was as critical of liberal 
individualism as he was of communism. In the late 1930s and early 
1940s, some South African neo-Calvinists flirted with national socialism, 
despite its excessive interest in state power; some assumed leadership 
positions in the pro-Nazi Ossewa Brandwag, which briefly seemed to offer 
a more radical alternative to Malan’s National Party (Marx 2008). But it 
was the National Party itself that served as the vehicle through which 
neo-Calvinist ideas shaped public policy, including over welfare reform. 
Kuyperian neo-Calvinism was deeply ambivalent about the welfare 
state—as evident in the speeches of some National Party MPs in 
Parliament. Whilst the systematic racism of apartheid cannot be attrib-
uted to neo-Calvinist theology, the concept of “Christian nationalism” 
was imported into the ideology of the NGK and National Party from the 
Netherlands, where Kuyper had used the concept with reference to 
church-run but state-funded schools (Elphick 2012). The NGK and 
National Party’s evolving approach to social programmes—and what 
later (in the 1950s) came to be known as the “welfare state”—reveals a 
clear imprint of neo-Calvinism, perhaps in part because Kuyperian 
thought accorded with the prior scepticism towards social programmes, 
which had begun to be evident in the early 1930s. After its electoral vic-
tory in 1948, the National Party struggled to reconcile its deep ambiva-
lence over the state’s social programmes with the political pressure to 
expand them (Seekings 2020).
In private, and in the wider white South African society, conservative 
(as well as openly racist) views were undoubtedly much more widespread 
than was evident in Parliament. This conservatism had surfaced publicly 
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in arguments for social work rather than social assistance in the late 
1930s, as we saw above, and in the archival records examined by Du Toit 
(2018). It is unlikely that the war transformed what most white South 
Africans really thought. But it did delegitimate the public articulation of 
conservative and racist views outside of the National Party (and Ossewa 
Brandwag).
 Conclusion
In South Africa, as elsewhere, political actors had their own ideas about 
the roles of the state, kin, markets and non-state organisations such as 
churches. They had their own ideas about the form of social contract 
linking individual citizens to the state and society, as well as about who 
was deserving of assistance (whether public or private) and who was not. 
At the same time, local actors’ understanding of who should get what and 
how were shaped—but not determined—through interactions with ideas 
from elsewhere. South African reformers, in each of Parliament, state and 
civil society, were well informed of diverse models of social policy reform, 
including new programmes (such as old-age pensions and different forms 
of social insurance) as well as “modern” forms of casework in social work. 
Policy reforms in Australia, New Zealand and Britain were especially 
influential, as is evident in official government reports, parliamentary 
debates and writings by activists in civil society.
Whilst there was no shortage of ideas on the public agenda, most of 
these were never implemented. The bold visions of social policy set out in 
the reports of a long series of government commissions and investigative 
committees—from the Pienaar Commission in the late 1920s to the 
Gluckman Commission (on a national health service) and the Social and 
Economic Planning Council in the early 1940s—were not realised. 
Neither social health insurance nor a national health service was intro-
duced (Marks 1997). Unemployment insurance remained limited (Meth 
and Piper 1984). Contributory pensions remained privately run (although 
often mandated by government, hence what I have called elsewhere 
“semi-social” insurance—Seekings [2002]). Nonetheless, by 1948 South 
Africa had what was clearly a nascent welfare state: Social assistance and 
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unemployment relief (as well as the very much less important workmen’s 
compensation) were being paid to at least 600,000 people, and probably 
more than 700,000 people, out of a total population of under 12 million. 
The state was also widely involved in the regulation of the family and 
interventions to contain delinquency. Expenditure on these social poli-
cies was one of the largest items on the government’s budget. Moreover, 
the system has been partially and unevenly extended to African people, 
albeit with discriminatory benefits. This was a liberal welfare regime, in 
the sense that the role of the state was residual, providing for people when 
and only when the market failed (although, as in the wage earners’ wel-
fare regimes of Australia and New Zealand—see Castles 1985—the state 
intervened strongly to raise the wages of white workers). It was less liberal 
in its continued veneration of the family, although eligibility conditions 
for pensions and other programmes recognised that families—white or 
African—were less extended than they were imagined to have been in 
the past.
This nascent welfare state was shaped by the “power resources” of vari-
ous local actors. Most obviously, the African majority lacked electoral 
power and had limited power through the deployment or threat of direct 
action. White workers had some organisational power, although they 
were divided between competing unions. They and the less skilled “poor 
white” population were, however, empowered by their votes. Changes in 
the voting preferences of white voters brought about changes in govern-
ment with real consequences for public policy. Industrial employers 
wielded considerable influence, largely because the government was eco-
nomically dependent: Few social policy reforms were effected without at 
least the acquiescence of industrial employers, especially the mining com-
panies. Industrial employers supported the extension of old-age pensions 
to African people, i.e. to people who would otherwise be the dependents 
of their employees, but generally resisted the expansion of state-run con-
tributory programmes. (White) farmers also enjoyed massive influence 
within the National Party, which meant that reforms could be imposed 
on them more easily when (as in the war years) the National Party was in 
opposition.
Identifying the political power of different classes or interest groups 
begs the questions of how these groups understood their interests and 
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how they legitimately pursued them in public. In South Africa, race—
and racism—shaped all of this. The “social question” could not be sepa-
rated from South Africa’s racial version of the “national question” (nor 
vice versa). White employers, white farmers and white workers almost 
always saw themselves as white, with a specific interest in preserving their 
privileges as white people in an African context. Even liberals’ enthusiasm 
for deracialising policies was paternalistic (when it wasn’t simply self- 
interested). There was no significant social democratic movement because 
the racial hierarchy was generally viewed as more important than the 
relations of production, with the result that there was little solidarity 
between white workers and other workers. Race shaped even the way in 
which most reformers tackled the “social question” within the white pop-
ulation, drawing on ideas from other, less racialised contexts. Much of 
the impetus to the initial introduction of programmes to support the 
(white) elderly as well as (white) mothers and children as well as attempts 
to regulate (white) families came from anxiety about the effects of pov-
erty on white solidarity and the racial hierarchy. This view was most pro-
nounced within the National Party but extended also into the Labour 
Party (at least in the 1920s) as well as sections of the South African Party 
(and later the United Party). Social democrats opposed to capitalist hier-
archy and progressive liberals opposed to a rigid racial hierarchy remained 
marginal to white politics and, except during the unusual circumstances 
of the Second World War, policymaking.
Contestation over the social question in South Africa (for a summary 
of the analysis, see Table  6.1) was also infused with shifting religious 
beliefs. Heclo noted in very Weberian terms the need to understand the 
moral and religious convictions of the actual people who built wel-
fare states:
The closer one looks at the lives of the men and women involved in every 
country, the clearer it becomes that those pushing for changes that academ-
ics would later label as social citizenship were people with deeply ethical 
commitments, usually of a religious nature. The project they set for them-
selves, each in his or her own way, was to bring social practice into closer 
alignment with religious/ethical principles of sympathy, brotherhood, and 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In South Africa, as in Europe (Kahl 2005; van Kersbergen and Manow 
2009), the construction of the welfare state was shaped by religious 
beliefs. Some of the proponents of reform came from more secular back-
grounds. Others understood the need for state action through religious 
lenses. Religious beliefs were especially important for the opponents of 
reform, first in the 1920s and early 1930s and then again in the 1940s. 
Whilst the social question was framed in primarily racial terms, religious 
beliefs inhibited (without forestalling entirely) the statist form of policies 
to address the social question.
Glossary12
African People of indigenous, African descent, excepting some people included under 
“coloured” (see below) and including a very small number of people of mixed 
descent who identified culturally with African people.
Afrikaner The first white settlers in South Africa, many from the Netherlands, others 
from Germany and France, who embraced an “African” identity during the nine-
teenth century, speaking Afrikaans, a language rooted in Dutch but remade in the 
late nineteenth century; in the past Afrikaners were also referred to as “Boers” 
(literally, farmers), a term now considered derogatory.
Bantu An official apartheid-era and hence derogatory term for African people.
Black A term sometimes limited to African people but sometimes inclusive also of 
coloured and Indian people.
Coloured A heterogeneous category, including people of “mixed race”, people of 
Southeast Asian descent (mostly “Malay”, often Muslim), as well as members of 
the indigenous Khoi and San populations of the Western and Northern Cape.
Indian South Africans of South Asian descent.
Native An official, largely pre-apartheid term for African people that over time came 
to be considered as derogatory.
Non-European/Non-white Used before and under apartheid to refer to African, 
coloured and Indian people; both terms came to be viewed as offensive to 
black people.
White/European People of European descent, including Afrikaners.
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A Racialised Social Question: Pension 
Reform in Apartheid South Africa
Marianne S. Ulriksen
 Introduction
It is apparent that the apartheid regime promoted a racialised and exclu-
sionary system, but we still need to understand how social security poli-
cies fit into the broader apartheid project. When the National Party (NP) 
came to power in 1948, it inherited a social security system based on 
means-tested social assistance programmes for the needy (the elderly and 
disabled) and a fragmented system of contributory pensions (see Chap. 
6). However, the apartheid regime undertook no major social security 
reforms, which is puzzling. Focusing on social security policies for the 
elderly, as this group is the most likely to receive social security benefits 
from the state, it is curious that the state did not push for the creation of 
a state-run national contributory pension scheme because the apartheid 
government was otherwise willing to pass reforms and content with a 
strong state. In addition, why did the regime continue to include blacks 
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as non-contributory pension beneficiaries (albeit at lower benefit levels) 
when in other areas the regime had no problem implementing harsh 
exclusionary policies for black South Africans? While the apartheid 
regime sought to promote the interests of their white, primarily Afrikaner, 
constituencies, the aim of this chapter is to understand how pension pol-
icy developments were justified within the apartheid ideology as well as 
the regime’s reactions to global discourses. The argument is that self-
interests may be a driver in policymaking, but policymakers also seek to 
justify their decisions in relation to dominant discourses and ideas, and, 
consequently, by studying the normative underpinnings of policy, we can 
find explanations to counter-intuitive scenarios such as this one.
Thus, this chapter addresses the following question: what ideas and 
concepts underpinned social security policies for the elderly in apartheid 
South Africa? In analysing this question, I use as my theoretical frame-
work the “onion skin model”, as discussed in the next section. My analy-
sis focuses on the ideas and perceptions of white politicians because only 
the white population had any say in policymaking in this period (up to 
1953, some coloured people could vote, and up to 1959, the African 
population had three white representatives in parliament). I do not disre-
gard the voices of other population groups, nor do I condone such an 
exclusionary approach to politics and policymaking. However, since my 
goal is to understand the ideas that lay behind pension policies during the 
apartheid era, my primary focus should be the perceptions and justifica-
tions of the people involved in policymaking. Other population groups 
and the international society can indirectly play a role in influencing the 
positions of white politicians, and this is also reflected in the analysis 
when relevant.
In focusing on the ideational basis of social security policies in apart-
heid South Africa, the chapter fills a void in the literature. There is a 
substantial body of work on apartheid (i.e. Giliomee 2003; Hodder- 
Williams and Hugo 1976; Lodge 2017; Posel 1991; Ritner 1967; van der 
Westhuizen 2007; Welsh 2009). Only a few studies take an ideational 
approach (Klotz 1999; Legassick 1974; Norval 1996), but they do not 
focus on social security policies. There is some work on social security 
during apartheid (van der Berg 1997; Devereux 2007; Patel 1992, 2015; 
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Simkins 1984; Scully 2019), but none of these takes an ideational 
approach.
My analysis builds on a reading of parliamentary debates (Hansards) 
and historical accounts (see the appendix for methodological consider-
ations). I predominantly conduct a qualitative reading of the material 
with the purpose of understanding the ideas and positions of different 
actors with respect to policy, but I have also conducted quantitative 
counts of keywords in the Hansards to gauge the dominance of and shift 
in overall key ideas over time (Figs. 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3). In terms of termi-
nology, I focus on formal social security policies for the elderly—con-
tributory pension schemes and non-contributory old-age 
pensions—thereby omitting the important work of community-based 
organisations providing care during the apartheid era (see instead Patel 
1992). Non-contributory pensions are also labelled social pensions, old- 
age pensions, and social grants. The appendix in Chap. 6 explains the 

































































































































ANC /power sharing /self-determination /parity
Fig. 7.1 Dominant frames expressed by South African MPs, 1945–1990. (Source: 
The author, based on author’s analysis (see Appendix) of the Hansards from the 
South African House of Assembly, 1945–1990)


































































































































Fig. 7.2 Terms used by South African MPs to reference the African population. 
(Source: The author, based on author’s analysis (see appendix) of the Hansards 











































































































ANC power sharing self-detemination parity
Fig. 7.3 Dominant frames vocalised by South African MPs, 1980–1990. (Source: 
The author, based on author’s analysis (see appendix) of the Hansards from the 
South African House of Assembly, 1980–1990)
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generally accepted during the periods of analysis even though some would 
now qualify as racist or as problematic in some other sense. Considering 
the extensive reference to concepts and terms used by contemporary 
actors in my analysis, I do not always use quotation marks for terms that 
are obviously contemporary.
 Changes in Ideas, 1948–1990: An Outline 
of the Analysis
To explore how ideas justified and legitimised limited pension policy 
reforms in apartheid South Africa, I apply the onion skin model (see 
Leisering, Chap. 1). Leisering argues that, while pension policies (more 
broadly “welfare institutions”) make up the visible surface of social policy, 
we have to look underneath the surface to understand the normative 
infrastructure that shapes social policy reform. At the deepest level, 
“frames” inform policies and are non-social ideas within which social 
policies are embedded. These ideas can be related to nation-building and 
development as well as global frames such as human rights and commu-
nism. The normative justifications of social policy are aligned to domi-
nant frames but can also contrapose global frames that key policymakers 
regarded as illegitimate.
Based on the dominant frames of non-social ideas are four layers of 
social ideas that, at different levels, provide the ideational underpinnings 
of social policy. First, at the more abstract level, the “construction of 
social responsibility” designates the extent to which the state takes respon-
sibility for a social issue and to whom in society this responsibility is 
directed. The recognition of central “social questions”, which require 
political remedies, informs which social issues the state takes up. For 
instance, this could include the recognition that the issue of poverty 
requires political attention. Within the category of broader social ques-
tions, specific problem groups are identified, and their social problems 
are put on the policy agenda (the “policy paradigm”). It is within this 
policy paradigm that policy solutions are identified, which in turn make 
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up the visible social policies (“welfare institutions”). Each period of anal-
ysis starts with a table summarising the application of the onion skin 
model to South Africa, which also structures the in-depth narrative.
Following Leisering’s model, I start with the ideational frames that 
dominated the discourse among white members of parliament (MPs) 
during apartheid. Figure 7.1 illustrates how frames have shifted over time. 
In 1948, when the National Party came to power, the frame “apart-
heid”—the idea of separate development for different racial groups—
dominated. This changed in the early 1960s when the concept of 
homeland/homelands—the idea of “independent nations” for different 
racial groups—came into more frequent use. As I will elaborate in the 
analysis below, this change does not indicate a general shift in the funda-
mental belief of racial separation but powerfully shows how frames 
changed to ensure continued legitimisation for (a lack of ) policy reforms. 
Around 1980 there was another shift. The attempt to promote the idea of 
“independent nations” for Africans outside of white-dominated areas 
failed, and the apartheid regime increasingly came under pressure from 
both within and abroad. Figure  7.1 illustrates a period with no clear 
Table 7.1 The onion skin model applied to South Africa, 1948–1960
Frame “Separate development”—on how to deal with the 
influx of “natives” to cities and the “purity” of the 
white race
Global frames: human rights and communism
Constructing social 
responsibility
Racially graded social responsibility
 – The Afrikaner volk (within “white unity”)
 – “Europeans to carry non-Europeans on their back”
Social question Racialised social question legitimised through civilisation 
argument
 – Livelihoods of “civilised” workers
 – The welfare of poor whites (separate from other 
racial groups)
Policy paradigms Segmented concept of social problems and problem 
groups: focus on Afrikaner upliftment
Welfare institutions Racially graded pension schemes
 – No national contributory pension scheme, instead 
disparity of funds
 – Social pension for the neediest and a benefit rate 
based on race
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ideational direction, which in turn had consequences for pension policy; 
a point that will be explored in the penultimate section.
The shifts in dominating frames delineate the periods into which the 
analysis is divided, although the partition into specific periods is artificial 
as frames and ideas are fluid and continuously refined or re-examined. 
Table 7.1 summarises the first period of analysis, 1948–1960, following 
Leisering’s onion skin model, which I further elaborate on in the follow-
ing sections (text in bold are the key focus areas).
 1948–1960: “Separate Development” 
and the Problem of “Civilised Labour”
[T]he election of the National Party in 1948 marked not so much a turn-
ing point in South African history as the intensification of a process which 
had been going on for three hundred years. (Wilson and Ramphele 
1989: 204)
As the world moved towards a recognition of global human rights and 
decolonisation, South Africa marched in the opposite direction with 
deeply entrenched social and racial separation and the development of an 
increasingly draconian state. The National Party that came into power 
stood in opposition to the previous governing party, the United Party 
(UP), which J.C.  Smuts led. Although in the 1940s there was some 
extension of social benefits to Africans (Chap. 6), the UP government 
also harboured fears of social mixing across race, and “Smuts never 
wavered in his belief that Africans were inferior people” (Thompson 
2006: 177). Thus, while power changed hands in the parliament in 1948, 
the main political parties (the NP and UP, the official opposition) gener-
ally agreed on the need for social separation based on race, and there was 
continuous support for discriminatory social security policies in the 
national parliament. However, some critical voices were represented in 
the Parliament, by groups like the Labour Party, the Communist Party, 
and the “natives’” white representatives (the latter representation was 
removed in 1959) (Norval 1996). Although most MPs then shared ideas 
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of separate development, the NP distinguished itself from the previous 
government’s central concept of “segregation” by promoting the idea of 
“apartheid” (Fig. 7.1).
 Frame: “Apartheid”—The Idea 
of Separate Development
The National Party started to use the term “apartheid” after the party lost 
elections in 1943, but it was in the 1948 election campaigns that the 
concept started to gain greater expression (Evans 2017; Giliomee 2003). 
Scholars dismiss the idea that there was a blueprint or an apartheid grand 
plan. Instead, the concept of apartheid developed in contrast to the 
opposing UP’s concept of “segregation” and global frames such as com-
munism and human rights. The apartheid frame was also constructed to 
respond to the perceived challenges of controlling the African population 
and maintaining white dominance (Posel 1991; Norval 1996). In order 
to discuss the apartheid frame in more detail and how it is different from 
segregation, it is useful to first present an excerpt from NP leader 
D.F. Malan’s campaign speech in Paarl, South Africa, 29 March 1948:
There are two sections of thought in South Africa in regard to the policy 
affecting the non-European community. On the one hand, there is the 
policy of equality, which advocates equal rights within the same political 
structure for all civilized and educated persons, irrespective of race or 
colour, and the gradual granting of the franchise to non-Europeans as they 
become qualified to make use of democratic rights. On the other hand, 
there is the policy of separation (apartheid) which has grown from the 
experience of the established European population of the country, and 
which is based on the Christian principles of justice and reasonableness. Its 
aim is the maintenance and protection of the European population of the 
country as a pure White race, the maintenance and protection of the indig-
enous racial groups as separate communities, with prospects of developing 
into self-supporting communities within their own areas, and the stimula-
tion of national pride, self-respect, and mutual respect among the various 
races of the country. (Malan 1948: 2–3)
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Malan’s reference to the “policy of equality” relates to the segregation 
policies of Smuts’ government. Similarly to the NP, Smuts and his gov-
ernment were concerned with how to control the African population in 
ways that would limit their influx into the cities while maintaining white 
South Africans’ access to cheap black labour, and the policy of segrega-
tion was also aimed at maintaining white political domination. However, 
Smuts underestimated many Afrikaners’ fear of “the ‘swamping’ of white 
civilisation” (Terreblanche 2002: 314) and the extent to which many per-
ceived that the policy of segregation had failed to stem the increasing 
urbanisation of the African population (Evans 2017; Norval 1996).
Apartheid was also framed in opposition to communism, which was 
perceived as a primary threat to Afrikaner nationalism because the com-
munist doctrine completely disregarded racial differences. As explained 
below, Afrikaner nationalism—the idea of an Afrikaner volk—was an 
important element in the NP’s rise to power, and, consequently, the com-
munist demand for equal rights and a breakdown of racial barriers “was a 
thrust at the very heart of [the Afrikaners’] ethnic existence” (Norval 
1996: 136). During the apartheid era, anyone advocating for equal rights 
across racial groups was regarded as a communist, although many of these 
advocates were, in fact, anti-communist (Norval 1996).
Apartheid was based on ideologies of nationalism and religious particu-
larism within which pro-apartheid intellectuals emphasised that the dif-
ferentiation between races was divinely ordained and each race had its 
own character and calling. Surprisingly perhaps, they argued that any 
policy of exploitation and oppression by whites was in conflict with the 
Christian basis of Afrikaner national life; instead, the NP vowed to facili-
tate opportunities for each racial group to develop according to its volk’s 
character (Welsh 2009; Norval 1996). As Malan put it that March day 
in 1948:
In their areas, the non-European racial groups will have full opportunities 
for development in every sphere and will be able to develop their own 
institutions and social services whereby the forces of the progressive non- 
Europeans can be harnessed for their own national development. 
(Malan 1948: 3)
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Hence, whereas segregation entailed “the concept of one community 
embracing different but interdependent elements”, apartheid dictated 
“the concept of several alien and fundamentally incompatible national 
groups” (Ritner 1967: 27, my emphasis). In theory then, different “non- 
white racial groups” were not “inferior” to the “white race” but rather 
“irreconcilably different” (Ritner 1967: 27). However, in practice, NP 
politicians continued to perceive whites as superior to blacks. Moreover, 
because they did not believe that actual implementation of geographical 
separation was possible, they saw it as their ordained duty to provide 
“trusteeship and guidance” to the black population (Ritner 1967).
The idea of separate development in individual “nation-states” (i.e. 
homelands) only gained traction from the late 1950s to the early 1960s 
(see below and Fig. 7.1). In the first decade of NP rule, the focus was on 
the maintenance of the white population as a “pure white race” and com-
plete eradication of any interracial mixing, although with a primary focus 
on the uplifting of the white Afrikaner community.
 Racially Graded Social Responsibility
As in the pre-apartheid era, in the 1950s, white politicians on both sides 
of the House also argued that their social responsibility should primarily 
be for the white population because how “long can the Europeans carry 
the non-Europeans on their backs?” (USA 1954: Mr Loubser: 3501). Yet 
there was a marked difference between segregationist and apartheid dis-
courses. The former made a distinction between “Europeans” (English- 
and Afrikaans-speaking whites) and “natives” (the African population) 
and treated each as a homogeneous group. The apartheid discourse, in 
contrast, promoted the idea of volkseie, which denotes the attributes that 
are particular to an ethnic/national group, i.e. volk, with a particular 
interest in the characteristics and identity of the Afrikaner volk 
(Norval 1996).
To elaborate, an underlying factor in the National Party’s victory in the 
1948 elections was the resurgence of Afrikaner nationalism, which united 
Afrikaners in a cross-class volksbeweging (people’s movement). The gov-
erning alliance of Smuts and Hertzog from the 1920s to the 1940s had 
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largely downplayed past conflicts between Afrikaans- and English- 
speaking white South Africans, but many Afrikaners felt that this alliance 
was perpetuating the dominance of the English-speaking community. 
The 1930s and 1940s saw rapid social change and (continued) substantial 
economic inequality between Afrikaners and the English. In addition, 
Afrikaners perceived the United Party’s retention of symbolic connec-
tions to Britain and the rapid urbanisation of Africans as the real threats 
to their identity (Welsh 2009; van der Westhuizen 2007). The National 
Party took advantage of this situation. As Terreblanche (2002: 298) 
explains:
By overemphasising the alleged injustices done to Afrikaners by British 
imperialism and foreign capitalism and exaggerating the dangers of swart 
oorstroming (‘black swamping’), Afrikaner ideologues succeeded in creating 
a ‘syndrome of victimisation’—i.e., the idea that the existence and interests 
of the Afrikaner volk were endangered by other population groups.
Thus, although the logic of volkseie would later be transposed to other 
“groups” in society, the concern of the Afrikaner nationalist movement 
was initially focused on the construction and purification of the Afrikaner 
community, and, as a result, the social responsibility of the apartheid state 
was primarily constructed to benefit the Afrikaans population (Van der 
Westhuizen 2007; Norval 1996).
Consequently, the focus on volkseie enabled the NP to emphasise its 
social responsibility towards the Afrikaner volk over that of the (British) 
English-speaking white South Africans. However, NP politicians vacil-
lated between using the term “race” to refer to volk (to differentiate 
between groups within the white population) and to “colour” (to differ-
entiate between “white” and “black”). In distancing themselves from 
“non-white” groups, Afrikaner nationals emphasised white unity and the 
whites as the “civilised” population in contrast to the “uncivilised” black 
population.
Hence, the construction of social responsibility was categorised across 
racial lines. The white “race”—and within this group, particularly the 
Afrikaner volk— was the apartheid state’s primary concern. The state 
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paternalistically regarded the black population as an “uncivilised” group 
that needed to be “carried by the Europeans” and, therefore, required 
some minimum of support, for instance, social pensions.
 The Racialised Social Question Legitimised by 
the Civilisation Argument
The concept of “civilisation” has been important in white-dominated 
regimes since the eighteenth century: white “civilisation” was contrasted 
with African “savagery”, thereby justifying the white population’s domi-
nance and privilege over other population groups. The rhetoric of “civili-
sation” remained an important means by which the NP mobilised support 
throughout the apartheid era (Van der Westhuizen 2007).
The 1930s and 1940s saw an increasing influx of low-skilled Afrikaners 
into the cities in search of work. Having grown up in rural areas, they 
were ill-prepared for city life and faced strong competition from the 
African population in the labour market. In addition, at this time, the 
low-income segments of all South African groups in the cities were 
increasingly intermingling, something which alarmed Afrikaans nation-
alists, as, in their view, they had to protect racial “purity” at all costs (Van 
der Westhuizen 2007).
Thus, the ruling NP government’s social question was, in the first 
instance, how to ensure the separation of low-income Afrikaners from 
the African population. This concern was connected to other questions 
prevalent in South Africa: the “native” question, particularly trying to 
stem the influx of Africans into the cities, and the “poor white” question, 
which was dominant in the 1930s (see Seekings, Chap. 6). Nevertheless, 
the dominant issue in the first decade of apartheid was separating the 
Afrikaans working class from the African working class, which was made 
possible by labelling the former as “civilised” (i.e. white) and the latter as 
“uncivilised” (i.e. black) labour (Norval 1996).
Following this, I argue that the social question was racialised. The 
main social question for the NP government was the “civilised workers 
question”, that is, a call for political remedies to ensure that low-income 
and low-skilled Afrikaners’ economic position would be improved to 
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prevent their intermingling with other racial groups. The regulation of 
“black” labour as a social threat to a lesser extent called for social policy 
remedies but rather those of control and oppression.
 Policy Paradigm: Afrikaner Upliftment 
as the Social Problem
Given that the social question concerned the situation of “civilised” (i.e. 
white) low-skilled workers, the NP focused on policy solutions that could 
eliminate the competition between black and white workers. Moreover, 
the Afrikaners were perceived as the primary problem group, given their 
disadvantaged position vis-à-vis the white English-speaking population, 
so the government pursued preferential treatment to ensure Afrikaner 
upliftment. From an ideational perspective, Afrikaner upliftment was 
important to ensure the unity of the Afrikaner volk by avoiding letting 
“working-class Afrikaner … consciousness as Afrikaners … be eclipsed by 
class-consciousness” (Welsh 2009: 13). However, it is also important to 
note that the NP was relying on low-income Afrikaners for their electoral 
victory in 1948 and in the many elections that followed (Van der 
Westhuizen 2007).
In order to improve the socio-economic status of Afrikaners, the apart-
heid state implemented job reservations and training programmes for 
low-skilled Afrikaners and, in various formal and informal ways, devised 
the exclusion of Africans from decent employment, such as by entrench-
ing black subordination in employment, non-recognition of black 
unions, and “closed shop” agreements that gave vetoes to white unions 
(Van der Westhuizen 2007; Welsh 2009). This created lucrative employ-
ment opportunities for Afrikaners, particularly in the public sector and 
parastatals, which “contributed considerably to the rapid … embour-
geoisement of Afrikaners” (Terreblanche 2002: 303). Afrikaners’ share of 
the national personal income went from 27.9 per cent in 1946 to 32.4 
per cent in 1960. In addition, the inequality gap between English- and 
Afrikaans-speaking whites closed: in 1946, the Afrikaners’ per capita 
income was about 40 per cent of English-speakers’ per capita income, 
whereas in the late 1970s it was 80 per cent (Van der Westhuizen 2007).
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 Racially Graded Pension Schemes
The NP had clear priorities concerning pension policies: “Our first con-
sideration and our first interest is the lot of the White worker and the 
European old people in South Africa. That is our first interest and our 
first responsibility” (USA 1955, Dr de Wet: 1499–1500). During this 
period, the opposition raised proposals to introduce a national contribu-
tory pension scheme, but the government was content with regulating 
private pension funds and promoting separate contributory pension 
schemes in the public and parastatal sectors to which Afrikaners were 
given preferential access.
Opposition parties repeatedly proposed motions to introduce a 
national contributory pension scheme. One argument for such a scheme 
was that under the current system of means-tested social pensions and 
some private pension schemes, many had no social security in old age. In 
fact, “it is the people in the middle-income group who find things diffi-
cult today” (USA 1954, Mr Tighy: 342–343). Another argument was 
that a national contributory scheme could replace the existing expensive 
social pensions, thereby actually enabling the country to save money 
(USA 1953, Mr Eaton: 728; USA 1955, Mr Lewis: 1465–1472). Finally, 
there was also the aspiration to “[be in] line with other Commonwealth 
and European countries” (USA 1951, Mr Eaton: 6702).
While the opposition parties called for a national contributory scheme, 
there was disagreement about whether such a scheme should include all 
South Africans. The Labour Party argued that the government could not 
eliminate non-Europeans from the definition of “worker”, and, therefore, 
“non-Europeans … are as much entitled to … a pension on a contribu-
tory basis as any European” (USA 1954, Mr Eaton: 350–351). However, 
the UP-dominated opposition’s main view was based on the civilisation 
argument that demands for a national contributory scheme “flows from 
the advance in our civilised standards of living” (USA 1959, Mr 
Durrant: 540).
The NP government was unsurprisingly in line with the civilisation 
argument and also emphasised that the circumstances between the 
“native” worker and a qualified artisan “differ too greatly” (USA 1960, 
Mr van der Heever: 1865). However, the NP government did not accept 
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the idea of one national scheme because not only did the circumstances 
across racial groups differ, but one also could not “establish a pension 
scheme for mineworkers on the same basis as one for public servants”, 
and so “the whole solution to the pension problem is to be found in…var-
ious schemes” (USA 1960, Mr van der Heever: 1865).
Thus, the NP government persistently argued against the idea of intro-
ducing a national contributory pension scheme, suggesting that such a 
scheme would be costly and that the white population would contribute 
disproportionally to other population groups, given that the new scheme 
would require, at least initially, state support:
If there were a change to a national pension scheme to-day it would have to 
be taken through to the bitter end and I ask the supporters of this motion 
whether they have considered the implications of their proposal for a young 
country such as South Africa with its small White population and its over-
whelming Native population. Speakers have said that if we introduce such 
a pension scheme the Natives and Coloureds will be included in it. Have 
you ever considered what it would cost a certain section of the people, 
people who contribute to taxation to-day, and from whose pocket the extra 
taxation would have to come? (USA 1955, Mr du Plessis: 1519–1520)
Instead, the government sought to promote the extension of private 
pension funds with the 1956 Pension Funds Act that served as the legisla-
tive foundation to regulate pension schemes to which employers and 
employees would both contribute. As explained by the Minister of 
Finance, the government saw a range of advantages to this new arrange-
ment, such as it did not encourage dependency and minimised the need 
for social pensions in the future:
The point I want to make is that these private pension funds serve the great 
social object of getting people to look after themselves, of being self- 
supporting and independent … For that reason there should be every 
encouragement from the side of the Government, and … [T]here is posi-
tive support in the form of the taxation relief given to the employer as well 
as to the employee contributing to a fund of this nature … if these schemes 
are established and extended, we can expect in future to have less provision 
made in the Pensions and Social Welfare Votes. (USA 1959, Minister of 
Finance: 573–575)
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Furthermore, the government praised itself for instituting a non- 
discriminatory policy: “The attitude we on this side adopt when we plead 
for the encouragement of the various private schemes is that we do not 
exclude the non-Whites. We say it is a matter for the employer and the 
employee themselves” (USA 1960, Mr de Villiers: 1881). However, as the 
opposition pointed out, although some schemes were available for the 
“natives”, “to a very large extent the Natives are not in a position to make 
voluntary contributions and they are consequently not able to draw ben-
efits” (USA 1960, Dr de Beer: 1878).
The NP government not only encouraged private pension funds but 
was also instrumental in expanding contributory pension schemes to 
public-service and parastatal employees in administration, the police 
force, prisons, the defence force, and the railways, among other sectors in 
which Afrikaners benefitted from preferential employment. Through 
employment, white staff were granted membership in these contributory 
pension funds, whereas black staff were, at best, entitled to a gratuity at 
the time of retirement (USA 1956, Minister of Transport: 1117–1118). 
Interestingly, while over the years the immense costs of the social pen-
sions were a repeated concern (see below), there was much less mention 
of the costs of keeping the public sector pension funds sound, although 
budget allocations were made for such purposes most years (USA 1955, 
Mr Hepple: 3391; RSA 1967, Mr van der Walt: 4890). Thus, the budget 
for public-service pensioners was heavily in favour of the white employees.
Together with the white workers, the condition of the “European old 
people” was the government’s first priority (USA 1955, Dr de Wet: 
1499–1500). This also implies that the situation of elderly blacks was 
only of secondary concern, and after 1948 when the NP government 
came to power, the government sought to restrict the numbers of Africans 
receiving social pensions by encouraging a stricter application of the eli-
gibility criteria, and although many more Africans received a pension 
over other population groups and this number increased in the 1950s 
and 1960s, the number of African beneficiaries decreased relative to 
white, coloured and Indian beneficiaries (see Table 7.2). Similarly, while 
the nominal value of social pensions increased for all population groups, 
Africans continued to be seriously disadvantaged—in 1944, the pension 
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value for whites was 12 times higher than for Africans, while in 1965 
white pensioners received a grant that was 11 times higher (Devereux 2007).
Only very few parliamentarians voiced concerns about the lower rates 
paid to other population groups, and then it was often because they were 
elected as their representatives. How small the pensions were for Africans 
and how unfairly they were administered is well illustrated by this quote 
from Mr Lee-Warden, representative of the “natives”:
The average pension which is paid to an African today is £13. Now, it is not 
£13 a week; it is not £13 a month; it is £13 a year! If you break that down 
it comes to 5s. [shilling] a week. To relate that to the cost of living one real-
izes how little it is.… It means that one person could buy six loaves of 
bread, costing 10d. [penny] each, in any one week. (USA 1960, Mr Lee- 
Warden: 3371–3373)
However, in general, racial discrimination in benefits was unques-
tioned, seemingly because the differentiated levels of civilisation were an 
undisputed paradigm and parliamentarians were primarily concerned 
with pensions for the white population. In fact, “policy debates were…pre-
dominantly conducted as if South Africa consisted of 4 million whites in 
a modern economy with few structural problems” (Beukes and Fourie 
1992: 98). One aspect of the social pensions that did receive some criti-
cism was the means test because it was perceived to “penalize the thrifty 
and set a premium on recklessness and thriftlessness” (USA 1955, Mr 
Gay: 1483). Critics argued that the means test was unfair to the elderly 
Table 7.2 Old-age pension beneficiaries in South Africa, 1949–1968
1949 1951 1955 1957–1958 1968
Numbers
Europeans 68,265 72,040 84,885 87,313 97,532
Coloured and Indian 40,125 42,980 49,060 49,030 65,359
Natives 199,514 197,332 215,206 217,097 248,640
Total 307,904 312,352 349,151 353,440 411,531
Per cent of total
Europeans 22.2% 23.1% 24.3% 24.7% 23.7%
Coloured and Indian 13.0% 13.8% 14.1% 13.9% 15.9%
Natives 64.8% 63.2% 61.6% 61.4% 60.4%
Source: The author, data from House of Assembly debates (Hansards), 1949–1968
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who had saved and owned assets. Nevertheless, the government would 
not remove the means test given the high expected costs.
Overall, the social pension programme proved resilient. In the parlia-
mentary debates in the 1950s, there was a strong sense that social pension 
was an expenditure that could not be cut:
I agree with my friends over there that the cost structure is high. It was also 
high under their regime. The greatest expansion in the public service came 
under that Government and not under this Government. [But…do] they 
want us to abolish those services. Do they want us to abolish Social Welfare 
and all those things? No, of course not! (USA 1952, Minister of Economic 
Affairs: 68)
Although social pensions were not reformed in any way and only 
incrementally adjusted, the amount spent on pensions quadrupled from 
1948 to 1960, given gradual increases in benefit levels and the number of 
beneficiaries (USA 1960, Mr van der Heever: 1859). The NP govern-
ment’s view on pensions was double-sided. On the one hand, it was sym-
pathetic towards the needs of the elderly and believed that “we should try 
to see whether we cannot do more for our aged” (USA 1959: 568–569). 
This was not exclusive to the white population because—as explained 
earlier—the NP government accepted its (temporary) duty to care for 
other population groups under its “trusteeship”. In addition, the govern-
ment actively used social pensions for Africans to counter South Africa’s 
negative image internationally (Patel 2015). On the other hand, the gov-
ernment had misgivings with the fact that only a small section of the 
(white) population “carried the rest on their back”: “there are few coun-
tries in the world were such a small section of the taxable population does 
so much for those sections of the population who do not pay taxes” (USA 
1956, Mr Haak: 2837).
To sum up, the apartheid government did not pursue any major policy 
reforms on pensions. The main new legislation was the Pension Funds 
Act of 1956, which was put in place to control and regulate pension 
funds. Calls for a national pension scheme were discarded: the govern-
ment was content that private- and public-sector schemes would cover 
their constituency of Afrikaner workers because of their preferential 
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access to employment. Social pensions, inherited from the previous 
regime, were supplementary. Race differentials were not questioned 
because the idea of different levels of living standards was generally 
accepted. Incremental adjustments in benefit values and accessibility 
caused a continuous increase in social pension expenses, a concern for 
which would continue in the succeeding periods.
 Shifting the Dominant Frame: From Apartheid 
to “Independent Nations”
When Hendrik Verwoerd—often named the architect of apartheid—
became prime minister in 1958, the term apartheid was already in com-
mon use and a central frame. However, with Verwoerd’s regime came 
another important change in the usages of concepts that would define the 
next two decades. Until then, the government had labelled the indige-
nous African populations “natives”, implying that they were a homoge-
nous group of people. However, now the government began to categorise 
Africans as distinct “Bantu ethnic groups”, thereby laying the foundation 
for the development of separate independent “homelands”, where each 
“ethnic” group had limited autonomy (Norval 1996). This dramatic shift 
in key concepts is illustrated in Fig. 7.2, which documents that around 
1958 parliamentarians gradually replaced the term “native” with “Bantu”. 
Figure 7.1 also makes it evident that a shift in frames took place by not-
ing when the terms “homeland”/“homelands” replaced—although a few 
years later—the term “apartheid”. However, these shifts in frames do not 
indicate a fundamental change in the underlying ideas of the apartheid 
project but rather a change in the justifications used to legitimise 
the regime.
Current events also prompted the shifts in discourse. The first months 
of 1960 was a difficult period for the apartheid government because of 
the Sharpeville shootings, international condemnation, the failed assas-
sination attempt on Verwoerd, and the massive outflow of capital (Welsh 
2009). In the South African media “the word apartheid itself was blamed 
as the source of the trouble” because it had negative connotations abroad 
(Van der Westhuizen 2007: 41). The government, instead, steered the 
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discourse away from “separate development” and towards “multi- 
nationalism” and “ethnic self-determination”. The government claimed 
that Africans would be given the right to self-government in their home-
lands (Posel 1991). As a result, “independent nations” (i.e. homelands) 
became the key “non-social” frame of the subsequent period.
 1961–1979: “Independent Nations” 
and the Government’s Attempt to Abandon 
Social Responsibility for Non-white Groups
The 1960s and 1970s were in many ways a turbulent period in South 
Africa and included several dramatic events, such as the assassination of 
Verwoerd in 1966 and the Soweto uprising in 1976. However, very little 
changed with pension policies. The apartheid government focused on 
establishing homelands with the desired aim of freeing the government 
from the responsibility of taking care of non-white population groups 
and ultimately maintaining white domination. In practice, the home-
lands scheme required extensive funding to facilitate, and although gov-
ernment spending increased, it was insufficient. Given the affluence of 
the white population, there was little need to pursue any major pension 
reforms. The 1956 legislation continued to regulate contributory pen-
sions, although the number of funds grew, and the main change in social 
pensions was the introduction of the “principle of discrimination”, which 
underscores the embedded nature of the civilisation argument. Table 7.3 
summarises the application of the onion skin model for this period and is 
further elaborated in the following.
 Frame: Homelands (“Independent Nations”)
Welsh (2009) argues that the homeland solution was Verwoerd’s second 
phase of apartheid. Whereas the first phase was pre-eminently about 
ensuring white control and Afrikaner upliftment, “the new phase pur-
ported to advance African ethnic ‘nations’ to self-determination in their 
‘homelands’” (Welsh 67–68). The term “ethnic self-determination” 
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mimicked the language used further north in Africa by African national-
ists fighting to achieve independence, and, in this way, the government 
tried to gain legitimacy with its critics by distancing itself from colonial-
ism and, instead, co-opting the ideas of rights to political independence 
(Posel 1991; Klotz 1999).
The 1959 Promotion of Bantu Self-Government Act established the 
statutory basis for homelands, and the 1971 Bantu Homelands 
Constitution Act completed the legislative framework (Welsh 2009; 
Thompson 2006). Practically, the government established “Bantu territo-
ries”, and any black person in white areas and cities that was deemed 
“superfluous to ‘white’ South Africa’s needs” was forcibly removed to an 
area the government identified as fitting the black person’s ethnic identity 
(Van der Westhuizen 2007: 126). The state forcibly removed and inter-
nally relocated 3.5  million people between 1960 and 1982 (Marais 
2011). In effect, the population of the homelands grew from 4.2 million 
in 1960 to 11 million in 1980. “About half of the black rural families had 
been rendered landless [by 1980] in what was basically rural slums with-
out services, facilities or employment” because there was not enough land 
and economic investments were also sparse (Van der Westhuizen 2007: 
101). The actual establishment of independent states took time, was 
costly, and, in many places, was incomplete. Transkei spearheaded the 
process and became “self-governing” in 1963 and “independent” in 1976. 
Table 7.3 The onion skin model applied to South Africa, 1961–1979
Frame “Independent nations”—still responding to urban 
influx and campaigning for racial separation
Global frames: right to political self-determination
Constructing social 
responsibility
Outsourcing social responsibility to each “independent 
nation-state”
Social question Racialised social question
 – Maintaining white domination
 – Civilisation argument when useful
Policy paradigms Increased welfare of whites
Grappling with “superfluous appendages”
Welfare institutions Stability in pension schemes
 – Separate schemes to address “separate needs”
 – “Principle of discrimination”
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Bophuthatswana became independent in 1977, Venda in 1979, and 
Ciskei in 1981. As the “nations” became independent, their citizens lost 
their South African citizenship (Thompson 2006).
 Outsourcing Social Responsibility to “Independent 
Nation-States”
The goal of the homeland scheme was to enable African groups to take 
responsibility for their own advancement, and the homelands became 
semi-autonomous political structures with responsibility for certain pol-
icy fields, most notably social welfare, but not other areas, such as defence 
and economic planning (Legassick 1974). However, so-called self- 
determination allowed white South Africa to shy away from its responsi-
bility for and contribution to the development of other communities 
because “what nation-state can be held responsible for the educational 
expenditure or the unemployment, old-age, and other welfare benefits 
needed in another sovereign land?” (Wilson and Ramphele 1989: 205).
In reality, white authorities did not provide the necessary economic 
support to make the new scheme work, and Afrikaners continued to lead 
the homeland bureaucratic systems. The homelands, therefore, remained 
totally economically dependent on the white regime for employment 
opportunities and funding. Furthermore, although the South African 
state continued to finance social welfare policies, there was less pressure 
to pass any pension reforms that could benefit the African population 
because “the extension of the services [should] be a function of the ability 
of the Bantu to pay” (Legassick 1974: 19; Picard 2005).
 Racialised Social Question
The social issue of Afrikaner upliftment in the 1950s was no longer press-
ing. South Africa experienced tremendous economic growth in the 1950s 
and 1960s, and the Afrikaners particularly—benefitting from preferen-
tial employment—experienced increased affluence. By 1970 the 
Afrikaners had become a predominantly urban people, and their per 
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capita incomes rose in comparison to those of English- speaking whites: 
from 49:100 in 1946 to 70:100 in 1970. The total white population’s per 
capita income grew by nearly 50 per cent during the 1960s. The decade 
was one of unprecedented affluence that led to the suggestion that white 
South Africans rivalled Californians “as the most wealthy community in 
the world” (Lodge 2017: 176; Welsh 2009). Africans also benefitted from 
industrial advancement; for instance, they gained from the increase in 
manufacturing employment opportunities. However, their income only 
rose by 23 per cent in the 1960s, and, thus, inequality between blacks 
and whites became even more accentuated (Lodge 2017).
In this context, the social question of the “civilised worker” lost some 
of its relevance because, within the new discourse on “independent 
nations”, the strategy was to make the previously labelled “backward” 
and “uncivilised” rural areas attractive to Africans. Nevertheless, racial 
discrimination continued largely undisputed in the white-dominated 
South African Parliament, and the idea of different standards of living 
was still used when politically convenient.
 Policy Paradigm: The “Superfluous Appendages”
Policy solutions were not clearly related to a social question in this period. 
Instead, the defining policy paradigms were predominately about main-
taining white dominance, and central to this plan was the removal of as 
many Africans from white areas as possible. Consequently, the main per-
ceived problem group that the government needed to address was that of 
the “superfluous appendages” (see below), although pension policies 
played a smaller role in solving social problems. As a government circular 
stated in 1961:
It is accepted Government policy that the Bantu are only temporarily resi-
dent in the European areas…for as long as they offer their labour there. As 
soon as they become, for some reason or another, no longer fit or superflu-
ous in the labour market, they are expected to return to their country of 
origin or the territory of the national unit where they fit in ethnically if 
they were not born and bred in the homeland. (quoted in Posel 
1991: 234–235)
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The government determined that “no stone is to be left unturned to 
achieve settlement in the homelands of non-productive Bantu” (Legassick 
1974: 27), and, therefore, the policy grew more aggressive during the 
1960s and the categories of “superfluous” people multiplied. Africans 
regarded as inessential to the “European” labour market included the 
aged, widows, the “unfit”, and women with dependent children, as well 
as doctors, attorneys, traders, and others. The Deputy Minister of Justice, 
Mines and Planning G.F Froneman referred to these groups as the “super-
fluous appendages”—add-ons or extra “limbs” of the African labour force 
who were unnecessary in white areas. Helen Suzman was quite alone in 
the Parliament when she gave the voiceless majority’s perspective:
In other societies, the aged, the sick, the widows and the very young are 
treated with special care. In our society, they are singled out for especially 
harsh treatment…they are the ‘superfluous appendages’. What does the 
honourable minister think the endorsing out of African families does to 
them? He is very proud of the number of people he has kept out of the 
urban areas, but never stops to think what…they live on and what their 
family lives are like. (Suzman 1970: 114–115)
 Pension Policies
The apartheid government was intent on making the homelands more 
attractive than the cities to the Africans, which led to a redesign of the 
system that categorised the values of social pension benefits to different 
racial groups. In 1965, the government established a “principle of dis-
crimination”, according to which the government paid pension benefits 
in the ratio of 4:2:1 to whites, coloureds and Indians, and Africans, 
respectively. This principle was based on a civilisation argument in which 
“both the Indian and the Coloured live at very much lower levels than 
the White man and their income is also on a smaller scale” (Minister of 
Social Welfare and Pensions, as quoted in Devereux 2007: 544–545). 
The civilisation argument was, however, somehow reversed for Africans. 
In the 1950s, the government differentiated between rural and “detribal-
ised” Africans who lived in the cities and, therefore, had lost their “tribal” 
identity and connections, which in turn led to differentiated pension 
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rates for Africans living in cities, towns, and rural areas, with higher rates 
for the former and the lowest for the latter.
However, by 1965, the government abolished this differentiation and 
set a uniform payment, which, in effect, slightly increased the pensions 
paid to Africans living in the rural areas while decreasing it for Africans 
living in the cities. Thus, in this case, the argument for different levels of 
civilisation no longer applied, because the government was intent on 
making the previously described “uncivilised” homelands attractive to 
(“superfluous”) Africans and removing incentives to move to the cities 
(Wilson and Ramphele 1989; Devereux 2007; Posel 1991). Subsequently, 
pension levels started to even out somewhat to be in line with the “prin-
ciple of discrimination”. Thus, while the annual amount paid to white 
persons increased by 124 per cent from 1965 to 1975, the amount for the 
coloured and Indians increased by 154 per cent, and that for Africans by 
238 per cent. Yet, at a ratio of 7:3:1, there was still some way to go to 
reach the 4:2:1 target (Devereux 2007). Moreover, while 3.2 per cent of 
the white population received a social old-age pension, this was only true 
of 1 per cent of blacks (RSA 1980, Mr Goodall: 2747).
Contemporaneously, the opposition again pleaded for a national con-
tributory pension scheme and linked this proposal to the simultaneous 
removal of the much-criticised means test for social pensions, the idea 
being that with a national contributory scheme, social pensions would in 
time become (almost) redundant (RSA 1967; i.e. Mr Oldfield and Mr 
Fisher: 4873–4882). The government, however, did not want to remove 
the means test, although it was relaxed in various ways in the mid-1960s 
(RSA 1965, Minister of Social Welfare: 276–78). The government also 
seemed content to continue with the fragmented system of contributory 
pension funds whereby separate schemes could cater to “separate needs”. 
In order to expand the pension schemes, the government would rather 
“try to compel … employers to … introduce private schemes … and … 
to conduct research on the basis of [the 1956 legislation to control and 
register all pension funds] to ascertain whether it will not be possible to 
make better provision for our workers in that way” (RSA 1967, Mr van 
der Walt: 4891).
Notwithstanding the government’s resistance to pursuing any kind of 
pension reform, the number of pension funds increased from 6570  in 
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1972 to more than 12,000 by the end of the 1970s (RSA 1980, Mr 
Goodall: 274–2749). Given that it was estimated that 38.8 per cent of 
the economically active population in South Africa belonged to a pension 
scheme in 1976 (RSA 1980), we can assume that this meant that the 
white population was already well covered by the existing fragmented 
system, which again helps to explain the government’s reluctance to 
expand contributory pensions to a national scheme for which the state 
would ultimately be responsible.
To sum up, there were no fundamental changes to pension policies in 
the 1960s and 1970s. The idea of different levels of civilisation was fur-
ther entrenched and specified by the “principle of discrimination”, and, 
although social pensions were improved slightly for Africans in rural 
areas, deprivation was widespread. Finally, the government saw no need 
to pursue any contributory pension reforms.
 Shifting the Dominant Frame: From Independent 
Nations to an Ideational Void
The Soweto uprising in 1976 was “a seminal event in the decline of apart-
heid” and a turning point in many ways because it “occurred at a time 
when international isolation and pressure for economic sanctions were 
increasing” (Welsh 2009: 101). The “grand idea” of the homeland 
schemes became increasingly hard to maintain, as few believed the gov-
ernment was sincere about easing its domination (Van der Westhuizen 
2007; Thompson 2006). This is also reflected in Fig. 7.1, which illus-
trates when the terms “homeland”/“homelands” started to lose traction. 
The Soweto events provoked some reforms in which “salary parity for 
teachers of all races with equal qualifications” was a key component 
(Welsh 2009: 108). The idea of parity was also raised with respect to 
social pensions around 1976. The opposition argued that discrimination 
based on race should be discontinued (RSA 1976, Mr Oldfield). During 
the same debate, the deputy minister of Social Welfare and Pensions 
stated that the “the Government has already declared itself prepared to … 
eliminate the gap with regard to the payments made to the various popu-
lation groups” (RSA 1976: 7746). However, the “fact of the matter is that 
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it cannot be done at the moment” (RSA 1976: 7746). This is an impor-
tant shift away from ideas of separate development and different levels of 
civilisation even if these changes were not immediately feasible according 
to the government. Nevertheless, within the government itself, there did 
not seem to be complete agreement on the idea of parity in wages and 
social benefits. For instance, the Minister of Information and the Interior 
Dr C.P. Mulder apparently—also in 1976—declared that “Blacks at the 
lower levels of work have to show greater productivity if the wage gap 
with the Whites was to be bridged” (RSA 1976, Mr Webber: 6110–6111). 
Parity became important in the 1980s debates, although the white parlia-
mentarians also remained concerned about the possible cost implications 
of equal access to and value of pensions.
 1980–1990: “A Country of Minorities” 
and Equalisation to an Extent
South Africa experienced a significant recession beginning in the late 
1970s and extending into the 1980s, and many whites experienced a 
decline in income. Moreover, administration of the complex network of 
apartheid laws was extremely costly (Thompson 2006; Welsh 2009). 
International pressures, including increased anti-apartheid activism and 
the enforcement of international sanctions that signalled to the domestic 
opposition that there was international support for racial equality, further 
exacerbated the apartheid state’s troubles (Klotz 1999). Table 7.4 sum-
marises the application of the onion skin model for the period 1980-1990 
and is further elaborated in the following.
 Frame: Power-Sharing and Unclear Directions
The NP government recognised that given the crisis of the apartheid state, 
some racial concessions were unavoidable (Van der Westhuizen 2007). 
However, P.W. Botha, prime minister of the apartheid government, flatly 
denied anti-apartheid actors’ suggestion of a unitary political system 
based on the principle of one-man-one-vote (Botha 1985). Botha 
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remained committed to the idea of separate development, and “[f ]unda-
mental to his thinking was that South Africa was ‘a country of minori-
ties’, each of which was to be accorded recognition. ‘Groups’ had to be 
the building blocks of any new system” (Welsh 2009: 209).
Although some political concessions were needed, the NP government 
could not contemplate giving Africans effective influence because the 
party feared the possible consequences of African majority rule on the 
white population (Thompson 2006). Instead, the NP drew inspiration 
from the US political scientist Arend Lijphard’s idea of “consociational-
ism”, which was essentially “power-sharing arrangements in heterogenous 
societies where minorities felt threatened by majority rule” (Van der 
Westhuizen 2007: 116). That the concept of power-sharing was domi-
nant in the minds of white politicians in the early 1980s is also evident 
from Fig. 7.3. In addition, Fig. 7.3 highlights that, unlike previous peri-
ods in which we could identify a single ideational frame, there was no 
clear ideational direction in the 1980s, particularly after Botha’s push for 
power-sharing based on his apartheid-related concept of “a country of 
minorities” faltered. For instance, although the idea of “parity” was dis-
cussed (see below), it was not a dominant frame. Instead, what became 
Table 7.4 The onion skin model applied to South Africa, 1980–1990
Frame “A country of minorities” and reform impulses while 
seeking to maintain white dominance, no clear direction
Global frames: increased anti-apartheid activism and 
sanctions urging racial equality
Constructing social 
responsibility
Recognition of the government’s social responsibility for 
everyone in the South African state
versus each to take care of oneself
Social question Struggle for regime survival eclipsed the social question
 – Parity—the recognition that, in time, there must be 
equality between racial groups
 – Equalisation: “you get what you contribute”
Policy paradigms Cost containment
Impossibility of fulfilling increasing needs with the 
existing policies and political structures
Welfare institutions Cost containment
 – Still no national insurance scheme
 – Move towards parity in benefits
 – Methods to “win hearts and minds”
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the overriding issue in parliamentary debates was either a concern for 
regime survival or a movement for regime overthrow. Figure 7.3 illus-
trates the popularity of the concept “ANC”, which is not an ideational 
frame but rather a context-based issue demonstrating an ideational void 
as conflicts increased and the future direction of the country became 
uncertain.
The government devised the Tricameral Constitution of 1983 as a 
solution to the problem of power-sharing, although it failed to gain cred-
ibility. Under this arrangement, whites shared power with Indian and 
coloured groups through the establishment of a new parliament consist-
ing of three “uniracial” chambers (House of Assembly for whites, House 
of Representatives for coloureds, and House of Delegates for Indians). 
Africans were excluded from this arrangement. Each chamber became 
responsible for its “own affairs”, such as social welfare, education, health, 
and local government, whereas a multiracial cabinet, representing all 
three chambers, became responsible for “general affairs”, including taxa-
tion, defence, state security, law and order, commerce and industry, and 
African affairs (Thompson 2006).
 Social Responsibility: Each to Their Own or 
White Obligation?
We can view the tricameral constitution as a mechanism for the white 
government’s further divesting of responsibility for coloureds and Indians, 
who were now also accountable for “their own” social issues, as was also 
the case—at least in principle—in the ten homelands. However, mem-
bers of the Conservative Party (right-wing opponents of the NP govern-
ment, who were voted into parliament in 1983) felt that in reality (and 
unfairly in their view), the white population was still bearing the burden 
for other population groups:
If we look at the Constitution, which was passed last year, it is clear that 
social welfare is the first matter to be classified as an own affair but—and 
this is the snag—subject to any general law with regard to norms and stan-
dards for the provision of financing for welfare services. Therefore, it is 
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actually a general affair from beginning to end … one must keep the con-
tribution of the taxpayers, who are represented here in the House of 
Assembly, in mind. For the financial year 1982–83, it amounts to R3 152 
million, and 2,206,000 people who are economically active paid it by way 
of personal income tax. The taxpayers of the House of Representatives paid 
R77 million, and 987,000 economically active people paid it. The amount 
for the House of Delegates was R74 million, and 235,030 people contrib-
uted to the State coffers. (RSA 1985, Dr Snyman: 2098)
Thus, some white politicians continued to feel that each group should 
take responsibility for only their members. Yet, within the NP, there was 
a growing recognition that somehow the apartheid system should trans-
form and that the homelands’ funding should by supported by white 
taxpayers (Hodder-Williams and Hugo 1976), that is, the state should 
take responsibility for all its citizens (including those living in the home-
lands). However, given the economic recession, international sanctions, a 
shrinking tax capacity, a sluggish economy, an excessive bureaucracy, and 
increased spending on defence, security, and black education, there was 
limited financial capacity to meet all needs (Terreblanche 2002; 
Thompson 2006).
 Eclipsed Social Question: Equality How?
Although the government committed to move towards parity in wages 
and social benefits in the late 1970s (van der Berg 1997), exactly how 
parity was perceived to relate to equalisation is somewhat confusing. The 
Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions had a rather convoluted sugges-
tion that brings to mind the civilisation argument of earlier periods but 
without the race element somehow. Using the figures from a research 
report on the living standards of various groups, the minister argued:
Does a Black person who spends R8 on housing have to receive the same 
pension as the White person who spends R55 on housing?… I think we 
should completely remove the element of colour from pensions. We should 
adjust pensions to people’s basic needs in respect of food, clothing, hous-
ing, and miscellaneous things, for if we did that, it would no longer be 
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necessary to speak of Black, Coloured, Indian, or White pensions. Surely 
there is not a single hon member of the official Opposition who can rise 
and say that if a person’s housing costs him R8, we should give him R55. 
On the other hand, surely there is no one who can say that if a person’s 
actual expenditure on housing is R55, we should give him R8. (RSA 1980, 
Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions: 7317–7318)
The minister emphasised that equalisation for contributory pensions 
did not imply that “the man who contributed least should get out the 
same as the man who contributed most” (RSA 1980, Minister of Social 
Welfare and Pensions: 2777). Put more bluntly, although the minister 
had earlier argued to remove the “element of colour” from contributory 
pensions, he elaborated that “the idea of egalitarianism must not be pro-
moted in such a way that the White man’s contribution must carry the 
black man” (RSA 1980, Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions: 2778). 
Therefore, it seems that the NP government’s understanding of equalisa-
tion in the early 1980s translates to “you get what you contribute” and 
that actual redistribution through social pensions should remain limited. 
The minister’s arguments highlight a search for justifications for inequal-
ity in a time of great insecurity, and given the intense political climate, 
the regime’s struggle for survival largely eclipsed social issues.
 Policy Paradigms and Pension Policies: 
Cost Containment
The overarching policy paradigm of the time, given the government’s 
financial constraints, was one of cost containment, which is also evident 
in the debates on pension policies. Opposition parties to the left of the 
government (i.e. the Progressive Federal Party and the South African 
Party) had not stopped their criticism of the means test for social pen-
sions, which “to many people…is only slightly less complicated than 
Einstein’s theory of relativity” (RSA 1980, Mr Widman: 2767). However, 
like the NP, they were concerned with the potential rising costs of social 
pensions in the years to come:
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In 1968, there were 98,134 old-age pensioners receiving an amount of 
R35,587,000 per annum. Eleven years later, in 1979, there were 137,760 
old-age pensioners to whom an amount of R142,553,000 was paid out 
every year … Working on the present basis, we shall find that in 20 years 
there will be 216,952 pensioners receiving R352,485,000 per annum. I am 
referring to Whites alone. What would the position be if other races were 
included and annual increases were taken into account in this regard? I do 
not want to think about it; the amount would be astronomical. (RSA 
1980, Mr Rossouw: 2738–2739)
The potential cost implications were also “astronomical” because “we 
in South Africa are committed to the equalisation of pensions for all races 
in South Africa” (RSA 1980, Mr Goodall: 2747). As a result, the opposi-
tion argued that there is an urgent need to establish a national contribu-
tory pension scheme “without delay” and presented a motion to that 
effect (RSA 1980, Mr Rossouw: 2736–2737). The minister responded 
that a national scheme would “involve everyone”, but “one certainly 
could not permit the Whites to carry the Blacks, the Coloureds, and the 
Indians in regard to such a scheme. They would have to look after them-
selves” (RSA 1980, Minister of Social Welfare and Pensions: 2773–2774). 
However, the minister promised to look into the matter, which in effect 
meant that the government once again shelved the idea of a national 
contributory scheme (a select committee was only appointed in 1984) 
(RSA 1985, Deputy Minister of Health and Welfare: 2125).
Despite earlier confusion on the terms of equalisation, the government 
remained committed to parity in social pensions, and the gaps between 
the races continued to narrow, although much too slowly according to 
the opposition on the left (RSA 1988). In 1985, white pensioners still 
received twice as much as African pensioners. Even so, “White pension-
ers, receiving R180 per month and living alone, could only just (and not 
always) keep their heads above water. Black pensioners, averaging R79 
per month, were below the poverty datum line” (Wilson and Ramphele 
1989: 64).
It was particularly Afrikaner farmers and lower-class people who were 
hit hardest among the white population by the economic recessions, and 
they found support from the newly formed Conservative Party that 
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argued their case in the Parliament: “it is the White who has become 
drastically impoverished during the past year as a result of redistribution 
of income” (RSA 1985, Mr Snyman: 2095). The Conservative Party 
members were intent on defending whites’ social pensions and felt pro-
voked by debates to equalise benefits in the other chambers:
We are sick and tired of a Minister like the hon Minister Hendrickse saying 
he will freeze White pensions. Let me tell this hon Minister to keep his 
hands off White pensioners. Let him concern himself with his own affairs 
and levy taxes in his own House—not in this one! … We are tired of being 
milked by every group in this country and then being accused of discrimi-
nation. (RSA 1985, Mr Barnard: 872)
In the months leading up to this debate in early 1985, a new cycle of 
resistance, protest, and violence had flared up (Welsh 2009). It has been 
suggested that the government increased social pensions to the African 
population in the 1980s, not only as part of a move towards parity but 
also to “win-hearts-and-minds” (Devereux 2007; Welsh 2009). Although 
it is hard to find evidence of a government’s covert motivations, it is strik-
ing that the government announced early in 1985 that old-age pension-
ers of all races would receive an R14 increase in their payments as of the 
first of October as well as a one-time bonus of R36 in May 1985 (RSA 
1985, Minister of Cooperation, Development, and Education: 
2372–2373). Therefore, even in the context of cost containment and 
widespread concerns over an uncontrollable social pensions budget, the 
government made additional payments, presumably to appease the pop-
ulation at a time of increased conflict.
In 1986, the mounting resistance led Botha to abolish the pass laws, 
which had been used to restrict the movement of the black population. 
Although the government had passed other reforms and made various 
concessions, urban influx control was “the central plank of apartheid” 
(Welsh 2009: 215). The ANC was no longer easily ignored, and the fun-
damental opposition to the NP government—and the apartheid regime—
was increasingly extra-parliamentary (Welsh 2009). Any noteworthy 
debates on pension policies were limited after the mid-1980s; the major-
ity of parliamentarians (except those on the right) now accepted the move 
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to parity, and the main debate centred on the pace with which it could be 
achieved within the given budget constraints (RSA 1988). Full parity in 
pensions was reached in 1993, the year before the country held the first 
free democratic elections. Spending on social old-age pensions increased 
from 0.59 per cent of the GDP in 1970 to 1.82 per cent by 1993 (van 
der Berg 1997). Consequently, social pensions were resilient and a con-
stant feature of the apartheid era. Contributory pensions for their part 
did expand, but in fragmented ways, and the state’s functions remained 
merely regulatory, ensuring that the pension funds catered to those with 
the ability to contribute and, hence, benefit.
 Conclusion
Ideational frames changed remarkably in nature during the apartheid era, 
but these shifts do not reflect policy changes but rather the need to mod-
ify ideational justifications for the existing policy. Table 7.5 summarises 
the ideational layers, first, during the period in which the concept of 
separate development dominated (1948–1979) and, second, during the 
period of the 1980s when ideational justifications could no longer be 
maintained. Both the 1950s “separate development” frame and the 
1960s–1970s “independent nations” frame sit firmly within the apart-
heid ideology in which the state’s social responsibility primarily targeted 
whites. The main social question was how to separate the “civilised” 
whites from the “uncivilised” blacks and reflects the policy paradigm 
focusing on white upliftment with only charitable concern for blacks. 
Based on these underlying ideas, a continuation of the fragmented and 
racially graded pension system suited the apartheid government. In the 
1980s, the apartheid government scrambled to find ways to maintain 
white power and limit the financial costs to the white population. Prime 
Minister Botha’s insistence on maintaining group rights (“each group to 
take care of themselves”) conflicted with the emerging global norm of 
racial equality, which was based on an individual-rights paradigm. 
Eventually, the former ideological stance had to give way, but it was not 
replaced by a clear ideational vision. In the end, finally, the complex 
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apartheid system and, with it, the whites-only Parliament and racialised 
old-age security scheme withered away.
What is striking about the South African case during apartheid is how 
the idea of social responsibility, justified with reference to civilisation 
arguments, was constructed to serve a discriminatory, racialised system. 
Advocating the idea of separate development and independent nations 
allowed the white political elite to focus on the welfare of their “own 
people” while blinding themselves to the obvious responsibility the gov-
ernment had for other racial groups. The white regime could then con-
struct social support for other population groups, for instance old-age 
pensions, as charity to people for whom the government was not directly 
responsible. However, the government could not maintain the regime’s 
ideational foundation because it had constructed social responsibility 
based on the different civilisation levels of various ethnic groups—an idea 
already dying out in the mid-twentieth century and belatedly in South 
Africa. Today, when countries make distinctions between citizens deserv-
ing of social policy and others, i.e. migrants, who are not deserving of 
state contributions, the construction of a state’s social responsibility and 
its consequent impacts on policy are highly relevant areas of research, and 
the apartheid state is a reminder of how far policy can be pushed with 
reference to ideational and normative justifications.
 Appendix
 Data Collection and Sources
The primary data are the Hansards: Debates in the South African 
Parliament from the years 1948 to 1990. I selected this data source, first, 
because I seek to gauge the ideas, views, and justifications of the apartheid 
government’s ministers and politicians as well as those of the opposition 
white politicians, as they, particularly the former, were the primary poli-
cymakers in South Africa during this period. Second, using contempo-
rary debates permits my own assessment of what was said—there and 
then—instead of necessitating reliance on stakeholders’ subsequent 
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recollections and (perhaps misleading/self-proclaimed) interpretations. 
Third, the volume of the debates is immense and rich. While the immense-
ness of material creates its own challenges, which I have sought to handle 
in various ways as explained in the following, the Hansards are an undis-
turbed picture of the spoken thoughts and opinions of white politicians 
during the apartheid era.
The Parliamentary Library in Cape Town kindly made the Hansards 
available to me as PDF files. Each PDF file (volume) typically covers 
about three months of debates of a given year and has an average length 
of about 1400 pages; each volume is saved under its year and a letter (a, 
b, c, or d) to clarify which period of that year the document covers (for 
example, 1950b is the second volume of 1950). While almost every sin-
gle year is represented in my data by at least one—often more—volume(s), 
there are also gaps, either because certain volumes have not (yet) been 
made available to me, or because some volumes have been poorly scanned 
and I cannot search them. While some critical knowledge might be miss-
ing, I feel confident that I have a sufficient representation of data to 
meaningfully interpret the ideational foundations of pension debates in 
South Africa. In all, my active database of the Hansards consists of 141 
volumes and almost 200,000 pages.
 Quantitative Analysis: Frequencies and Word Selection
As the first step in my analysis, I sought to substantiate the dominant 
“frames” that white politicians used, i.e. what did the white political elite 
perceive as key concepts and challenges in South Africa (for the theoreti-
cal background of frames and non-frames, see Chap. 1). I used computa-
tional linguistic techniques to show the frequencies of key terms as they 
appeared in each Hansard and the temporal changes in the use of key 
terms across the whole collection of Hansards over time (as illustrated in 
Figs. 7.1, 7.2, and 7.3). I opted to use all the Hansards available, even 
though the number of volumes per year is not even. However, as my 
purpose is to illustrate trends in word use and changes over time and each 
volume is roughly the same length, I do not see a problem with this 
method of counting.
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I selected words based on reading historical sources and academic 
works. I expected some terms to matter at certain times and less so at 
other times (as the figures also illustrate), i.e. ideas/ideologies such as 
“segregation”, “apartheid”, and “homelands”, labels such as “native” and 
“Bantu”, and concepts/justifications such as “self-determination” and 
“parity”. Nevertheless, some words could not be used—although rele-
vant—because they could have numerous meanings and therefore would 
provide a misleading picture. For instance, the idea of “independence” 
(for “Bantu” nations), the label “blacks” (representing the African or non- 
white population), and the justification of “rights” are all examples of 
words that can be used in many other contexts beyond the one relevant 
to this study, and, therefore, I have not included them.
 Qualitative Analysis: Constructive Reading
To get an in-depth understanding of the pension debates, I picked vol-
umes in which (based on previous word counts) the terms “pension” and 
“contributory pension” were particularly prevalent. I conducted a careful 
reading of these selected volumes (11 in all, representing the years 1951, 
1955, 1956, 1959, 1960, 1965, 1967, 1970, 1976, 1980, and 1985). 
Since I seek to understand the broader debates surrounding the specific 
discussions on pension policies, I do not believe that a computation- 
based selection of “snippets” of text would allow me to understand some 
of the underlying tones and emotions involved. Consequently, I read lon-
ger sections of parliamentarians’ speeches and discussions related to pen-
sion bills or other topics in which pensions somehow became an issue. 
Based on this careful reading, I have collected more than 80 pages of 
direct debates, which I then, in a subsequent reading, boiled down to a 
13-page data overview in which I highlighted opinions for and against 
social pensions and a national contributory pension scheme, respectively, 
and the race-related justifications for these opinions. The narrative in this 
chapter is drawn from this final data overview and other information 
gathered from the Hansards, as well as additional information and his-
torical data available in other literature (listed in the references).
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(Re)formulating the Social Question 
in Post-apartheid South Africa: Zola 




In 1994, for the first time, “African”, “coloured” and “Indian” South 
Africans voted alongside their “white” counterparts in the country’s first 
non-racial election. (For an explanation of terms used in South Africa, see 
glossary in Chap. 6). The African National Congress (ANC), led by 
Nelson Mandela, secured a substantial majority, and Mandela became 
President. For almost three years he presided over a Government of 
National Unity, in which the ANC participated alongside the party of 
apartheid, the National Party,1 although real power lay with the 
ANC. From early 1997, the ANC governed alone. The ANC’s core sup-
port base comprised the African majority of the population that had been 
most oppressed under apartheid and remained largely disadvantaged as 
of 1994.
1 As well as the Zulu nationalist Inkatha Freedom Party.
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Unsurprisingly, the social question was redefined. For the first time in 
South African history, all South Africans were full citizens, with the full 
social and economic rights of citizenship as much as political rights. 
Given the enduring racialised pattern of disadvantage, the social question 
was inevitably going to be redefined to focus unambiguously on the expe-
riences of black, and especially African, South Africans. Prior to 1994, 
the South African state had often been concerned with poverty or wages 
or employment among white South Africans (and, in the 1980s, coloured 
and Indian South Africans), but only occasionally with how these issues 
were experienced by the African majority. In the 1980s, the apartheid 
state had redefined the social question in response to the threat to it 
posed by protesting black workers, students and other township residents 
and sought to win them over or at least to secure their acquiescence 
through modest policy reforms. But this political opportunism was half- 
baked as well as belated. Democratisation in 1994 marked a far more 
radical rupture with the past.
Democratisation opened up multiple possibilities of change. Whilst 
African people had all experienced discrimination and oppression under 
apartheid, different classes within the African population put forward 
their distinct claims to redress and thus sought to reframe the social ques-
tion in their own, often sectional interests. African workers, organised 
into powerful trade unions, demanded higher wages and improved con-
ditions of employment. The African middle classes, from whom much of 
the political elite came, demanded improved opportunities in profes-
sional and managerial occupations. The rapidly forming African elite, 
including much of the political leadership, demanded opportunities to 
seize a share of the country’s wealth through “Black Economic 
Empowerment” (both legal and corrupt). The urban and rural poor 
wanted jobs and improved public services. The ANC was pulled and 
pushed by all of these demands.
The result was contestation over precisely how the social question was 
to be reframed. For African industrial workers—organised into powerful 
trade unions, with close ties to the ANC and a strong intellectual wing—
the social question entailed primarily a racialised version of the struggle 
over inequalities generated through capitalist relations. The unions 
denounced the apartheid (or racial) “wage gap”, between highly paid, 
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skilled, managerial and professional occupations (disproportionately 
filled by white South Africans) and unskilled and semi-skilled occupa-
tions (mostly filled by African South Africans). They demanded and 
quickly secured basic social democratic reforms: strengthened processes 
for collective bargaining over wages and conditions of employment (and 
for setting minimum wages in unorganised sectors); corporatist policy- 
making institutions; and worker-oriented skills development. These 
reforms entailed further expansion of South Africa’s system of “semi- 
social” insurance for workers in formal employment. Workers in formal 
employment in most economic sectors were required to contribute to 
pension funds and, to a lesser extent, private health insurance. Most of 
these funds were, in practice, run by the trade unions. The government’s 
unemployment insurance fund was extended, at least nominally. 
Unionised workers—more and more of whom were more middle- than 
working-class—became, in important respects, economic “insiders”, 
concentrated in high-productivity sectors or the protected public sector.
For the African middle classes and elite, the social question revolved 
around the substitution of race-based affirmative action in place of 
apartheid- era racial discrimination, to open up rapidly opportunities for 
upward economic and social mobility. The fast-growing African middle 
classes and elites (at least outside of public sector employment) looked 
primarily to the private sector for their retirement pensions and health 
insurance (as well as for healthcare and the education of their children). 
High earners were not allowed to claim from the Unemployment 
Insurance Fund.
For the largest part of the population, however, the social question 
revolved around poverty and effective exclusion from the economy. 
Almost no one in the poorest half of the population enjoyed formal 
employment or trade union membership or access to the educational 
credentials required for highly paid occupations or the connections 
required for wealth accumulation. Without land, formal employment, 
educational credentials or connections, the poor were “outsiders” from 
the largely capitalist economy (Seekings and Nattrass 2005, 2015). Trade 
unions generally neglected workers outside of formal employment and 
the unemployed (Bramble and Barchiesi 2003; Buhlungu 2010). Indeed, 
the success of organised labour in addressing the “worker’s question” 
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arguably framed the poverty question by pushing the economy down a 
skill- and capital-intensive economic growth path. The poorest half of the 
population enjoyed some power as voters and through the use (or threat) 
of direct action. These forms of power were limited, however, by the 
design of the electoral and political systems, especially in comparison 
with the power of other, non-poor classes (Seekings and Nattrass 2015). 
The poor thus remained heavily dependent on how poverty and the poor 
themselves were perceived by the country’s more powerful political play-
ers, including especially the ANC leadership.
Given the success of the black elite, middle class and organised work-
ing class in accessing improved opportunities and standards of living, the 
fundamental post-apartheid social question revolved around poverty and 
crucially around elite perceptions of poverty and the poor. Under ANC 
governments, for the first time, poverty moved to the forefront of the 
rhetoric of the governing party and new state. The questions of workers’ 
rights and racial redress were at least as important in terms of command-
ing the attention of the government, but the unresolved poverty question 
framed successive government documents and ANC election manifes-
tos.2 In the late 1990s ANC ministers and ANC-appointed officials 
reframed poverty as a largely developmental problem, representing the 
poor as the victims of apartheid in the sense that apartheid had denied 
them opportunities—just as it had denied fair opportunities to black 
workers or the aspirant middle classes and elite. In the 2000s, the social 
question was reframed, emphasising more the legitimacy of a claim (or 
right) to dignity on the part of the poor. This was reflected in the acknowl-
edgement of the importance of social assistance programmes as a neces-
sary and effective mechanism for mitigating poverty. The reframing of the 
social question was shaped by the rights talk associated with the post- 
apartheid constitution (and subsequent jurisprudence) and promoted 
strongly by civil society, as well as by the imperatives of electoral competi-
tion. Within government, the person who was most responsible for the 
embrace—and subsequent expansion—of social assistance was Zola 
Skweyiya, the minister responsible for Welfare (or “Social Development”, 
2 Several other “questions”, including the “land question” and questions of enduring discrimination 
against women and other groups, were far less of a priority.
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as it was renamed) from 1999 to 2009. This chapter examines, first, the 
ANC’s developmental ambitions between 1994 and 1999, then turns to 
Skweyiya’s successful efforts to legitimate social assistance during the 
2000s and, finally but briefly, considers the period of partial reaction 
after 2009.
This chapter does not consider in detail the policies adopted in response 
to the reframing of the social question because these have been docu-
mented extensively elsewhere. In summary, the state’s policies to create 
jobs were misguided and unsuccessful. Rather than emphasise the cre-
ation of jobs in labour-intensive sectors for unskilled workers, govern-
ment policy focused on raising productivity and wages, resulting in more 
capital- and skill-intensive production in the formal economy. The inad-
equate numbers of new “jobs” entailed mostly low-earning self- 
employment in the informal economy. Government policy was especially 
unfortunate in view of the failure to improve the quality of public educa-
tion and hence continued shortages of skilled labour. Successive ANC 
governments also failed to expand agricultural livelihoods. The primary 
cause of a slow reduction in poverty rates in the 2000s was therefore not 
employment but rather the social assistance system, inherited from apart-
heid but expanded through (primarily) a new Child Support Grant. The 
basic shape of the social welfare system remained unchanged, however, 
with a limited social insurance system and large holes in the social safety 
net. The combination of rising unemployment and an inadequate social 
assistance safety net was that poverty persisted (Seekings and Nattrass 
2015; Nattrass and Seekings 2019).
 “Poverty Knowledge” and the Developmental 
Imperative (1994–1999)
The ANC formed a government in 1994 alert to the scale of the challenge 
of poverty. The previous year, the ANC had backed an initiative by the 
World Bank and the University of Cape Town (UCT) to map poverty 
through South Africa’s first countrywide income and expenditure survey 
(Wilson 1996). The apartheid state had never collected good data on 
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countrywide poverty. The 1993 survey was led by UCT Professor Francis 
Wilson, who in the 1980s had led a research programme on poverty that 
brought together local and thematic studies (see Wilson and Ramphele 
1989). The 1993 survey provided the “scientific” data—or “poverty 
knowledge”—that had been lacking hitherto (see Davie 2015). Using a 
poverty line set at about R840 (i.e. about US$250, at the time) per month 
for an urban family comprising two adults and three children, and at a 
slightly lower level in rural areas, almost one half of the population of 
South Africa lived in poverty. In some parts of the country—notably the 
Eastern Cape and Northern Transvaal—about two-thirds of the popula-
tion lived in poverty (Whiteford et  al. 1995). The poverty line widely 
used within South Africa was about 60 per cent more generous than the 
standard international poverty measure of (at the time) US$1 per person 
day (adjusted for local purchasing power). Even using the austere $1/day 
measure, however, as many as one in four South Africans lived in poverty, 
which was a much higher proportion than in other countries with similar 
levels of development or GDP per capita.
At the same time, few ANC leaders had much recent experience in the 
poorest, rural parts of the country. Many had spent as long as three 
decades in exile or jail. Most of the ANC’s “internal” leadership was 
drawn from urban areas. In the social welfare policy field, ANC activists 
were drawn primarily from the urban Western Cape, where they were 
especially familiar with the failings of apartheid-era social work and in 
some cases had been involved in community-based struggles over hous-
ing, rents and service delivery. Few ANC policymakers had close and 
recent experience of rural poverty.
The ANC first spelt out its understanding of and response to poverty 
in its 1994 Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP, which 
served as an extended election manifesto). Poverty was described as “the 
single greatest burden on South Africa’s people”. The ANC promised “a 
better life for all”. “Attacking poverty and deprivation” would be “the first 
priority of the democratic government”. The poor would be empowered 
“to sustain themselves through productive activity”. The government’s 
primary responsibility would be to “create opportunities for all South 
Africans”. This would be supplemented with a safety net based on social 
security (ANC 1994). In his inaugural State of the Nation address, 
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Mandela committed his government to ensuring that South Africans 
enjoyed freedom from want, hunger and deprivation, as well as political 
freedoms. These, he said, were “fundamental to the guarantee of human 
dignity”. They would be achieved through reconstruction and develop-
ment. In his address, Mandela sketched a minimal safety net: primary 
school feeding schemes and workfare. His government would “confront 
the scourge of unemployment”, he added, “not by way of handouts but 
by the creation of employment opportunities”.3
The ANC inherited a significant safety net, despite the fact that the 
National Party—in government through the entire apartheid period—
had been deeply ambivalent about the welfare state (Seekings 2020). In 
1994, just over two million elderly or disabled people received means- 
tested, non-contributory old-age pensions or disability grants. About half 
a million other social grants were paid out. The total cost of these social 
assistance programmes came to more than 2 per cent of GDP. Racial 
discrimination in benefits had been abolished prior to the 1994 elections, 
although racial discrimination persisted in terms of access to some of the 
programmes. Social and semi-social insurance programmes provided lit-
tle in the way of a safety net for the poor. Despite the importance of social 
assistance in mitigating poverty, the new ANC government was not 
enthusiastic. In his inaugural presidential address, Mandela himself 
denounced “handouts”.4
After winning the election, the ANC formed a coalition government 
with the National Party. The Ministry of Welfare was one of the few min-
istries given to the National Party, which reflected its perceived insignifi-
cance. An ANC Member of Parliament (Geraldine Fraser-Moleketi) was 
appointed as deputy-minister, and an ANC-aligned academic and activist 
(Dr Leila Patel) was appointed as a special advisor to guide the process of 
drafting a new “white paper” (i.e. government policy proposals) on social 
welfare. In January 1996 Patel was appointed as director-general (i.e. 
senior bureaucrat) in the Department of Social Welfare. In mid-1996, 
the ANC’s Fraser-Moleketi took over as minister.
3 Mandela, State of the Nation Address, 24 May 1994; available on https://www.gov.za/
state-nation-address.
4 Mandela, State of the Nation Address, 24 May 1994; available on https://www.gov.za/
state-nation-address.
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Through the 1990s the ANC-led government framed the challenge of 
poverty using three primary discourses: a conservative discourse focused 
on but not limited to costs; a technocratic discourse emphasising the 
authority of statistical measurement; and—especially—a developmental 
discourse (or, more accurately, ideology). Each of these three played its 
part in reframing the social question. The discourse of paternalistic con-
servatism later articulated by Skweyiya (see later) was very muted during 
this period.
The Department of Welfare emphasised the unaffordability of the 
social assistance system inherited from apartheid. In the face of “spiral-
ling” costs, the government concluded that it could “no longer afford the 
social security function”. The Department would “re-evaluate” social 
security to render it more cost-effective. Expenditures would be reduced 
by “eliminating” fraud, which were said to cost as much as 10 per cent of 
the social assistance budget. Applying the means test more strictly would 
also save “millions of rands” (South Africa 1995: 7; 1996: 20). A pressing 
dilemma was what to do about the State Maintenance Grant (for poor 
single mothers), which in practice excluded African people. Faced with a 
prospective bill amounting to about 2 per cent of GDP—that is, dou-
bling expenditure on social assistance—if the exiting programme was 
extended to the whole population, the government’s first instinct (in 
1995) was to propose doing away with the programme (Lund 
2008: 18–19).
These sentiments might have been promoted by the continued role of 
the National Party within the Department of Welfare during 1994–1997, 
but they also fitted with powerful sentiments within the ANC.  ANC 
leaders and ANC-aligned officials seem to have associated social grants 
with apartheid-era social work, which focused on the supposed failings of 
individuals and the ensuing need for individual casework. The ANC 
wanted a more modern approach.
The ANC’s modernism was both reflected in and pushed forward by 
its investment in statistical data. The South African state had for many 
decades demonstrated a “mania for measurement” (Posel 2000), albeit 
selectively (e.g. never measuring poverty among the entire population) 
(see also Davie 2015). The post-1994 state took this passion for measure-
ment to new heights. The parastatal Statistics South Africa was 
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transformed: besides collecting standard economic and demographic 
data, it initiated annual household surveys and a five-yearly income and 
expenditure survey. The government also commissioned a major study of 
poverty and inequality. The ensuing data demonstrated, again and again, 
the extent of poverty. Poverty on this scale could not be due to the failings 
of any individuals but must rather have structural roots. For the ANC it 
was obvious that apartheid was the cause of South Africa’s pervasive pov-
erty because apartheid had denied black South Africans the opportunities 
to prosper. Vice-President Thabo Mbeki articulated this in his descrip-
tion in 1998 of South Africa as comprising “two nations”: one, white and 
prosperous, the other, black and poor (see Nattrass and Seekings 2000).
What was needed was the abolition of racially discriminatory con-
straints on black South Africans and a massive programme of “recon-
struction and development” (the RDP)—echoing the language used to 
frame state-driven programmes in Europe, following the Second World 
War. The ANC’s priority was to promote development, not to expand 
“welfare” through either social grants or social work. The Department of 
Welfare said that it accepted the need for social grants but, “to ensure that 
those receiving welfare do not become permanently dependent on state 
aid, social grants for certain target groups will be closely linked to job 
creation and other anti-poverty programmes. Successful development 
programmes will empower people to earn a living, move off the social 
security system and achieve economic independence” (South Africa 
1996: 19–20). As Mandela himself explained in speeches, the poor would 
achieve dignity through self-help, that is, through taking advantage of the 
opportunities that would open up now that apartheid had been abol-
ished. In his 1996 State of the Nation Address, Mandela appealed to the 
poor not to “sit back, expecting charity” (whilst also urging the rich to 
stop viewing the poor as “hordes of irritants”).5 The ANC bought into 
the developmentalist ideology that had been hegemonic in Africa in ear-
lier decades (Mkandawire 1999), along with the anxieties about “depen-
dency” that often accompanied it (see, e.g. Seekings 2017a).
5 Mandela, State of the Nation Address, 9 February1996; available on https://www.gov.za/
state-nation-address.
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The new developmentalism was central to the White Paper for Social 
Welfare, drafted through a consultative process in 1995–1996 under 
Patel’s leadership and then published in August 1997. The White Paper 
committed the government to the goal of “developmental social welfare” 
and “re-orienting [its] services towards developmental approaches”. This 
meant helping people to meet their own needs, through “the develop-
ment of human capacity and self-reliance”, rather than relying on the 
state: “South Africans will be afforded the opportunity to play an active 
role in promoting their own well-being and in contributing to the growth 
and development of our nation”. The developmental emphasis was per-
haps aimed primarily at professional social work (which was “largely 
rehabilitative” rather than “preventative and developmental”), and the 
White Paper did commit itself to the principle of “appropriate social 
assistance for those unable to support themselves and their dependents”. 
But the emphasis was clearly placed on enhancing the capacity of “vul-
nerable individuals and families … to earn a living through employment 
creation, skills development, access to credit and, where possible, through 
facilitating the transition from informal to formal employment”. This 
encouraged a critique of the “welfare state” for promoting “dependency” 
through unearned “hand-outs”. The White Paper itself proposed the 
establishment of a government unit “to identify groups of beneficiaries 
who could be absorbed into public works and other employment pro-
grammes” and seemed to envisage that the old-age pension programme 
would be scaled back as contributory pension programmes expanded 
(South Africa 1997; see further Patel 2005; Gray 2006). As the Minister 
of Welfare, Fraser-Moleketi, told parliament, “welfare has become associ-
ated with charity and hand-outs, with food parcels and pensions, some-
thing in which it was alleged bleeding hearts got involved”. She called for 
a shift in thinking about “welfare”, “from paternalism to self-reliance” 
and investment in development.6
This new approach was shaped by ideas from outside of South Africa. 
One important influence was the work of the South African–born but 
later US-based scholar James Midgley, whose book Social Development: 




The developmental perspective on social welfare was published in 1995. 
Midgley’s book advocated “social development” as a new approach to 
social welfare distinguished by “its attempt to harmonize social policies 
with measures designed to promote economic development. … It stresses 
the need for a wider commitment to economic develop-ment and empha-
sises the importance of social interventions that are compatible with eco-
nomic development objectives” (Midgley 1995: 1–2). Midgley’s 
description of “distorted development” across much of the “Third World”, 
informed no doubt by his adolescence in South Africa, resonated with 
South African policymakers after 1994. Patel (2014, 2015) acknowledges 
the deep influence of Midgley’s work, as well as of the UN World Summit 
for Social Development held in Copenhagen in 1995 (see also Gray 
2006). Whilst Midgley and Patel were not hostile to social grants, nor (at 
that time) were they enthusiasts.
This thinking shaped the reform of the State Maintenance Grant, 
which was to have far-reaching and not entirely intended consequences. 
The grant provided generous support to poor, single mothers, but almost 
entirely excluded South Africa’s black African population. When it was 
pointed out that abolishing the programme would cause massive hard-
ship, the government appointed a committee to be chaired by another 
social work academic and activist, Francie Lund. The Department of 
Welfare described the Lund Committee’s brief as to “look at ways of link-
ing social grants with developmental programmes, so that single parent 
families can move towards becoming self-supporting”. It would also look 
at ways of making absent parents contribute to the costs of raising their 
children (South Africa 1996: 22). In its report, completed in late 1996, 
the Lund Committee recommended that the State Maintenance Grant 
be replaced with a new Child Support Grant that would be rolled out to 
the entire population from 1999. Accepting tight fiscal constraints, the 
Committee had to recommend that benefits be parsimonious and older 
children be excluded (Lund 2008).
The government’s thinking was clearly set out by Fraser-Moleketi in 
speeches to parliament. In early 1997 she declared that:
With regard to poverty, we believe that development goes beyond redistri-
bution and safety-net measures and implies a pattern of growth facilitated 
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by carefully designed Government interventions to reduce poverty and 
inequality. … We intended to ensure that there is a restructuring of the 
social security system … to foster the ability of the poor in our country to 
produce their way out of poverty through programmes which will generate 
and enhance livelihood as a fact and means of achieving household food 
security.7
Later in 1997, she told parliament that the new emphasis on develop-
mental welfare would “empower individuals and communities so that 
they can break out of the poverty trap”. She reaffirmed the government’s 
“commitment to poverty reduction through cash transfers which supple-
ment the household incomes of poor families”, that is, the safety net. But, 
“welfare expenditure” had reached “its ceiling” so that in future budget-
ary allocations would increase slowly:
The challenge facing us is to use the available resources optimally and bring 
about savings in the total welfare function through aligning expenditure 
with priorities, promoting greater efficiency and accountability in delivery 
and ensuring that programmes are well targeted at those in the greatest 
need and that the design of programmes is appropriate and 
cost-effective.8
The modesty of the benefits under the proposed new Child Support 
Grant was justified on the basis that resources should be directed to other, 
more developmental programmes (especially during a period of fiscal 
crisis):
In an ideal world, I too would wish to be able to spend more on social 
security in the immediate term. However, in a developing country such as 
ours, we have to balance competing demands and decide how to use scare 
resources in the most effective way. Ultimately, the most effective antidote 
to poverty is for all our people to have a meaningful stake in the economy. 
While administering cash transfers, the Ministry of Welfare, in collabora-
tion with other ministries, has embarked on a number of projects aimed at 
7 Fraser-Moleketsi, Hansard, House of Assembly, response to State of the Nation Address, 11 Feb 
1997, col 41.
8 Fraser-Moleketsi, Hansard, House of Assembly, Budget vote, 8 May 1997, col 2309-14.
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giving a hand up to the many who remain excluded from the main-
stream economy.9
The Department of Welfare’s flagship programme was a training pro-
gramme for unemployed women with young children that would reduce 
their “dependence” on social grants. In early 1999, as the new Child 
Support Grants were being rolled out, Fraser-Moleketi told Parliament of 
women who had been “dependent on state maintenance grants” but who 
were now earning much more through projects such as brick-making and 
vegetable-growing: “We want to ensure that many of the beneficiaries 
move from dependency to self-sufficiency and towards building the self- 
esteem of women.”10
Fraser-Moleketi’s views were shared by other leading ANC policymak-
ers. The influential chairman of the parliamentary portfolio committee 
overseeing social welfare, Cas Saloojee, acknowledged the importance of 
a social safety net but at the same time insisted that even a “comprehen-
sive” system of social security would limit “the social security obligation 
of the state … to the poorest of the poor, the most vulnerable and the 
unemployed”. (In fact, the state provided almost no support for the 
unemployed). Saloojee continued: only by reducing the expense of social 
grants could the state divert “funds that are currently committed to social 
security … to developmental social welfare services”:
We have got to acknowledge that social security cannot solve the problem 
of the magnitude of poverty that we face, but that such financial resources 
can make a significant impact on job creation and empowerment of people 
to become self-reliant. The old expression ‘Give a man a fish, and you feed 
him for a day; teach him to fish, and you feed him for a lifetime’, comes to 
mind again.11
The ANC viewed developmental efforts, including training pro-
grammes, as the priority. The real value of old-age pensions and disability 
9 Mail and Guardian, 9 May 1997.
10 Fraser-Moleketsi, Hansard, House of Assembly, debate on the State of the Nation Address, 9 Feb 
1999, col. 305; also budget vote, 19 March 1999, col.2851-5.
11 Saloojee, Hansard, House of Assembly, Budget vote, 19 March 1999, col 2859-60.
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grants was allowed to fall, and total expenditure on social grants fell as a 
proportion of GDP.
President Mandela himself mentioned social grants only twice in his 
six State of the Nation Addresses between 1994 and 1999. In his first, in 
1994, he mentioned that his government would address the backlog of 
applications for old-age pensions. In his last, in 1999, he said that pen-
sions and disability grants would be raised, by a small amount—although 
this was not enough to raise their real value to the level when he had 
become president five years before. Mandela never mentioned the new 
Child Support Grants in his State of the Nation Addresses. By contrast, 
he mentioned development a total of 89 times in the six addresses.12
 Zola Skweyiya’s Partial Reframing of Poverty 
(1999–2009)
In mid-1999, following the election, the new president, Mbeki, appointed 
a new Minister of Social Welfare, Zola Skweyiya. Skweyiya was consider-
ably older than his predecessor (he was born in 1942) and came from a 
rather different background. First, he knew from personal experience 
what it meant to go to bed without supper or to go to school without 
breakfast.13 Second, he was immersed in the African mission-educated, 
Christian political tradition that was liberal on many issues but paternal-
istically conservative on others. His schooling had concluded at the elite 
Lovedale College—established by missionaries more than a century ear-
lier—where he overlapped with Thabo Mbeki. He went on to the 
University of Fort Hare before following Mbeki into exile. Like Mbeki, 
Skweyiya did not return to South Africa until 1990. Whilst in exile he 
studied law (completing a PhD in communist East Germany) and held a 
series of largely diplomatic posts for the ANC as well as setting up its 
Legal and Constitutional Affairs Department. Both before and after 1990 
he represented the ANC at the UN Commission for Human Rights. He 
12 Mandela, State of the Nation Addresses, 1994-1999; available on https://www.gov.za/
state-nation-address.
13 Hansard, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 27 March 2003.
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was firmly part of the ANC’s “nationalist”, non-Communist wing. In 
1994, Mandela appointed him minister of Public Service and 
Administration. In 1999, his old friend Mbeki moved him to the Ministry 
of Social Welfare.
At the time of his appointment as minister of Social Welfare in 1999, 
fewer than 3 million grants were paid monthly. When he stepped down, 
ten years later, about 13 million grants were paid monthly—an increase 
of an average of 1 million grants per annum over Skweyiya’s ten years as 
minister. Over the same period, expenditure on grant payments approxi-
mately trebled, in real terms (i.e. taking inflation into account). Whilst 
economic growth was strong across much of this period, expenditure also 
grew significantly in relation to GDP. As subsequent studies made clear, 
this expansion of social assistance played a major part in the slow reduc-
tion of income poverty (van der Berg et al. 2006; Leibbrandt et al. 2010).
This future expansion of social assistance was not suggested in 
Skweyiya’s first comments after becoming minister. He initially seemed 
to take up where Fraser-Moleketi had left off. His Department continued 
to emphasise “the promotion of self-reliance to reduce dependency on … 
social grants” (South Africa 1999: 6) and was renamed the Department 
of Social Development. It adopted a “Ten Point Plan” that listed its pri-
orities, in apparent order of importance: the first priority was “restoring 
the ethics of care and human development in all welfare programmes” 
(which entailed “the rebuilding of families and communities”); the sec-
ond was “developing and implementing an integrated poverty eradica-
tion strategy”; only third did the Plan list social security (South 
Africa 2000).
In early 2000, however, Skweyiya struck a different note in his first 
major speech as Minister of Social Welfare. Skweyiya began by quoting 
President Mbeki on the importance of a “humane and people-centred 
society”.14 He went on to describe some of what he had learnt over the 
past year whilst travelling around South Africa:
I met the grandmother in the rural village of Inanda caring for a HIV- 
positive daughter, the girl-child taken from school to care for her siblings, 
14 Hansard, House of Assembly, Welfare budget vote, 18 April 2000, col. 2661.
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and the single mother who cannot find a job. I saw the pain on the face of 
a young child who had been abused and raped in Claremont near Durban. 
I heard the frustration of a father with disability who wants to learn new 
skills in Maokeng, Kroonstad, but has nowhere to turn to. I listened to the 
anguish of the devastating effect of the loss of a pension or grant in poor 
families.15
He concluded that “much more needs to be done” to reverse the deg-
radation and marginalisation of the poor.16 Through his “encounters” 
with the poor, Skweyiya learnt something that researchers subsequently 
confirmed: Social grants were very important in sustaining dignity (see, 
especially, Wright et al. 2014, 2015).
The chairman of the parliamentary portfolio committee, Saloojee, fol-
lowed Skweyiya’s lead, striking a more positive tone. He referred explic-
itly to the need to restore “the dignity of all of our people” through 
poverty reduction—and then emphasised repeatedly the importance of 
social grants to the relief of poverty. He lamented the lack of an “inte-
grated poverty strategy” but envisaged an expansion of social assistance, 
especially through the Child Support Grant. “The initial strategy for tar-
geting our country’s poorest children is to be followed by broader cover-
age, to ultimately include all the country’s poor”, he said. “If these 
children go hungry and have parents with no visible means of support, 
we have failed these children by not providing them with support to 
ensure their protection and development”.17 The government would be 
guided by the recommendations of a Committee of Inquiry (to be chaired 
by Professor Viviene Taylor) appointed to examine what might be entailed 
in a more comprehensive system of social security.
In comparison with the five years of the Mandela presidency, this was 
an extraordinary embrace of social assistance. It was dressed up in the 
discourse of dignity that Mandela (and his then vice-president, Mbeki) 
had used previously, but the discussion of social assistance gave this dis-
course new substance. In the late 1990s the discourse of dignity had been 
embedded in South Africa’s new Constitution (in 1996) and in 
15 Ibid., col. 2663.
16 Ibid., col. 2663–4.
17 Ibid., col. 2673-7.
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subsequent constitutional jurisprudence, giving the discourse heightened 
prominence and legitimacy. The 1996 constitution recognised respect for 
a person’s “inherent dignity” as one of the founding values underpinning 
the new constitutional order. This represented a “stark and dramatic” 
break with the apartheid past (as then Chief Justice Mahomed put it in 
1998, quoted in Chaskalson 2000: 193). As Constitutional Court Justice 
O’Regan elaborated in 1995:
Respect for the dignity of all human beings is particularly important in 
South Africa. For apartheid was a denial of a common humanity. Black 
people were refused respect and dignity and thereby the dignity of all South 
Africans was diminished. The new Constitution rejects this past and affirms 
the equal worth of all South Africans. Thus recognition and protection is 
the touchstone of the new political order and is fundamental to the new 
Constitution. (quoted in Chaskalson 2010: 1381)
O’Regan wrote this in connection to capital punishment, which the 
Constitutional Court declared unconstitutional. Dignity was central also 
to judgements on issues such as corporal punishment and gay marriage. 
But dignity had very clear relevance also to the interpretation of social 
and economic rights, as Arthur Chaskalson (the then president of the 
Constitutional Court and later also Chief Justice) acknowledged explic-
itly. Section 27 of the Constitution enshrined “the right to have access 
to … social security, including, if they are unable to support themselves 
and their dependents, appropriate social assistance”; it committed the 
state to taking “reasonable legislative and other measures, within its avail-
able resources, to achieve the progressive realization” of this right. As 
Chaskalson commented in 2000: “These rights are rooted in respect for 
human dignity, for how can there be dignity in a life lived without access 
to housing, health care, food, water or in the case of persons unable to 
support themselves, without appropriate assistance?” Chaskalson went 
on to explain that the Constitution did not “contemplate” complete 
equality of goods or wealth. Rather, it required the state “to show respect 
and concern” for those citizens whose basic needs were not being met at 
the same time as taking into account “the general interests of the com-
munity concerning the application of resources”, through taking 
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“reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, 
to achieve the progressive realisation” of access to the goods that were 
minimally necessary for human dignity (Chaskalson 2000).
Skweyiya’s concern for the dignity of the poor framed his positive atti-
tude towards social grants. In 2001, he described social assistance as “the 
Government’s primary investment in poverty alleviation” (emphasis 
added). He added that, whilst “the current grant amounts are not suffi-
cient to address large-scale poverty, deprivation and inequality in South 
Africa”, the government would “continue to increase spending on social 
assistance as resource constraints allow”.18 His department’s Annual 
Report for 2001 similarly identified social security as—for the first 
time—its primary priority, acknowledging that its developmental train-
ing programme for unemployed women had floundered (South Africa 
2001: 9).
This new perspective was far from hegemonic, however, as soon became 
clear in the debate over the Taylor Committee’s report. In its somewhat 
chaotic report, completed in early 2002, the Taylor Committee endorsed 
the hegemonic developmental approach to “social protection”: public 
health, education and other services were necessary to enhance the capa-
bilities of the poor. In the short term, however, the Committee recom-
mended that the holes in the existing safety net be filled through the 
extension of the Child Support Grant to the age of 18 and then the 
introduction of a modest “basic income grant” for all adults (South Africa 
2002). Skweyiya himself initially seemed favourable. But he faced strong 
opposition within the ANC leadership and government. The powerful 
government spokesman Joel Netshitenzhe reiterated the mantra that 
able-bodied adults should not receive “handouts” but instead should be 
helped to “enjoy the opportunity, the dignity and the rewards of work”. 
The government would not support a basic income grant, he said, because 
it had a rather different “philosophy”.19
The proposed basic income grant never attracted significant support 
within the ANC leadership: grants for unemployed adults were routinely 
18 Hansard, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 3 April 2001, col 1956-7.




denounced as “handouts”. Pensions for the elderly were never really ques-
tioned (although the government did resist lowering the age at which 
men became eligible for old-age pensions). The disability grant became 
more controversial over time, with ANC MPs voicing concerns that able- 
bodied people were receiving grants or, even, that they were contracting 
HIV in order to access grants (Kelly 2013). The most controversial issue, 
however, was the Child Support Grant, paid mostly to poor mothers. 
Opponents argued either that it was not affordable or that it encouraged 
undesirable behaviour. The question of affordability brought Skweyiya 
into conflict with, especially, the powerful Minister of Finance, Trevor 
Manuel. By challenging the supposed unaffordability of expanded grants, 
rather than contesting the philosophy, Skweyiya put Manuel on the 
defensive:
The ANC will not be bamboozled into doing things that it knows are not 
possible. We would like to give each and everybody that basic income 
grant. We would like to ensure that each and every family eats every night. 
The basic question is, how do we do that? We have a problem here. We 
introduced the child support grant to be given to each and every child 
under the age of seven … Up to the present moment half a million chil-
dren are still not getting that. The money is there, but the question is how 
to bring it to the people.20
Under pressure, the government did announce that the age limit for 
Child Support Grants would be raised (in phases, between 2003 and 
2005) from a child’s 7th birthday to the child’s 14th birthday.21 Although 
President Mbeki himself made this announcement in 2003, he subse-
quently seemed less than enthusiastic. One year later, in his 2004 State of 
the Nation Address, he pointedly did not include social grants in his list 
of the ANC government’s achievements since 1994. Instead, he referred 
to the need to “create the conditions … to reduce the numbers of our 
people dependent on social grants”.22 The ANC did decide, however, to 
emphasise strongly the rising number of social grants in its campaign for 
20 Hansard, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 27 March 2003.
21 Mbeki, State of the Nation Address, 14 Feb 2003.
22 Mbeki, State of the Nation Address, 6 Feb 2004.
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the country’s third democratic general election in April 2004—although 
it did not promise any significant expansion of social grants, emphasising 
instead the prospect of one million new “job opportunities” through the 
workfare programme (ANC 2004). Following the elections, Mbeki deliv-
ered a second State of the Nation Address. Now he did refer to the con-
solidation of a “social security net”. But he also reiterated the imperative 
of reducing dependency on social grants, declaring that “a society in 
which large sections depend on social welfare cannot sustain its 
development”.23 That same year the government launched its new, 
“Expanded” Public Works Programme, to provide a small proportion of 
unemployed people with some of the “dignity of work”—a concept with 
deep roots in the ANC and South Africa (Barchiesi 2011; Ferguson 
2015)—and, through enhancing skills and the experience of work, 
“reduce, over time, the proportion of our people who subsist solely on 
social grants”.24
Over the following years, Skweyiya balanced the defence of selective 
social assistance—for deserving categories of poor people—with the kind 
of developmental rhetoric that had prevailed prior to 2000. In a 2005 
debate, he emphasised that his department had “sought to ensure the 
provision of comprehensive social protections services against vulnerabil-
ity and poverty to as many deserving people as possible”, including 
through expanded social assistance programmes. At the same time, he 
trotted out an old denunciation of fraud. His department had offered 
indemnity to anyone who came forward and admitted to receiving a 
grant illegally. A total of 30,000 people had done so, resulting in consid-
erable savings. But “we are not satisfied with the result of the campaign” 
because “more people should have come forward”. Now, the law would 
be enforced, beginning with public servants and the syndicates behind 
fraud. Also, he suggested, the sustainability of the social protection sys-
tem depended on poor people taking advantage of improved economic 
opportunities so as to become less dependent on the state.25
23 Mbeki, State of the Nation Address, 21 May 2004.
24 Skweyiya, 2004 budget vote, Hansard, 3 June 2004, col. 594.
25 Skweyiya, 2005 budget vote, Hansard, 5 April 2005, col. 1333-1400
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Skweyiya’s message may have been mixed but was far more positive 
about social grants than many of his colleagues in the ANC. One ANC 
MP invoked the need for “moral regeneration” whilst declaring that mod-
est grants would merely create dependency. “The ANC does not believe 
that it was supposed to create a South Africa where people would depend 
on the state for food, without opportunities for development”, he pro-
claimed, speaking in Zulu; “it is not part of the African culture to wait to 
be fed instead of doing things on your own”.26 Another ANC MP, rein-
forced this point:
Our people are not waiting for handouts. The budget is such that people 
can provide for themselves. People have heeded the call: ‘Wake up and do 
it yourself ”. In this budget we are trying to support them in their efforts to 
become independent. … In the rural areas people plough and do different 
kinds of job to sustain a living.
In response to opposition parties’ rhetorical support for the expansion 
of social assistance through some kind of basic income grant, this ANC 
MP declared that “the basic income grant that [an opposition MP] is 
referring to is not the solution for the needs of the people. People have 
their own way of living, not by getting handouts”.27 Skweyiya felt the 
need to rebut his own colleague, noting that “it had been proved beyond 
any reasonable doubt” that grants did not create a culture of dependency 
(see also Surrender et  al. 2010; Ferguson 2015). He also took care to 
point out that the government’s caution was not because ANC leaders 
were “scrooges”, but rather because of resource constraints.28
Skweyiya successfully legitimated social grants for selected categories 
of deserving poor, not for the unemployed (the dreaded “handouts”). He 
did not do away entirely with the earlier developmentalist doctrine. His 
Department for Social Development initiated a new developmental pro-
gramme (Gwebindlala) to “provide income support while simultaneously 
26 Hansard, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 5 April 2005, col. 1350-7 (Lewis 
Nzimande).
27 Hansard, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 5 April 2005, col. 1389 (B. Solo).
28 Hansard, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 5 April 2005, col. 1398-1400 
(Skweyiya).
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developing the human capital of beneficiaries through skills development 
and job-placement services”.29 This rhetoric was not unlike the rhetoric 
associated with the welfare state in Europe and elsewhere, except that in 
the South African context programmes like this provided support and 
services for very few people, whilst a very large number of people received 
no income support at all and many others received very modest income 
support. The developmentalist discourse appealed to the ANC’s more 
conservative MPs, one of whom commented that “maintaining our lives 
through charity is not black people’s way of living … Whenever we found 
ourselves in situations beyond our control, we would be given a cow. 
Although one would not get ownership of the cow, one would be able to 
get milk and plough the fields”.30
The distinction between those poor who deserved grants (i.e. the 
elderly, disabled, children and caregivers) and those who needed to be put 
to work meant that government documents both celebrated and criti-
cised grants. A discussion document released in early 2007 emphasised 
the “dignity of work”. It criticised social grants that lacked any mecha-
nism for helping beneficiaries to find work and explicitly advocated more 
efforts to promote the kinds of employment appropriate for people with 
minor disabilities (and currently receiving disability grants). The docu-
ment advocated “active labour market measures, skills development pro-
grammes, special employment and labour-intensive development 
programmes and labour-intensive government services”, as well as further 
“consideration” of an “aggressive expansion” of public works programmes: 
“the drive to get all South Africans working when they are able to do so 
must become a central preoccupation” (South Africa 2006a).31 Similarly, 
the Department of Social Development’s “Strategic Plan” for 2006–2010 
referred to its continuing commitment to a “paradigm shift” from a wel-
farist approach to “developmental welfare” (South Africa 2006b). The 
ANC’s 2007 policy discussion document on “social transformation” also 
emphasised the “dignity of work” and the importance of public works 
29 Hansard, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 28 March 2006, col. 986 (Dr 
Jean Benjamin (Deputy-Minister).
30 Hansard, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 28 March 2006, col. 1000 
(B. Solo).
31 Later, in the early 2010s, the term “activation” entered the policy discourse in South Africa.
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programmes as an alternative to social assistance. Arguing (rather 
unclearly) against a basic income grant, the ANC suggests that discussion 
should take place “in the context of our challenges as a developmental state 
rather than against the ideological backdrop of a welfare state” (ANC 
2007: 3, emphasis added). The primary emphasis of the “attack on pov-
erty” should entail empowering people “to take themselves out of pov-
erty”. The social safety net should be limited to the protection of “the 
most vulnerable in our society” (ibid: 2), implying specific groups of 
deserving poor rather than the poor in general.
The government’s overall approach thus remained resolutely develop-
mental: poverty reduction required simply that the benefits of economic 
growth be “shared”. In early 2006, the government launched its 
Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative for South Africa (AsgiSA). This 
envisaged that poverty and unemployment rates would be reduced by 
one half through increasing the economic growth rate (to 6 per cent p.a.) 
and sharing growth, primarily through absorbing more labour into the 
“mainstream economy”. Key elements of the plan included increased 
public investment in infrastructure, accelerated skill development and 
reducing the regulatory burden on small- and medium-sized businesses 
(South Africa 2005). Whilst economic growth rates remained strong up 
to the global economic crisis of 2008–2009, the benefits were not shared 
widely: wages rose but employment in the formal economy remained 
stagnant.
Skweyiya recognised that he needed to rebut the lingering distaste for 
social grants among many of his ANC colleagues, which they often 
dressed up in their commitment to developmentalism. Skweyiya’s solu-
tion was to commission research that would provide the data to under-
mine his colleagues’ objections. The first of the ensuing reports, completed 
in late 2006 and presented to Cabinet, dispelled “assertions that our 
social assistance programme encourages teenage pregnancies, that chil-
dren are fostered for the purpose of accessing grants, and that people with 
disability will harm themselves in order to continue accessing social 
grants” (as Skweyiya reported to Parliament in 2007).32 Further reports 
32 Hansard, House of Assembly, Social Development budget vote, 28 March 2007, col.2393 
(Skweyiya).
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examined the effects of grants on poverty alleviation and development, 
the benefits of raising the age limit on the Child Grant, the means-test 
and conditions on grants.
These reports did not persuade all ANC leaders that social grants 
should be expanded further. At a national conference in December 2007, 
the ANC resolved that the Child Grant age limit be “gradually extended 
to eighteen years” and the age threshold for men to receive the old-age 
pension be reduced to sixty years. But the ANC resolved also that “grants 
must not create dependency and thus must be linked to economic activ-
ity” (ANC 2007). In his State of the Nation Address at the beginning of 
2008, President Mbeki—who had been defeated by his rival Jacob Zuma 
in the contest for the presidency of the party at the December confer-
ence—referred to the age threshold for pensions but pointedly did not 
mention the Child Grant. When, a few days later, Skweyiya told the 
Parliamentary Portfolio Committee and then announced in a press brief-
ing that the age limit for the Child Grant would be increased to 18 years, 
this was almost immediately contradicted by the minister of Finance.
Less than a year later, however, the government confirmed that the age 
limit would be raised. ANC leaders (including the Minister of Finance, 
Trevor Manuel) attributed the government’s shift to the “compelling evi-
dence” in “recent research” that the Child Grant had reduced child pov-
erty. He (and interim President Motlanthe in his 2009 “State of the 
Nation Address”) seems to have been referring not to the research com-
missioned by Skweyiya but to research commissioned by the Treasury 
that attributed the decline in income poverty (and child hunger) in the 
early 2000s to the Child Grant.
Unsurprisingly, ANC leaders did not draw attention to two other fac-
tors: factional politics within the ANC combined with the imminence of 
the 2009 elections. In late 2007, an eclectic coalition supported Jacob 
Zuma and ousted Mbeki as party leader; one year later the coalition 
ousted Mbeki as president of the country. At the time this was widely 
interpreted as a “shift to the left” within the ANC (e.g. Proudlock 2011: 
154; and generally Booysen 2011). The new leadership proved to be 
more opportunistic than left wing. The decision to raise the Child Grant 
age limit—which was not made until almost one year after the pro-Zuma 
coalition secured control over the ANC—seems to have been due more 
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to the sidelining of Mbeki personally and electoral opportunism. The 
ANC in 2009 faced a resurgent parliamentary opposition (comprising 
both the Democratic Alliance, supported largely by racial minorities, and 
the new Congress of the People led by Mbeki supporters who defected 
from the ANC) and widespread extra-parliamentary protests (the so- 
called “rebellion of the poor”—Alexander 2010). Under Zuma, the ANC 
sought to project itself as a party that had both achieved much hitherto 
and was now regenerated under new leadership (Beresford 2015; Booysen 
2011). Crucially, the “new” ANC needed to demonstrate that the gov-
ernment was doing something new and positive to reduce poverty. Given 
that most of the other political parties were calling for the Child Grant 
age limit to be raised, the ANC chose to emphasise in its election mani-
festo that its expansion of social grants had “pushed back the frontiers of 
poverty” (ANC 2009).
More generally, the courts and civil society activists had transformed 
the normative and discursive context. Activists and the courts rarely 
agreed on precisely how social and economic rights should be operation-
alised, but they concurred, for the most part, on the underlying under-
standing of “dignity” and community, rooted in a Kantian moral 
philosophy. They thus continued to strengthen and legitimate the alter-
native discourse around social grants adopted (at least sometimes) by 
Skweyiya. The strongest judicial statement of this was in two cases in 
which the Constitutional Court ordered the government to pay pensions 
and grants to legally resident non-citizens on the same basis as citizens. In 
one of these judgements, Justice Mokgoro emphasised the constitutional 
commitment to building a “caring society”. Permanently resident non- 
citizens should not be abandoned “to destitution if they fall upon hard 
times”; the state should not force them into “relationships of dependency 
upon families, friends and the community in which they live” (Mokgoro 
2004). The government resisted legal efforts to expand social assistance 
programmes. Officials in Skweyiya’s own department filed affidavits 
opposing cases brought by civil society activists to expand social grants. 
Moreover, the courts themselves were generally reluctant to push the 
executive too far or too fast, especially when policy shifts had major 
financial implications. In a series of major cases, the courts decided that 
the government was not obliged to provide very expensive healthcare or 
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housing for all, nor to extend old age pensions or child grants. In a case 
that provoked the ire of civil society activists, the Constitutional Court 
decided unanimously against determining any “minimum core” of public 
services that citizens could claim under the constitution (see, e.g. Langford 
et al. 2013). But the courts ensured that the experience of poverty contin-
ued to be viewed as an indignity that society had to address. As one legal 
scholar put it, drawing on the work of American philosopher Martha 
Nussbaum, “conditions of poverty are not a reflection of the moral 
blameworthiness of groups experiencing poverty rather they reflect how 
we as a society have failed to value human dignity”. Respect for human 
dignity requires “redressing the social and economic conditions of those 
whose capacity for development and agency is stunted by poverty”—and 
accepting shared responsibility to enable the poor to live as equal mem-
bers of society (Liebenberg 2005: 12–14).
Skweyiya’s complex defence of social grants for deserving categories of 
poor people but preference for job creation for able-bodied adults entailed 
an understanding of “social citizenship” and solidarity that accorded with 
popular opinion and norms. Quantitative and qualitative evidence sug-
gested that most South Africans shared a strong sense that a large number 
of people were deserving of the support of society as a whole. Almost all 
South Africans concurred that differences in income (as well as differ-
ences in wages among working people specifically) were too large, and 
that the government should redistribute from rich to poor (Roberts 
2014). Most South Africans, without regard to race or class, not only 
supported the principle of tax-financed pensions for the elderly but 
believed that the value of the pension should be increased (even if it 
meant that they themselves paid higher taxes). Most South Africans also 
included in the “deserving poor” people who were unable to work because 
they were disabled or sick, or who were caring for children or the elderly 
(Seekings 2007, 2010). There was even some evidence that people 
believed that the unemployed had some “right” to some kind of support 
(e.g. CASE 2005; Roberts 2014). At the same time, there was widespread 
scepticism about social grants for unemployed adults and outright con-
demnation of grant recipients who “misspent” their grants (e.g. on alco-
hol) (Seekings 2007; Dawson and Fouksman 2020).
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 The Conservative Backlash: The Social 
Question After Skweyiya (from 2009)
Skweyiya did not stand for re-election to parliament in 2009. His imme-
diate successor, Edna Molewa, was Minister of Social Development for a 
little more than one year before she was in turn replaced (in November 
2010) by Bathabile Dlamini. Dlamini, who was a loyal member of the 
faction around Zuma, remained minister until Cyril Ramaphosa ousted 
Zuma as president in February 2018. Dlamini’s term as minister—lasting 
more than seven years—is remembered primarily for the controversy sur-
rounding the award of the national contract to pay social grants to the 
multinational company Cash Paymaster Services and her ensuing incom-
petence and dishonesty in solving the crisis (Gronbach 2017). But it was 
also a period of conservative reaction against the expansion of the social 
assistance system under Skweyiya, albeit a reaction that did not lead to 
any clear retrenchment of social grant programmes. Under Dlamini, the 
Department of Social Development began to emphasise more strongly 
the need to strengthen the family so that the family could take over from 
the state much of the responsibility for care. A 2012 White Paper empha-
sised “self-reliance”, that is, the converse of dependency (South 
Africa 2012a).
President Zuma himself provided a clear line to his ministers. In 2011, 
he reportedly told businessmen that “we cannot be a welfare state”; tax-
payers should develop the country “rather than feed the poor”.33 This 
might sound like an argument against further expansion, but Zuma later 
made clear his own patriarchal criticism of paying grants to young 
women. In a 2015 speech to traditional leaders, Zuma branded teenage 
mothers as irresponsible bad mothers, claimed that they were not using 
the child support grant for their children and suggested that they were 
cheating the system. Instead of being allowed to drop out of school, 
Zuma suggested they should be sent to somewhere like Robben Island—
the apartheid-era prison for political prisoners—where they could com-
plete their schooling, thus empowering them to work and support their 
33 “Zuma says S. Africa can’t be welfare state: SAPA”, 24 November 2011; https://af.reuters.com/
article/topNews/idAFJOE7AN04C20111124.
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children themselves. If they were to be given grants, then the grants 
should not be paid in cash, which recipients could spend as they like, but 
rather in vouchers that could only be used to buy designated items. 
Zuma, together with many other conservatives, saw the “problem” in 
terms of the supposed immorality of young women, not the economic 
and other structural factors that encouraged teenagers to become moth-
ers.34 Other ministers worried about “dependency” with regard to other 
areas of public policy. Announcing a new model for funding public hous-
ing, Minister Lindiwe Sisulu, for example, stated that “giving free houses 
creates a dependency syndrome”. The government “cannot continue giv-
ing out free houses anymore”, but instead would “give people subsidies so 
that they can build houses themselves”.35 The ANC adopted a very 
ambivalent stance towards social protection in its election manifestos 
(ANC 2014).
Under Zuma, the government and ANC emphasised poverty as much 
as previous governments in their plans and resolutions. Inequality was 
emphasised even more strongly than hitherto. But the plans emphasised 
the developmental state not the welfare state. The most prominent plan 
completed during this period—the 2012 National Development Plan 
(South Africa 2012b)—focused on the reduction of poverty and inequal-
ity. As the Plan made clear in its chapter on social protection: “These 
goals can be achieved by building capabilities that enable individuals to 
take part in the formal economy and in other parts of society”—reversing 
the effects of apartheid. “If apartheid destroyed opportunities for the 
majority of the population and trapped them in poverty, the challenge for 
the next 20 years is to rebuild the opportunity structures and help indi-
viduals develop the capabilities to live the life they wish to lead”. Whilst 
“employment is the best form of social protection”, the state should con-
tinue to provide for those who cannot provide for themselves—in “labour 
market and employment friendly” ways. A “balance” should be struck 
between the provision of a safety net and “incentivizing and supporting 
34 http://mg.co.za/article/2015-03-11-zuma-send-teenage-mums-to-robben-island.




individuals to develop their own ability to respond to shocks and save for 
rainy days”. The Plan envisaged replacing the existing, and admittedly 
patchy, safety net with a comprehensive “social floor”—borrowing the 
concept promoted by the ILO, culminating in the ILO’s 2012 
Recommendation 202 on Social Protection Floors—but the Plan pro-
posed no new programmes that might actually achieve the ambition. 
Social assistance would be expanded only insofar as more efforts would 
be made to ensure that eligible individuals applied for and received exist-
ing grants. The “social floor” for the unemployed working-age popula-
tion would entail not social grants but rather “various active labour 
market initiatives such as public works programmes, training and skills 
development, and other labour market related incentives”. The Plan 
seemed to envisage vaguely a massive expansion of these initiatives, but 
there were few specific proposals. The Plan also worried about the contin-
ued affordability of existing programmes.
Zuma’s State of the Nation Addresses indicate his disinterest in social 
grants. In 2009 he told Parliament that “We are mindful of the need to 
link the social grants to jobs or economic activity in order to encourage 
self-reliance amongst the able-bodied”. In 2011 he repeated this point: 
“Since we are building a developmental and not a welfare state, the social 
grants will be linked to economic activity and community development, 
to enable short-term beneficiaries to become self-supporting in the long 
run.” He regularly reported on action to prevent fraudulent grant pay-
ments. From 2012 he reported the rising number of beneficiaries—due 
to decisions taken before he took office, combined with population 
growth—but otherwise barely mentioned grants at all.36
The ideological shift within the ANC may have corresponded with 
deepening ambivalence among the public (although it is unclear whether 
elite discourse led public opinion or vice versa). Both quantitative and 
qualitative research suggests that support for social grants in South Africa 
is conditional on the behaviour of the recipients. More than 50 per cent 
of respondents in a representative countrywide survey in 2015 agreed 
that young women spent too much of their grants on alcohol. One half 
of the sample also agreed that young women have children so that they 
can access a child grant. When the same questions were asked in a 2018 
36 https://www.gov.za/state-nation-address#2009.
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survey, public opinion seems to have become more critical. As many as 
60 per cent of respondents agreed that young women spent too much of 
their grants on alcohol. In both 2015 and 2018, more than half of the 
respondents agreed that adults who were physically able to work should 
be required to do so in return for any money received from the govern-
ment. In 2018, the same proportion agreed that citizens become lazy 
when they rely on government grants or pensions.37 Roberts (2014) 
reports that support for the redistribution of income by the government 
seems to have declined modestly (by some but not all measures) between 
the mid-2000s and the early 2010s. If so, this may be driven by declining 
concern with inequality and support for government action among the 
growing African middle classes (Seekings 2017b). More and more quali-
tative researchers find evidence that at least some poor people are quite 
critical of the payment of social grants, especially to young women (e.g. 
Mosoetsa 2011; Blake 2018).
In practice, the Zuma governments of 2009–2018 presided over a 
marked lack of development and job creation. As became clear later, large 
parts of the state were “captured” by private interests, who used the state 
for personal enrichment rather than national economic development or 
poverty reduction. The government’s corrupt allocation of the national 
contract to pay social grants and its inability to address the subsequent 
abuse of grant payments were indicative of the broader malaise.
Skweyiya—like Mandela—was, for the most part, conservative. But 
his conservatism was paternalistic, unlike the more reactionary patriar-
chal conservatism articulated by Zuma. Skweyiya was surely horrified by 
“state capture” and the crisis of grant payments under Zuma. Skweyiya 
believed that all people, however poor, were members of the broader 
community and had some claim to collective resources, alongside a gen-
eral responsibility to strive for self-reliance. Whilst he was minister, child-
care grants were rolled out for an additional ten million children, at a cost 
of more than 1 per cent of GDP. This was, to his mind, the right thing to 
do. The social question, for Skweyiya, meant assisting poor people who 
were unable to satisfy their own minimum needs through their own 




efforts. For Zuma, in contrast, the social question appears to be a cultural 
or moral one: decadent urban and/or Western morality needs to be rolled 
back, and a disciplined and patriarchal African social order 
re-established.
Skweyiya would have been unlikely to preside over the expansion of 
the welfare state had he not taken over what was already a welfare state, 
notwithstanding the hostility or ambivalence towards it both within the 
National Party (under apartheid) and the ANC (in the period 1994–1999). 
The reframing of the “social question” in South Africa in the early 2000s 
was, in important respects, path dependent: existing, apartheid-era social 
assistance programmes had helped to cement an understanding within 
the general population of who is deserving and who is not. This perme-
ated into elite thinking in the late 1990s sufficiently to deter major pro-
grammatic retrenchment and in the 2000s to facilitate programmatic 
expansion. Skweyiya himself was party to a long tradition of paternalist 
conservatism within South Africa’s African elite. Nonetheless, there was 
nothing inevitable about the expansion of social assistance under 
Skweyiya. The ANC might have chosen other programmes to shore up its 
electoral support among the poor. It might have adopted a more patriar-
chal line long before Zuma became president.
The first two phases in the post-apartheid reframing of the social ques-
tion involved some influence of ideas from abroad. The developmental 
turn from “welfare” to “social development” was influenced by the ideas 
articulated by Midgley. It may also have been influenced by the large 
number of Nordic, other European and Australian policy consultants 
who flooded into South Africa in the 1990s, most of whom fuelled a 
vision of skill-intensive, high-wage job creation, with unemployment 
being tackled through active labour market policies. Skweyiya’s advocacy 
of expanded social assistance coincided with the global embrace of social 
assistance by international organisations (von Gliszczynski and Leisering 
2016). Under Skweyiya, the Department of Social Development com-
missioned research from a series of foreign researchers to support his 
argument for expansion. In both phases, however, reframing was rooted 
firmly in the convictions of South African policymakers. Whilst many of 
the individual technocrats held more progressive views, the dominant 
approaches within the ANC leadership were all conservative, whether 


















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































developmental (in the late 1990s), paternalistic (Skweyiya) or patriarchal 
(under Zuma). The result was that a social (protection) floor or compre-
hensive safety net remained an ambition rather than a reality. Table 8.1 
summarises the analysis.
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and their progress through time mirror that clash, or the silencing thereof. 
They are thus the final expression of the struggle for public recognition of 
the people’s demands.
As we argue, in Brazil, the essence of the social question, or the process 
of the construction of citizenship, developed fairly independently from 
the construction of the social protection system, although Social Security, 
instituted by the 1988 Citizen Constitution, is one of the most remark-
able conquests on that score.
The aim of this chapter is twofold. First, it develops a periodization 
and typology of the multiple historical configurations of the social ques-
tion in Brazil over the past 100 years in order to observe its relationship 
with the construction of the social protection system, Social Security, in 
particular. As guaranteed in the 1988 Constitution, that system includes 
social insurance, social assistance, and public healthcare. Second, the 
chapter systematizes how social movements, conflict-led dynamics, 
labour, and different regimes of accumulation shaped social policies and 
citizenship, contributing to define patterns of inclusion—which varied 
over time, lending new form to the social question, the many facets of 
which seem to form a kaleidoscope of “social questions”.
Over the course of this chapter, we seek to demonstrate that, in the 
span of just over a century, the social question took on a variety of forms, 
but was repeatedly marked by the struggle for recognition and the fight 
for inclusion—a strong indication that the process of constructing citi-
zenship has been something of a permanent effort to break down 
boundaries.
In addition to the introduction and conclusion, the present chapter is 
divided into four sections. This structure reflects the periodization 
adopted in attempts to characterize the essence of the social question, 
which expresses itself in terms of clashes between society and the State. 
These phases are associated with changes at the level of the political 
regime, patterns of development, the shape and function of institutions, 
and the agendas driven by the social conflicts that they spring from. They 
include struggles for labour rights, access to land, democracy, better liv-
ing conditions, equality, inclusion, mobilization against racism and sex-




Following this introduction, the second section covers 1899–1929 and 
is divided into two subsections. In this phase, the social question is, above 
all, “the question of the needs of the people” (Castro Gomes 2005: 49).
The third section focuses on the period that saw the construction of 
regulated citizenship (Dos Santos 1979): 1930–1963, a span that includes 
a prolonged authoritarian period (1930–1945) but also a democratic 
respite (1946–1963). The State led the charge on this front. With the 
consolidation of social insurance for a small portion of the working class, 
the social question was transformed into a regional question, framed by 
the struggle for increased access to land.
In the fourth section, the chapter situates the social question within 
the struggle for democracy and against inequality, mobilizations that 
would swell and multiply throughout both the “economic miracle” and 
the severe recession that followed.
The fifth section goes from the civil-military coup of 1964, which 
entailed a loss of political rights, to the mid-1980s, when the severity of 
the economic crisis broke the prevailing political pact and led the military 
to support a “slow, gradual, and secure opening”. During this phase, the 
social question may be defined as the democratic question, coupled with 
the fight against inequalities.
The final section analyses the period after re-democratization 
(post-1988), which brought a transition to a civil government and the 
reinstatement of open elections for the presidency. Here, the social ques-
tion would become the question of full, unrestricted citizenship in the 
attempt to build a new Brazil (Paoli 1989). Social Security was imple-
mented, broadening the scope and scale of social protection and intro-
ducing universal rights for the first time in Brazil’s history.
 1889–1929: The Social Question as the Needs 
of the People—Under the First Republic—
Repression, Concealment, and Reshaping
Two phases precede the classical model of associating the social question 
to labour and the emergence of the social protection system.
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In the first phase, which we place between the proclamation of the 
Republic in 1889 and the end of the 1910s, the social question was 
framed by grassroots movements around the cost of living, the right to 
housing, and unionization. This time frame is also justified by the fact 
that in 1919, Brazil—as a signatory of the Peace Conference and Treaty 
of Versailles, which led to the creation of the International Labour 
Organization (ILO)—formally recognized the power of the international 
workers’ movement, with important consequences for domestic policy. 
As a founding member of the ILO, Brazil took part in the first International 
Labour Conference that year and adhered to the tripartite system of rep-
resentation determined there, bringing together governments, employers, 
and employees.
Brazil’s adhesion to institutions such as these, which would begin to 
mould relations within this new community of nations and implement a 
new international order, would have an important effect on the framing 
of its first labour laws.
The second phase, between 1919 and 1929, saw the discussion and 
passage of the country’s first social laws to regulate wage labour, and the 
first initiatives designed to ensure the right to retirement benefits and 
pensions.
To the eyes of many authors (Castro Gomes 1979, 2005; Cardoso 
2010), the 1920s were the years in which the social question shifted from 
the struggle over the cost of living and a lack of affordable housing—a 
broad-ranging movement that had become increasingly radical over the 
years—to the field of labour rights in a strict sense. At stake were the 
number of work-hours per week, women and minors at work, vacation 
time, and the lingering, urgent matter of occupational accidents—com-
pensation for which, when it did come, depended on the goodwill of 
one’s employer.
The introduction of the Commission on Social Legislation in the 
Chamber of Deputies in late 1918, as well as the first vote on the 
Occupational Accidents Law in 1919, would contribute to redefine the 
social question and lend it new centrality. Both measures reflected the 
strengthening of the workers’ movement on an international level and 
provoked a backlash from national elites.
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Employers worked to restrict the measures as best they could, looking 
to avoid excesses that might undermine their process of accumulation. In 
the words of Castro Gomes (1979), employers put on a united front that 
was complex and contradictory: on the one hand, their stance preserved 
“the classical principles of liberalism, defending the ‘freedom to work,’ 
but gradually grafted onto it an acceptance of state intervention, an 
acceptance that was forced upon them and limited to specific issues” (163).
In 1915, the federal government had put forth a bill proposing man-
datory compensation for occupational accidents. While the proposal 
remained tabled for a number of years, it would be joined by other issues, 
such as the establishment of a minimum wage for industrial workers. 
These scattered demands were the reflection of budding pressure, born of 
the advance of industrialization and urbanization.
The period was thus shaped by the emergence of a regulatory frame-
work focused on wage labour, meeting the needs of a very small subsec-
tion of the working population.
The business community lobbied for women to be able to work the 
same hours as men, instead of daily shifts of up to six hours.1 They sup-
ported a ban on work for minors under 10 (not 12), spoke in favour of a 
minimum age of 15 (not 16) for a young person to be considered an 
adult on the labour market; pressed for a 56-hour work week; and 
opposed the establishment of schools and childcare facilities within fac-
tories, a long-time demand of social movements. In other words, they 
contested the workers’ demands, point by point.
They did, however, accept the establishment of private workers’ com-
pensation policies (for minor accidents, death, or disability), taken out 
with insurance companies. These policies only covered the worker in 
question, with no provision for dependents, and would not trigger pay-
ment of retirement benefits or pensions for those who ceased to work. In 
other words, they vehemently denied the creation of Social Security. And 
it would be on these terms that the occupational accidents bill would 
1 They successfully contested the idea of banning women from working night shifts, as well as elimi-
nating a proposal that would have ensured a period of rest (with two-thirds of pay) before and after 
childbirth (Castro Gomes 1979: 177).
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finally pass in 1919, the regulatory cornerstone of the nation’s social pro-
tection system.
The capital-labour conflict was transformed into an individual, exter-
nal issue, regulated by a contract and designed to be dealt with between 
the worker and the insurer. In the words of Dos Santos (1979), “until 
1924, suits over occupational accidents would remain in the realm of 
private conflicts. Strictly speaking, they were matters for the police, and 
victims had to request an investigation” in order to determine whether or 
not compensation was in order.
Thus, the event commonly celebrated as the first conquest of the incip-
ient working class—protection against accidents in the workplace—fell 
outside the scope of public social insurance. The Eloy Chaves Act, passed 
in 1923 (see later), likewise failed to include worker’s compensation as a 
part of the incipient social protection system. It would remain subject to 
private contracts, outside the realm of social rights. For the next 40 years, 
employers’ associations staunchly opposed the adoption of collective, 
contributory, public insurance systems.
In 1921, the social question remained present, and it would make its 
presence felt in the heated electoral debate. But not even that could guar-
antee the effective functioning of the National Department of Labour, 
which had been created in 1917 in response to a wave of strikes. The aim 
was to monitor compliance with the laws that were beginning to establish 
a new system of protection for labourers. Due to pressure from business 
interests invested in delaying and hindering the effective application of 
these new laws, the department would remain functionally inoperative. 
In its stead came the National Labour Council (Conselho Nacional do 
Trabalho, or CNT), instituted in 1923, even as the government aggres-
sively repressed mobilizations by the emergent working class. Workers on 
the federal and state railways had been on the point of outright rebellion, 
and their walkouts during the general strikes had seriously affected other 
productive sectors. They were the most organized and mobilized group 
calling for workers’ rights.
These obstacles, however, failed to foil some of the most important 
institutional innovations of the so-called First Republic (1889–1930). 
One was the Eloy Chaves Act of 1923, which created the nation’s first 
fully funded pension scheme by instituting the Pension and Retirement 
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Fund for the workers on the São Paulo Railway. The Fund would also 
provide other labour-related benefits. In addition, there were the Lei de 
Férias (which regulated vacation time) and the Código de Menores 
(which stipulated working conditions for minors). The Pension and 
Retirement Funds (CAPs) were created in Brazil at the initiative of a 
group of lawyers, businessmen, and public figures (Malloy 1986), strongly 
influenced by Argentina, where similar funds had been in place since 1904.
Not even this would blunt the impact of the Funds on the ascendant 
Brazilian business class, which believed that it would be essential for the 
State to act, not as a gendarme, but now as a “machine for progress” (Pio 
Vieira 1978: 119). This was the tone taken by the leader of the movement 
in Brazil, federal deputy Eloy Chaves, a scion of the colonial oligarchical 
elite and the Paulista aristocracy.
Eloy Chaves’ proposal revealed a Bismarckian inspiration, relying on 
mandatory contributions from both employees and employers to a self- 
administered, non-state pension fund. The project called for a broad 
range of other provisions: medical care and medication for the policy-
holder and his family; regular retirement benefits; pensions for employ-
ees’ heirs; immediate coverage of funeral expenses; and disability 
retirement. The fund was to be administered by the beneficiaries them-
selves (Pio Vieira 1978: 236), with the participation of the employer.
Chaves proposed a constellation of decentralized funds outside the 
umbrella of the State and administered by the private sector. He opposed 
a general rule for pensions and the creation of a public fund. True to his 
liberal values, he put his foot down at State intervention into the provi-
sion of retirement benefits and pensions.
The act was finally passed in January of 1923. Each railway company 
would have to create a retirement and pension fund for its employees 
(whether permanent or temporary). The funds would be fed by monthly 
contributions from employees (3% of their salary) and an annual contri-
bution from the railway companies (1% of gross income2); and the State 
would not contribute funds of its own, but would allocate revenue from 
2 Dos Santos (1979) clarifies that, in the absence of oversight, the 1% contribution was effectively 
made, not based on gross revenue but rather the wage bill. This situation persisted through the 
1960s, substantially reducing the employer’s contribution.
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an extra tax of 1.5% on railway fares. These resources would be deposited 
in a special account in a bank chosen by the administrators of the Fund, 
with no government participation, and would be put towards purchasing 
national or state bonds.3
Old-age pensions were calculated based on the worker’s average salary 
over their last five years of service, granted after 30 years of service and 50 
years of age,4 and were lifelong. Moreover, a worker who suffered “total 
and permanent disability [would] have the right to retirement, no matter 
the length of his service” (Pio Vieira 1978: 267). Retirement benefits for 
the disabled would be equivalent to 50% of the retirement benefit 
received by workers with over 30 years of service and 25% for workers 
who had between 10 and 30 years of service. It would not be possible to 
receive multiple regular old-age pensions or retirement benefits 
concurrently.
The most important part, which had to do with the model of capital-
ization, is laid out specifically in Article 39: “Retirement benefits and 
pensions may be lesser than stipulated in this law if resources in the Fund 
cannot sustain the respective charges, and this may be the case while 
resources remain insufficient” (Pio Vieira 1978: 271). In other words, the 
rule established a defined contribution and an undefined benefit, exempt-
ing the employer from guaranteeing a true substitute income in the 
period after one’s working life.
Attempts to extend the Eloy Chaves Act to major companies in all sec-
tors soon followed, while resistance to the law spread within the railway 
sector. Chaves himself came out against proposals that sought to expand 
the model to other sectors and attempts to involve the State in financing 
pensions. In his vision, the new Funds ought to live off of their own 
resources and go without public financing, unlike the classical Bismarckian 
model, which included state subsidies. More generally, “State contribu-
tion had to be avoided at all costs in the structuring of any other Funds 
for any other categories of workers” (Pio Vieira 1978: 300).
3 Law 4.682 of January 24, 1923. Pio Vieira (1978: 266).
4 The initial recommendation was a minimum age of 55, but, under pressure from the railway 
workers, Eloy Chaves reduced it to 50.
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Thus, we need to qualify the classical reading that the corporative, 
paternalistic structure of the government under the First Republic was 
responsible for developing Brazil’s first mechanisms of social protection 
(Slivnik 2018).
The CAPs would stand as the country’s main social insurance model 
through 1931, when the system underwent its first reform. By then, some 
98 company-specific Caixas had been created, covering close to 147,000 
members (Slivnik 2018).
According to Slivnik (2018), the CAPs persisted throughout the 1920s 
as “civil societies run by Advisory Boards, composed of representatives for 
employers and employees, which were to determine [the Fund’s] invest-
ment policy and deliberate over the concession of retirement benefits and 
pensions” (45). The Chaves Act rejected the mutualist tradition devel-
oped within the workers’ movement, which had been able to offer low- 
cost medical services and medicine.
On another legislative front, the country saw increased regulation of 
wage labour. Employer associations’ attempts to quash the approval of 
vacation rights came to naught. A law guaranteeing 15 days of vacation 
for employees, labourers, and workers at banks and other institutions was 
passed in 1925 (Castro Gomes 1979). The legislation would not go into 
effect for factory workers until 1930, however, thanks to violent resis-
tance on the part of the industrial bourgeoisie and the indifference of the 
governing authorities.
Child labour would be regulated in 1927; underage workers were a 
considerable contingent of the agricultural workforce, but also in rapidly 
expanding urban sectors, especially industrial production. Employers 
successfully proposed that youth aged 14–18 be treated as adults, while 
children of ages 10–14 would be able to work up to six hours per day.
The balance of these first few decades of republican rule is fairly slim. 
Despite minor advances in terms of labour regulations, the absence of 
compliance oversight and repeated stonewalling on the part of employers 
in commerce and industry hamstrung hopes of more far-reaching gains 
for urban workers. In the 1930s, only 3% of the working population 
were covered by these new labour regulations (D’Araújo 2019).
We may, however, safely dismiss the idea that before the Vargas era, the 
social question was treated as “a matter for the police” (D’Araújo 2019; 
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Castro Gomes 1979). At this point in time, it combined both dimen-
sions. “Social legislation far beyond the political aim of ensuring social 
peace and spill over into the economic realm, as coercion made it possible 
to secure greater productivity from the workforce” (Castro Gomes 
1979: 215).
In addition of being incipient, the foundations of the Brazilian labour 
and social insurance legislation left out the majority of those working on 
the streets or at odd jobs.
 1930–1945: The Social Question 
as a Workers’ Question
The Revolution of 1930, that put an end to the First Republic, was a 
military coup d’état led by Getúlio Vargas, who had run for president in 
1930 as the candidate of the Aliança Liberal (Liberal Alliance). The 
Alliance’s motto was “Let us carry out the revolution serenely, before the 
people do it violently”. This newly formed coalition cast itself as an alter-
native to the political establishment represented by major coffee produc-
ers and exporters, who had dominated the system during the First 
Republic. Getúlio was defeated; the administration’s candidate, a repre-
sentative of the São Paulo oligarchs, won but was kept from taking office 
by the coup. Getúlio Vargas became the head of the Provisional 
Government, awarding himself broad powers. The 1891 Constitution 
was revoked, and Vargas began governing by decree. A new constitution 
would only be put in place in 1934.
Before leading the military coup, Getúlio Vargas—who was to govern 
Brazil through an authoritarian regime from 1930 to 1945—once 
declared on the campaign trail: “We cannot deny the existence of the 
Social Question (questão social) in Brazil as one of the problems that must 
be addressed seriously by the authorities. What little we have in terms of 
social legislation is not applied, or only the smallest part of it is, sporadi-
cally, despite our commitments in that regard as signatories of the Treaty 
of Versailles.”5
5 Speech made on January 2, 1930, in Rio de Janeiro. Documents from Biblioteca Nacional, 1963.
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Brazilian social legislation was moved forward by an unprecedented 
international scenario in which multilateral accords took on the strength 
of legislation. But in the real world, that very legislation was powerless. 
Still, Vargas pointed out a social question, and it would fall to the State 
to address it. This would be one of the great legacies of the Vargas Era: the 
construction of an institutional framework designed to protect labour 
and workers, albeit during a period of authoritarianism and the repres-
sion of unions and grassroots movements, leaving out the majority of 
non-regular workers.
Social policy post-1930 focused on the matter of labour, a central pil-
lar of the new regime of accumulation. This new social engineering was, 
in Vargas’ words,6 designed to overcome “pauperism and all the ills that 
stem from an excess of activity without fixed occupation”. It began with 
the creation, following the Revolution of 1930, of the Ministry of Labour, 
Industry, and Commerce, and the foundation of the National Department 
of Labour in 1931.7 Finally armed with an institutional structure designed 
to analyse, formulate, and execute social and labour laws, the State would 
take vigorous, direct action towards regulating capital-labour relations, 
supported by a new union law approved the same year, which would 
repress, delegitimate, and demobilize free unionization (which had been 
legal since 1907). To this end, one of the new government’s first measures 
was a 1931 law governing unions.
In order to exist, any union organization would have to be formally 
recognized by the Ministry of Labour. Employee and employer unions 
were instituted, organized by branches and professions. The new union 
law also stipulated that, from 1943 onward, it would become compulsory 
for every worker in a given category to pay a union tax. These new unions 
were denied the right to political or ideological manifestations and ulti-
mately served to stand beside the government in defending the economic, 
social, and legal interests of their professional categories; drawing up con-
tracts; maintaining cooperatives; and providing social services (D’Araújo 
2019). In practice, over the 1930s, Vargas’ social legislation led to the 
6 Vargas in 1938, quoted by Cardoso (2010: 786).
7 The measure had first been proposed in 1917, but it was blocked by uncompromising resistance 
on the part of employers.
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destruction of autonomous unions and the independent organization of 
the working classes.
Only unionized workers would enjoy the benefits of labour legislation 
and its associated rights (including vacation), and only they could partici-
pate in collective bargaining. Non-union members were also unable to 
file official complaints (Dos Santos 1979). At its root, then, the legal and 
institutional framework taking shape thus worked to set peers apart.
Before 1930, the Brazilian government had taken a liberal approach to 
the unions, repressing their mobilizations while refraining from regulat-
ing them. The period that followed saw the making of state-led, corpo-
rate unionism, guided by the principle of the “collaboration between 
classes”.8 Independent unions were subject to interventions and police 
invasions, and their members might be jailed (Castro Gomes 2005).
Starting in the early 1930s, despite the grave economic crisis that had 
overtaken the country in the wake of the 1929 crash, an important set of 
measures would broaden the scope of the regulation of the labour market 
in a move to encourage the ongoing accumulation process. They included 
the official recognition of certain professions; the first rules governing the 
adoption of collective agreements; wage equality; workday laws in indus-
try and commerce; new rules about the employment of women and 
minors; and a law that “nationalized” the workforce (requiring that two- 
thirds of employees be Brazilian citizens).
The employment record book of 1932 became a watershed, separating 
out urban workers who were gainfully employed, belonged to recognized, 
State-regulated professions, and bore the official stamp of the union. This 
configuration thus established a durable, stubborn link between one’s 
employment record book, one’s status as a unionized worker, and access 
to social benefits.
In 1934, a new Constitution would introduce the labour court system. 
At that point, it was overseen by juízes classistas, union representatives 
who stood in as labour judges. This indirectly expanded executive action 
into the realm of the judiciary, concentrating more power in state hands 
when it came to adjudicating labour conflicts.
8 A turn of phrase coined in 1931 by Senator Lindofo Collor, then Minister of Labour.
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Dos Santos (1979) refers to this complex process of constructing new 
institutions as regulated citizenship:
All members of the community who find themselves in any occupation 
recognized and defined by law are considered citizens. Citizenship is thus 
expanded through the regulation of new professions and/or occupations, 
first of all, and through the broadening of the scope of the rights associated 
to said professions, rather than the expansion of the values inherent to the 
concept of belonging to the community. Citizenship is embedded within 
one’s profession, and the rights of the citizen are limited to the rights rele-
vant to his place in the productive process, as enshrined in law (75–76).
Of course, this regulated citizenship was aimed at industrial workers, 
who were relatively few in number, and failed to take in the rural popula-
tion: in 1940, 70% of the population lived in rural areas, and only 3% of 
that group owned land (Cardoso 2010). Rural poverty would be addressed 
not through agrarian reform—eternally postponed and sidestepped (see 
Chap. 10, in this book)—but by expanding the nation’s agricultural fron-
tier and occupying Amazonia and the Centre-West, seen as demographic 
voids. This made it possible to boost the meagre productivity of small- 
scale rural production without touching highly concentrated landhold-
ings—and hence without challenging the bases of reproduction for many 
of the country’s elites.
When it came to rights and benefits, social policy came to reproduce 
the same stratification instituted in the job market, setting apart those 
recognized as workers from the masses without citizenship. In the pro-
cess, antagonisms and divisions were fostered amongst working people 
who were afforded different statuses.
One of the first measures in the realm of social protection would be 
the reform of the Old-Age Pension and Retirement Funds (CAPs), in 
1931. The Eloy Chaves Act was modified: the benefits afforded to rail-
way workers were now extended to the employees of other companies 
that provided public utility services (transportation, electricity, telegraph 
and telephone service, water and sewage). This expansion did not chal-
lenge the company-specific model, nor did it alter the financing rules 
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stipulating that State representatives could not participate in the 
Advisory Boards.
While the number of CAPs would continue to rise (by 1936, there 
were 189, as opposed to 98 in 1931) (Slivnik 2018), their institutional 
status was shaken by the restructuring of the social insurance system, 
which came under State control, with the creation of the Institutes of 
Retirement and Old-age Pensions (Institutos de Aposentadoria e Pensões, 
or IAPs) in 1933.
The first IAP was created for maritime workers and would set the 
mould for the rest. From 1934 onward, other professions would create 
their own Institutes, among them commercial employees (IAPC), bank 
employees (IAPB), industrial employees (IAPI), and transportation and 
cargo workers (IAPTEC). This movement would gradually lead to the 
reorganization of the CAPs (one was created for civil servants in 1939).
Both models—CAPs and IAPs—would persist through the 1960s, 
functioning in different ways. Not only did they move away from the 
company-specific framework and bring together all the workers in a given 
sector across the nation, but the IAPs also included federal representatives 
on their Advisory Boards who were tasked with appointing the chair. 
Slivnik points out another relevant difference: “the funds corresponding 
to the State’s quota, for IAP contributions, which were obtained through 
newly created fees and taxes, now went through the National Treasury, 
unlike the Eloy Chaves Act, wherein the funds were collected by the com-
panies themselves and deposited directly into the Funds” (Slivnik 2018: 
54–55). This would seem to be the expression of an actuarial concern on 
the part of the State, which now also began to use the resources saved up 
in the IAPs.
By separating out the workers recognized as such into sectors con-
trolled by State-authorized unions, the emergent social insurance model 
maintained the splintering of horizontal solidarity and heightened the 
struggle for benefits specific to each category.
The problems caused by this fragmented model are well known. They 
would be listed in an ILO report published in 1935 by the Ministry of 
Labour, Industry, and Commerce.9 Among other measures, the report 
9 In 1934, Adrien Tixier, an ILO employee and specialist in Social Security, came to Brazil on an 
independent mission to evaluate the incipient social insurance system (see Slivnik 2018: Chap. 2).
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suggested the creation of the National Institute of Social Insurance 
(INSS) to unify the social insurance system and provide uniform rights 
and benefits; to set up regional funds with a minimum of 50,000 associ-
ates per organization (to ensure financial solvency and resilience);10 and 
that Brazil’s social insurance legislation be brought into greater compli-
ance with the international conventions led by the ILO.11
The recommendations fell on deaf ears, and the IAP model was 
enshrined in 1937, the year in which Vargas proclaimed the Estado Novo 
(the new state), quashing individual and political freedoms and tighten-
ing control over unions.
As Vargas put it in 1938, responding to complaints of his curtailing of 
individual freedoms: “The Estado Novo does not recognize the rights of 
individuals over the collective. Individuals do not have rights, they have 
responsibilities!” The National Security Law of 1935 had already ham-
mered a nail into the coffin of social movements, turning the social ques-
tion into a matter of national security (177), in light of the Communist 
threat (Castro Gomes 2005).
Despite the advance of the social insurance system, the severe deficits 
in the country’s social protection network were countless and unques-
tionable, as conservative ideologues and jurists12 associated with the 
Varguista push did not deny. In the early 1940s, disability benefits were 
far below subsistence level; those in search of outpatient services or hos-
pitalization would find few options; and there was no credit available for 
low-income housing, one of the great demands at the time.
Moreover, very few enjoyed that insufficient protection to begin with. 
According to the 1940 Census, out of “26.8 million workers, only 16.6% 
could be considered potential beneficiaries of social insurance under the 
legislation governing CAPs and IAPs. Among those ‘left out’ (those whose 
professional activities went unrecognized by law), 9.4 million were rural 
workers, 2.9 million worked in undefined or undeclared professions, and 
10 At that point, 80% of CAPs had fewer than 1000 covered members.
11 Compensation for work accidents (1925); work-related illnesses (1925); equal treatment for for-
eign and domestic workers (1925); compulsory health insurance (1927); and compulsory disabil-
ity, old age, and death insurance (1933).
12 On this, see Cardoso (2010) for a deep analysis of the works of Oliveira Viana as a consultant for 
the Ministry of Labour under Vargas.
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9.9 million were domestic workers”13 (Slivnik 2018: 98, 200), generally 
unremunerated. Even in the trades covered by legislation, coverage ranged 
between one-fourth and three-fourth of workers; by 1940, coverage was 
far from complete (Slivnik 2018).
Finally, these various institutes and funds did not provide unemploy-
ment insurance or any sort of aid for workers who left the job involun-
tarily. Nor were the benefits provided uniformly, except in the case of 
retirement benefits and pensions, which were the cornerstone of the sys-
tem. Different sums and rules applied across each sector.14 As Werneck 
Vianna (1998) explains, medical assistance was only offered if resources 
were available and conditioned on a supplementary contribution.
While retirement benefits for disabled and other workers’ categories 
were slim, old-age pensions were even more so, thanks to the application 
of a 50% reduction.
The minimum wage, another institutional innovation of the Vargas 
era, born in 1936 and still a linchpin of labour rights, began to be regu-
lated by the federal government in 1940. Its nominal value was set very 
low; under no circumstance would it suffice to meet a family’s needs in 
terms of food, clothing, hygiene, and transportation, as the law that cre-
ated it imagined. Moreover, the minimum wage varied across 14 different 
administrative regions. The minimum wage would only be established 
nationwide in 1984, under the military dictatorship that had been in 
power since 1964.
The institutional framework that included and standardized labour 
laws and welfare rights would take on its definitive form in 1943 with the 
introduction of the Consolidated Labour Laws (Consolidação das Leis 
do Trabalho, or CLT), consolidating all laws that had been created since 
the Revolution of 1930 to govern individual and collective labour rela-
tions (individual contracts and collective agreements; workdays, vaca-
tion, and weekly rest; protection for workers, women, and children; 
occupational medicine, labour courts, etc.).
In 1945, shortly before he was forced out of office, Vargas approved a 
decree creating the Brazilian Institute of Social Insurance, which was 
13 A total of 99% women, according to the 1940 Census (Slivnik 2018: 108).
14 For more details, see Slivnik (2018).
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designed to centralize and unify all existing social insurance regimes. The 
decree would be revoked by his successor that year, however, leaving the 
fragmentation, selectivity, and minimal efficacy of Social Security intact.
Nevertheless, the creation of the CLT seems unquestionably tied to a 
desire to resolve the social question—understood in that moment as a 
labour question—in that it established the positive value of produc-
tive work.
In the scenario depicted by the “myth of concessions”, labour laws and 
social rights emanate directly from State action and are conceded by its 
representatives in a peaceful process (Castro Gomes 2005), moving past 
conflicts and struggles and addressing the social question ignored under 
the First Republic. The Estado Novo is seen to have thrown itself into the 
task of forging a social democracy, in spite of the ongoing suppression of 
individual and political freedoms.
Prevailing dissatisfaction with living and working conditions, even 
amongst those benefiting from regulated citizenship, may explain the 
outbreak of strikes and protests after the fall of the Estado Novo (1945) 
and the return to a democratic regime.
 1945–1963: The Social Question 
as the Regional Question Under 
Democratic Rule
Vargas was deposed by a military junta on the eve of the first democratic 
elections in 15 years. A new Constitution was ratified in 1946, which 
preserved the social rights secured over the course of the 1930s, as well as 
their exclusionary rules. The document represented a new commitment 
to democratic rule and political freedoms. It broadened political citizen-
ship by extending the vote to all those over age 18, while still excluding 
the illiterate. The right to strike would be restricted and ultimately regu-
lated by decree, effectively banning stoppages across nearly all professions 
(Schwarcz and Starling 2018). Not even this rule would prove effective, 
however. In 1946 and 1947, bottled-up grievances spi lt onto the 
streets again.
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Vargas was democratically elected and returned to power in 1950, hav-
ing run on a campaign of expanding his nationalist, industrializing 
agenda—but not even this could placate the workers covered by his social 
legislation. In addition to factory strikes, mass mobilizations took over 
the streets again. In 1953, the March of the Empty Pots, against the cost 
of living and in support of wage increases, rallied 60,000 people in the 
industrial heart of the nation, São Paulo. The marchers’ demands included 
price freezes, an expansion of the water and sewer networks, and reforms 
to extend protective legislation to rural workers, among others.
Shortly thereafter came the Strike of the Three Hundred Thousand, 
which took in countless industrial sectors. After a month of action, the 
government backed down and conceded an average salary increase of 
32% (Schwarcz and Starling 2018). Beyond the salary increases, the gen-
eral strike had a major impact in that it put the urban question back on 
the map of social demands. In the words of Leal (2011), spaces of repro-
duction—housing, transportation, basic sanitation, electricity, health-
care, schooling, postal services, and consumption—would reframe the 
essence of the social question through spontaneous action during this 
new phase of peripheral capitalist development.
Against a background of extreme social polarization, the Organic 
Social Insurance Law (LOPS) was passed in 1960, designed to unify leg-
islation around the Institutes and Funds for retirements and pensions. 
Fleury (1994) describes LOPS as a second attempt to rationalize the sys-
tem, the first having been Vargas’ abortive Brazilian Institute of Social 
Security.
LOPS marks a fundamental change: it moves away from the fully 
funded model and introduces the public simple distribution model, as 
well as authorizing the inclusion of self-employed workers in cities as 
individual contributors (Teixeira 1990). “The focus shifted to standard-
izing benefits and broadening coverage—preserving the original exclu-
sion of rural workers—and the end result was a demagogical gesture that 
worsened the system’s financial straits even as it failed to expand its nar-
row financial base” (Fleury 1994: 194).
Instead of ebbing, this tension and social agitation would draw strength 
from the protagonism of new social actors, who had not yet been incor-
porated into the realm of regulated citizenship. The independent 
 L. Lavinas
321
mobilization of rural workers would redefine the social question, which 
had hitherto been framed in terms of social legislation and an existing 
framework that marginalized them.
Small farmers and their families rose up across the country, calling for 
access to and legalization of the occupied land where they were working 
and resisting attempts to expel them. The struggle against the latifundia 
system entailed fighting both the concentration of property and the pro-
found poverty to which the citizenship-deprived masses were subjected. 
These rebellions began in southern Brazil, but the Northeast would see 
the emergence of a peasant organization that would expand the social 
question beyond the urban industrial sphere.
The Peasant Leagues, formally constituted in 1955,15 served to put 
land reform on the nation’s political and social agenda. The right to land, 
here, was equated with the right to decent work, free of oppressive rela-
tions. The Leagues formed in the sugarcane fields, a region where the 
majority of the enslaved population had been taken during the colonial 
period. There followed four centuries of absolute, quasi-feudal control by 
coronéis, local landowners, whose power was now threatened by the inde-
pendent organization of largely illiterate and destitute farm workers, for-
gotten by the Republic and by its democracy.
Reluctant to collaborate with the State, the Leagues moved to occupy 
fallow or abandoned plots of land to allow poor, exploited peasants to 
cultivate them and thus improve their standard of subsistence. They pro-
vided legal advice and medical assistance and defended members who 
were threatened or expelled by major landowners, who subsequently 
refused to compensate them for their investment in the land. On the 
whole, the Leagues worked to denounce violence as a way to regulate 
labour relations.
For the first time, working independently, the citizenship-deprived 
rural population would act to reframe the social question in Brazil.
Overlapping rural and agrarian issues, compounding the rural-urban 
conflict and the new shape of the urban question, would make approaches 
15 The Union of Rural Farmworkers and Labourers (ULTAB) had been created in São Paulo the year 
before, and it would become the National Confederation of Workers in Agriculture (CONTAG) 
in 1963.
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to the social question as a whole even more fraught. In 1963, practically 
faced with a looming insurrection, João Goulart’s labour-friendly admin-
istration introduced two aggressive measures designed to meet the 
demands of rural workers.
First, the legislature approved a bill that had been tabled since 1956, 
creating the Rural Workers’ Statute (EST), which finally extended to 
rural wage labourers the same labour rights which urban workers had 
enjoyed for two decades: unionization, a minimum wage, vacation, paid 
weekends, advance notice, and compensation. The statute also included 
special measures designed to protect women and children. While 
undoubtedly innovative, it was also selective, leaving out the vast major-
ity of the diverse workforce in the countryside. Even so, its potential to 
reform and modernize social relations in the countryside posed such a 
threat that the EST would be revoked in 1973, during the most repres-
sive period of the military dictatorship.
Second, the government created the Rural Worker Assistance Fund 
(FUNRURAL). This pioneering measure stipulated that labourers in the 
countryside would have the right to 1% of the sale price of their prod-
ucts. The funds would be channelled through the Institute of Retirement 
and Pension Benefits for Industrial Workers (IAPI). In practice, the pro-
gramme ran consistent deficits, given obstacles to revenue collection. It 
would be reformulated and made independent, with an administrative 
structure of its own, in 1971, under the military regime.
In both instances, these attempts to regulate citizenship for rural work-
ers and small farmers proved unsatisfactory, as the concept represented a 
threat to the power of agrarian oligarchies, which frontally opposed the 
logic of individual and social rights (see Ondetti, in this volume).
 1964–1988: Dictatorship, the Authoritarian 
Modernization of Social Insurance, 
and the Struggle for Democracy
The authoritarian context that followed the civil-military coup of 1964 
was marked by the suppression of political freedoms and the furious 
repression of all opposition. It gained decisive support from the urban 
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middle classes, fuelled by their dread of Communism and the conse-
quences of prolonged economic stagnation. Buoyed by these fears, a mili-
tary dictatorship would govern the country for the next 21 years, with a 
technocratic model of development that attained eye-popping growth 
rates (11% per year from 1968 to 1973). This growth lent some legiti-
macy to the military government; at the same time, inequality also 
deepened.
Surprisingly, amidst a severe policy of wage reduction, which would 
diminish the purchasing power of the minimum wage and the working 
classes, the military regime completely reorganized the social insurance 
system, in an overhaul focused on efficiency. The system would undergo 
not one, but two profound administrative reforms.
The first reform came in 1966: the unification of all IAPs, with the 
exception of the institute for civil servants (IPASE), led to the creation of 
the National Institute of Social Insurance (INPS). The authoritarian 
regime was able to overcome resistance from unions,16 aided by their lack 
of funding. The union base was stifled, and control of the system was 
shifted to a public structure, centralized at the federal level.
Those covered by the INPS were entitled to retirement, pensions, and 
other social insurance benefits, as well as medical treatment at partnering 
public or private hospitals. These beneficiaries were formally employed 
workers (and their dependents), those with their employment record 
books up to date. Left out were the informally employed, domestic work-
ers, the clergy, and rural workers. The reform established a compulsory 
contribution rate for employers and employees, and the benefit calcula-
tion rules were applied uniformly, regardless of each sector’s organiza-
tional strength.
This was yet another step towards the universalization of the system. 
However, this unification was motivated less by universality than by effi-
ciency, as it preserved occupational distinctions at its foundation. Civil 
servants, for example, were maintained in a parallel system along the lines 
of the old IAPs. In 1968, however, the regime began allowing those not 
16 Werneck Vianna (1998) recalls that previous attempts to unify the IAPs under democratic 
regimes failed because union and social insurance activists mobilized workers in protected occupa-
tions in defence of their rights, thus preserving their political privileges.
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formally employed—employers, as well as the self-employed—to con-
tribute to the system independently. This expanded the system’s financial 
base, and the improvement in coverage was taken by some as compensa-
tion for the repression of social demands (Teixeira 1990).
Another creation from this period was the Severance Indemnity Fund 
(Fundo de Garantia por Tempo de Serviço, or FGTS), a sort of unemploy-
ment insurance instituted after lobbying from the business sector. 
Formally employed workers were entitled to a savings account in their 
name, linked to their work contract, into which a sum corresponding to 
8% of their salary would be deposited on a monthly basis. Those dis-
missed without cause would be able to access the funds in the account. In 
fact, the FGTS was introduced to make it legal to fire workers who’d been 
continually employed for over ten years, since under the terms of the 
CLT they had achieved estabilidade (tenure) and could not be dismissed.
Another important institutional innovation that arose from this 
restructuring, led by the now-unified Ministry of Labour and Social 
Insurance, was the framing of a national healthcare system that privileged 
an assistance-based approach funnelled through private networks. It was 
at this point that, as part of its economic development project, the mili-
tary government supported the growth of a powerful medical-industrial 
complex, driving the privatization of medical assistance, whether through 
purchases in the private sector funded by Social Security or public subsi-
dies for the construction of private hospitals. This would kick-start the 
process of the internationalization of the healthcare system, as multina-
tional companies arrived in Brazil to meet the healthcare consumption 
demands of the rising middle classes.
In the field of healthcare, a new pattern of stratification manifested 
itself. Low-income workers who were currently formally employed were 
treated at public hospitals, institutions plagued by deficient financing 
and with dismal records in terms of patient outcomes. As increased 
demand led to bottlenecks, new routes of access to private medical ser-
vices emerged, company health plans chief among them. The result was 
that State increasingly purchased third-party services on the market to 
meet the needs of social insurance beneficiaries (Werneck Vianna 1998). 
Meanwhile, the middle classes and those with significant purchasing 
power were drawn in by the promise of better care through private 
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medical institutions, driven by fiscal incentives (individual tax deduc-
tions17) and rising incomes. All the while, the poor, those deprived of citi-
zenship, remained at the mercy of a meagre network of philanthropic 
institutions.
At the same time, “exclusionary expansion” continued to hold sway, 
with the gradual, almost always incomplete incorporation of new catego-
ries. PRORURAL, or the Programme of Assistance for Rural Workers, 
was instituted in 1971; despite the new name, this was merely a revamped 
version of the 1963 FUNRURAL. In spite of challenges to implementa-
tion and its negligible functional efficacy, PRORURAL did provide tex-
tual reinforcement of social rights for groups that had previously gone 
wholly unprotected or had only patchy coverage.
Another relevant extension of coverage came with the 1972 regulation 
of the profession of domestic worker and its subsequent incorporation 
into the social insurance system. As recently as 2013, the majority of 
working women in Brazil were domestic workers. But the law remained 
a dead letter.
The second and most significant reform of the social insurance system 
under the authoritarian regime would come in 1977 when the military 
government completely overhauled the National System of Social 
Insurance and Assistance (SINPAS). For the first time, social assistance 
was included in the system’s organizational structure. In an attempt to 
ensure better management, different services were addressed by a variety 
of bodies. Social Security remained with INPS; medical care was taken 
over by the National Social Insurance Medical Assistance Institute 
(INAMPS);18 and the Brazilian Assistance League Foundation (FLBA)19 
and National Foundation for the Welfare of Minors (FUNABEM)20 
17 The 1966 tax reform and the 1967 Constitution inaugurated a new array of tax deductions.
18 Other creations of the period included the Institute for the Financial Administration of Social 
Insurance and Assistance (IAPAS), tasked with collecting contributions, overseeing resources, and 
managing the system’s funds, and DATAPREV (Public Pension System Data Base), which worked 
to systematize and manage the network’s data.
19 Originally the Brazilian Assistance League—the organization was founded in 1942 to provide aid 
to the families of soldiers serving in World War II. It was reorganized as a Foundation in 1969 by 
the dictatorship.
20 Created in 1964. Under the military dictatorship, juvenile delinquents came to be seen as a 
“national security issue”, and there emerged a consensus that poor children belonged in boarding 
schools. The repressive policy of sending delinquents to reform school lasted through the start of 
the re-democratization process in the mid-1980s.
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would be brought in to address the indigent population, albeit employ-
ing a repressive approach. In practice, the system continued to segregate 
services by clientele. More troublingly, as this assistance was institutional-
ized, it developed a clear punitive bent; the groups it attended almost 
exclusively were single mothers (LBA) and juvenile delinquents 
(FUNABEM), both targeted by public policy by virtue of their deviant 
behaviours.
Such a distorted perspective of social assistance explains why the gov-
ernment implemented no poverty-fighting programmes supported by 
cash transfers to mitigate the hardships suffered by those unable to meet 
their most basic needs. Poverty mitigation, meanwhile, remained largely 
charitable and provided by private institutions.
As the 1970s’ decade drew to a close, the economic miracle began to 
melt away and the social question was channelled into the struggle for 
democratic freedoms, amnesty (1979), and political opening. With the 
support of the Catholic Church, society organized and mobilized in 
working-class neighbourhoods. Associations of all stripes were formed, 
rooted in a shared logic of resistance to the dictatorship. One item on the 
agenda, just as at the turn of the century, was the cost of living: the work-
ing population bore the brunt of skyrocketing inflation (211% in 1983) 
and considerable wage cuts, which reduced the real value of the mini-
mum wage by over 50% (Lavinas 2017). Though GDP per capita rose 
6.1% p.a. from 1970 to 1980, the Gini index, as measured by household 
income, went from 0.504 in 1960 to 0.592 in 1980. This was the rise of 
the “new trade unionism” (Schwarcz and Starling 2018), which broke 
away from the state-controlled model of the Vargas era and opened up a 
phase in which leaders would seek to forge a unified representation for 
the working classes, moving beyond socio-occupational categories.
Pressure to put an end to the dictatorship grew across the country. So, 
too, did reactions from within the armed forces from those opposed to a 
return to democratic order; repressive mechanisms which had never been 
dismantled were set to work again.
On January 15, 1985, a new civil government inaugurated the New 
Republic, and a Constituent Assembly would be called in 1987 to draw 
up the nation’s new carta magna. Rarely had Brazil seen such widespread 
mobilization and engagement with the constitutional debate. Through 
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associations, committees promoting grassroots participation, activist 
gatherings, and unions, petitions would be drawn up and hundreds of 
proposed amendments were submitted from all sectors of society. This 
may serve to show how it is nearly impossible to speak of the social ques-
tion in Brazil, given the enmeshed tangle of issues that would come to 
shape the Citizen Constitution of 1988. That Constitution would 
become the repository of collective hopes of addressing a whole variety of 
social issues.
Among the groups most active in drawing up the section on social 
rights, scholars, politicians, and activists from the field of Social Security 
took pride of place.
 1988–2015: A New Wave of Democracy—Social 
Security for All21
The 1988 Constitution establishes citizenship as one of its fundamental 
pillars. Among its explicit objectives are the construction of a free, just 
society rooted in solidarity, the eradication of poverty and the reduction 
of social and regional inequalities, as well as the welfare of all, without 
prejudice or any form of discrimination. The document guarantees the 
participation of civil society across a variety of forums (healthcare; educa-
tion; social assistance) to democratize the decision-making process.
The process of re-founding the nation (Paoli 1989) and the return of 
democratic rule, would, however, unearth issues that had to be addressed 
urgently. Extreme poverty, that long-stifled element of the social ques-
tion, finally came to the fore. It had worsened belatedly, not as a conse-
quence of the waves of industrialization and the impoverishment of the 
working classes—which predated workers’ mobilizations—but as a mani-
festation of inertial inflation, which had been forcing up the prices of 
basic necessities since the 1970s. In 1993, hyperinflation hit 2477% 
(IPCA—IBGE, Contas Nacionais 2018), threatening the very survival of 
multiple sectors of the population.
21 Part of this section draws on Lavinas (2017).
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The fight against hunger would become a central element of the social 
agenda. As in the past, it would focus on the struggle against the cost of 
living. The first major social mobilization along these lines was the cam-
paign for Citizen Action Against Hunger, Extreme Poverty, and For Life.
Poverty as a social question would become a central part of the land-
scape of social struggles, as the social protection system enshrined in the 
1988 Constitution, with the creation of Social Security, was regulated 
and implemented. For the first time, the term “Social Security” was added 
to the body of the law, and Brazil’s poor became entitled to rights.
The Constitution of 1988 was a watershed moment in Brazil in terms 
of social rights. With it, the country would be transformed. Articles 194 
and 195 of the Constitution implemented a Social Security System, com-
prising healthcare, pensions and other labour-related benefits, welfare 
schemes, and unemployment insurance (Article 201). Under the Citizen 
Constitution, healthcare is defined as universal and free of charge. 
Nonetheless, private institutions may work to complement the Unified 
Health System (Sistema Único de Saúde, or SUS), in keeping with direc-
tives established by the public system. Social insurance, including unem-
ployment insurance, is contributory and guarantees a relatively broad 
array of types of coverage in cases of forced or definitive inactivity (pay- 
as- you-go model). Social insurance also guarantees pensions and other 
benefits to small family farmers irrespective of prior contribution records 
This is a major achievement in the process of universalizing access to pen-
sions for both rural and urban workers. Non-contributory old-age pen-
sions to rural workers, both male and female, are paid out of the general 
budget of the Social Security System (collecting contributions from both 
employees and employers). They are not considered welfare benefits but 
a solidary principle in order to promote equality of rights. Social assis-
tance schemes, meanwhile, introduce the right to a safety net for the 
demonstrably poor, subject to means test.
The incorporation of social assistance under the umbrella of Social 
Security comes as an extremely relevant institutional innovation. Until 
this point, care for the poorest and destitute had been mostly limited to 
charity and philanthropic organizations, but then it has become the 
State´s legal obligation (Lavinas et al. 2017).
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Other equally important rights were written into the letter of the law: 
the right to housing and the social function of the city and urban prop-
erty; the social function of agricultural property (see Chap. 10, in this 
book) and the promotion of agrarian reform; food security; the right to 
free and secular education at all levels (day care and preschool; primary, 
middle, and high school; college; and youth and adult education); and 
the right to security, to say nothing of the Constitution’s considerable 
expansion of labour and union rights. Eduardo Fagnani and Flavio 
Tonelli Vaz write that the Constitution of 1988 inaugurated “a social 
protection system inspired by the values of the social welfare state” (2013: 
98–99) as seen in Europe.
Finally, the Constitution reaffirmed the ILO model of tripartite financ-
ing for Social Security. Should the National Treasury need to transfer 
fiscal resources to the General Social Insurance Regime (RPPS, which is 
contributory), one might argue that the situation would not constitute a 
“deficit”, but rather a follow-through of a constitutional responsibility 
(Fagnani 2005).
To shore up the social order outlined in the Constitution, the mem-
bers of the Constituent Assembly established a specific budget for Social 
Security, set apart from the fiscal budget (revenues from which would go 
towards financing other social rights, such as education, sanitation, hous-
ing, etc.). The idea was to ensure a measure of fiscal autonomy for Social 
Security by feeding it with certain exclusive revenue streams drawing on 
a variety of sources.
With this in mind, the Social Security budget draws off of contribu-
tions from employees and employers and from voluntary contributors 
(self-employed workers, idle working-age adults, etc.), in keeping with 
the logic of contributory Social Security. It is also fed by so-called social 
contributions, which include taxes on consumption, reflecting a society- 
wide contributive effort, or on company earnings, rather than income 
tax. Finally, there are also contributions from lotteries and revenue from 
the ministries that make up the various sectors of Social Security, although 
these are modest sums. In theory, all of these revenue sources are tied to 
Social Security and supply it exclusively. However, since 1994, the federal 
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government started slashing the Social Security budget in order to shift 
funds over to the fiscal budget, applying a 20% cutback22 (dubbed as the 
Unbinding of Federal Revenue or DRU).
 National Social Insurance Scheme
Brazil adopted two public social insurance regimes in addition to the 
complementary fully funded regime, which is voluntary. They were all 
instituted by the Social Security Organic Law n. 8.212 of 1991.
The General Social Insurance Regime (Regime Geral da Previdência 
Social, or RGPS) provides pensions and other contributory benefits for 
workers in the private sector, and is operated by the National Social 
Security Institute (Instituto Nacional da Seguridade Social, or INSS). 
The Special Social Insurance Regime (Regime Próprio da Previdência 
Social, or RPPS), meanwhile, covers civil servants at all levels of govern-
ment and the military, and it is included in the fiscal budget (not in the 
Social Security budget). Finally, the 1988 Constitution created the 
Complementary Social Insurance Regime, served by open (run by banks 
and financial institutions) and closed (company-based) private pension 
funds, a system designed to complement workers’ incomes after their 
definitive retirement. These complementary fully funded pension schemes 
are subject to private regulations. The open private pension fund are vol-
untary, whereas the company-based funds tend to be mandatory, reach-
ing the fraction of wages that surpasses the public contribution cap 
(see later).
The RGPS is contributory and compulsory for workers in the private 
sector covered by the Consolidated Labour Laws but also takes in a broad 
range of voluntary policyholders (working-age adults, the self-employed, 
individual micro-entrepreneurs, and rural producers). It is a pay-as-you-
 go regime, with rules that, though distinct, cover both rural and urban 
dwellers.
The contribution rate is 20% of received remuneration or any contri-
bution between the social insurance floor (the current minimum wage) 
and the contribution cap, set at R$5840.00 (USD 1500) per month in 
22 Lifted to 30% in August 2016.
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2019. This 20% is split between workers and employers; the workers’ 
part is graduated, varying from 8% to 11%, while the rest is the employ-
er’s responsibility. Non-salaried contributors pay the full 20%, with the 
exception of Individual Micro-Entrepreneurs (Microempreendedores 
Individuais, or MEIs), for whom the rate was lessened (invariably 5% of 
a minimum wage), and small family farmers, who are taxed 2.1% of the 
value of the gross revenue from the sale of their production. In addition 
to this category of contributor, classed as “specially insured”, rural social 
insurance includes two other forms of membership, which fall under the 
general contribution rules for the RGPS.23
The array of benefits provided by social insurance is a varied one, rang-
ing from retirement plans and pensions to paid maternity leave, unem-
ployment insurance, family allowance, sick pay, accident benefits, and aid 
for inmates’ families, among others. Not all working categories are eligi-
ble to all benefits. The regulations vary according to the benefit and the 
beneficiary, but over recent years, they have trended towards greater uni-
formity, even between the RGPS and the RPPS (for instance, the floor 
and the cap are the same across both regimes).
As of 2019, approximately 30.3  million retirees and pensioners are 
covered by the RGPS. Around two-thirds of all RGPS’ monthly retire-
ment benefits and pensions amount to the social insurance floor, which 
stands at the minimum wage. Of all benefits, 80% fall below the level of 
two minimum wages. Around 85% of the elderly population (60+) is 
covered by social insurance or assistance old-age benefits (Continuous 
Cash Benefit—BPC, see later) in Brazil.
A broad pension reform was approved in 2019, with the purpose of 
unifying both regimes (private sector and civil servants) as recently 
achieved in China (see Chap. 3, in this book) and trying to impose a 
short-term transition towards a fully funded compulsory system. This 
reform will have further impacts on the Social Security system as a whole, 
negatively affecting the healthcare system and welfare schemes.
23 In addition to the “specially insured worker” (a category exclusive to small rural producers work-
ing on family farms), rural social insurance also includes the categories “individual contributor” 
(rural producer and self-employed worker) and “rural employee” (worker who provides services of 
a rural nature to an employer on a non-sporadic, remunerated basis). For individual contributors, 
a 20% rate is levied on the base salary, while rural employers have 8, 9, or 11 percent of the base 
salary withheld and levied by their employer.
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 Social Assistance
The right to a minimum level of protection by the State has completely 
reconfigured the social pact. Now, the Organic Social Assistance Law 
(LOAS, Law n. 8.742), passed in 1993, guarantees a minimum wage to 
poor senior citizens (aged 65 or older) and the handicapped living in 
families with per capita household income below one-fourth of the cur-
rent minimum wage. The number of recipients of the BPC (Non- 
Contributory Regular Pension) amounts to 4.9  million. The monthly 
benefit corresponds to a minimum wage, equivalent to R$998 in 2019. 
As stated by the Constitution, it is universal, though means-tested, apply-
ing to both rural and urban areas.
In parallel, since 2003, those who are not eligible for a BPC—that is, 
millions of children, young adults and able-bodied adults—can now 
qualify for a Bolsa Família stipend. In this respect, Bolsa Família went on 
to fix the limited coverage imposed by the eligibility criteria of the 
BPC. As an anti-poverty programme, it is less costly than BPC, given the 
difference in the average benefit—which in the case of Bolsa Família is 
R$185 (US$ 48) per month. The household benefit is subdivided in a 
basic stipend and a variable one paid for children or youth aged 0–17. In 
2019, while federal spending with Bolsa Família corresponded to 0.48% 
of Brazilian GDP, the BPC represented 0.88% (Lavinas 2020). Targeting 
mechanisms also differ; unlike the BPC, Bolsa Família recipients are sub-
ject to controls and conditionalities (school attendance, medical visits, 
immunization). In 2019, 14 million families are Bolsa Família beneficia-
ries, a headcount that certainly falls short of the total target population. 
“Bolsa Família” has been recognized nationally and internationally as an 
exceptional public poverty-fighting policy. None of this, however, was 
enough to ensure that the programme be enshrined as a right, ensuring 
full coverage for its target population. As a non-right, “Bolsa Família 
bends to budgetary logic and fails to expand its coverage as a countercy-
clical measure, as might be expected” (Lavinas 2017: 131).
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 The Unified Healthcare System
The utopia of healthcare for all is undeniably the hallmark of not just the 
1988 Constitution but also the entire societal ideal in play at the time. 
The 1988 Constitution created the Unified Health System (Sistema 
Único de Saúde, or SUS), specifically as a counterpoint to the trend 
towards the privatization of Brazilian healthcare, inherited from the years 
of the dictatorship. It was authorized by the SUS Organic Law n. 8.080 
of 1990.
The principle behind the public healthcare system, inspired on univer-
sal European models, is “health and democracy”. The slogan speaks to the 
basic idea behind the public health movement, which led to the health-
care reform, as well as to its mobilizing power. The aim is to break away 
from the legacy of liberal, profit-oriented medicine and cut down on the 
use of the designation “philanthropic” for healthcare institutions. In their 
place would come a public system committed to full service, universal 
coverage, and equal access.
Nevertheless, SUS does not guarantee full public provision, since most 
services are contracted out to the private sector via concessions. Despite 
the tremendous expansion of the public health network in the 1990s and 
its open-door treatment policy, private providers grew quickly, gained 
momentum, and ultimately drained SUS funding through tax waivers 
and tax credits. To give some sense for the contradictions and ambiguities 
that plague healthcare policy, total public spending at all levels of govern-
ment on healthcare stands at 4% of GDP (multilateral agencies recom-
mend 6%). Private spending, meanwhile, which is largely out of pocket, 
has come to 5.5% of GDP. The public network treats 75% of the popula-
tion, while the other 25% patronize the private sector; this is an eloquent 
testament to the twinned, hybrid health system in Brazil.
Ever since its creation, the Unified Health System has suffered from 
chronic underfinancing as a result of the government’s decision to sup-
port the expansion of the private sector—which is now increasingly inter-
national and financialized. To this day, the healthcare plan market, created 
in 1968 by the military regime, is being underwritten by hefty tax incen-
tives. Ocké-Reis and da Gama (2016) estimate that, between 2000 and 
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2013, tax credits on healthcare (through waivers) in relation to total 
expenditures by the Ministry of Health remained practically stable, 
around 30% per year.
Programmes such as Farmácia Popular, which allows for the free distri-
bution of medication and has extremely high approval ratings, meet just 
one-third of prevailing demand. The result is that medications are the 
fifth quintile of the income distribution’s number one healthcare expense 
(Lavinas and Gentil 2018). In short, the Brazilian health system remains 
deeply stratified by income.
At its birth, then, Social Security was marked by a mixture of improve-
ments and ambiguities that reflect historic problems and the challenges 
posed by multiple social questions. This is due in part to prevailing mac-
roeconomic policy, which has given no quarter to a more effective univer-
salization of social rights. Social spending has risen significantly, but it 
remains predominantly concentrated in cash transfers—they make up for 
68.8% of social spending across all levels of government—as opposed to 
in kind provision (Lavinas 2017)—which has been seen to have much 
broader redistributive effects and to homogenize the patterns of social 
reproduction across social classes.
The importance and scale that the social protection system acquired 
through the consolidation of Social Security broadened the process of 
social inclusion, which was also driven by a new cycle of economic growth 
that incorporated tens of millions into the mass consumer market who 
had previously been excluded or only marginally included. This would 
become clear at the peak of the social-developmentalist model 
(2003–2014), which combined three drivers of growth: a renewed focus 
on natural resources, the expansion of the domestic consumer market, 
and investments (Bielschowsky 2012).
But amidst a period of wage recovery, with broadened poverty-fighting 
programmes, access to credit, and incorporation into the mass consumer 
market, Brazilians—now armed with citizenship—took to the streets en 
masse to call out for public transportation, quality public healthcare and 
education, and affordable housing.
These would ultimately attract anti-Workers’ Party right-wing groups 
and serve as a magnet for the frustrations and aspirations of multiple 
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political positions’ deepening political divergences. The Landless Workers’ 
Movement (MST), created in 1984, and the Homeless Workers’ 
Movement (MTST), from 1997, are evidence that forms of exclusion 
persist in both rural and urban environments. Democracy and the con-
solidation of a social protection system—understood as access to social 
ownership—have not alleviated the hardships faced by those seeking to 
live off the land they work or those who hope to find a decent roof under 
which to live.
The Black movement, and its struggle for racial equality, is another 
social force that has redefined the terms of the social question in Brazil. 
While the 1989 Caó Act made racism a non-bailable crime with no stat-
ute of limitations, it proved necessary to create a Statute of Racial Equality 
in 2010 to ensure the practical application of equality of opportunity; the 
defence of individual, collective, and diffuse ethnic rights; and the fight 
against discrimination. Black and Brown people represent 52% of the 
Brazilian population, but they are disproportionately poor, underedu-
cated, and most vulnerable to violence, especially when wielded by the 
State. Being a Black, in Brazil, is still “a matter for the police”, as the say-
ing goes.
A hundred years after the abolition of slavery, the recognition that rac-
ism is an essential aspect of the social question in Brazil made it possible 
to take steps away from colourism and a long past of exclusion. Legally 
mandated diversity has advanced, moving towards the universalization of 
access. The 2012 Law of Social Quotas, for example, set aside 50% of 
admission spots at federal public universities for young people from low-
income families (per capita household income of up to 1.5 times mini-
mum wages) who attended public high school, a measure which 
significantly boosted Black enrolment. The 2014 Law of Racial Quotas 
set aside 20% of federal jobs for Black, Brown, and Indigenous candidates.
The social question in twenty-first-century Brazil remains defined by 
the ongoing struggle for the recognition of social cleavages that have 
become naturalized and masked, and by the implosion of certain barriers 
that reinforced selectivity, stratification, and discrimination.
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 Conclusion: The Social Compact at Risk
This chapter has sought to systematize multiple facets of the social ques-
tion in Brazil, covering a period that opens with the incipient debate 
about social protection begun in the late 1910s (for a summary, see 
Table 9.1). Looking back on the century-long process of the construction 
of a system of Social Security in a peripheral economy marked by deep 
structural heterogeneity, we may see that the layers of recognition 
(Leisering 2019, see also Chap. 1 of this book) of the social question have 
continued to multiply and remain intertwined and indivisible.
Social policy has expanded both under democracy and dictatorship. 
Under the first period of dictatorship (Vargas, 1930–1945), social policy 
has been instrumentalized as a means of social control. Labour relations 
were at the foreground of social policy and labour legislation built on the 
denial of the civil rights of workers and citizens. During the second period 
of dictatorship, 1964–1985, Social Security was modernized.
We have seen the continual, growing advance of coverage against risks, 
which moved from the regulated citizenship of the first phases of state-led 
industrialization to the universalization of rights enshrined in the Citizen 
Constitution of 1988. The social question, newly framed in terms of 
social inclusion, redefined the scope of social policies and reaffirmed uni-
versalistic value orientations.
While the early social security and labour legislation would organize 
the labour market to ballast the process of industrialization and the con-
servative modernization of Brazilian society, the consolidation of citizen-
ship belatedly introduce an entirely new dynamic.
The re-democratization of Brazilian society in 1988 allowed for the 
creation of a relatively solid, broad system of social protection bolstered 
by exclusive funding, which included both labour rights and the struggle 
against poverty.
This being said, the realm of the public provision of goods and de- 
commodified services is also a stronghold for resistance to the equaliza-
tion of opportunities. We have not yet been able to bypass income and 
status as forms of access to quality education, healthcare, or even public 




































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































charge in denouncing how this exclusionary universalization acts in a 
discriminatory fashion and undermines citizenship.
This positive and promising outlook is nevertheless at stake and has 
been under attack since the impeachment of democratically elected 
President Dilma, in 2016, and the following election of far-right President 
Jair Bolsonaro, who took office in January 2019 and is openly committed 
to the dismantling of the public sphere in Brazil.
Two labour reforms, adopted in 2018, have already reinforced infor-
mality and work precariousness, representing a blow to social rights. 
With declining contributions from employees and payroll exemptions 
for employers, the Social Security budget will soon be stifled and unable 
to fund pensions and other labour benefits. As a consequence, the struc-
tural heterogeneity that decades of industrial policymaking and various 
developmentalist models failed to overcome will amplify again, magnify-
ing inequalities, as is already the case. Sick-pay, occupational accident 
insurance, and maternity leave are benefits in peril. They risk being 
moved from the scope of the Social Security system to the financial sec-
tor, through contracts with private insurers. New waves of pension reform 
will probably undermine further the public pay as you go system.
Even the Bolsa Família programme, relying on targeting mechanisms, 
is now contested, collapsing the most innovative dimension of the 1988 
social compact: the right to minimal protection from the State, through 
a subsistence income. A sign that compensatory anti-poverty schemes, 
albeit cheap and central to the logic of residual welfare policies, do not 
escape the grip of the neoliberal mindset that governs today’s Brazil.
The assault on the social through disenfranchisement, if unstopped, 
will interrupt and prevent social citizenship from fully consolidating 
in Brazil.
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Ideational Bases of Land Reform 
in Brazil: 1910 to the Present
Gabriel Ondetti
Brazil’s colonial past conferred upon it a highly unequal landowning 
structure in which the large majority of the rural population was either 
landless or land-poor, while many vast holdings were not intensively uti-
lised. Neither independence from Portugal in the early nineteenth cen-
tury nor the transition from monarchy to republic near the end of that 
century ameliorated this situation. At least in part because of this under-
lying structural context, the “agrarian question,” or what to do about a 
highly unequal rural landholding structure, has been a longstanding 
source of debate and political conflict. Few issues have been as salient or 
provoked as much strife.
The agrarian question is different from the issues discussed in the rest 
of this volume. Most obviously, unlike a social security system, land 
reform for the most part only benefits the rural population. In addition, 
the agrarian question has not been just a social question but also an eco-
nomic one. Indeed, its rise as a national issue in Brazil was driven to a 
substantial extent by concerns that an unproductive farm sector would 
G. Ondetti (*) 
Missouri State University, Springfield, MO, USA
e-mail: GabrielOndetti@missouristate.edu
344
hinder industrialisation. Still, there is good reason to address land reform 
as a social issue. Given the frequent exclusion of rural populations from 
early social security development, land reform can be thought of as a kind 
of proto-social protection programme for the countryside, providing a 
measure of income and food security in lieu of cash transfers. Indeed, 
some would argue that it is superior to cash, since land ownership pro-
vides a degree of autonomy and self-sufficiency that cash cannot.
This chapter explores the historical trajectory of the agrarian question 
in Brazil. It focuses, in particular, on ideas about the nature of the agrar-
ian structure, its consequences and how to address the problems it causes. 
However, as with other chapters in the volume, it is not simply an intel-
lectual history. Rather, it examines how ideas have interacted with other 
variables, especially collective actors, legal institutions and policy out-
comes. While the emphasis is on ideas advanced by advocates of reform, 
some attention is devoted to opposing arguments. It draws on both exist-
ing scholarly works and a variety of primary sources, including constitu-
tional texts, newspaper reports, documents published by social movement 
and non-governmental organisations and official land reform data. The 
chapter fills a significant gap in the scholarship on land reform in Brazil. 
Although the literature in this area is rich, there are few historical over-
views, and those that do exist (Camargo 1986; Linhares and Teixeira da 
Silva 1999) do not focus specifically on ideas. In addition, those works 
are now somewhat dated.
A historical analysis virtually demands some kind of periodisation as a 
way of making sense of the evolution of events, but breaking history into 
discrete segments is a somewhat arbitrary and artificial exercise. No claim 
is made that the scheme used here is the only one possible or even the 
best one for all purposes. Nevertheless, the chapter argues that the trajec-
tory of the agrarian question can be usefully understood in terms of four 
basic periods, each of which was characterised by a distinct set of political 
dynamics with regard to this issue.
During the first, which encompasses the 1910s, some of the ideas that 
would most profoundly shape the agrarian question in Brazil were articu-
lated. However, a political context marked by strong landowner domi-
nance sharply limited their influence. The second period, from the 1920s 
to the mid-1950s, was characterised by important political 
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transformations and the recognition of the agrarian question as a pressing 
issue. Pro-land reform ideas diffused more widely and gained tentative 
expression in legal institutions, especially the constitution. However, the 
state did little to alter the structure of landholding, in part because the 
direct beneficiaries of land redistribution, the rural lower class, remained 
politically quiescent.
The third period, from the end of the 1950s through the mid-1980s, 
brought greater conflict over land. It was marked initially by the emer-
gence, for the first time in Brazilian history, of a grassroots land reform 
movement. However, rather than achieving its goal, the movement con-
tributed to the rise of a repressive military dictatorship that ultimately 
rejected its demands. Still, the conflicts of the period brought significant 
institutional advances and the emergence of an intellectual and political 
movement within the Catholic Church highly favourable to land reform. 
Both would influence the events of the fourth period.
From the late 1980s to the present, the democratisation of Brazilian 
politics has helped produce unprecedented increases in both mobilisation 
for land and actual implementation of land reform. Although the major 
ideas supporting reform have remained largely the same as in the past, 
some new rationales have emerged in recent decades, linked mainly to 
environmental and health concerns. In addition, facing greater threats 
than before, landowning elites and their allies have engaged in innovative 
forms of organisation and devised new rhetorical strategies focusing on 
the modernisation of agriculture and on the failings of the many land 
reform settlements (see below) that now dot the countryside.
While land reform has clearly reached its historical peak during this 
most recent period, the degree of change in the agrarian structure remains 
modest, hardly altering the general distribution of rural property, which 
remains among the world’s most unequal. Overall, then, Brazil is a case 
in which pro-land reform ideas have deep historical roots and have 
achieved considerable institutional expression, but in which actual land 
redistribution has remained superficial, due to a political power balance 
that has favoured large landowners over the major direct beneficiaries of 
land redistribution, the rural landless and land-poor.
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 Emergence of Pro-land Reform Ideas: 
the 1910s
Land reform would not become a substantial national political issue in 
Brazil until the 1930s. However, some of the core ideas behind it emerged 
earlier. The 1910s constitute a particularly important period in this sense, 
since they saw the publication of a number of texts providing compelling 
rationales for state intervention in rural land ownership.
Some scholars trace the origins of the Brazilian agrarian question to 
late nineteenth-century liberal political elites, like Andre Rebouças, an 
advisor to Emperor Pedro III who advocated the end of slavery and the 
distribution of land to former slaves (Camargo 1986: 56),1 or Rui 
Barbosa, a legislator and government minister who, following the estab-
lishment of a republic in 1889, pushed for reforms that would create a 
more fluid land market (Linhares and Teixeira da Silva 1999: 71–75). 
However, a lucid general argument in favour of promoting equitable 
landownership would only appear some years later.
That argument came from the pen of Alberto Torres, a politician and 
intellectual known for his nationalist views (Pinto 2010). During the first 
half of the 1910s, Torres published a series of essays and books that 
advanced major criticisms of Brazilian society. Many had to do with the 
political regime established by the 1891 constitution, but he also laid out 
a sophisticated critique of an economic system devoted to producing a 
handful of export commodities (mainly coffee, sugar, latex and cacao) on 
large estates. Torres argued that this system enriched a narrow landown-
ing elite at the expense of society as a whole. Not only did it concentrate 
the income from agriculture, but it also contributed to high food costs 
(since the best land was devoted to export crops) and tended to degrade 
the environment because the easy access of wealthy planters to land dis-
couraged careful use of soils.
Torres advocated reforms that would partially reorient agriculture 
towards the production of food for the domestic market and promote 
wider ownership of land. Such a system, he argued, would increase 
1 Slavery ended in 1888, later than in any other country in the Americas. Rebouças’ advocacy not-
withstanding, the freed slaves did not receive land.
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popular welfare, stem migration of the rural poor to the cities and pro-
mote better stewardship of natural resources. Torres did not go as far as 
to urge expropriation of private land, but he did suggest that the state 
should take the lead in distributing unused or unclaimed lands in small 
parcels to the landless and land-poor. According to the author:
“it would make sense to promote…the division of properties in order to 
disperse wealth, thus consolidating popular welfare. Our politicians have 
not yet grasped that Brazil needs to strengthen its people, endowing the 
poor classes of society with that minimum level of security and welfare that 
comes from owning property…Our policies should move with greater 
courage – without attacking property or established rights – toward a wider 
distribution of wealth and a more complete levelling of opportunities and 
means for action.” (Torres 2002 [first published in 1914])2
At roughly the same time that Torres was elaborating his critiques, 
another author in distant France was launching a broader attack on prop-
erty rights that would eventually wield significant influence in Brazil, as 
well as other Latin American countries. Based partially on earlier writings 
by August Comte, the jurist Léon Duguit argued in a series of lectures 
delivered in Argentina in 1911 that private ownership of land (and other 
capital assets) should be understood not as an inalienable individual right 
but as a “social function” (Duguit 1918). As such, it involves an obliga-
tion to use land in ways that benefit society as a whole, which in practice 
mainly means putting it into agricultural production. If the owner does 
not fulfil this obligation, the state, Duguit suggested, should have the 
power to coerce him to do so.
Like Torres, Duguit was not a socialist and did not oppose private 
property. Nevertheless, he did believe that nineteenth-century liberalism 
had gone too far in championing individual rights, and he argued for a 
reorientation of legal codes towards obligations to the collective good. 
Although Duguit’s ideas about property did not achieve great influence 
in his native Europe, his emphasis on productive use of assets was poten-
tially more compelling in Brazil, where agriculture remained the core of 
2 All translations in this chapter are by the author.
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the economy and land ownership was concentrated in a small elite who 
often failed to use their holdings productively. The contrast between 
huge, lightly cultivated estates and the millions of peasant families who 
scraped out a precarious living on tiny holdings or on other people’s land 
was destined to make the social function an appealing concept to reform-
ers in Brazil and elsewhere in Latin America.
However, at the time of their publication, neither Torres’ nor Duguit’s 
ideas appear to have had much impact on Brazilian society. This was 
probably because the system Torres was criticising, based on the kind of 
strong property rights regime that Duguit denounced, rested on powerful 
pillars of support. The decentralised oligarchic system created after the 
fall of the monarchy had not yet faced major challenges. Despite the 
trade disruptions caused by World War I, commodity exports continued 
to be a key source of growth, and the groups who dominated that sector, 
especially the coffee “barons” of the state of São Paulo, enjoyed great 
prestige and political influence. Given the low levels of urbanisation and 
industrialisation, there were few actors capable of forcefully questioning 
the status quo.
 Societal Recognition of the Agrarian Question: 
1920s to the Mid-1950s
Political and economic transformations that occurred during the 1920s 
and 1930s altered the balance of power and thus favoured the wider dif-
fusion and further elaboration of pro-land reform ideas. To some extent, 
awareness of the agrarian question came to influence legal institutions, 
most notably the constitutions drafted in 1934 and 1946. However, the 
awakening of society to this issue had two crucial limitations. First, the 
prospective direct beneficiaries of land reform did not engage in signifi-
cant political action. Second, and relatedly, the state did little to promote 
a more equitable pattern of landholding.
Two events were especially important in destabilising the oligarchical 
system. First, in 1922 a movement arose within the armed forces that 
criticised the political regime as corrupt and unresponsive to popular 
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needs. Made up of junior officers, the tenentes (or “lieutenants”) under-
took repeated armed rebellions. From 1924 to 1927, a tenentes force 
roamed the interior of the country, seeking support from the population 
and resisting various attempts to destroy it. Although it ultimately dis-
solved, the movement constituted a blow to the system’s legitimacy. 
Second, the stock market crash of 1929 initiated a global economic crisis 
that undermined Brazil’s export-oriented development model and helped 
provoke a political regime change. Prior to that point, there had been an 
informal agreement between the elites of São Paulo and neighbouring 
Minas Gerais to rotate in controlling the presidency. In an attempt to 
protect their interests in the face of the crisis, in 1930 São Paulo broke 
with this arrangement and sought to hold onto the office for a second 
term. In response, Minas Gerais joined some other states in organising a 
military coup that brought to power Getúlio Vargas, a wily politician 
who would deeply influence Brazil’s development.
Vargas led Brazil from 1930 to 1945, mainly as a dictator, and again 
from 1951 to 1954 as a democratically elected president. During these 
years, he centralised power in the national executive branch and increas-
ingly used the state to promote industrialisation and diversify the econ-
omy away from agriculture. He was also largely responsible for the 
creation of the country’s social security system and a labour code that 
extended significant new rights to workers while also imposing corporat-
ist controls on their organisations (Malloy 1979). The Vargas presidencies 
thus played a crucial role in the rise of the statist development model that 
Brazil would pursue until at least the early 1990s.
The Great Depression and Vargas’ rise to power favoured the emer-
gence of the agrarian question as a national issue. The collapse of trade 
and the suffering it caused called into question the benefits of export-led 
development and diminished the prestige enjoyed by planters and their 
associates. While the landowning elite remained powerful, other social 
groups, especially industrialists but also civil servants and urban workers, 
saw their status rise as a function of the growing emphasis on state-led 
industrialisation. Political space expanded within the state and the 
broader society for ideas that questioned the compatibility of the land-
holding system with public welfare. Consequently, in the early 1930s, 
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both Torres’ ideas and the concept of the social function gained consider-
able popularity.
Despite having died in 1917, Torres became among the most influen-
tial intellectuals of the Vargas era, since his nationalism and rejection of 
export-based development were in tune with political trends (Bravo 
2016). His books were republished, and three works by other authors 
came out on his life and thought (Rachum 2015: 89). A society was 
formed in 1932 called the “Friends of Alberto Torres,” which included 
prominent intellectual and political figures. Torres’ ideas regarding the 
rural sector were endorsed by the former tenentes, who became key advo-
cates of land reform in the early 1930s and in some cases held influential 
positions within the state (Camargo 1986; Bravo 2016). To advance their 
reformist views, in 1931 the tenentes created an organisation called the 
“October 3 Club,” which issued a manifesto that reflected many of Torres’ 
views.3 On the agrarian question, the document asserted that it should be 
“obligatory for governments to reduce to the minimum possible all forms 
of latifundia [i.e., large landholdings]” and urged the state to distribute 
land to the landless (Bravo 2016: 122).
Vargas himself also echoed some of Torres’ ideas about rural society, 
both during the early 1930s and in later years. In speeches, Vargas some-
times underscored the problem of rural-urban migration and the irony of 
landlessness in a land-rich country; for example, in a 1933 speech he 
argued that, because of the allure of the cities to destitute rural workers, 
“the urban proletariat has increased disproportionately, leading to pau-
perism and all the ills resulting from the surplus of work without perma-
nent jobs” (quoted in Cardoso 2010: 786). In a 1941 address, he asserted 
that “it is impossible for us to maintain the dangerous anomaly of peas-
ants without their own land in a country where rich valleys like the 
Amazon remain uncultivated and vast pastures are without livestock.” 
Furthermore, he warned that if rural living conditions did not improve, 
Brazil could “witness an exodus from the fields and the overpopulation of 
the cities, an imbalance with unforeseeable consequences, capable of 
weakening or annulling the campaign for the integral improvement of 
the Brazilian man” (quoted in Cardoso 2010: 784).
3 Its name came from the date on which the 1930 coup d’état was initiated.
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Just as Torres had, Vargas and his tenente allies called for reforms that 
would promote more equitable landownership without frontally attack-
ing the institution of private property. Upon taking office, Vargas 
announced a programme of government, one aspect of which was the 
distribution of farmland in order to “encourage, without violence, the 
progressive extinction of the latifundium” (quoted in Rachum 2015: 89). 
A similar position was laid out in the October 3 Club’s manifesto. Rather 
than demanding massive expropriation of private estates, it called on the 
state to “promote the social utilisation of public lands and those that have 
been illegally occupied and exploited so that, once they have reverted to 
state control, they can be used to establish cooperative agricultural colo-
nies” (quoted in Bravo 2016: 122). While the tenentes would fade as a 
political force after the mid-1930s, Vargas continued to rhetorically 
endorse land reform periodically until his dramatic death by suicide in 
1954 (Camargo 1986).
Like Torres’ ideas, the social function of property, after being largely 
ignored in Brazil in previous decades, became the subject of substantial 
discussion during the early 1930s. Editorials about it were published in 
newspapers by eminent lawyers and politicians and some major political 
parties incorporated it into their programmes (Sodré n.d.: 54). It was also 
a topic of debate during the 1933–1934 constituent assembly and, as 
discussed below, would have some influence on the resulting constitu-
tional text. The concept was endorsed by actors of diverse perspectives; 
for example, Antônio Augusto Borges de Medeiros, an erstwhile Vargas 
ally who sided with the conservative São Paulo opposition after the 1930 
coup, argued that property should no longer be “the sacred and inviolable 
right of the French Revolution of 1789” but rather a “social function” 
and that, as such, “its exercise is subordinated to the norms and prescrip-
tions that the state assigns it in the name of the public interest” (Medeiros 
1933: 34). In its 1932 manifesto, the pro-Vargas October 3 Club asserted 
that “With regard to property, individual interests cannot be allowed to 
override the social function” (quoted in Bravo 2016: 121). Finally, João 
Mangabeira, a prominent legislator who opposed Vargas from the left, 
was an enthusiastic defender of the concept. In a 1934 editorial, 
Mangabeira called Duguit “the most profound, the most brilliant, the 
most original, the greatest of French constitutionalists,” and argued that 
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in the jurist’s Argentine lectures, Duguit “frames the question in such 
terms and resolves it in such a way that he turns his doctrine, frankly, 
victorious” (quoted in Maldaner 2015: 72).
While ideas advanced by Torres and Duguit gained considerable 
prominence after 1930, land reform advocates did not limit themselves 
to parroting these ideas. One relatively new theme that developed during 
these decades was the link between land reform and industrialisation. 
Torres had believed deeply in Brazil’s agricultural vocation and showed 
little interest in promoting industry. However, that position ran contrary 
to the thrust of state policymaking under Vargas and his successors. 
Post-1930, the agrarian question was increasingly tied to the ongoing 
processes of import-substitution industrialisation and construction of a 
social security system to meet the needs of urban workers (Moreira 1998; 
Linhares and Teixeira da Silva 1999). For Brazilian manufacturing to 
prosper, it was argued, it would need a substantial domestic consumer 
market. That fact that much of the population was made up of destitute 
peasants was an obstacle to that goal, one that could be addressed through 
land redistribution. Moreover, by the 1950s, there were growing con-
cerns that insufficient farm production would impede industrial develop-
ment by stoking inflation and limiting inputs for sectors like food and 
textiles (Linhares and Teixeira da Silva 1999).
Such arguments were most forcefully articulated by economic nation-
alists, who played an important role not only in the varguista coalition 
but also in forces to the left of that coalition, especially the Brazilian 
Communist Party (PCB) (Moreira 1998). Although banned from elec-
tions during most of this period, the PCB had significant intellectual 
influence and was increasingly involved in labour organising. Communists 
tended to frame the problems of the rural sector as reflecting the persis-
tence of “feudal” or “pre-capitalist” economic relations that tied landless 
families to large landowners (Caminha 2018). Land reform would mod-
ernise the countryside by replacing these paternalistic, patron-client types 
of relations with ones based on market exchange. The PCB supported a 
more aggressive approach to land reform than other groups. Most of the 
tenentes and other moderate nationalists, including Vargas, called for a 
gradual transition away from the latifundium-dominated land tenure 
structure (Bravo 2016). They viewed forcible expropriation of private 
 G. Ondetti
353
holdings as a tool to be used cautiously and seemed to believe that much 
could be achieved simply by taxing fallow land. In contrast, the commu-
nists called for more abrupt and sweeping change.4 In a manifesto pub-
lished in 1958, for instance, the PCB endorsed “the radical transformation 
of the agrarian structure, with the liquidation of the land monopoly and 
pre-capitalist labour relations” (quoted in Santos 2008: 139).
Duguit’s ideas regarding the social function of property were also not 
necessarily accepted without debate or in their original form (Maldaner 
2015). Even critics tended to acknowledge during these years that private 
property rights could not be absolute. However, they (particularly con-
servative Catholic jurists) questioned Duguit’s broader critique of indi-
vidual rights as vague and dangerous. Rather than being a social function, 
they argued, private property should be thought of as having a social 
function and thus being subject to certain legal constraints on its use 
(Sodré no date; Maldaner 2015: 65–66). Probably owing to both the 
logical force of this argument and ignorance of Duguit’s actual writings, 
which were not easily accessible, this perspective would become the dom-
inant way of understanding the social function in Brazil, as in much of 
Latin America (Mirow 2010; Ondetti and Davy 2018).
As this discussion suggests, by the 1950s, the agrarian question was 
well established in Brazil at the ideational level. The belief that rural land 
inequality exerted a negative effect on the country’s social and economic 
development was widespread, at least among more informed sectors of 
society. There was also substantial support for reform of the land tenure 
structure, although opinions varied considerably regarding the character 
of that reform. In terms of the onion model discussed in the introduc-
tion, the “agrarian question” was a type of social question, implying a 
general concern about the acute concentration of rural landownership 
coupled to a call for a solution. The agrarian question gave rise to differ-
ent “policy paradigms” that framed the issue in different ways and envis-
aged different policies, ranging from rapid liquidation of all large estates 
to a gradualist approach based on distribution of public lands and 
4 It is worth noting, however, that the most prominent PCB leader, Luís Carlos Prestes, was a for-
mer tenente. Prestes’ embrace of Marxism made him a major exception to the moderate reformism 
that characterised the tenentes.
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taxation of unproductive private holdings. The rise of the agrarian ques-
tion was part of the more general “social question” that was arising as a 
result of changes set in motion by the global economic crisis of the late 
1920s and early 1930s. At the same time, however, it was also an aspect 
of an emerging societal concern with developing a modern industrial 
economy that would make Brazil autonomous of foreign powers, that is, 
an “economic question.”
To a significant extent, societal recognition of the agrarian question 
came to be reflected in legal institutions. Most importantly, it had some 
impact on the new constitutions drafted in 1934 and 1946. Influenced 
by both domestic events and examples of socially oriented post-World 
War I European constitutions, the 1934 document featured a variety of 
social, labour and educational provisions symbolising the state’s recogni-
tion of the social question. These included several provisions related to 
land access, an issue ignored by the 1891 constitution. Among other 
measures, the new constitution:
 1) Required that agricultural work be the subject of a legal code that 
would “strive to fix the rural man in the countryside” (i.e. prevent 
rural-urban migration).
 2) Required that the federal government, in cooperation with the states, 
organise “agricultural colonies” for the benefit of people from poorer 
regions and those lacking work.
 3) Gave all Brazilians who did not already own property the right to 
obtain up to ten hectares of land for free by occupying it for ten years 
and turning it productive.
 4) Prohibited concessions of more than 10,000 hectares of public land to 
a private actor without prior authorisation of the Senate.
In addition, the 1934 constitution contained an at least implicit social 
function clause. The initial draft had included a clause referring explicitly 
to that concept in a section titled “The Social Order.” It read, “Guaranteed 
is the right to property, with content and limits to be defined by law. 
Property has, above all, a social function which cannot be exercised 
against the collective interest” (Maldaner 2015: 73). Over the protests of 
João Mangabeira and some other constituents, the clause was moved to 
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the “Declaration of Rights and Obligations” section and its wording 
altered to: “Guaranteed is the right to property, which cannot be exer-
cised against the social or collective interest.” These changes shifted the 
emphasis from social obligations to individual rights. Nevertheless, by 
asserting that property rights are limited by obligations to society as a 
whole, it represented a change relative to the 1891 constitution, which 
had merely allowed the state to seize private property for public projects 
such as roads or parks.
The 1937 constitution, which framed Vargas’ dictatorial Estado Novo 
(New State) regime, excluded most of the pro-land reform provisions. 
However, the 1946 document, drafted under a more democratic regime 
after Vargas’ resignation, restored them, albeit in somewhat different 
form. The state’s obligations to “fix the rural man in the countryside” and 
create agricultural colonies were reaffirmed, and the area obtainable 
through squatting was increased to 25 hectares. In addition, the notion 
of a social function of property was reintroduced, without, once again, 
using that term. The section on individual rights stated, “Guaranteed is 
the right to property, save in the case of expropriation for public necessity 
or utility, or for social interest, conditional on prior and just indemnity 
in cash.” In addition, the section on the “Economic and Social Order” 
indicated that “The use of property will be conditioned on social welfare. 
The law can…promote the just distribution of property, with equal 
opportunity for all.” While this language was generally more favourable 
to land redistribution than the corresponding language in the 1934 con-
stitution, the new stipulation requiring that owners of expropriated land 
be indemnified in cash imposed a limitation of no small importance 
(Camargo 1986: 173). Due to this rule, any substantial land reform based 
on expropriation of private holdings would be vastly expensive to the 
government that implemented it.
Despite the intellectual rise of the agrarian question and the inclusion 
of moderately pro-land reform language in the constitution, little was 
actually done during these decades to alter the structure of rural landown-
ing. Vargas established several colonisation projects on public land. Most 
were a part of a highly publicised, but practically insignificant initiative 
during the early 1940s called the “March to West” by which the state tried 
to populate and develop a part of Brazil’s vast rural hinterland (Lenharo 
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1986). Following the 1945 democratic transition, a number of bills were 
introduced in Congress that sought to advance land reform (Camargo 
1986: 171–187). Most attempted to provide a statutory basis for the state 
to expropriate underutilised private holdings, and at least one tried to skirt 
the constitutional requirement of compensation in cash through a creative 
interpretation of this provision.5 Nevertheless, none of them was ulti-
mately approved. Similarly, as Lavinas points out in this volume, the state 
did very little during these years to extend to workers in the countryside 
the social and labour policies that benefitted urban workers. As with land 
reform, Vargas and his allies made repeated promises to carry out such 
reforms, but ultimately did not do so (Camargo 1986; Fausto 2006).
The key reason behind the lack of progress was an imbalance of politi-
cal influence in favour of conservative forces. Vargas’ rise to power had 
both reflected and reinforced the weakening of the rural oligarchy. 
Nevertheless, landowners retained great power, due to their wealth, their 
role as suppliers of foreign exchange and their vast political network. In 
1932, the São Paulo coffee oligarchy had spearheaded an armed rebellion 
against Vargas. Although the government eventually triumphed, the con-
flict lasted three months and took hundreds of lives. Vargas subsequently 
bowed to São Paulo’s demand for a transition towards an elected, consti-
tutional government. This concession was the beginning of the end of the 
influence of the tenentes, the most important social reformist faction asso-
ciated with Vargas. The conservative turn was consolidated under the 
Estado Novo. The democratic opening of 1945 did not initially revert this 
situation, since landowners used their influence in Congress to frustrate 
efforts at land reform. Much of that influence was exercised through the 
Social Democratic Party (PSD), the more powerful of the two varguista 
parties, which owed its electoral force largely to conservative rural politi-
cal networks. By the 1950s, relatively few voices openly defended the 
agrarian status quo. However, various motives were averred for resisting 
land reform bills, including the importance of protecting property rights, 
the need to postpone reform until a supposed future time of greater 
5 A 1952 bill endorsed by President Vargas would have mandated the state to compensate expropri-




political tranquillity and the risk of undermining investment and pro-
duction (Camargo 1986; Linhares and Teixeira da Silva 1999).
One important underlying reason for the persistence of landowner 
power was the quiescence of the rural lower class. While Brazil experi-
enced some non-political symptoms of rural discontent, such as millenar-
ian movements and rural banditry (Façó 1991; Martins 1995), no 
substantial grassroots movement for land reform or other state policies 
emerged during these years. For the most part, large landowners remained 
solidly in control of their workforces and communities. To the extent that 
land reform arose as a national issue, it was because of the actions of 
urban political elites who sought to use it to advance their own agendas. 
Had there been a substantial mobilisation of the rural poor, Vargas and 
his followers might have leveraged it to attempt substantive land reform, 
or at least extend social and labour rights to the countryside. However, 
the lack of a significant challenge made such a turn of events unlikely.
 Mobilisation Without Reform: Late 1950s 
to Mid-1980s
What could be thought of as a third period in the evolution of the agrar-
ian question runs from the end of the 1950s until the reestablishment of 
democracy in the mid-1980s. This period was characterised most notably 
by, on the one hand, the emergence of a substantial grassroots movement 
for land reform and, on the other, a conservative reaction that ended up 
stonewalling the movement’s core demand and contributing to the rise of 
a military dictatorship. Although this period ultimately did not result in 
significant land reform and was not as fertile ideationally as the previous 
ones, it was not totally sterile for advocates of this policy. Institutional 
reforms occurred, which would set a high bar for future authorities. In 
addition, certain ideas arose that would gradually come to have a signifi-
cant impact on the struggle for land.
The traditional passivity of the rural lower class came to an end in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s. Mobilisation began among tenant farmers in 
the state of Pernambuco and, with the support of leftist politician 
Francisco Julião, gradually spread to other parts of the poor north-eastern 
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region of Brazil (Azevêdo 1982; Bastos 1984). Known as the “Peasant 
Leagues,” the movement was involved in both providing its members 
with practical assistance with problems like legal defence and medical 
care and demanding sweeping land reform, which it vowed to pursue “by 
law or by force.” Another regional movement for land emerged in Rio 
Grande do Sul, Brazil’s southernmost state. Like the Peasant Leagues, the 
Movement of Landless Farmers (MASTER), was initially a defensive 
response by poor farmers with precarious land access (Eckert 1984; 
Wagner 1989). However, with the implicit support of leftist governor 
Leonel Brizola, it began invading properties considered to be vulnerable 
to state seizure, due to abandonment or dubious ownership claims.
During the 1960s there also arose a rural unionisation movement. For 
years, PCB activists had sought to organise rural workers, but their prog-
ress was impeded by landowner hostility, lack of a favourable legal struc-
ture and the indifference or hostility of governing authorities. Under the 
left-leaning government of João Goulart (1961–1964), however, the 
political climate became more hospitable and, in 1963, the Congress 
passed the Rural Worker Statute, which facilitated union registration. 
PCB-led unions grew in number, especially in the northeast (Maybury- 
Lewis 1994; Pereira 1997). Concerned that the rising rural mobilisation 
would be harnessed by leftist forces, groups associated with the Catholic 
Church also entered the fray, organising progressive but non-communist 
unions. State authorities likewise sought to encourage and channel the 
growing rural labour movement, at least initially as a way of counterbal-
ancing the Peasant Leagues, which had rejected collaboration with 
Goulart. The unions were more active in organising wage laborers than 
the Leagues, but the social bases of the two overlapped significantly. 
Although more focused on bread-and-butter issues than the Leagues, the 
unions also endorsed land reform.
Nevertheless, the growing clamour for land redistribution did not 
result in significant reform. President Goulart, who represented the more 
leftist faction within varguismo, introduced legislation that would have 
allowed a far-reaching land reform, in part by eliminating the constitu-
tional requirement of prior compensation for expropriations in cash 
(Dezemone 2016: 141). However, Congress refused to pass it, along with 
some other progressive reforms. Moreover, Goulart’s efforts to use mass 
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protest to pressure legislators into approving his agenda backfired, help-
ing provoke a military coup in 1964 and the establishment of a conserva-
tive authoritarian regime that would last until 1985. Although the regime 
initially showed signs of wanting to implement its own expropriation- 
based land reform (including legislation discussed below), it ultimately 
backed off this proposal. Instead, its agricultural policies focused on pro-
moting technical modernisation, mainly through the provision of subsi-
dised credit to large producers. To the extent they were addressed at all, 
rural social problems were dealt with through other policies. Reviving a 
Vargas-era initiative, the regime established a series of agricultural coloni-
sation projects in frontier areas, especially the vast Amazon River basin. 
In 1971, it also introduced a social security programme, including pen-
sions and healthcare, exclusively for people involved in agriculture and 
other rural activities. Although the benefits were extremely modest, the 
programme was extensive and did not require any contribution from 
beneficiaries (Malloy 1979: 132–134; Houtzager 2008).
To make matters worse for the land reform cause, doubts about the 
wisdom of advancing it grew within the Brazilian Communist Party 
(PCB), traditionally among its most ardent defenders. As mentioned ear-
lier, the PCB had long stressed the importance of mobilising the peas-
antry to struggle for land, since breaking up large estates would encourage 
a thorough transition to capitalism in the countryside (Passos Guimaraes 
1963). However, that view was increasingly challenged by Caio Prado Jr., 
a leading Marxist intellectual (Prado 1963, 1966). What distinguished 
the Brazilian rural society, Prado suggested, was not its feudalism (which 
he questioned), but the weak ties of the population to land. The Portuguese 
had established an economy based on vast plantations relying on slave 
labour. Outside of these estates, few families enjoyed stable access to 
enough land to maintain an independent family farm, even after the end 
of slavery. They therefore depended deeply on large landowners for their 
livelihood, whether in the form of wages or quasi-wage compensation. 
Thus, with the exception of a few rural areas affected by European immi-
gration, Brazil lacked a landed peasantry. Consequently, Prado believed, 
calls to mobilise for land redistribution were destined to fall largely on 
deaf ears. Instead, he urged the PCB to focus its appeals to rural dwellers 
on labour-oriented demands, such as better wages and working 
10 Ideational Bases of Land Reform in Brazil: 1910 to the Present 
360
conditions (Prado 1963). While Prado’s arguments probably helped 
encourage the PCB’s embrace of an incremental, union-based strategy in 
the countryside, the party continued to call for land reform as a long- 
term solution (Pereira 1997; Santos 2008).
Despite the lack of substantial land redistribution and the wavering 
advocacy of the PCB, this period did bring some developments with 
positive implications for advocates of land reform. First, significant 
advances occurred with regard to legal institutions. In 1964 President 
Humberto Castello Branco, the first leader of the military regime, decreed 
the Land Statute, which appeared to mandate a substantial land reform. 
The law allowed expropriation of private holdings based not only on low 
productivity but also on sheer size. In other words, even a productive 
estate could be expropriated if it exceeded a certain number of hectares. 
A constitutional amendment approved at the same time removed the 
requirement that expropriated landowners be indemnified in cash and 
instead allowed compensation in bonds payable over a 20-year span.6 The 
law declared that its purpose was to “condition the use of land on its 
social function,” “promote the just and adequate use of property” and 
“make obligatory the rational exploitation of land” (article 18), among 
other objectives. In addition, the regime’s 1967 constitution became the 
first in Brazil’s history to use the term “social function,” stating that one 
of the principles of the “Economic and Social Order” was “the social 
function of property” (article 157). Although they went largely unimple-
mented, these robust legal provisions, as discussed later, established a 
high baseline for subsequent legislative initiatives.
Second, this era brought some innovative ideas related to the agrarian 
question. The most consequential arose within the Catholic Church, a 
crucial institution in this traditionally Catholic country. The church had 
long been considered a bastion of the status quo. Its occasional advocacy 
of social reform, including land redistribution, was motivated largely by 
fears that social grievances would be exploited by godless communists. 
However, during the late 1960s and 1970s, it developed a strong left 
6 Payment would be based on values declared for the purposes of the federal land tax. Since land-
owners had an incentive to minimise the value of their land for that purpose, this rule would tend 
to exert downward pressure on compensation.
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wing of its own. This “popular church” movement was deeply committed 
to land reform, a policy it came to view as the embodiment of Christian 
values of fraternity and solidarity with the poor and downtrodden. Not 
only did the church advocate land redistribution, but Catholic lay activ-
ists and priests also became actively involved in organising rural people to 
struggle for land (Mainwaring 1986; Martins 1991; Adriance 1995).
Central to this process was the National Conference of Brazilian 
Bishops (CNBB), which, beginning in about the early 1970s, adopted a 
consistent pro-land reform position. In 1975, moreover, the CNBB 
founded the Pastoral Commission on Land (CPT), an entity devoted to 
supporting demands for land reform through advice, legal defence, dona-
tions and direct involvement in organising initiatives (Poletto and Canuto 
2002). Though initially focused on the Amazon, where the military 
regime’s development initiatives had spurred violent conflict over land, 
the CPT quickly  established local chapters throughout much of the 
country. It supported efforts to unionise workers and, as will be discussed 
later, played a fundamental part in creating what would become the key 
land reform organisation of the post-military era, the Movement of 
Landless Rural Workers (MST), in 1984. CPT activists used religious 
symbols and biblical references to frame the struggle, comparing it, for 
example, to Moses’ decades-long trek through the desert to the promised 
land. Although the military had little interest in redistributing land, the 
church’s activism helped revive the agrarian question during the early 
1980s, forcing authorities to adopt efforts to quell land-related conflict, 
especially in Amazonia.
The popular church movement had both international and domestic 
roots. In part, it was a response to the Second Vatican Council 
(1962–1965), a series of gatherings through which the global Catholic 
Church had resolved to make itself more relevant to the lives of the faith-
ful (Adriance 1986). In Latin America, this call was interpreted as a man-
date to develop a “preferential option for the poor” or, in other words, to 
adopt efforts to materially improve the lives of the poor in the here-and- 
now, not simply through charity but by supporting political efforts at 
equity-enhancing reforms. During the late 1960s and 1970s, Latin 
American theologians, including the Brazilian priest Leonardo Boff, 
played a fundamental part in the development of “liberation theology,” a 
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school of thought that argues that the church has a moral and doctrinal 
responsibility to intervene in society on behalf of the poor. While the 
popular church movement extended throughout much of Latin America, 
Brazil was one of the countries most affected by it (Bruneau 1982; 
Mainwaring 1986).
Thus, although the period analysed in this section was characterised 
most notably by the state’s ultimate rejection of the demands for land 
reform raised by the Peasant Leagues and other actors of the pre-coup era, 
by the early 1980s, buoyed by frontier violence and Catholic Church 
sponsorship, the agrarian question was re-emerging as a national issue. In 
addition, the military had left a relatively positive institutional legacy, 
including the Land Statute and a constitution that explicitly recognised 
private property’s social function.
 Democracy, Protest and Limited Reform: Mid- 
1980s to the Present
The period since the return of elected civilian governance in 1985 has 
been marked by two major shifts related to the agrarian question. First, 
grassroots mobilisation for land reform achieved a scale and level of 
organisation unprecedented in Brazil’s history. Second, land redistribu-
tion by the state, though still limited, also reached its historical peak. 
These changes are related to the broad context of regime democratisation 
but do not reflect gains in legal institutions specific to agrarian reform, 
which arguably deteriorated relative to the military era. The key ideas 
underpinning the struggle for land have continued to be largely the same 
as those in earlier eras, but in recent decades the actual implementation 
of land reform has given rise to a relatively new debate about its virtues 
and flaws, with advocates often emphasising the environmental and 
health benefits of smallholder production and detractors disparaging 
land reform settlements as poverty-ridden shanty towns.
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The armed forces’ control of the federal executive branch, seized 
through the 1964 coup, was returned to civilians in 1985.7 Over the next 
five years, Brazil extended the suffrage to illiterates (who had previously 
been denied the vote), approved a new constitution and held its first 
popular presidential election since 1961. Despite numerous crises and 
the removal of two presidents by Congress, democracy has survived more 
than three decades.
Sustained democracy, combined with the support of other civil society 
actors, helped give rise to a grassroots land reform movement that by the 
second half of the 1990s constituted a substantial political force 
(Fernandes 1996; Wright and Wolford 2003; Ondetti 2008a; Pahnke 
2018). It was anchored by the Movement of Landless Rural Workers 
(MST), an organisation combining centralised national leadership with 
local affiliates throughout the country. The MST arose in the extreme 
south of Brazil, but gradually expanded to other regions. While its cre-
ation was largely a product of activism by the popular church, especially 
the CPT, it eventually became autonomous of the church. It developed 
its own secular worldview made up of a heterogeneous mixture of mainly 
Marxist ideas, as well as its own distinctive tactical methodology, based 
on massive invasions (or “occupations,” as activists term them) of under-
utilised private estates and the formation of roadside squatter camps. 
While overshadowed by the MST, the rural unions also continued to 
struggle for land and, inspired by the MST’s relative success, adopted 
some of its methods. The movement peaked in the late 1990s, when there 
were some 850 land occupations nationwide (see Fig. 10.1). In recent 
years it has declined, due in part to authorities’ growing unwillingness to 
grant land to people who occupy it. Nevertheless, at its peak the move-
ment was undoubtedly a much larger and better-organised phenomenon 
than its counterpart of the early 1960s.
Land reform has also intensified greatly relative to the past. Official 
data suggest that some 95% of the families that have benefitted from land 
reform in Brazil received their land during the current democratic period 
7 The legislature was only closed for a short period during the early 1970s but functioned under 
substantial restrictions thereafter. The first post-coup civilian president, José Sarney, was chosen by 
a special electoral college. It was only in 1989 that a popular election was held for president.
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(see Table  10.1). This period also accounts for more than 75% of all 
expropriated farmland. Clearly, protest actions led by the MST and other 
groups have played a key role in pressuring the state to redistribute land, 
mainly by calling the attention of the media and the public to the plight 
of the landless (Carter 2011). Protest has been relatively effective in part 
because Brazilians, as opinion polls have consistently shown, generally 
support land reform (Ondetti 2008a, b; Simonetti et al. 2012) and, in a 
society with a free press and competitive elections, authorities cannot 
ignore public preferences entirely.
Nevertheless, reform activity has been inconsistent. As Table 10.1 indi-
cates, the first three presidents of the democratic era (José Sarney, 
Fernando Collor and Itamar Franco) did not redistribute much land. 
That trend ended, however,  under Fernando Henrique Cardoso 
(1995–2002) of the centrist Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB), 
who settled more landless families than all his predecessors combined and 
expropriated almost as much private land. His successor, Luiz Inácio Lula 
da Silva (2003–2010) of the leftist Workers’ Party (PT), also granted land 
to a substantial number of families but did so mainly by distributing 

















Fig. 10.1 Land occupations in Brazil, 1988–2018. (Source: The author, data from 
reports of the Comissão Pastoral da Terra (CPT; https://www.cptnacional.org.br/
index.php/publicacoes-2/conflitos-no-campo-brasil) and the database Dataluta of 
the Núcleo de Estudos, Pesquisas e Projetos de Reforma Agrária (NERA), 




settlements, rather than expropriation. After da Silva’s first term 
(2003–2006), reform began to tail off, and it has ground to a virtual halt 
in recent years. Even Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016) of the PT did little in 
this area. These fluctuations arguably reflect the fact that land reform is 
only materially relevant to a small minority of Brazilians, given that more 
than 80% of the population now lives in urban areas. Its salience thus 
tends to surge in response to dramatic events, such as instances of violent 
repression against land occupiers, only to fade as public attention inevi-
tably shifts to other issues (Ondetti 2008b). Moreover, during the last 
two decades the expansion of the conditional cash transfer programme 
Bolsa Família has undermined land reform by providing an alternative 
approach for fighting rural poverty (Morton 2015).
Table 10.1 Land reform in Brazil, 1900–2019
Presidential 
term Families Granted Land








Pre-1985 45,471 4.7 6,044,955 23.7
Sarney 
(1985–1989)
68,999 7.1 4,240,141 16.7
Collor 
(1990–1992)
34,773 3.6 163,902 0.6
Franco 
(1993–1994)
14,407 1.5 1,101,856 4.3
Cardoso 
(1995–2002)
408,976 42.1 10,167,614 39.9
Da Silva 
(2003–2010)
359,476 37.0 3,511,552 13.8
Rousseff 
(2011–2016)
36,564 3.8 224,216 0.9
Temer 
(2016–2018)
3,292 0.3 5,344 0.0
Bolsonaro 
(2019–)
0 0.0 0 0.0
Total 971,958 100 25,459,580 100
Source: The author, data from Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma 
Agrária (INCRA)
a2019 figures are through July
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Inconsistent implementation of reform helps explain why land inequal-
ity remains high.8 Current figures are unavailable, but data from the 2006 
agricultural census show a level of inequality, measured in terms of the 
Gini coefficient, almost identical to that of 1985 (Brazilian Institute of 
Geography and Statistics, IBGE). Even within Latin America, which has 
the most skewed rural land distribution of any region, Brazil ranks among 
the five most unequal countries, with a Gini of 0.87 (Oxfam 2016: 22).
The institutional framework for land reform has played an ambivalent 
role in the fate of this policy under democracy (Mészáros 2013; Ondetti 
2016). On the one hand, the new constitution ratified in 1988 follows 
the military era constitution in explicitly adhering to the social function 
principle and allowing the state to expropriate large rural properties that 
do not fulfil that function, compensating the owners with bonds. 
Furthermore, it seemingly sets a higher bar for satisfying the social func-
tion, requiring not only “rational and adequate exploitation” of the land 
but also preservation of the natural environment, observation of labour 
laws and “exploitation that favours the welfare of both owners and work-
ers” (article 186). On the other hand, Article 185 states flatly that “pro-
ductive property” cannot be expropriated. Inserted in response to 
landowner pressure, this article would seem to neutralise the last three 
social function criteria, since they can only serve as the basis for expro-
priation if the property is also unproductive. In addition, unlike the 1964 
Land Statute, the 1988 constitution does not provide for the possibility 
of expropriation based on the sheer size of a property. In fact, by stating 
that productive land cannot be expropriated, it explicitly eliminates that 
possibility. Thus, although the 1988 constitution is widely known for its 
pioneering social provisions, with regard to land reform it is a deeply 
ambivalent document.
The ideas deployed during this period to justify land reform have for 
the most part been the same ones used by activists in earlier decades: land 
reform can alleviate rural poverty and hunger, both for humanitarian rea-
sons and to slow down migration to the overcrowded cities; it can increase 
agricultural output by putting unutilised land into production; it can 
8 Socio-economic trends, such as the growth of soybean production, which is characterised by 
strong economies of scale, may also contribute to inequality.
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lower the prices of farm goods; and it can dynamise the economy by 
making consumers out of people who previously earned barely enough to 
meet subsistence needs. These arguments can be found in the public 
statements and documents of the MST, rural unions and CPT, as well as 
in hundreds of books, articles, theses and editorials published by left- 
leaning intellectuals and land reform activists.9
Nevertheless, recent decades have brought some ideational innova-
tions, at least in a relative sense. These have come from both the advocates 
of land reform and their adversaries, who have grown in organisation. 
Among defenders of land redistribution, the most novel trend is the 
attempt to frame land reform as a policy favouring environmental protec-
tion and human health. In its early years, the MST leadership sought to 
mould its settlements into large cooperatives operating essentially as 
commercial farms, albeit within a socialist framework (Ondetti 2008a: 
125–126; Andrade Neto 2015). The commitment to cooperativism has 
for the most part endured, despite often encountering resistance from 
settlers (Brenneisen 2002; Devore 2015). Over time, however, the MST’s 
discourse has become increasingly critical of large-scale commercial farm-
ing methods, especially the use of technology packages marketed by mul-
tinational firms like Monsanto and Bayer, involving chemical fertilisers 
and pesticides and genetically modified seeds.
Initially, opposition to such technologies focused on the costs involved, 
which MST leaders argued were prohibitive for small-scale producers, as 
well as on the physical risks to farmers from applying highly toxic pesti-
cides. Gradually, however, the MST has come to frame its rejection of 
modern farm technologies more broadly as reflecting a commitment to 
organic agriculture or “agroecology” (Coordenação Nacional do MST 
2010; Bosatto and de Carmo 2013; De’Carli 2013). Since about the 
mid-2000s, it has increasingly sought to position land reform as a policy 
in harmony with the growing consumer interest in food that is free of 
pesticides and genetically modified organisms (GMOs). It promotes 
agroecological practices among MST settlers through courses and inter-
nal publications and advertises its achievements externally via urban 
9 Stédile (2013a) and Stédile (2013b) provide a representative sample of contemporary pro-land 
reform writings, as well as some anti-reform views.
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organic food markets, seminars and participation in pro-organic food 
coalitions. Among other achievements, it claims to be the largest pro-
ducer of organic rice in Latin America (Camargo 2017). According to the 
president of an MST rice cooperative in the state of Rio Grande do Sul, 
organic production:
isn’t just an economic alternative, but a choice for an integral way of life, 
which views agriculture as an ecological activity for the benefit of both the 
families that produce and those that consume, with respect to the environ-
ment and biodiversity. Ideologically, we don’t want to argue with anyone, 
but it’s been proven that when you apply insecticides to crops, what will 
follow is toxicity.” (Quoted in Camargo 2017)
In advancing this position, MST leaders have made common cause 
with politicians, celebrities, non-governmental organisations and other 
movement organisations that oppose the growing technification of food 
production. The MST forms part of such entities as the National 
Articulation for Agroecology and the Permanent Campaign against 
Chemical Pesticides and in Favour of Life, both of which promote organic 
farming within Brazil. It is also part of an international network called La 
Via Campesina, which opposes chemical and GMO use as part of a 
broader defence of small-scale agriculture that includes support for 
domestic production of foodstuffs (i.e. “food sovereignty”), domestic 
control of land and water resources and land reform (La Via 
Campesina 2019).
Thus, the largely Marxist emphasis on the class struggle and opposi-
tion to capitalism that characterised the MST’s discourse for most of its 
history has gradually given way to one in which “post-material” concerns 
with the environment and food safety play a larger role. This transforma-
tion has been driven by the changing views of Brazilian society as a whole 
and, in all probability, a desire on the part of the MST to build a broader 
set of alliances. To some extent, this shift has also been embraced by other 
entities representing smallholders, such the Confederation of Workers in 
Agriculture (CONTAG), which brings together the rural unions, and the 
CPT (Sabourin et al. 2017: 365). In fact, over the last two decades, there 
has been a convergence of the land reform and organic farming 
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movements that has helped make Brazil one of the regional leaders in 
pro-organic agriculture policymaking (Sabourin et al. 2017).
However, the innovations have not been limited to pro-land reform 
forces. Faced with unprecedented challenges to their property rights, 
combined with an inability to fall back on military intervention, land-
owners have engaged in new efforts to defend their interests. During the 
mid-1980s, in response to the announcement of a land reform plan by 
Sarney, the first president of the democratic era, landowners from across 
Brazil created a peak organisation called the Democratic Rural Union 
(UDR). The UDR sought to both lobby against land redistribution at the 
national level and support local efforts to defend rural properties from 
land occupations. Its association with acts of violence eventually led to its 
disappearance as a national organisation, but during the 1990s landown-
ing and commercial farming interests gradually constructed a legislative 
coalition whose breadth and discipline easily exceeded those of most of 
Brazil’s numerous political parties. Since then, the Parliamentary Front 
for Agriculture10 has typically controlled 20–25% of the seats in Brazil’s 
Congress and used its weight to advance bills that favour big agriculture 
with regard to land, labour rights, environmental protection and other 
areas (Simionatto and Costa 2012; Corrêa 2018).
As part of its efforts to fight off land reform, Brazil’s commercial farm 
sector and its allies and sympathisers in the state, press and intelligentsia 
have developed a discourse that emphasises stability, efficiency and eco-
nomic growth. To a large extent, their messaging echoes that of past 
opponents of land reform. However, some themes are relatively new. 
First, to a greater extent than in earlier eras, opponents of land reform 
have argued that, due to the intense process of agricultural modernisation 
since the military era, the unproductive latifundium has been essentially 
extinguished from the countryside (Graziano Neto 1999; Navarro 2014; 
Bergamo 2015). Agriculture, they emphasise, is now the most efficient 
and internationally competitive sector of the Brazilian economy. At the 
same time, it employs relatively few people, due to mechanisation and 
urban-rural migration. From this perspective, land reform is an anachro-
nism, a policy rendered irrelevant by economic progress. As one author 
10 This group is better known by its informal name, bancada ruralista.
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puts it, “…the economic and productive changes of the new phase of our 
agricultural history have laid to rest the Brazilian agrarian question and it 
is unlikely to be revived” (Navarro 2014: 700).
A second relatively new theme consists of attacks on existing land 
reform settlements, which barely existed prior to the current democratic 
period. Critics point out that settlements suffer from low levels of pro-
duction, widespread poverty and heavy dependence on government 
income support programmes. Rather than thriving smallholder commu-
nities, they are miserable “rural shanty towns” (favelas rurais), offering 
residents few prospects for economic progress. As a result, many settlers 
end up selling or abandoning their plots (O Estado de São Paulo 2014). 
Opponents of land reform typically attribute these problems to both the 
settlers’ lack of “vocation” for agriculture and the state’s failure to provide 
settlements with adequate infrastructure (e.g. roads, electricity, irriga-
tion), credit and extension services. The proper response to this situation, 
they argue, is to slow down or even halt the distribution of new land and 
instead focus on equipping settlements with needed infrastructure and 
services. To the extent that land reform continues, in their view, it should 
focus on granting plots to people selected on the basis of their proven 
experience in agriculture.
Of course, these points are disputed by land reform activists. The 
apparent productivity of large landholdings, they argue, has much to do 
with the failure to update the indices of agricultural production used to 
judge whether a property is fulfilling its social function. Advances in farm 
technology have made possible greater per hectare yields, yet the indices 
used date back to the 1970s.11 Moreover, while acknowledging the pov-
erty of many settlements, they insist that the state ought to improve set-
tlement quality while at the same time also intensifying land redistribution. 
Nevertheless, the views endorsed by commercial farming interests and 
their supporters have clearly informed state policies over the last decade 
or so, as reflected in the sharp decline of land expropriations and new 
settlements, even under nominally left-leaning governments 
(Simonetti 2015).
11 The da Silva government proposed updating the indices, but backed down under pressure from 




This chapter has examined the evolution of the key ideas regarding the 
agrarian question in Brazil, as well as their interaction with actors, insti-
tutions and policy outputs. It has argued that the history of the agrarian 
question can be understood in terms of four periods defined by intellec-
tual and political events that affected how it was understood and acted 
upon. The characteristics of each period are summarised in Table 10.2.
As the chapter has suggested, most of the core ideas supporting redis-
tribution of rural land were already well established by the mid-twentieth 
century. Beginning in about the 1910s, land redistribution gradually 
came to be viewed by many Brazilians as a vital tool for relieving poverty, 
slowing down rural-urban migration and promoting economic develop-
ment. To a large extent, these are the same notions propagated by land 
reform activists today.
Nevertheless, ideas about the agrarian question have not remained 
wholly static. New arguments have risen in favour of it, emphasising 
especially its coherence with Catholic social teachings and, later, concerns 
about the environment and human health. In addition, there have been 
changes in the criticisms of land reform, most (though not all) of which 
have come from conservatives. In recent decades, these have gone beyond 
the traditional emphasis on property rights and stability to underscore 
both the obsolescence of land reform, given the modernisation of agricul-
ture and the accompanying rural exodus, and the failure of official settle-
ment policy to produce thriving rural communities.
These ideational innovations have occurred not in isolation, but as 
initiatives in an ongoing political struggle over the distribution of land. 
For decades, pressure for land reform came mainly from urban middle- 
class reformers who championed it out of a blend of humanitarianism 
and concern for advancing industrialisation. Beginning in the late 1950s, 
however, the potential beneficiaries of land reform, that is, poor small-
holders, tenant farmers, sharecroppers and rural wage workers, began to 
mobilise to demand this policy. Ironically, the result was not so much 
reform as repression and conservative agricultural modernisation. 
However, the military years did bring certain changes ultimately 
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favourable to land redistribution, most notably an institutional acknowl-
edgement of the legitimacy of this policy and the rise of a progressive 
movement within the Catholic Church that placed great priority on land 
reform. The return to democracy since the mid-1980s has helped trans-
late these advances (despite some backtracking in the institutional realm) 
into an unprecedented increase in expropriation and settlement activity, 
in part by facilitating the rise of a grassroots movement able to exert sub-
stantial pressure on the state.
Nevertheless, Brazil’s agrarian structure remains highly unequal. In the 
last decade, moreover, the state has made little effort to redistribute addi-
tional land. Under President Jair Bolsonaro, who came to office in January 
2019, land redistribution has even been officially suspended (Maisonnave 
2019). The contrast between the broad acknowledgement of the impor-
tance of land reform in Brazilian society and the lack of actual reform can 
be understood as a product of the power imbalance between the landless 
and land-poor, who control few economic or political resources, and the 
owners of large landholdings, a group comprised of relatively wealthy 
people who often enjoy considerable influence within the state. While 
many Brazilians who are not members of either of these categories sym-
pathise with the idea of land reform, their support for this policy is gener-
ally too tepid and wavering to overcome the determined resistance of 
landowners. Thus, Brazil seems likely to remain a country in which the 
agrarian question is broadly acknowledged ideationally and institution-
ally, but only superficially addressed in actual policy.
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One Hundred Years of Social Protection: 
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Lutz Leisering
This volume ventures into a largely uncharted territory, enquiring if, 
when, and how the social question has been raised in four countries over 
the last hundred years—countries that are better known as “emerging 
markets” in the early twenty-first century. Assuming that the social ques-
tion reflects problems of social integration in modernising societies 
against the background of modern ideas of equality and human rights, 
the contributors to this volume investigate social policies in the four 
countries, starting from the interwar years, with special emphasis on 
social protection.
The volume provides an analysis focused on ideas reflected in contem-
porary documents—ideas as a strand of social protection in their own 
right and as legitimising and constituting interests and institutions. Ideas 
are a key factor in explaining the rise of social protection, as depicted in 
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Gough’s summary explanatory model of the “Five Is” (see Chap. 1, Fig. 
1.1). The volume takes a historical approach to overcome the presentist 
bias of the current literature on social policy in the Global South. 
Midgley’s (1984) historical study, now a classic, went largely unnoticed at 
the time of publication.
In addition to our substantive research interest, we also seek to con-
tribute to theorising Southern welfare. Accordingly, in this concluding 
chapter, I1 present the main findings of the country-focused chapters in a 
comparative perspective and framed by five overarching concepts—his-
torical evolution, social construction, political language, multireferential-
ity, and transnational diffusion—that build on the theoretical framework 
developed in Chap. 1. The five concepts can generally serve as a concep-
tual template for studies of social protection in Southern countries. For 
each of the five concepts, I give examples, counterexamples, and specifi-
cations from the country studies. The chapter closes with theoretically 
and empirically grounded thoughts about the future of social protection 
in middle-income countries.
The first finding relates to the historical evolution of social protection: 
the hundred years from 1920 to 2020 mark the rise of social protection 
programmes in the four countries. The second finding relates to the social 
construction of the social, that is, to the articulation of “social” issues: all 
four countries, except India, have articulated social issues in a generalised 
way as a social question, which is the core of a multi-layered configura-
tion of social ideas, as conceptualised in the onion skin model (see Fig. 
1.2, Chap. 1). The third finding concerns political language: the use of 
“social” semantics has spread in all four countries. The fourth finding 
concerns “multireferentiality”, that is, the linkage of social protection to 
diverse ideas and interests beyond purely “social” ideas (like social justice 
or solidarity): social protection policies were largely driven and shaped by 
“non-social” ideas and interests that acted as frames. The fifth finding 
1 As in Chap. 1, “I” refers to the author’s views and arguments, while “we” refers to the volume’s 
contributors’ views and findings. I thank Sony Pellissery, Marianne Ulriksen, Gabriel Ondetti, Hu 
Aiqun, and Jeremy Seekings for comments which helped to improve the chapter (the latter gave 
particularly extensive comments). I am also indebted to John Berten for communication on the 
history of the terms “social insurance” and “social security”, and to Ravi Ahuja for explaining to me 
the meaning of socialism in India.
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describes the transnational diffusion of ideas: external ideas have pervaded 
domestic social protection policies from the beginning, testifying to the 
rise of world society, conceived as a global consciousness and shared 
world culture (Meyer 2007: 262f.).
 Historical Evolution: 1920 to 2020 
Was the Century of Social Protections 
for These Four Countries
In Europe, the social question arose in the 1830s and 1840s, and substan-
tial social policy measures were taken from the 1880s onward. After 
World War II, the “welfare state” as a new type of state and society 
unfolded. Social policy in the Global South, including our four coun-
tries, came later but not as late as often assumed. When we initiated our 
collaborative research project, we first thought of starting with the 1940s. 
However, the empirical evidence taught us to start earlier. We found that 
all four countries had an early start regarding ideas and actual legislation. 
This is our first finding on the evolution of social protection policies. 
Between 1920 and 1950, many of the basic social categories that were 
used in later debates already figured in politics. The year 1920 is not a 
neat cut-off point, though. Some social ideas and (highly selective) mea-
sures started earlier, such as the ideas of Duguit and Torres on land reform 
(1911, 1914) that were applied in Brazil later, the famine codes in late 
nineteenth-century India, and the late nineteenth-century and early 
twentieth-century debates on the “cost of living” in Brazil.
We know that social protection policies do not simply reflect socio- 
economic conditions, as the functionalist theory of the “logic of industri-
alisation” assumed in the 1960s. Instead, political factors mediate 
processes of industrialisation, urbanisation, and dislocation. Although 
the four countries started social protection roughly around the same 
years, they did so at different levels of economic development, except 
China and India which started from the same very low level (see Chap. 1, 
Table 1.3).
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The second finding regarding the evolution of social protection is, as 
expected, the expansion of social protection over the last hundred years. 
The social question was articulated in an increasingly inclusive way, and 
new discourses, actors, and categories relating to the social emerged. 
Moreover, older debates, doctrines, and actors were “socialised”, that is, 
they turned to social issues. Even in periods of upheaval, war, and civil 
war, and under democracy and dictatorship alike (the latter in Brazil 
from 1930 to 1945 and 1964 to 1985 and in China since 1949), social 
protections were debated and legislated. There were periods of intensified 
social policy activity, as in South Africa from 1924 to 1933, Brazil from 
1930 to1945, India from 1946 to 1952, China from the 2000s until the 
early 2010s, and during the 1940s in all four countries. In South Africa, 
a key component of the national social protection arrangement, old-age 
pensions, did not change much during apartheid.
The finding of overall expansion needs qualification. First, there were 
periods of retrenchment, notably in China during the early reform era 
(1978–2000), similar to what Rimlinger (1971) calls a “liberal break” in 
his analysis of the rise of Northern social policy. This describes a period in 
which older welfare institutions (in the case of China: socialist welfare) 
are crumbling, while new institutions that would address the social prob-
lems ensuing from economic liberalisation are still rudimentary. Second, 
expansion mainly refers to the extension of coverage and not necessarily 
to raising benefit levels and improving the quality of services. Third, there 
was massive decoupling or delayed coupling between ideas and legisla-
tion and also between legislation and implementation, as in the case of 
the Employees’ Social Insurance Act of 1948 in India. Implementation 
was often deficient or absent. Debates tended to produce an ideational 
surplus, which could reflect either empty promises or powerful ideas that 
would mobilise people and fuel later reforms. In Brazil, decades of calls 
for thoroughgoing land reform produced very modest results, even under 
leftist governments. In Brazil, there was also a gulf between the 
Constitution, which is rich in social promises, and the reality of social 
services and living conditions. India’s history is replete with ideas that 
created a “horizon of expectation” (Ahuja), which largely remained a 
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horizon. In China, the implementation of the industrial accident insur-
ance has been very patchy (Liu and Leisering 2017).
Did the early beginnings of social protection ideas and programmes 
constitute an institutional path? The answer is mixed. There is evidence of 
social protections’ institutional continuity across major historical junc-
tures (qualifying Piachaud and Midgley 2013: 267). This seems to indi-
cate that the institutional arrangements of social protection may have 
acquired a dynamic of their own early on. Post-apartheid South Africa 
largely built on the institutional legacy of the apartheid era. Even the de- 
racialisation of social protection began in the early 1940s, accelerated in 
the 1980s, and was completed in the 1990s. New programmes like the 
Child Support Grant built on programmes set up under the apartheid 
regime and before. In Brazil, social protection remained labourist under 
both democratic and authoritarian governments, and even Vargas’ far- 
reaching social reforms built on earlier institutionalisations of social 
protections.
However, the year of the foundation of the People’s Republic of China, 
1949, marked a break with earlier periods: socialist social protection and 
the Soviet variety of social insurance associated with Stalin replaced ear-
lier institutions in the 1950s (but Taiwan built on the pre-1949 legacy). 
There were further significant departures from or extensions of histori-
cal paths. While Brazil remained labourist overall, Brazil’s early intro-
duction of a non-contributory rural pension in 1971 was remarkable, 
as was Brazil’s pioneering role in the field of social cash transfers in the 
late 1990s and early 2000s. Regarding the latter, it is an open question 
whether the mushrooming of social cash transfers for the poor across the 
Global South indicates a new social model even in countries that had been 
labourist for a long time. China is the country with the most conspicuous 
path changes, from socialist social protections (1949/1951–1978), to a 
liberal period of retrenchment (1978–2000), then more inclusive social 
protections (2000–2012), and finally, more authoritarian “social gover-
nance” thereafter.
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 Constructing the Social: All Four Countries, 
India the Least, Have Articulated Social Issues 
as a Social Question
In all four countries, India the least, a social question was voiced, and 
generalised terms like social insurance and social security emerged. Social 
problems are ubiquitous in any society but they are not necessarily articu-
lated, that is, turned into a public issue. In most societies, some social 
problems are articulated, but few societies voice a generalised concern for 
social issues as a threat to the integration of society to be tackled by the 
state, that is a social question.
The social question has three facets: first, the social question reflects 
“objective” socio-economic conditions, such as industrialisation, disloca-
tion, urbanisation, wage labour, factory labour, and de-agrianisation. 
Second, it refers to intellectuals, experts, politicians, and social move-
ments’ articulation of such conditions as a general concern for society to 
be addressed by the state. These articulations may be ahead of the socio- 
economic conditions of the country, like raising the labour question in a 
largely agrarian society (as some early critics of social protection in India 
argued), or they may lag behind, underrating the scale of social problems. 
Third, the social question involves references to political measures to be 
taken in response to the articulated social problems. Each of these three 
facets or dimensions has its own history. They are related but in a contin-
gent way—a loose coupling.
The country-centric chapters identify three main varieties of the social 
question—in historical order: the land question, the labour question, 
and a less distinct variety that I propose to call “exclusion/inclusion”. 
Furthermore, there are variants of the three main types, and other, more 
specific social questions, such as the poverty question (which heralded 
“exclusion/inclusion”) and the hunger question, which has been particu-
larly central to Indian politics and is related to the issue of food security. 
The three main varieties of the social question do not represent distinct 
historical stages. The land question often co-existed with the labour ques-
tion, and the seeds of “exclusion/inclusion” were sown early on, through 
the poverty question, as in South Africa from the 1920s.
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The land question—or agrarian question—was first. This cannot come 
as a surprise, considering that agricultural production and related ways of 
living prevailed during the early years of industrialisation. Pellissery and 
Lødemel (2020) make a case that property rights in land remain an essen-
tial component of social citizenship today. In Brazil, both anti-feudalism 
and anti-capitalism played a role in the struggle over land reform, as did 
the ideas of early reformist thinkers, especially Duguit and Torres, and, 
towards the end of our observation period, novel ideas like agroecology 
and food safety that redefined the land question. In China in the 1920s, 
Sun Yat-Sen posited the land question as the social question, and in the 
aftermath of the revolution in 1949, the People’s Republic of China 
achieved the only thorough land reform among the four countries.
The labour question or workers’ question came second, confining the 
social question to workers and, more specifically, to formal workers and, 
originally, to selected groups of industrial workers only. As Ahuja argues 
for India, the distinction between formal and informal workers, which is 
crucial for social protection across the Global South, was created in the 
process. In India, even the very category of “labour” emerged as a legiti-
mate political category in the decades before independence (Ahuja 2018: 
319). The labour question revolved around work issues, especially work-
ing conditions, individual labour rights, and collective labour rights, that 
is, the right to collective action through unions to empower the workers 
vis-à-vis employers and markets. Social protection was part of the labour 
question in the shape of social insurance programmes. Most countries in 
the Global South introduced industrial accident insurance—sometimes 
called workmen’s compensation—as the first branch of social insurance 
(Usui 1994), and this branch is most closely related to labour issues. 
Brazil was strongly labourist, with Vargas establishing state corporatism. 
China was labourist to a degree before 1949 but more narrowly so in suc-
ceeding decades. South Africa was mixed pauperist-labourist, focusing on 
the “poor white problem” in the 1920s and 1930s and the racialised 
“civilised workers’ question” under apartheid; but public and semi-public 
social insurance was weakly developed. India was labourist with regard to 
a very small group of workers, and social protections even for these work-
ers were limited; yet, the construction of the social question as the labour 
question culminated in the labour legislation of the 1940s.
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The more universalistic question of exclusion/inclusion came later and 
extended beyond formal workers to the poor and possibly all citizens, 
including informal workers, the rural population, women, and persons 
with disabilities. In South Africa, the poverty of white persons was articu-
lated as a social problem in the early and mid-twentieth century because 
it questioned the racial hierarchy. The “poor white problem” was primar-
ily a problem of non-workers, especially persons who could not work due 
to age, infirmity, disability, or children (single mothers) and could not 
support themselves out of employment-related insurance. They should 
get work and the children should receive schooling. More inclusive poli-
cies started during the last decade of apartheid to be further developed in 
the 1990s, and during the 2000s, the discourse became more inclusive. 
In Brazil, the Constitution of 1988 was a major boost to social policy, 
and since 1988, belief in “social inclusion” became dominant across 
political ideologies (Pereira and Bertholini 2017). In China, the 2000s 
and early 2010s witnessed more inclusive policies associated with broader 
ideas, such as “inclusive growth”, “humanity-based” policies, and “rights”. 
In South Africa, “dignity” and “social rights” came to the fore in the same 
years, underpinning a universalistic agenda responsive to the needs of the 
poor; in a less pronounced way, this also happened in India. In India and 
South Africa, references to social rights introduced the courts as actors in 
social protection. Social protections geared to the poor, mainly cash 
transfers, were generally established late, spreading from the 2000s 
onward, with precursors in South Africa (1928) and in Brazil (1971). 
India had been concerned with the hunger question since the late- 
nineteenth century but gave prominence to the needs of the poor and 
hungry at a fairly late stage and in particularistic ways: the fifth Five-Year 
Plan (of 1974) first put poverty on the country’s agenda. In South Africa, 
what could be called the “deviance question” also mattered. It referred to 
the problem of delinquency and morally improper behaviour by poor 
white persons, which the state tried to address through social work and 
institutional care.
The three social questions sometimes intertwined. For example, we can 
interpret the introduction of a non-contributory rural pension in 1971 in 
Brazil as a way of alleviating the land question. In South Africa, the pov-
erty question also intersected with the land question. From the 1920s 
 L. Leisering
391
through to the present, the expansion of social assistance in South Africa 
was necessitated by—and understood in terms of—the decline of agrar-
ian society, first among “poor whites” because of the commercialisation of 
“white” farming and then among the black majority as a result of dispos-
session of and forced removals off the land.2
Remarkably, the earliest and most privileged welfare provisions, namely 
for persons close to the government—public sector employees, soldiers, 
teachers, and the like—were not normally discussed in the context of a 
social question. Instead, it seems that the need for these provisions was 
taken for granted, as in Europe, where provisions for persons in the pub-
lic sector were the earliest forms of state social protection, starting in the 
eighteenth century, apart from public poor relief introduced in the six-
teenth century.
The social question was not ubiquitous. China and India are examples 
of this. When China was socialist in the strict sense (1949–1978), the 
social question was dormant, assumed to be resolved in the institutions 
of socialism. Social protection was embedded in the socialist institutions 
of production: the rural People’s Communes, the state-owned enterprises, 
and the urban work units. In sociological terms, these were functionally 
diffuse institutions in which the welfare function was weakly differenti-
ated. Every person was assumed to be integrated into the socialist organ-
isation of work and, thereby, covered by social protection. The state-owned 
enterprises provided social insurance but of the statist Soviet-type associ-
ated with Stalin (Hu and Manning 2010). In the People’s Communes, a 
plot of land, to which every person had access by birth, sustained the 
members’ welfare. In the socialist institutional setting, a social policy 
community could not develop, and the supremacy of the Communist 
Party left little room for the open articulation of social problems. Civil 
society and non-governmental organisations were non-existent.
The absence of the social question under socialism makes sense, at least 
theoretically, since socialism is designed to extinguish capitalist markets 
and the attendant social damages. During the negotiations that led to the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 1946–1948, the Soviet Union 
2 The early introduction of old-age pensions for farmers in European countries also reflected a link 
between social protection and the land question (Leisering et al. 2002: 58–61).
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maintained that its socialist institutions already realised social rights—a 
socialist understanding of social rights as human rights that differed from 
liberal understandings (Davy 2014). In the communist German 
Democratic Republic (1949–1990), the very notion of “social policy” 
was suspect till the mid-1960s (Schmidt 2013: 30).
After the dormancy of the social question in socialist China, the 
Chinese government explicitly denied the social question during the lib-
eral break period (1978–2000) when they delegated the social responsi-
bility of the state to non-state actors under the flag of “socialisation”. 
When I acted as a consultant to the Chinese government in 2001 
(Leisering et  al. 2002), many Chinese actors still denied the need for 
state-provided old-age pensions in rural areas; they referred to the land 
and family as sufficient resources for living. South African state officials 
used a similar argument to justify the exclusion of poor African people 
from social pensions and other kinds of social assistance in the 1920s and 
1930s, as well as during the first decades of the apartheid regime.
In India, the social question was stifled throughout the last hundred 
years because of the cultural denial of equality in the Hinduist tradition. 
Individualised measures of social protection were weak, often eclipsed by 
“socialist” macroeconomic policies. In the late 1940s and the 1950s, the 
Indian Congress proclaimed a socialist orientation, and “socialism” was 
even included in the constitution in 1976. However, “socialism” only 
indicated a kind of etatism that comprised policies like Soviet-style plan-
ning, state regulation of industries, and Keynesianism. In later decades, 
particularistic, identity-based claims to social protections relating to the 
dalits and adivasis curtailed the social question.
 State Responsibility, Policy Paradigms, 
and Welfare Models
In theoretical terms, the social question is the pivotal middle layer in the 
onion skin model of social ideas. It is related to the top and bottom layers 
of the model—to the social responsibility of the state, policy paradigms, 
and models of social protection—but in a contingent way.
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State Responsibility. The articulation of the social question puts 
demands on the state as the addressee of social responsibility. Remarkably, 
all four countries hold strong notions of national statehood, even in the 
face of marked divisions based on ethnicity, religion, caste, and the rural/
urban divide. Before 1949, the Chinese state was weak: warlords ruled in 
the immediate aftermath of the fall of the Empire, and, afterwards, the 
conflict between the Nationalist Party and the Communist Party led to 
civil war and regional divisions. The joint war against Japan added to the 
upheaval. During the 1920s and 1930s, Chinese intellectuals studied 
Western ideas of an organic society. After 1949, the People’s Republic 
proclaimed state socialism, underpinned by a symbiosis between state 
and party. However, up until 1978, the social organisation of the country 
was actually decentralised, comprised of a large number of collectives, 
mainly the rural People’s Communes, the state-owned enterprises, and 
the units of the state and party. In the first two decades of the reform era, 
that is, after 1978, the state retreated from social welfare provisioning. 
From 2012, the party-state has deepened.
Since independence, India has been a democracy and as such poten-
tially responsive to social issues. Although the proclamation of “social-
ism” conjured up the notion of a strong state, the federal structure allowed 
for highly divergent social policies in the various Indian states, and some 
Indian states, such as Kerala, became quasi-welfare states (Singh 2015a, 
b). In the 1940s debates on the future of Indian society, Gandhi advo-
cated a model of local communities that would have precluded a strong 
“social” state. The South African state was deeply racialised. Through the 
creation of separate “homelands” for black persons in the 1960s and 
1970s, the state surrendered its social responsibility for many of its citi-
zens in the most extreme form.
Policy Paradigms. What policymakers define as the problem to be tack-
led is a key element of a policy paradigm. Countries may define very 
different groups as problem groups that deserve state-provided social pro-
tection. In China, “social problems” were discussed in the 1920s in both 
Marxist and non-Marxist terms. Persons close to the government and, for 
example in South Africa, war veterans, were considered the most deserv-
ing. Socio-economically defined groups, above all workers, were the cen-
tre of the labour question, but countries differed as to which branches of 
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industry were covered by their social insurance programmes (for Brazil, 
see the historical study by Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock 2009). Life-course 
groups, above all children and older persons, were also key addressees, 
mostly by means-tested programmes, that is, based on need. South Africa 
(old-age pensions in 1928) and Brazil (rural pensions in 1971) were pio-
neers. In the move towards social cash transfer programmes since the 
early 2000s, life-course groups are the main targets (Leisering 2019: 161, 
181), while non-disabled persons of working age—the working poor, 
unemployed, and underemployed—mostly lack own entitlements (also 
in our four countries), calls for universal rights-based benefits notwith-
standing. In India, social protection focuses on identity groups based on 
caste. Few countries define the addressees of basic income security in a 
non-categorical way, purely by need; the Chinese cash transfer pro-
gramme Dibao and some provisions under Brazil’s Bolsa Família are 
examples.3
Models of welfare institutions. A range of models emerged over the hun-
dred years: the most common was and still is the model of social insur-
ance, which is closely associated with the labour question. However, 
non-contributory social assistance programmes also figured early on, for 
example, in 1928 in South Africa. Towards the end of our observation 
period, since the 1990s, more universalistic models have arisen or been 
called for. The new social cash transfer programmes, mostly a variety of 
social assistance (only 20 per cent of the programmes are not means- 
tested; Leisering 2019: 169f.), are designed to make up for the limita-
tions of social insurance programmes. State-regulated private protection, 
such as industrial accident insurance in Brazil in the 1920s, may also 
reflect a social concern of the state.
 Tracing the Social Question
In Chap. 1, I have defined the concept of “social question”: “Raising the 
‘social question’ means that a society recognises social issues in a general-
ized way as a key concern of society, to be addressed by the state, linked 
3 The Indian Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act is a public works pro-
gramme rather than a social cash transfer programme.
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to a call for political remedies. The underlying assumption is that the 
state is responsible for individual welfare”. When applying the concept in 
empirical studies, we need to operationalise it. How can we ascertain if 
the social question is raised in a particular country or not? Since some 
social issues are articulated in some way in almost any society, we need to 
define more precisely what we mean by the “social question”. This is not 
normally done in the literature, for example, not even by Heclo in his 
article “The social question” (1995), who, like Castel (2003: xix f.), 
defines the social question through its intended effect, namely societal 
integration. Such a functionalist definition is unsatisfactory because there 
are functional equivalents to the social question: rulers may seek to secure 
societal integration through nationalism, mobilisation for war, or reli-
gious fundamentalism.
Based on the test of the concept in the chapters on the four countries, 
I propose eight criteria for ascertaining if, and to what degree, a society 
raises a social question:
 1. Social issues must be seen as a challenge for a society or nation state as 
a whole—for societal cohesion and integration, as emphasised by 
Heclo (1995: 675) and Castel (2003: xix f.), or for the modernisation 
and development of a society—rather than only for sectional groups 
or particular institutions. Raising the social question implies a vision 
of society. In India and China during the 1920s, the call for social 
protection was part of a call for modernisation and overcoming the 
“backwardness” of the countries. In South Africa, the social question 
referred to the need to protect the existing racial hierarchy and the 
“civilisation” of the white settlers. In the new, post-2012 era in China, 
social protection is part of the Party’s vision of a “middle well-off soci-
ety” and the “Chinese Dream”.
 2. The social question reflects a generalised, comprehensive understand-
ing of and interest in social issues rather than a reference to a particu-
lar social problem or welfare programme.
 3. The social question is not just a list of measures to be taken by govern-
ment, but involves the explication of an underlying idea or even “cos-
mology”, as Kaufmann (2013a: 33) puts it (see the quote in Chap. 1).
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 4. The articulation of the social question needs to go along with the 
explicit attribution to the state of a social responsibility for the welfare 
of the citizens and calls for political action. The more the social ques-
tion goes along with equally comprehensive concepts in the other lay-
ers of the onion skin models—the more it is linked to a far-reaching 
attribution of social responsibility to the state and the more it gives 
rise to elaborate policy paradigms and complex models of welfare 
institutions—the more it is entrenched in politics and society.
 5. The social question must appear on the agendas of parliament, politi-
cal parties, social movements, or in development plans or other rele-
vant documents.
 6. The social question must have a significant weight in public debates as 
compared to other societal concerns. To trace the social question, we 
need to find out how social issues are related to concerns like the 
national question or economic development.
 7. Social issues must be referred to in terms of individual welfare, instead 
of only in terms of collective welfare to be achieved through economic 
growth. Accordingly, the social question needs to refer to the state and 
state policies rather than the economy. However, the reference to the 
state may include state regulation of the economy.
 8. The social question, to be more than an empty promise, needs a degree 
of institutionalisation. This includes the creation of government 
departments specialising in welfare issues, as happened in all four 
countries. The department of labour or separate departments of social 
welfare may cover social issues. The emergence of epistemic and expert 
communities as well as political parties with “social” agendas and dis-
courses give substance and sustainability to the social question. The 
social question also has a cognitive side: surveys of living conditions, 
commissions on social problems, social reports, and the like provide 
informational bases for social policies. In post-apartheid South Africa, 
there was a “mania for measurement”, and social researchers played a 
role in conceptualising social reforms. The British tradition of parlia-
mentary commissions influenced South Africa and India.
These eight defining characteristics of the social question can also be 
used as a template for comparative research. The range, depth, and 
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content of the social question also depend on the arenas of political delib-
eration and discursive spaces. Zacher (2013: 87–109) emphasises that the 
welfare state requires the institutions of liberty to enable free delibera-
tions on the social question according to the changing needs of and ideals 
among citizens. Authoritarian regimes put severe constraints on public 
deliberations, including, among others, freedom of the media. Especially 
since 2012, China has constrained civil society activity, relying on 
GONGOs (government-organised non-governmental organisations) 
instead to secure Party policies. In democratic societies, illiteracy and 
high morbidity rates may act as constraints on public deliberations, as in 
India and South Africa, respectively (see Table 1.2 in Chap. 1).
 Political Language: The Spread 
of “Social” Semantics
Ideas are closely connected to language. Changes in ideas may be associ-
ated with changing semantics, but new ideas can also emerge using exist-
ing language, through reinterpretation of terms—new wine in old bottles. 
And vice versa, old wine in new bottles, is also common. The rise of social 
ideas often corresponds with a new language for talking about social 
problems and welfare institutions (for Northern countries see Petersen 
and Béland 2014a).
In all four countries, social-oriented language has spread, including 
new terms that indicate a generalised understanding of social issues 
beyond miscellaneous social grievances that can be found in any society. 
The key comprehensive terms that figure in all four countries are “social 
insurance”—denoting a generalised model of welfare; “social security”—
a generalised policy paradigm; and, less pronounced and more contested, 
“welfare state”—a term that reflects a generalised understanding of the 
state’s social responsibilities. This list also outlines the historical order in 
which they appeared and the increasing abstraction of the concepts. 
“Social security” occupies an intermediate position between the narrower 
concept of “social insurance” and the wider concept of the “welfare state”.
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The term social insurance was the earliest term used that went beyond 
individual problems and programmes. The ILO, which champions the 
social insurance model (Seekings 2008), has used the term from the 
beginning of the period under review (e.g. ILO 1925; see Berten 2020). 
In the period’s early years, the narrower term “labour insurance” was in 
use, as in China in the 1920s and 1930s and in China’s 1931 Constitution. 
However, participants had already referenced “social insurance” in the 
Communist-led second Labour Conference in 1925, and the Nationalist 
government referred to it in 1941. Social insurance was (and still is) a 
comprehensive term, since it covered a comprehensive range of basic 
social “risks” that the ILO codified. In this way, “social insurance” bore 
the seeds for extending social protection beyond the group of formal 
workers because the list of covered risks extended beyond the risks of 
work to the general contingencies of everyday life, and the reference to 
the workers’ families and dependents potentially opened up a broader 
range of addressees, including women.
Social security as a term came later, in the 1940s, and turned into a 
platform for extending the scope of social protection. In India, the Indian 
National Congress first mentioned the term in 1940, but mainly limited 
to labour welfare. In South Africa, a movement, committee, and plan all 
referred to the term in 1942. In China, the term became official from 
1945 onwards and was even included in the Constitution in 1946/1947. 
China seems to be the only country in which the term disappeared for a 
significant period of time: the law of 1951 refers to “labour insurance” 
and the term “social security” did not appear in the Constitution of 1954, 
but reappeared in the 2004 Constitution (and already 1986  in the 
Seventh Five-Year Plan) and was put into practice in the policies of the 
2000s. In Brazil, the term “social security” entered into law as late as 
1988 in the new Constitution and encompassed social insurance, univer-
sal healthcare, and social assistance.
The welfare state is a broader concept than the other two (Petersen and 
Béland 2014b: 298) and, even more than the others, refers both to provi-
sions and ideational underpinnings or even cultural beliefs. The term 
“welfare state” is less frequently used in the four countries and highly 
contested. In South Africa, President Zuma explicitly rejected the idea of 
a welfare state, as the National Party had emphatically done already under 
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apartheid, for example, in Parliament, although, remarkably, the National 
Party had been happy with the notion of a “social welfare state”.
However, regarding the scope of social protections, actual develop-
ments, or at least policy goals developed towards what could be called a 
“welfare state”. Seekings (Chap. 6) describes South Africa as a “nascent 
welfare state” by 1949. The “four principal social policies” that China’s 
Nationalist Party (Guomindang) articulated in 1945 also came close. The 
welfare state is a key element of the self-image of societies in Britain, 
Germany, and the Nordic countries, but it is an open question if this will 
ever occur in the four countries that we investigate or many other 
Southern countries. Regarding social effort, even Southern countries 
with fairly comprehensive social protections spend much less on public 
welfare (see Fig. 1.5 in Chap. 1) than do Northern welfare states (which 
spend 20–35 per cent of their GDP).
There are several other comprehensive terms. The oldest and most 
comprehensive is “social policy”, which was mentioned in South Africa as 
early as 1934. The term originated in mid-nineteenth-century Europe 
and spread globally throughout the twentieth century (Kaufmann 2013b: 
36–39 and passim). More recent expressions, mostly spreading since circa 
2000, include “social protection”, which has a somewhat broader mean-
ing than “social security”, “social pensions”, “corporate social responsibil-
ity”, “social sustainability”, “social safety nets” (World Bank 2018), and 
“social cash transfers” (for the origin of the latter term see von Gliszczynski 
2015: 28–30). The proliferation of terms with the component social testi-
fies to the increasing recognition of social issues across the globe.
What is the meaning of the inconspicuous word “social”? The precise 
meaning of “social” in the context of social policy is difficult to pin down: 
“the systemic character of social policy is not nearly as evident as that of 
the market economy. What ‘the social’ means in distinction to the eco-
nomic and the political, or in other words: which social phenomena and 
problems are relevant as the effective sphere of social policy and why—to 
this day no clarity has emerged on this question” (Kaufmann 2013b: 
97–98). In common usage, the “social” is often set in opposition to the 
economic or, alternatively, to the individual. Historically, “social” as an 
idea and a term originated in France and Germany in the 1830s and 
1840s (Kaufmann 2012: chapter 2; Kaufmann 2013b, c) and was used in 
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the then-new terms “social reform”, “social policy”, “social question”, and 
others (Pankoke 1970). “Social” implies the recognition of the cleavage 
between the modern political ideal of equality and the socio-economic 
inequalities of emerging industrial-capitalist societies, which the German 
philosopher Hegel (1770–1831) first explicated in systematic terms. 
While Marx’s solution to this cleavage was to overthrow capitalism, his 
contemporary Lorenz von Stein (1815–1890), like Marx (1818–1883) a 
Hegelian, conceived of social policy (sociale Politik) as a way to bridge and 
mitigate this cleavage by reforming capitalism. Accordingly, social policy 
and the social question are reformist rather than revolutionary policy 
concepts.
 The Career of “Social Security”
As expected, “social security” has been a key term and idea in the history 
of social policy in the four countries. Therefore, it is worth tracing the 
career of the term beyond its appearance in the four countries.
According to the authoritative study on the concept of security 
(Kaufmann 1973, 2012: chapter 5), “security” is a key normative idea of 
modern society or, more specifically, of the functionally differentiated 
society, as systems theorists conceive of modern society. Marx identified 
security as the overarching idea of civil society (or of capitalism, as he 
later termed it): “Security is the supreme social concept of civil society …” 
(Marx 1978: 43).4 Social security is a variety of the broader concept of 
security. While “social”, the “social question”, and other related terms 
emerged in the second third of the nineteenth century, the term “social 
security” only emerged a century later. One might have expected “social 
security” to originate in Western and Northern Europe, but the first use 
of the term is commonly attributed to American President Franklin 
Delano Roosevelt in 1934, and the term figured explicitly in the name of 
the US “Social Security Act” of 1935, which was part of the New Deal. 
Yet only the term was new; it hardly conveyed new ideas that were previ-
ously unknown in Europe (Kaufmann 2012: 135).
4 German original: “Die Sicherheit ist der höchste soziale Begriff der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft …” 
(Marx 1956: 365; written in 1843).
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In international arenas, “social security” emerged in the 1940s as a key 
term and idea as part of the “welfare internationalism” of that decade, 
reflecting visions of a new post-war order (Kaufmann 2012: chapter 4). 
The term was mentioned in the Atlantic Charter of 1941, and the ILO 
used the term from 1940 onwards, officially from 1942 (Berten 2020). 
Latin American countries also took up the term at the Inter-American 
Conference on Social Security in Santiago de Chile in 1942. Although 
social security was defined rather narrowly at the conference, it was set in 
a wider context: the conference emphasised “the role of social insurance 
as the principal method of organising social security … social security 
policy … demands for its success concurrent measures to promote full 
employment, to increase national income, to raise the standard of living 
and education upon which health and capacity depend” (Inter-American 
Conference on Social Security 1942: 688).
From then on, the concept quickly spread globally, although (or just 
because) international organisations and states both interpreted it in very 
diverse ways. In 1948, social security became a human right under the 
newly founded United Nations’ Universal Declaration of Human Rights. 
However, Article 22, which lays down the right, and Article 9 of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(ICESCR) of 1966, which restates this right in a more binding way, have 
just one sentence on this right, much less than for other rights. The arti-
cles name no standard and no agent in charge of specifying and imple-
menting the right. This was left to the ILO (Davy 2014), which issued 
the key Convention no. 102, the “Social Security (Minimum Standards) 
Convention” (ILO 1952). The ILO tended to refer to the term narrowly 
as social insurance but had mentioned social assistance in many docu-
ments right from the beginning (Berten 2020). Out of our four coun-
tries, only Brazil has ratified Convention no. 102, but all have ratified the 
ICESCR, although South Africa did so as late as 2015 (see Table 1.1 in 
Chap. 1).
The use of the term “social security” in relevant political contexts indi-
cates the emergence of a substantial understanding of the social in four 
respects.
First, social security is a comprehensive term that may cover a range of 
welfare policies and programmes. The use of the term indicates that the 
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country in question has developed an overarching notion of the various 
common insecurities in individuals’ lives and the need for political 
responses. To confront the “Five Giants”—Want, Ignorance, Disease, 
Squalor, and Idleness—William Beveridge in his report of 1942 designed 
a “plan for social security”: “it is a plan all-embracing in scope of persons 
and of needs” (Beveridge 1942: 9). At the time, “social security” was a 
very recent term, and, although it pervades Beveridge’s report, the report 
was actually entitled “Social Insurance and Allied Services”. The term 
“social insurance” had played an overarching role before in policies and 
programmes, but a truly overarching term had been missing in the inter-
war years (Berten 2019, 2020). “Social security” is potentially broader in 
scope than “social insurance”, in particular because it includes non- 
contributory benefits for the poor, and, if fully realised, social services 
(Kaufmann 1973: 95).
Second, as Kaufmann emphasises, social security has a double character, 
denoting a set of welfare programmes and services as well as an idea, 
namely that the state should ameliorate the insecurity of its citizens’ lives 
in a comprehensive sense. While the English language only has one term, 
“social security”, the German distinction between soziale Sicherung, 
which denotes the institutional side, and soziale Sicherheit, which denotes 
the guiding idea, reflects the two sides of social security. When the idea of 
“social security” emerged globally in the 1940s, it was associated with 
visions of a new post-war society and new welfare ideas like prevention 
and rehabilitation (Kaufmann 1973: 95–98). However, it was a vision 
without specific instruments, “a normative concept … in search of insti-
tutional realisations” (Kaufmann 1973: 98; transl. L.L.). This might help 
to explain its trajectory, and it demonstrates that powerful ideas may take 
precedence over actual social protection measures.
The advent of the concept of social security also historically signalled a 
transition from the labour question to more universalistic ideas of inclu-
sion. In the Global North after World War II, social policy changed in 
character from class-based politics, which had emphasised collective 
labour rights, working conditions, and “labour insurance”, to redistribu-
tive policies for all citizens in order to enhance individual welfare—“social 
security” (Kaufmann 2013b). Redistribution was not so much between 
classes, but between older persons and the young (in the form of old-age 
 L. Leisering
403
pensions and long-term care, often based on the idea of a contract 
between generations), between the sick and the healthy (in the form of 
medical services), and between families and persons without children.
Third, unlike traditional poor relief and charity, but similar to social 
insurance, social security is not only about welfare provisions in the here 
and now but also oriented to the future,5 both providing and requiring a 
“long view” by citizens (de Swaan 1988, using a term by Norbert Elias). 
The designated outcome of social security programmes is not only finan-
cial betterment but also “security” for citizens in planning their lives. The 
idea of security includes self-assurance as psychological security of the self 
(Kaufmann 1973, ch. 4.5). Von Benda-Beckmann and von Benda- 
Beckmann (1994) have challenged the view that traditional societies in 
the Global South lack a concept of social security because their members 
are absorbed by daily exigencies, unable to plan for the future. Based on 
research in Indonesia, the von Benda-Beckmanns argue that traditional 
societies also have a notion of the future and develop distinct ideas of and 
rules for social security. However, social security is mostly embedded in 
functionally diffuse social settings like the family, kinship, and the village.
Fourth, social security reflects a reformist strategy, with an emphasis on 
achieving security within capitalism rather than challenging the struc-
tural inequalities of capitalism (Heclo 1995: 667). The above quote from 
Marx reads in full: “Security is the supreme social concept of civil society, 
the concept of the police. The whole society exists only in order to guar-
antee for each of its members the preservation of his person, his rights, 
and his property” (Marx 1978: 43).6 That is, the concept of security is 
geared to securing rather than transcending civil society or capitalism 
(Marx 1956: 36). The idea of preserving a person and the person’s rights 
and property, if extended to the social, encapsulates the thrust of the 
concept of social security or even the welfare state. Social security is about 
the livelihood of persons, their social rights, and “social property”. 
Entitlements to social security, especially through social insurance 
5 On the temporality of the idea of security in general see Kaufmann (1973: ch. 4.3).
6 German original: “Die Sicherheit ist der höchste soziale Begriff der bürgerlichen Gesellschaft, der 
Begriff der Polizei, daß die ganze Gesellschaft nur da ist, um jedem ihrer Mitglieder die Erhaltung 
seiner Person, seiner Rechte und seines Eigentums zu garantieren” (Marx 1956: 365f.; written 
in 1843).
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 programmes, may acquire the legal status of property for the property-
less, as, for example, endorsed by the Supreme Court (Constitutional 
Court) in Germany (Zacher 2013: 95). Social security is about securing 
the livelihood of the wage labourer and other members of society, but 
leaves the basic relations of production intact, as does the general concept 
of security. The earlier concept of social insurance was similarly reformist, 
but social security implies a more far-reaching remoulding of living con-
ditions under capitalism.
 Multireferentiality: Social Protection Is Largely 
Driven and Shaped by “Non-social” Ideas 
and Interests
When talking about social policy ideas, one tends to think of “social” 
norms and values like social justice, solidarity, equality, and welfare. Such 
norms drive social movements and NGO work. Yet to promote social 
policies, referencing these norms is not enough. Kaufmann (1997, 2012: 
277–285) holds that, historically, social policy in Europe only expanded 
because its collective utility beyond simply its welfare impacts—its eco-
nomic, political, social, and cultural utility—could be demonstrated to 
the key actors. Similarly, Midgley (2013: 9–20) distinguishes several 
“functions of social protection” beyond the welfare function that need to 
be considered. Policymakers who seek to advance social policy need to 
create “synergies” between social and economic (and other) goals 
(Kaufmann 2012: 284; see also Rodgers 2013).
In all four countries references to the non-social functions of social 
protections figured explicitly and prominently in political debates. These 
references operated as frames of social protection, either supporting or 
countering extensions of social protection. This shows that opposition to 
social policy is not only about interests; rather, counter ideas are devel-
oped to justify the rejection of more substantial social protections. When 
tracing frames, we also found that counter ideas are more complex and 
less immediately interest driven than common terms like “neoliberalism“ 
or, referring to South Africa, racism suggest. Marianne Ulriksen (Chap. 
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7) concludes that “the apartheid state is a reminder of how far policy can 
be pushed with reference to ideational and normative justifications”.
In the introduction, I distinguish between three types of frames: non- 
social frames, global frames, and counter frames (see the onion skin 
model, Fig. 1.2; for global frames see the next section). Social policy is 
not just underpinned by “social” ideas but relies on ideas originating 
from other spheres of society (Achinger 1979). These frames of the social 
differ between the four countries and across time: social security was con-
ceived, alternatively, as facilitating, counteracting, or irrelevant to other, 
potentially broader societal concerns, especially economic growth, devel-
opment, nation-building, social cohesion, and social peace. Surprisingly, 
the key arguments and contestations about social protections were simi-
lar in the four countries, and they also resemble debates in the Global 
North, with similar arguments and frames for or against social protection.
We identified a broad range of frames that operated in the four coun-
tries. In South Africa under apartheid and before, the “native question” 
was the racialised national question, and it framed the social question. 
The native question was about securing the white and Christian “civilisa-
tion” and, in conjunction, the racial hierarchy. In post-apartheid South 
Africa, developmentalism was used to protest the extension of social pro-
tections or at least was indifferent to them. Nelson Mandela and the 
African National Congress (ANC) were strong developmentalists. After 
apartheid, racial redress was another important frame that eclipsed the 
social question. However, anti-racism movements also helped to bring 
“dignity” to the fore, which became a key legitimising idea of more uni-
versalistic and rights-based social protection in the 2000s. Dignity is a 
strong frame because it is a basic value and can rally support from all 
political camps. In postcolonial India, the struggle for independence 
from foreign oppression and a developmentalist emphasis on economic 
growth tended to crowd out the social question. In China, securing social 
stability and the rule of the Communist Party have been the overarching 
frames of social protections in the reform era. In conjunction, the frame 
developmentalism or “GDPism” served to justify welfare retrenchment 
from 1978 to 2000. In Brazil and Argentina, developmentalist thinking 
was particularly influential in the 1950s and 1960s (Sikkink 1991).
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There were other influential frames. In South Africa, a moral frame 
gave rise to what I have described above as the deviance question. Ideas 
on creating an ecological society also came in at the end of our observa-
tion period, in the debate on land reform in Brazil. Religious frames also 
mattered. Neo-Calvinism acted as a counter frame to social protections 
in South Africa from the late 1930s onward, and the Hindu culture in 
India generally stifled the social question. Liberation theology in Brazil, 
inspired by left Catholicism, was a forceful movement in favour of far- 
reaching social reforms.
Remarkably, reference to human rights sometimes counteracted the 
extension of social protections. According to T. H. Marshall (1950), citi-
zenship is made up of three kinds of rights: political, civil, and social. Yet 
in political discourses, social rights often take a backseat, and social pro-
tections in particular are not “sexy”. Calls for political and civil rights 
may crowd out demands for social rights. The fight against apartheid in 
South Africa was a case in point. It was primarily a fight for political and 
civil rights. Nelson Mandela was a freedom fighter and not much inter-
ested in issues of social protection. India has experienced strong move-
ments for political and legal rights, while universal social rights are 
consistently underdeveloped. Political and legal equality can do little to 
counter the vast inequalities in Indian society. In international politics, 
for a long time, NGOs similarly focused on political and civil rather than 
social rights. For example, NGOs from all major political camps rejected 
or disregarded the idea of cash benefits for the poor well into the 1990s 
(Leisering 2019: 5f.).
Non-social ideas not only support or inhibit the extension of social 
protections but may also shape policies. Social ideas often mix with other 
ideas, leading to a hybridisation of the normative foundations of social 
protection, especially with regard to who is seen as deserving public ben-
efits. For example, at the time of the early labour question, social protec-
tions were largely confined to industrial workers because they were seen 
as crucial to the economic development of the country. The social cash 
transfer programmes that have emerged since 2000 mostly focus on chil-
dren (and older persons) while neglecting persons of working age. This 
reflects a developmentalist approach in a different way: the argument is 
that children are the economic agents of tomorrow (von Gliszczynski 
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2015: 132f.). South Africa’s post-apartheid social reformer Zola Skweyiya 
was a paternalist conservative who balanced the idea of a caring society 
with developmentalism, which resulted in a hybrid understanding of the 
state’s social responsibilities.
Frames are not static; they may be interpreted in different ways and 
change over time. Economic arguments have been brought forward 
against and in favour of the extension of social protection. Social protec-
tion for industrial workers, for example, was meant to bolster the import 
substitution model of economic growth, as in Brazil. Christian ideas can 
equally work against or in favour of social protection, as neo-Calvinism 
in South Africa and the liberation theology in Brazil illustrate. Proponents 
of social protection may also be ambivalent about the extension of social 
protections, for example, the National Party under apartheid South Africa 
or the ANC after apartheid.
 Transnational Diffusion: External Ideas Have 
Pervaded Domestic Debates on Social 
Protection from the Beginning (the 1920s)
All four countries have experienced external influence in one way or 
another. Colonisation was Northern powers’ most direct inroad into the 
Global South but in the strict sense, only one of the four countries was a 
colony, India under the British Raj, while South Africa and Brazil were 
not simply colonised but also settled by farmers, workers, and slaves at 
different stages, and China experienced “externally-induced modernisa-
tion” (see Table 1.1 in Chap. 1). Some colonial rulers introduced rudi-
mentary social protections and shaped administrative traditions that have 
repercussions till the present day.7 For settler societies, one can generally 
assume that the legacy of the settlers’ countries of origin—Portugal, 
Britain, the Netherlands, Germany—played a role, and that later associa-
tions, especially the Commonwealth, had an influence on the nation’s 
historical trajectory.
7 See Schmitt (2015) and Leisering (2019: 157) on present-day differences between anglophone 
and francophone countries in Africa.
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Is there a reason to assume a wholesale domination by Northern pow-
ers? Or do Northern perspectives on the Global South unduly obscure 
indigenous ideas and practices? It is generally plausible to assume that 
external ideas had a formative influence on the field of social protection 
for several reasons (see Chap. 1: availability of Northern models, lack of 
domestic expertise, and international organisations’ and donors’ activity).
The chapters in this volume provide ample evidence that external 
ideas—concepts pertaining to society and social welfare, institutional 
models of welfare, and expert knowledge—were omnipresent in all four 
countries—even in China under authoritarian rule after 1949, the 
Communist Party’s claim to self-governance notwithstanding. Our find-
ings align with a key tenet of the bourgeoning literature on diffusion and 
policy transfer, namely that external ideas are not usually simply trans-
planted to the receiving country but are subject to translation, adapta-
tion, interpretation, syncretisation, and combination with domestic 
ideas. Communism became Sino-communism in China. “Socialism” in 
India did not mean the overthrow of capitalist society, but a kind of 
etatism as explained above. In the Indian state of Kerala, the Communist 
Party had a strong nationalist tendency (Singh 2015a). The concept of 
social insurance, which the ILO propagated, took on different shapes in 
the countries of the South (for Brazil see Lewis and Lloyd-Sherlock 
2009), and the socialist countries, including China in the 1950s, adopted 
the etatiste Stalinist version of social insurance rather than the Bismarckian 
(Hu and Manning 2010). In the 2000s, China almost completely copied 
the German model of industrial accident insurance but did not adopt the 
self-governance in the administration of the insurance, which was seen as 
a threat to Party rule (Liu and Leisering 2017). Our findings also confirm 
the general insight of diffusion research that “decoupling” (Meyer 2009: 
182) between the adoption of international norms and ideas, on the one 
hand, and domestic policies, on the other hand, is endemic.
Some Latin American countries, including Brazil, were remarkably 
independent early proponents of extensive welfare commitments by gov-
ernments and even pushed Northern governments to do more in interna-
tional arenas. Latin American governments—not the Soviet Union as is 
sometimes assumed—were key drivers of social rights in the years 
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1946–1948 in the preparation of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (Davy 2013, 2014).
From the late twentieth century onwards, there were two almost paral-
lel but incongruous ideational movements.8 Economic liberalisation and 
marketisation, often described as “neo-liberalism”, became globally hege-
monic doctrines in the 1980s and 1990s that thoroughly transformed 
domestic politics worldwide, including our four countries (for the global 
spread of liberalization as a process of diffusion, see Simmons et al. 2008). 
This shift even affected “socialist” China, where it triggered economic 
reform and the attendant liberal break in social protection. However, 
almost simultaneously, from the 1990s onwards, an individualised under-
standing of social human rights also spread: the right to social security 
was interpreted as denoting individual entitlements to public benefits, 
superseding earlier collectivist, developmental or socialist, understand-
ings (Davy 2013, 2014). The reference to “rights” and “rights-based” pro-
grammes and policies became part of the social discourse, and international 
organisations used this discourse to mobilise action on social protection 
and other social concerns. The new rights discourse also found its way 
into domestic politics, especially in South Africa and even in China dur-
ing the 2000s and early 2010s. In operative terms, international organisa-
tions increasingly pushed for the extension of social protection through 
global campaigns and interventions in Southern policies (for social cash 
transfer programmes see von Gliszczynski 2015). From the early 2000s, 
even the ILO eventually took to actively advocating for non-contributory 
social cash transfers besides social insurance under the flag of “Social 
Security for All” (ILO 2003; see Leisering 2020). Brazil’s, China’s, and 
South Africa’s pioneering models of social cash transfers (see Table 1.1 in 
Chap. 1) came earlier, though, testifying to a “development revolution 
from the global South” (Hanlon et al. 2010).
Our findings challenge two frames of reference of much of the policy 
transfer literature. First, the literature mostly analyses the activity of one 
sending agent, be it an international organisation or another country. 
8 In international politics, Koehler (2015: 740f.) identifies a related disjunction between the “first 
UN” and the “second UN”. In the UN system, neoliberalism came to dominate the “first UN”, 
that is, the member states, while the “second UN”, that is, the UN secretariat and UN agencies, 
restored the UN’s ideals of the UN Charter by calling for social justice and human rights.
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Second, studies mostly investigate the spread of policies—such as the 
World Bank’s global campaign for a larger share of private old-age secu-
rity in the 1990s and 2000s. In contrast, we detected a multiplicity of 
external agents and influences that shape several layers of the social (rather 
than only policies).
First, regarding the multiplicity of external agents, a range of Northern 
welfare states acted as agents of diffusion. British ideas, such as the 
Beveridge Report of 1942, impacted debates in India and South Africa. 
South African politicians observed not only models from Commonwealth 
countries, especially New Zealand and Australia, but also US casework 
models. The Netherlands played a role in South Africa’s societal develop-
ment through Dutch neo-Calvinist theologians. The German model of 
social insurance, which the ILO had taken up, was influential worldwide, 
except in socialist countries. However, in the reform era, even China 
adopted a Bismarckian industrial accident insurance programme. 
Marxism, originating in Germany, was a major influence on China since 
the 1920s. The Soviet Union influenced Chinese thinking as early as the 
1920s and 1930s and more forcefully so after the Communist revolution 
in 1949, by spreading the Soviet Union’s model of industrial develop-
ment and the Stalinist model of labour insurance. Ideas from the Soviet 
Union also resonated in India. Furthermore, there were countries that 
acted as mediators between Northern and Southern ideas, above all 
Japan, which had taken in Northern ideas as early as the nineteenth cen-
tury and influenced Chinese thinking before 1949. South Korea also 
acted as mediator. The Soviet Union was a mediator of Marxist ideas.
International organisations were also active in disseminating ideas 
around the world. Meyer (2009) conceives of these organisations as key 
proponents of “world culture”, that is, globally shared principles—such 
as universalism, individualism, rationalism, and human rights—and 
models—such as statehood, constitutions, and education. The ILO was 
founded in 1919, with India as a founding member. The creation of the 
United Nations in 1945 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
of 1948 gave rise to a diversifying landscape of international organisa-
tions, both governmental and non-governmental, that would become 
major social policy actors from the 1990s onwards (Deacon et al. 1997), 
such as UNICEF, the World Health Organization (WHO), the Food and 
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Agriculture Organization of the UN (FAO), the United Nations 
Development Programme (UNDP), plus national development agencies 
and donors. The ILO, the key player in the field of social protection since 
the interwar years, lost its hegemony. Global religious organisations also 
played a role. The Latin American liberation theology echoed the new 
thinking of the Second Vatican Council (1962–1965).
Diverse diffusion mechanisms were operative. Emulation, rather than 
policy learning, was frequent. Emulation is about receiving socially 
accepted ideas from select senders, that is, it is about social construction 
(e.g. of social problems and models of social security) rather than the 
close empirical observation and hard evidence that characterises policy 
learning (Dobbin et al. 2007: 450–454).
More concrete mechanisms of dissemination included the translation 
of Western academic literature, which was influential in domestic debates 
on “social problems”, “social policy”, and modernisation in China in the 
1920s, and academic study abroad by thousands of Southern intellectu-
als. In China, students returning from Japan, Europe, and the USA dis-
cussed Marxist and non-Marxist concepts of society. The key architect of 
apartheid Hendrik Verwoerd and the major reformer in post-apartheid 
South Africa Zola Skweyiya both studied in Germany. During the last 
decade of apartheid, external pressure from the global public helped to 
loosen the hold on power of the racist regime.
These multiple external influences interacted in various ways. A syn-
thesis of external influences, combined with domestic ideas and practices, 
may give rise to unique national solutions. The Chinese social assistance 
programme Dibao is a case in point (Leisering et al. 2017). The strength 
of various external influences also varied over time. China was the most 
extreme case among our four countries, switching to Soviet ideology in 
1949 (before, the Communist Party had only been active in some regions) 
and repeatedly changing between external models in the field of old-age 
security during the reform era (Hu 2015, 2016). The conspicuous swings 
in social policy in China after 1978 pinpointed by Shih-Jiunn Shi par-
tially happened in conjunction with swings in references to exter-
nal models.
Second, regarding the multi-layered nature of external influences, we 
found that external influences operated on each of the four layers of the 
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onion skin model, rather than only on the policy level, and that the influ-
ences on the four layers were incongruent in some instances. Some influ-
ences only affected the most general layers—the state’s social responsibility 
and the social question—without necessarily impacting policies or insti-
tutions. In the process, the language of social welfare changed to include 
new terms like “social insurance” and “social security” and, more recently, 
“social inclusion” or “social sustainability”, but related changes in actual 
policies came much later or not at all (“decoupling”). In China, since 
2012, it has worked the other way around. While China has been jetti-
soning references to rights and civil society, distancing itself from key 
“Western” ideas, actual social protection programmes remain largely 
unchanged. Some new social categories have even entered constitutions, 
thereby entrenching the social responsibility of the state. The Brazilian 
Constitutions of 1934 and 1946 reflected socially minded European con-
stitutions, the Chinese constitution of 1946 adopted the term “social 
security”, and, in 2004, even China added human rights to its Constitution 
as well as the aim of establishing a social security system.
All in all, the countries we study in this volume reveal a plethora of 
external influences but talk and action were often decoupled. Countries 
were subject to heterogeneous influences from several senders and in sev-
eral layers of the social. An in-depth study of these types of diffusion 
processes remains a desideratum. Moreover, various influential senders 
that have exerted influence besides the ILO are not analysed in this volume.
 The Social Question in Flux: Diversification 
and Traps
The four countries, except India, have achieved a degree of social protec-
tion coverage over the last hundred years, which ranks them among the 
leaders in the Global South (see Table 1.1 in Chap. 1). For some time, 
Western observers had held the view that India would demonstrate the 
superiority of democracy vis-à-vis communist China. However, around 
1980, China took the lead in economic growth and, from the 2000s, also 
in the field of social protection. Will the four countries further expand 
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their social protection systems, even become welfare states? Or will they 
remain stuck at the current level of social protection—a “middle social 
protection trap”, similar to the much discussed “middle income trap” 
with regard to economic development?9 Or will they even fall back? What 
social questions will be raised?
While Northern welfare states reached “growth to limits” (Flora 1986) 
in the 1980s, covering almost all citizens by all major social services, 
countries in the Global South, even the most advanced ones, are far from 
this state: a restricted range of programmes, patchy coverage, low benefit 
levels, uneven quality of services, weak implementation, and clientelism 
and corruption are all widespread and social spending remains low (see 
Fig. 1.5 in Chap. 1). In the Global South, countries with comprehensive 
and universalistic social service programmes are rare. Few Southern coun-
tries are “proto-welfare state regimes“(including Brazil; see Table 1.1 and 
the discussion in Chap. 1). Only 16 out of 148 Southern countries have 
put in place social cash transfers that provide basic income security for all 
citizens, at least by law (in 2012/13; Leisering 2019: 194), and this 
includes Brazil and China, and South Africa is close (see Table 1.1). Only 
29 per cent of the global population, North and South, are covered by 
social protection programmes in all key areas of protection (ILO 2017: 
168), often with limited benefits. All in all, despite recent extensions, 
Southern social protections remain precarious and moderate at best.
The success model of social protection in the Global North and main 
pathway to universalism, social insurance, remains structurally limited in 
the Global South, due to the large share of informal workers. Breman and 
van der Linden (2014) even see informal work as a global threat that 
increasingly extends to the Global North. Therborn (2019: ix) and 
Breman et al. (2019) see evidence of a new global social question revolv-
ing around multiple forms of precarious labour. Yet, the ILO (2015) 
sticks to the notion of formal employment and seeks to spread it world-
wide, and thereby also social insurance (see historically Seekings 2008). 
The Indian government is increasingly providing social security like 
9 Real GDP per capita declined in Brazil during the 2010s and stagnated in South Africa (see Fig. 
1.3 in Chap. 1).
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maternity allowances and small pensions to informal workers but dis-
jointed from job security.
 “Exclusion/Inclusion”: The New Social Question?
The social question had already started to shift beyond the workers’ ques-
tion in the 1940s, with “social security” as an ideational horizon. South 
Africa had focused on non-workers as early as the 1920s, under the flag 
of the “poor white problem”. Since the 1990s, the social question has 
further moved towards ideas of universalistic “inclusion”. “Inclusion”, 
“inclusiveness”, and “inclusive policies” have become standard terms in 
the global development community’s lexicon (e.g. UN 2018). Yet, the 
potential new social question “exclusion/inclusion” is less distinct than 
the labour question or the land question. “Inclusion” seems to provide an 
open platform that can accommodate a variety of ideas and concepts.
What aspects of the social does “inclusion” address? The concept goes 
beyond the problems of the capitalist labour market and inequalities of 
class, which defined the labour question. The contributors to this volume 
demonstrate that social issues revolve around a range of fundamental 
inequalities besides economic class, including ethnicity/“race”, caste, gen-
der, land ownership, and the urban/rural divide. “Inclusion” is a very 
broad term that would cover all these forms of inequality. However, the 
concept of inclusion extends even further, by highlighting a new facet of 
inequalities. “Inequality” is an abstract and impersonal term, whereas the 
language of exclusion/inclusion is often used to specify who exactly is 
excluded, who excludes, and from what it is that persons are excluded. 
This perspective has particularly been applied to issues of gender, to per-
sons with disabilities, and “vulnerable” persons. The latter term denotes 
diverse groups, such as children, especially handicapped or orphaned 
children, persons with disability, older persons, or women.
There is another usage of “inclusion”, which further differs from 
“inequality”. While addressing social inequalities presupposes a compari-
son of a person’s or group’s position with that of another, pointing out 
deficient inclusion can also refer to socially defined standards, without 
necessarily or primarily involving comparisons. In this sense, inclusion is 
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about enhancement, reflecting the welfare state’s intellectual origins in 
the Enlightenment, especially the idea of the self-perfectibility of man 
(Janowitz 1976). Education and medical services, for example, aim to 
develop citizens’ cognitive and physical capabilities. Amartya Sen (1983) 
links inequality and inclusion to emphasise the absolute core of relative 
poverty, arguing that economic inequalities (or relative poverty) may 
impair inclusion (defined in “absolute” terms of capabilities). Sen’s con-
cept of capabilities is part of this inclusion tradition, as is T. H. Marshall’s 
concept of social citizenship (see Leisering 2019: 51f.).
In collective terms, enhancement may mean raising the general stan-
dard of living in poor countries, that is, tackling collective poverty rather 
than individual poverty or inequality in the first place. This concept of 
enhancement is akin to a developmental notion of welfare, which Drèze 
and Sen (1991: 22) call “growth-mediated security”, which is market- 
driven, in contrast to “support-led security” provided by the state.
Deficiency of inclusion is socially defined. From a constructivist per-
spective, social policy attends to forms of inclusion that political actors 
deem insufficient in view of socially defined standards (Kaufmann 2012: 
153). Marshall (1950: 11) defines the substance of social citizenship in an 
open way by referencing “the standards prevailing in the society”. The 
constructivist understanding opens up the concept of inclusion to a wide 
range of social issues: to diverse kinds of inequality and related exclu-
sions, and to collective enhancement in respect to diverse aspects of liv-
ing. In political terms, the openness of the concept of inclusion may thus 
enable consensus between different stakeholders. However, the openness 
of the forms and standards of inclusion also blurs the social question. 
Diverse interpretations are possible, giving rise to strong or weak, indi-
vidualist or collectivist notions of the social question.10
Some authors see dependence/autonomy as the most fundamental 
social question and the core concern of the welfare state (Vobruba 1997; 
Leisering 2019: 49). Vocalising the social question as exclusion/inclusion 
is indifferent to the question of dependence/autonomy. Dependence/
autonomy reflects an individualistic interpretation of inclusion, which 
10 This is similar to the use of “universalism” by international organisations. “Universalism” belongs 
to the semantic field of “inclusion” and is also vaguely defined (see Leisering 2020).
11 One Hundred Years of Social Protection: The Rise… 
416
would, for example, require “de-familialisation” (Esping-Andersen 1999: 
45) to secure individual autonomy particularly for women and children, 
analogous to and supplementing “decommodification” (Esping-Andersen 
1990) in the labour market. By contrast, conservatives and socialists tend 
to conceive of including persons as members of their families or other 
collectivities, with pre-defined rights and duties, rather than individual 
rights bearers.11 Autonomy would also require de-clientelisation of social 
relationships. Clientelism and patronage is especially widespread in the 
Global South and a major concern for social policymakers (Wood and 
Gough 2006: 1707–1709).
What is the future of the social question if defined as social exclusion/
inclusion? I have distinguished three facets of social questions: “objective” 
socio-economic conditions, the articulation of problematic conditions as 
societal concerns, and welfare institutions set up in response. The first 
and third facets indicate problems that could limit or even halt the fur-
ther extension of social protections in many countries in the Global 
South. I postulate that there are two potential traps: the “residualism 
trap”, which refers to welfare institutions (third facet), and the “inequal-
ity trap”, which refers to socio-economic conditions (first facet).
 The Residualism Trap
Several countries in the Global South, including our four countries, have 
a reasonable amount of economic resources and administrative expertise 
to plan and create substantial welfare institutions. Indicators like educa-
tion, literacy, means of transport, or the use of digital technologies have 
all improved, even in many poorer countries. However, with rising social 
problems and expectations, more resources will be needed. For example, 
health services for all citizens according to the standards of Western and 
Northern European welfare states, or comprehensive social assistance to 
those in need, are currently elusive for Southern countries. In conse-
quence, as long as countries are caught in a middle-income trap, it is 
unlikely they will escape a middle-social protection trap.
11 I owe this distinction to Jeremy Seekings.
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Rising expectations are particularly pronounced among members of 
the middle class who aspire to Northern standards of public welfare, such 
as generous pensions and high-quality health services. However, “inclu-
sion” is often meant to be achieved through universal welfare programmes, 
which tend to provide meagre flat-rate benefits to all citizens, such as 
non-means-tested, non-contributory pensions and low-quality services. 
Such programmes may be appropriate in societies in which most people 
are in or near poverty but tend to be less attractive for the rising middle 
class, who then invest in private provisions. If many members of the mid-
dle class have done so, it might be too late to win them back to state- 
based provisions. As a result, the middle classes’ political support for 
public welfare will dwindle, the fiscal space also for services for the poor 
will shrink, and the universalistic services for the poor will become resid-
ual12—a residualism trap. In addition, demographic ageing might be too 
advanced in some countries, especially in China, to make the case for 
large-scale contributory and earnings-related old-age pensions.
 The Inequality Trap
Economic inequality is extreme in all four countries and has risen mas-
sively in the wake of neoliberal policies since the 1990s (see Fig. 1.4 in 
Chap. 1).13 Social cash transfers to the poor have tangibly reduced extreme 
poverty in many countries but have hardly affected inequality (World 
Bank 2018: 61; for Brazil and South Africa see Barrientos et al. 2013). 
Social protection in general has done little to reduce inequality14 and has 
even produced massive new cleavages (for socialist China see Dillon 
2015). Social inequalities in the four countries have seemingly become 
too exaggerated to be contained by social protection programmes. Social 
12 See Esping-Andersen (1990: 25), Korpi and Palme (1998), and the discussion in Leisering (2019: 
340–343).
13 For inequality and stratification in the four countries, see generally Li et  al. (2013) and 
Frazier (2011).
14 For welfare outcomes of social policies in the BRICS countries, see Maiorano and Manor (2017), 
for the role of employment policies for income inequality see OECD (2010). In a major study of 
the relationship between social protection and inequality, Midgley (2020) revitalises the egalitarian 
claim of social protection.
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protection policies are facing the challenge of switching from “easy redis-
tribution” to “hard redistribution” (Holland and Schneider 2017).
Wulfgramm and Starke (2017) argue that in societies with extreme 
socio-economic inequalities, attempts at more far-reaching redistribution 
can become divisive. Based on data that includes Brazil, South Africa, 
and other middle-income countries, they find (2017: 20f.) that “both 
market inequality and state redistribution have dividing effects on public 
opinion… while the problem of income inequality certainly is driving a 
wedge into societies, the solution of more redistribution may be equally 
divisive from a certain level onwards… for progressive policy advocates in 
advanced welfare states, keeping the primary distribution of incomes in 
check may be preferable to further redistribution in order to avoid a more 
divided public… However, … many of the institutional preconditions of 
egalitarian ‘predistribution’… may be extremely difficult to create and 
sustain in countries without historical precedent”. That is, even if social 
protection policies escaped the residualism trap and achieved hard redis-
tribution, they risk being divisive, not to mention that changes in pri-
mary distribution are beyond the reach of social protection policies.
At this point, we are reminded of the reformist nature of the social 
question concept. Marx scorned the reformist ideas of his time. In his 
1875 Kritik des Gothaer Programms (Critique of the Gotha Programme)—a 
critique of the draft of a programme for a unified social-democratic work-
ers’ party in Germany—Marx criticised the expression “social question” 
as empty journalist talk that suggested a state-led strategy, as opposed to 
class struggle that would bring down capitalism. That is, Marx rightly saw 
the “social question” as the key semantics of the then-emerging reformist 
concept of “social policy”:
the physic of the prophet! … In place of the existing class struggle appears 
a newspaper scribbler’s phrase: ‘the social question’, to the ‘solution’ of which 
one ‘paves the way’. Instead of arising from the revolutionary process of 
transformation of society, the ‘socialist organization of the total labour’ 
‘arises’ from the ‘state aid’ that the state gives to the producers’ co-operative 
societies and which the state, not the workers, ‘calls into being’. It is worthy 
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of Lassalle’s imagination that with state loans one can build a new society 
just as well as a new railway! (Marx 1977: n.p.)15
In fact, social protection policies in the South have left private owner-
ship of the means of production and capital largely untouched. 
Capitalism—more precisely: predatory capitalism and oligarchical rule—
has persisted, most visibly in Brazil and South Africa, or has appeared in 
a new guise in China, combining state capitalism with oligarchical Party 
rule. The earliest form of the social question, the land question, was about 
property, but no thoroughgoing land reform has ever been achieved, 
except for China in the early years after the communist revolution, 
although the reform was dismantled during the era of socialist transition 
(1953–1956) with the agricultural collectivisation, which in turn has 
been tacitly upturned during the era of expanding state capitalism. In 
Brazil, even Duguit’s reformist concept of a “social function of property”, 
despite its prominent place in the constitution, had little substan-
tive impact.
Marx, in the above quote, asserted the limitations of “state aid” for 
workers in the face of the structural constraints of capitalism and pleaded 
for class struggle instead. Pellissery et al. (2015) extend Marx’ argument 
beyond capitalist structures and economic inequalities. They demonstrate 
that both targeted and universalistic social protection policies cannot 
redress the “durable inequalities” of caste in India, but that political par-
ticipation and mobilisation are needed to bring about structural change.
All in all, social protection policies in the four countries might be 
trapped by extreme inequalities and the residualist tendencies of inclusive 
welfare institutions. While reformist social strategies are subject to these 
traps, socialist social protections put in place in China between 1949 and 
1978 are no solution either, since they provided minimal security at best 
15 German original: “ das Heilmittel des Propheten! … An die Stelle des existierenden Klassenkampfs 
tritt eine Zeitungsschreiberphrase—die soziale Frage, deren Lösung man ‘anbahnt’. Statt aus dem 
revolutionären Umwandlungsprozesse der Gesellschaft ‘entsteht’ die ‘sozialistische Organisation 
der Gesamtarbeit’ aus der ‘Staatshilfe’, die der Staat Produktivgenossenschaften gibt, die er, nicht 
der Arbeiter, ins Leben ruft. Es ist dies würdig der Einbildung Lassalles, daß man mit Staatsanlehn 
ebensogut eine neue Gesellschaft bauen kann wie eine neue Eisenbahn!” (Marx 1962: 26).
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in a society characterised by collective poverty.16 Moreover, social protec-
tion in socialist China was highly stratified (Dillon 2015). 
Developmentalist strategies geared to growth-mediated security (be it 
through markets or a socialist command economy) are no cure either; 
they have produced the high levels of inequality in the first place and are 
prone to incur environmental damages with new problems of securing 
livelihoods. Both socialist and unfettered developmentalist strategies fail 
to give adequate attention to the exigencies of social protection.
Since the 2010s, all four countries studied in this volume have had 
radical leaders—Bolsonaro, Modi, Xi Jinping, and Zuma (the latter till 
2018)—who took to nationalist policies, which are, sociologically speak-
ing, a functional equivalent to social policy as means of societal integra-
tion, especially in times of abating economic growth rates.
 Renewing the Social Question
Authors in the Marxist political economy tradition, such as Breman et al. 
(2019) and Therborn (2019), paint a gloomy picture of the future of the 
global social question, focused on the global spread of precarious labour.17 
Nor do the residualism and inequality traps promise a glamorous future.
Yet, when examining the core facet of the social question—the articu-
lation of problematic conditions as societal concerns—a somewhat 
brighter picture emerges. From the angle of neo-institutionalist world 
society theory, Meyer (2009: 199) argues: “the growing list of perceived 
‘social problems’ in the world indicates not the weakness of world- cultural 
institutions but their strength. …. A world with so many widely dis-
cussed social problems is a world of Durkheimian and Simmelian inte-
gration, however much it may also seem driven by disintegrative 
tendencies”. However, do these global perceptions and discussions actu-
ally matter? International organisations operate with a surplus of “social” 
ideas, as Southern countries have also increasingly done since the 1990s. 
16 For the predicaments of socialist social policies in a relatively well-off country, the German 
Democratic Republic (1949–1990), see Schmidt (2013).
17 Interestingly, Therborn (2019: ix) also speaks of “inclusion” as the new social question but con-
ceives of it in narrow labour terms.
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Representations and recognition of social problems and problem groups 
abound, but they are only loosely coupled with actual measures and are 
often phrased in vague terms (see Leisering 2020 for the indistinctive use 
of “universalism” in global debates). However, several studies by Meyer 
and associates and other authors show that international organisations’ 
ideas and models do influence domestic policies, even if only in the long 
run (for social pensions see Böger and Leisering 2020).
Furthermore, global discussions have been broadening, effecting a 
diversification of the social question. Over the last two decades, migra-
tion, climate change, environmental decay, global epidemics, and digi-
talisation have emerged as new (or newly addressed) global phenomena 
that raise issues of exclusion and inclusion. In the process, new ideational 
resources and frames from these “non-social” spheres may revitalise the 
social question. For example, the concept of “sustainability” ties the social 
question to the ecological question, which has a broader constituency 
and more political clout. Hybrid terms like “social sustainability” and 
“social and ecological sustainability”, as addressed in the UN Sustainable 
Development Goals of 2015, redefine the concept of development as well 
as the role of social protection policies. Climate activists, the digital com-
munity, gender-rights advocacy groups, and the disability movement also 
bring new power and ideas to social policies. However, the challenges of 
hard social divisions by race (South Africa, Brazil), caste (India), class, 
and gender (all four countries) remain.
The future seems neither gloomy nor bright, but diverse. Some coun-
tries are pursuing more successful reformist strategies than others. It 
might be that a few Southern countries will build up a generous, well- 
managed, and rights-based architecture of social protections that includes 
all strata of society, based on a culture of publicly addressing the social 
question and a socially responsible state. The common reference to 
“Northern welfare states” obscures that even in the Global North, genu-
ine welfare statism in this cultural sense is largely confined to a few coun-
tries in Western and Northern Europe and the Commonwealth 
(Kaufmann 2013a, c).
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